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Abstract.
Despite wide acknowledgement of the threats from human-induced climate change to 
human societies and the wider ecosystem, no comprehensive long-term global agreement 
to tackle the problem has yet been reached to replace the Kyoto Protocol. In arguing for a 
replacement, evaluative claims are often made that certain policy proposals are more 
environmentally effective, equitable or efficient than others. However, these three dominant 
criteria are subject to a range of interpretations, and can come into conflict with one 
another. This limits their use for guiding policy. Philosophy can and should play a role in 
scrutinising alternative conceptions, their justifications and assumptions, and help develop 
justifiable formulations of the criteria. Existing philosophical contributions have focused 
on aspects of the equity criterion, but have largely overlooked the other two criteria and 
have not considered how they should be prioritised overall. This thesis, for the first time, 
considers and proposes an ordering of these three criteria (focusing on mitigation), drawing 
on a Green Economic conceptual  framework. This places ecological effectiveness first, 
defining the ecological limits of economic greenhouse gas-emitting activity; equity is then 
applied second, to define equitable resource sharing of the emissions space; and efficiency 
last, to imply genuinely efficient use of emissions space in contributing to equitable human 
well-being. The thesis then examines in detail how each criterion should be interpreted 
within this context, so that they are mutually consistent. As well as offering a set of ordered 
evaluative criteria for a climate change mitigation agreement, it aims to highlight the role 
of the conventional political-economic framework in climate policy debates and draw out 
the hidden conceptual and ethical assumptions it imports. This thesis also, therefore, aims 
to further the development of Green Economic thinking and show its relevance to the 
current substantial threat of dangerous anthropogenic climate change.
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Introduction
Despite wide acknowledgement of the threats from human-induced climate change to human 
societies and the wider ecosystem1, no comprehensive long-term2 global agreement to tackle 
the problem has yet been reached. Whilst international wrangling continues over replacing the 
much-criticised Kyoto treaty, global emissions continue to rise3 and recent estimates4  suggest 
that around 350,000 people already die each year as a result of human-induced climatic 
changes5. Against the background of this dire need for collective action, what possible useful 
contribution can be made by philosophy, maligned for its tendency to have “interpreted” the 
world rather than “to change it”?6 
It is my firm belief that philosophy can make an important contribution to the global response 
to this challenge. This contribution is both conceptual and normative. Debates about climate 
policy have, until recently, been dominated by neo-classical economics and frequently invoke 
pseudo-scientific claims7 about the merits of particular policy proposals without questioning 
or, often, even acknowledging the values and assumptions which underlie such judgements8. 
When particular values and principles are invoked at a political level: such as requiring 
1 See e.g. IPCC, 2007c, (Summary for Policymakers); Bailey & Wren-Lewis, 2009; Lister, 2009. Although public 
opinion is variable; US and UK polls in 2010 showed a decrease in public belief in anthropogenic climate change 
(Goldenberg, 2010).
2 The Kyoto protocol extends only to 2012, was never ratified by the United States, and only set binding 
reductions for 37 industrialised countries implying just a 5% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions against 1990 
levels by 2008-2012 if successful. Ongoing negotiations for a replacement agreement have currently only 
resulted in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord and 2010 Cancun Agreements. These simply state the general need for 
“deep cuts in global emissions... to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celcius”(UNFCC, 
2010, 2/CP.15; UNFCC, 2011, 1/CP.16) and have not yet specified particular targets for emission reductions, 
beyond “achieving the peaking of global and national greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible”.
3 IEA estimates reported in the Guardian (Harvey, 2011) placed total carbon dioxide emissions for 2010 at 30.6 
gigatonnes(GT); 1.6GT higher than in 2009.
4 DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2010, p12.  Although impacts of climate change cannot be “linked to 
any specific event”, the report estimates them statistically  “considered an added stress, effect or change”, on 
“pre-existing characteristics of society”.
5 Research for Oxfam also implies that “by 2015 there may be more than a 50 per cent increase” in people 
“affected by climate-related disasters in the average year” compared to the last decade. (Taylor & Schuemer-
Cross, 2009, p25) 
6 Marx, 1845
7 Highlighted by e.g. Padilla, 2004, p532 
8 Brown, 2002, p236
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climate policy to be “on the basis of equity”9 or prevent “danger”10, they can remain largely 
unanalysed, despite being subject to a wide range of interpretation11. Philosophical enquiry can 
contribute through scrutinising competing claims, analysing alternative policy positions, 
identifying ideological points of conflict, their justification and assumptions, and by 
advocating and defending particular proposals. Indeed, this need has not gone unnoticed, and 
philosophical contributions to climate policy debates have grown over the last decade12. 
The particular focus of these contributions has been on alternative principles for equitable 
distribution of burdens in a global climate agreement13, although I do not find the conclusions 
adequate, as I explain in chapter 3. However, philosophical scrutiny has largely overlooked the 
two other significant criteria normally cited alongside equity to guide climate policy. These 
are ‘environmental effectiveness’(which I reconstrue in chapter 1 as ‘ecological 
effectiveness’) and ‘efficiency’(ordinarily understood in terms of ‘cost-minimisation’), and are 
increasingly leaned on as the three key criteria that climate policy proposals should fulfil14. 
These also warrant philosophical engagement, but have not yet received the same attention as 
equity15. Therefore, a central aim of my thesis is to distinguish and critique possible 
interpretations of these three criteria, and offer an understanding for each which should be 
used to guide and evaluate climate policy proposals.
9 UNFCC, 2011, 1/CP.16, Section 1.4.
10 E.g. UNFCC, 2010, 2/CP.15, section 1 refers to preventing “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system”.
11 Whilst I disagree with Hulme in his largely relativist approach to controversy over such interpretations (see 
chapter 2, section 1), he is right in highlighting that they should be explicitly analysed and considered. See 
Hulme, 2009, passim.
12 Most notably Donald Brown, Stephen Gardiner, Simon Caney and Ed Page. However, this has yet to be 
accommodated into IPCC reports.
13 E.g. Page, 2008; Caney, 2005.
14 E.g. Stern (2008, p4), highlights “Effectiveness”, “Efficiency”, and “Equity” as “three basic principles” for 
global policy on climate change. Similarly Agarwal (2002, p386), requires “ecological effectiveness”, “economic 
effectiveness”, and that policy solutions be “socially just and equitable”.
15 Although aspects of them have received some, through debates surrounding intergenerational justice (Caney, 
2008), discounting (Padilla, 2004) and criticism of climate change policy's reliance on cost-benefit analysis 
(Brown, 2002).
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Yet these three criteria cannot be considered as wholly independent. For, as I consider in 
chapter 1, section 0.1, they can conflict. How such trade-offs should be approached is at least 
as significant for policy as how each criterion is singly interpreted. Analysis is, therefore, also 
needed of how they might be prioritised or, alternatively, as I pursue in chapter 1, how the 
criteria might be framed so as to be mutually consistent. Any  framework to guide 
international climate policy on dangerous anthropogenic climate change (henceforth DACC16) 
will involve exploration of the structure of the problem. Although, therefore, the ultimate goal 
of this thesis is to examine interpretations of the three central criteria for an agreement, this is 
set within the context of developing a particular conceptual approach, which I apply as a 
framework to the problem of DACC in chapter 1. 
As such, Chapter 1 partially operates as an extended introduction. It sets up the theoretical 
background to the thesis by elucidating the role of economic conceptual and ethical 
frameworks in understanding both the problem of DACC and the three main criteria for an 
international agreement designed to resolve it.  In particular, I critique the conventional 
economic description of DACC as a ‘tragedy of the commons’, a view implying that man-
made climate change is an inevitable result of the common resource nature of the atmosphere. 
I argue, rather, that the “tragedy” results from an economic perspective which treats the 
ecosystems and other public goods as ‘externalities’. I then consider an alternative, Green 
Economic approach to the problem, building on Herman Daly’s reconceptualisation of the 
economy-ecosystem relationship that underlies much green economic thinking, and which 
pictures the economy and society as subsystems of ecosystems. I argue that the three criteria 
for a climate agreement - ecological effectiveness, equity and efficiency - emerge in this 
particular order from this conceptual approach. This ordering is not, however, a 
straightforward prioritisation, but what I have termed ‘ethico-conceptual’; each is defined 
within the context of and in terms of the former, which are  preconditions of the latter (If this 
appears somewhat abstract here, the reader will, I hope, be helped by the examination in 
16 I have chosen this term for clarity rather than “global warming” or “climate change”, and because the 
“dangerous anthropogenic” prefix takes on board concerns that the move from “global warming” to “climate 
change” was a political attempt to sanitise the phenomenon (Poole, 2006).
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section 2.2). It is within the context of this ordering that I consider  interpretations of each of 
the criteria in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2 examines ecological effectiveness, the first of the ordered criteria, which defines the 
ecological emissions space within which the equity and efficiency criteria can be applied. I 
consider the standards by which a mitigation agreement is judged ecologically effective; how 
it should define global emissions limits in terms of the “danger” to be prevented in DACC. 
This divides into two main aspects, covered by parts A and B of the chapter. The first 
concerns the particular outcomes that should be prevented and possible justifications for their 
prevention. I argue that the relevant harms threatened by DACC are to the ecological 
conditions of functioning and flourishing of future generations and, more originally, that both 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric views will coincide on when these occur. I argue 
further that in seeking to prevent such harms, costs to current generations should not be taken 
into account through straightforward intergenerational burden or resource distribution, but in 
terms of how they transform our current societies and their ecological pre-conditions as they 
evolve into future forms. The second part of chapter 2 considers how we should respond to 
uncertainties over the emissions levels at which these outcomes occur. I argue for a particular 
interpretation of the precautionary principle which understands them as uncertainties rather 
than risks that can be straightforwardly absorbed into conventional cost-benefit calculations.
Chapter 3 examines the criterion of equity within the context of the limits defined by chapter 
2. I examine four possible conceptions of equity17 which could be used to determine an 
equitable distribution of emissions allowances between countries18. These are: Comparable 
Effort; Equal Allowances; Capacity and Basic Needs. I draw on philosophical literature on 
equality and distributive justice, which has only recently begun to be applied to the climate 
change debate19. I argue that whilst equal (per capita) allowances may seem an intuitively 
equitable principle, it does not allow for existing inequalities in wealth – and welfare- between 
17 As identified by Ashton and Wang, 2003
18 I use the terms “non-industrialised”/ ”industrialised” or “poorer”/”richer” countries throughout the thesis rather 
than “developing”/”developed”, which I regard as somewhat patronising.
19 E.g. by Page, 2008; Starkey, 2008
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countries. I therefore argue in favour of a Capacity principle, understood from the perspective 
of equality of objective welfare. Although a 'Basic Needs’ principle might also seem to offer a 
prioritarian alternative, I argue that it either collapses back into a principle of ‘Capacity’ and 
stricter egalitarianism, or fails to account for relative poverty. Elsewhere20 I have argued that a 
fifth principle, 'Historical Responsibility' is only equitable in so far as it is contingently linked 
to Capacity.
Chapter 4 considers the final criterion: efficiency. I explain limitations in conventional 
economic definitions of efficiency which mean that it risks undermining or replacing both 
ecological effectiveness and equity. I consider an alternative approach implied by Herman 
Daly’s understanding of allocative efficiency which views it as operating only within the 
limits of the first two criteria. I examine carbon trading as the paradigm case for this approach. 
However, drawing on critiques of carbon markets, I argue that this conception of efficiency 
still retains a narrow economic imperative which threatens nonetheless to work against the 
apparent limits of its operation and undermine ecological effectiveness and equity. I propose 
an alternative conception, drawn initially from Schumacher and Daly’s general concept of 
efficiency, that defines efficiency directly in terms of ecological effectiveness and equity 
rather than acting as a competing value which requires restraint.
Suggesting that these criteria should be used to evaluate policy proposals might be said to be 
more idealistic than pragmatic. However, what is deemed pragmatically possible is largely 
grounded in the dominant political and economic ideologies of the day21 . One’s perception of 
the limitations on possibility will depend on which beliefs and practices are held as 
fundamental and which are susceptible to change. Human societies, unlike the physical world, 
are not guided by fixed laws - rather, reflection on them can alter their operation in turn22. 
20 Makoff, 2011
21 Whilst ultimately limited by some physical constraints e.g. to build renewable technologies , possibilities are 
largely dependent on political will - for example, if all resources were diverted to an effort on the scale of 
mobilisation during WWII, then achieving quicker, deeper structural changes could be more feasible (Simms, 
2011)
22 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p93, on how the economic model “influences actual behaviour away from community-
regarding patterns towards selfish ones”.
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Hence Maurice Strong23 has lamented how the economic rhetoric surrounding DACC 
reminded him “of the clamor surrounding earlier fundamental changes in the way business 
was done – that is the movements to abolish the slave trade and later child labor. Then, as 
well, the dominant economic ethos of the times clashed with a new moral and ethical 
responsibility”. So, whilst there is an important role for some policy research to be based on 
the assumed constraints of current political limitations, there is also a vital role for thinking 
about policy in a way that tests and alters these limits, opening new possibilities24.
Accordingly, this thesis attempts to set out a conception of the ideal standard towards which 
climate policy should be shifted, as far as possible25. But as others have argued26, there is also 
a  pragmatic reason for ethical debate on climate policy. In global climate negotiations still 
dominated by power clashes and short-term national interests, broader principles which can be 
mutually respected are needed to underpin and drive forward climate policy and foster 
agreement. The dialogue must be shifted towards finding ethically-guided common aims 
which define concrete policy and away from simply aggregating the minimal commitments 
which individual nations currently feel they are separately prepared to sacrifice27. The latter 
has continued to describe much of the negotiations at the recent climate talks in Cancun, 2010, 
where, as one WWF campaigner has described, “They say that they want 2C, the pledges 
don’t get to 2C. It is like the emperor has no clothes”28.
23 Former under-secretary general of the U.N., cited in Brown, 2002, p239.
24 This is somewhat analogous to Baker's interpretation of Wittgenstein, that the primary task of philosophising is 
to create new possibilities or awareness of alternative possibilities. That philosophers are in the grip of pictures 
and by recognising this are no longer constrained by them, but can entertain the possibilities of others (see 
Hutchinson and Read, 2008, section II).
25 And, given what I have said about possibilities, the phrase “as far as possible” cannot be determined 
objectively and in advance but is created depending on how far people - politicians, economists, campaigners, 
government advisers and the wider public – can create and be influenced by them. See also chapter 2 section 4.4, 
where I discuss this further.
26 E.g. Meyer, who argues that “equity is survival” (Meyer, 2000, p17) since equity is needed to gain support 
from low-income, low-emitting countries who will resent further reductions whilst richer countries’ are still far 
higher. Baer et al argue similarly in Baer et al, 2008, p28.
27 I.e. it must move from being a “political science problem”, to “an ethical problem”, Baer, 2002, p394-5.
28 Lou Leonard, quoted by Black, 2010.
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This is not to suggest that philosophical enquiry alone will resolve the global impasse or offer 
a mythical neutral path forward. But it can contribute arguments for defensible solutions, and 
offer conceptual and ethical tools to guide the content of debates. It can question the 
robustness and integrity of assertions that particular policy solutions are more justifiable than 
others. It can help formulate ethical criteria underlying such claims, draw out ethically 
relevant differences between policy proposals and strengthen or discredit grounds for the 
arguments of campaigners and policy advocates. And, as I argue in chapter 1, it can help to 
remove misconceptions, in particular, of conventional economics, which can blinker our 
collective vision away from more radical and very possible solutions. 
The potential contribution of philosophy to climate change is therefore wider than might be 
supposed. The questions I consider move beyond the domain of conventional ethics and 
moral/political philosophy. They also demand reflection on our relationship with the wider 
ecosystem – how it is and how it should be – and, as I argue in chapter 1, on the constraints 
this places on human socio-economy, which have been transgressed in the case of DACC. 
This involves the relatively newer domain of environmental philosophy but additionally, 
perhaps less obviously, philosophy of science and of economics. Because such reflection 
involves challenging ontological assumptions about how our social, economic and ecosytemic 
environment are constituted, assumptions which frame different analyses of the causes of the 
threat of human-induced climate change, and which in turn influence the solutions proposed29. 
It is worth clarifying my methodology. Although I draw from particular conceptual and ethical 
approaches, including green economic philosophy and radical egalitarian positions, I do not 
claim to develop a theory of the problem of DACC or how it should be addressed: at least not 
in the sense in which theory is understood within science. This is partly because it does not 
seem meaningful to invoke theory for questions of human action, analogously to the use of 
theory in the physical sciences.30 Here I roughly follow Winch, who considers that one cannot 
29 This in turn, reflects back on traditional moral/political philosophy. We should ask, as Daly has of economics, 
“What insights can we gain from traditional [morality]? What mistakes must we correct?”. Daly, 1997, p61
30 Where, i.e. analysis involves “methodological or substantive reductionism, Hutchinson et al, 2008, p3.
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understand society or its operation as in scientific study by abstracting and generalising from 
it31. The objects of study are people, with meaningful, rule-governed behaviour32; “A man's 
social relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about reality”33. To understand a 
society, one therefore has to understand its particular ideas, such that “the understanding of a 
human society is closely connected with the activities of the philosopher.”34 . Read has 
expressed this more recently with regards to economics: “there is no ‘just stating’ the laws or 
facts of Economics. Every economic or political move, including the moving of stating the 
alleged facts or laws affects ‘the’ laws/facts... the very ‘laws’ themselves  are thoroughly 
reflexive and utterly historical”3536. The point here is not that we cannot analyse and 
understand behaviour in social science; rather that the term 'theorising' does not appropriately 
describe the activity.
 
Likewise, the notion of ethical theory in morality is misleading. Ethical theories seek to 
capture and systematise our moral instincts about a situation.  Rawls famously describes this 
using the idea of ‘reflective equilibrium’37, where an ethical theory attempts to provide an 
account (expressed through “regulative principles”38) of our moral instincts, which can in turn 
be altered to conform with the theory, and so on, until theory “matches” our judgements in 
“reflective equilibrium”. But in this case, it therefore appears misleading to describe this 
process as one of moral ‘theorising’. Because, as Rawls acknowledges but does not thereby 
find telling, moral instincts are not, as “with physics”39 fixed like the initial data and 
observations from which we generalise, but are themselves altered and shaped by ethical 
reflection on possible “regulative principles”. 
31 Winch, 1990, p66-71
32 Winch, 1990, p50
33 Winch, 1990, p23
34 Winch, 1990, p91
35 Read 2007a, p318. 
36 Daly and Cobb offer a similar critique of the misleading abstractions of neo-classical economics and the 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness” (Daly & Cobb, 1990, p35-43.). See chapter 1, section 2.2.
37 Rawls, 1972, p48
38 Rawls, 1972, p49
39 Rawls, 1972, p49
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Let me explain by considering this process of moral reflection in more detail. I understand 
‘moral instincts’ as one’s various beliefs about how to act in particular scenarios. These beliefs 
may or may not be consistent with one another, they can change over time after discussion or 
reflection that emphasise particular principles, and are themselves the result of previous 
reflection. For example, should Jim arrive at a lakeside to find the oft-mentioned drowning 
child, his moral instincts may plausibly40 be to swim to save the child, and/or to encourage the 
child to save itself through shouting encouragement, thus ‘empowering’ it, and/or that the 
child should take responsibility for its own actions in unadvisedly swimming alone in a deep 
lake. Consideration of particular regulative principles may justify particular instincts over 
others, for example: ‘if you have the ability to prevent death/suffering, you should do so” or 
“people should take responsibility for their own actions”. Being torn between them, he may 
proceed to consider other similar situations in which each principle might be applied: do one’s 
instincts here likewise suggest that the principle will be supported? For example, supposing he 
favours the latter principle. Considering a scenario where the child were his own, were much 
younger or had been coerced by others may lead to refinements of the principle, or its 
abandonment and possibly (I would hope, in this case) revision of his instincts in the initial 
scenario. 
This process depends on appealing to particular scenarios where one’s moral instincts are 
particularly strong or uncontentious and using these as analogies for others that are similarly 
structured, but more ambiguous. One’s guiding regulative principles that are considered and 
employed in this process thereby depend on the features of these clearer cases, which become 
a model from which to operate. That is to say, alongside Lakoff and Johnson, that morality is 
ultimately “structured metaphorically”, and moral ‘theories’ employ distinct conceptual 
metaphors41 to refine our moral instincts in particular ways. Different moral metaphors can be 
employed in particular ethical cases, drawing out different kinds of features of the situation. 
40Although this is not to suggest that I find all of these possible beliefs morally palatable or justifiable, they are 
merely examples of plausible moral feelings some people may have.
41 Lakoff and Johnson , 1999, p290 (see chapter  14, “Morality”). I do not discuss the particular metaphors that 
they believe to constitute moral concepts but agree that “our moral understanding is thoroughly metaphoric” 
(p292). 
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For example, in the case of the drowning child above, one might varyingly conceptualise the 
relationship between the child and Jim as victim and rescuer, as student and teacher, or (albeit 
exceedingly harshly!) as miscreant and disciplinarian. 
Not all may be argued to be appropriate or ultimately justifiable (as I expand on shortly), but 
they sometimes may be, depending on the particular circumstances42, and can imply different 
actions either singly or in combination. To take an example from this thesis, I examine in 
chapter 2 section 2 how the “intergenerational equity” metaphor understands intergenerational 
obligations in terms of an equitable distribution between two spatially distinct groups, in 
contrast to a distinct, developmental metaphor, and consider how both metaphors should 
contribute to our obligations in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
This is where the term 'theory' is misleading; it implies the possibility of a full and final moral 
description of human action and a set of principles which can and should be turned to in 
advance of any particular case. My concern here is similar to Graham Smith’s criticism of the 
“ethical monism” prevalent in mainstream moral philosophy, that “Within both the broader 
field of moral philosophy and environmental ethics itself, the defence and refutation of 
competing systematic theories is one of the principal preoccupations, carried out in the belief 
that we will eventually discover irrefutable arguments in favour of one particular theoretical 
approach, whether Kantian, utilitarian, neo-Aristotelian or whatever... Much time is spent by 
proponents refining theories to account for particularly obscure possibilities and to create an 
ethical theory which can deal with all potential situations.”.43 Whilst some writers do seem to 
distance themselves from such a picture, and acknowledge the limits of ethical theorising and 
42 For example, whilst I imagine few in the case above would hold moral instincts to ignore the child and teach it 
a lesson, but suppose the child is not drowning but has armbands and is simply stuck in the middle of the lake – 
wet and miserable but not at risk of long-term physical harm. Perhaps the child does this on a regular basis, is at 
constant risk to himself and will continue to do so unless he has the opportunity to experience the consequences 
of his actions.
43 Smith, 2003, p19. Desjardins hints at a similar kind of scepticism about the role of moral theory “as providing 
the same general type of practical guidance as science and technology”. Whilst, he argues, “many philosophers... 
believe that the role of ethics is to provide a general principle or theory that can be applied in specific cases and 
from which we can deduce specific practical conclusions” and that “ethics is capable of offering the same kind of 
objective and unambiguous conclusions as science.”, he warns that “Ethical issues of any type... are seldom open 
to such unambiguous resolution. The world is not as simple as we might like it to be.” (Desjardins, 2006, p14).  
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the ultimate ambiguity in concrete ethical issues, they often still understand themselves as 
engaged in the process of theorising, and consider and evaluate moral theories as competing 
theories44.  I suggest that such “ethical monism” ignores those metaphors emphasised in other 
ethical 'theories' and the moral dimensions of a situation that they highlight, which may also 
sometimes be relevant and justifiable. 
Similarly Lakoff & Johnson argue that “The traditional view of moral concepts and reasoning 
is predicated on denying that our moral concepts are metaphoric”, but “we do not, and cannot, 
have... some metaphor-free way of conceptualizing abstract moral concepts or entire moral 
positions... we do not have a monolithic, homogeneous, consistent set of moral concepts”45. 
My understanding of morality as metaphorical is different, therefore, from (for example) the 
Kantian view of morality along foundationalist lines. For Kant, one can rationally derive a 
universal moral law, the Categorical Imperative, and further moral rules from its various 
formulations to regulate one’s behaviour. These are universal not just in the sense of applying 
to any and every rational agent, but also in the sense of duties that govern any and every 
situation. This paints rationality as a neutral form of argument, embodying metaphors of law 
to conceptualise “laws of freedom”46 and “duty” as a motive distinct from “inclination”47. 
However, I should not be taken merely as arguing for pluralism per se, if, as Wenz implies, it 
is conceived as offering some form of “pluralistic theory”48, or the acceptance of multiple 
monistic “theories”49. Rather, I am advocating what might be called an ‘open pluralism’50, in 
that none of these ‘theories’ can be understood as self-enclosed systems that wholly capture 
moral phenomena, in the way they normally strive for. Metaphors from different ‘theories’ can 
44 For example, Jamieson reminds us that “All... theories have strengths and weaknesses, and at some point all of 
them exact a price that some people are not willing to pay. Rather than viewing them as finished objects that 
should be either worshiped or condemned, these families of theories should be seen as ongoing research 
projects.”. But this still implies the possibility of ultimate success that was criticised by Smith.
45 Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p330
46 Kant, 1993, p53
47Kant, 1993, p64
48 Wenz, 1993, p62 and p69.
49 Ibid., p65
50 Thanks to Tom Greaves for this suggested terminology
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be combined and contrasted in the process of moral reflection on different kinds of scenarios 
to give new and unexpected insights. 
This is not to suggest that any metaphor may be appropriate or valid in every situation51, or to 
take a morally relativist stance. We can still argue in each case for/against particular 
metaphors as better or worse ways of morally framing a scenario. This is not to match them to 
real-world moral 'facts', since truth and falsity are not the particular determinants of morality 
(although they may play a role in components of ethical disagreements, e.g. misrepresentation 
of scientific understanding on climate change which can and should be challenged). Rather, 
some may be unjustifiable because they are e.g. uncaring (such as the intergenerational equity 
metaphor52), too crude (such as game theoretical analysis of commons tragedies53), or, self-
contradictory (tradeable permits as a model of ‘embedded’ efficiency54)55. 
Yet neither is this to suggest that we should act purely instinctively and unreflectively, or that 
we should not consider and employ particular ethical principles to guide actions. We can and 
should.  But these are not abstracted, law-like generalisations; one has to decide which apply 
in particular cases. One cannot avoid the case-by-case nature of ethical thinking, and which 
principles apply will depend on which metaphors are employed in morally describing the 
features of that case. What is typically understood as moral ‘theorising’ should be recognised 
as developing and considering the applicability of particular moral metaphors for different 
scenarios. And, the role of such moral ‘theory/ies’ in particular, concrete cases - such as, here, 
for DACC and the three criteria for climate mitigation policy – is to examine how far different 
moral metaphors and models from purported ethical theories compare to/ are appropriate to 
that concrete case. How far, that is, they frame the issues of the case in useful ways: whether 
they share any relevant moral features, whether they ignore others (which might be 
highlighted by distinct metaphors) or whether they are consistent. I use these not to form the 
51After all, many metaphors conflict (see e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999, p330). 
52 Chapter 2, section 2.3
53 Chapter 1, section 2
54 Chapter 4, section 2.2.
55 See Bernstein, 1983 who explores how we can move beyond the “Cartesian Anxiety” that underlies the 
objectivist/relativist dilemma through reconceiving it as primarily a practical question (p222).
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basis of a new theory (since this I hold this to be a misleading endeavour), but to reflect on and 
criticise various existing positions, values and principles, and develop others, to advocate an 
interpretation of the three criteria which I think is justified.  
In arguing for the appropriateness of particular moral metaphors to this or any case, there will 
be disagreement. I want to emphasise again that this does not imply that all views on the 
matter are equally valid: I hold and believe that the approaches I advocate in this thesis are, 
roughly, how the matter of DACC should be understood and acted on, and that the actions of 
others should conform to this. Of course, those taking opposing views will disagree, and 
accordingly, will not perceive the approach and principles that I am advocating as applying to 
their actions (and vice versa). There is nothing neutral or external to these positions to which I 
can point to ultimately confirm my own position, or they to theirs. But this does not mean that 
both views are equally appropriate: we can seek to persuade each other through dialogue; 
perhaps I might try to relate my arguments to beliefs we hold in common, or draw attention to 
implications of their approach which they would reject in a similar case. This may or may not 
be successful, but this is the only route available, and so is the one I pursue here.
Lastly, some caveats on scope. First, I 'assume' in this thesis both that climate science is 
correct about the phenomenon of DACC56, and that the problem needs to be tackled through 
mitigation57.  Secondly, the thesis focuses almost exclusively on policy for climate mitigation, 
that is, the reduction of emissions levels so as to prevent some degree of DACC, rather than 
adaptation to the effects of DACC. Both are unfortunately now necessary58 and are also inter-
related since decisions as to mitigation efforts may affect adaptation measures and vice 
versa59. In addition, there are many other complex and important aspects of both mitigation 
56 I.e. that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions can alter and are altering climatic systems. See also appendix 
2, section 1 on “theoretical uncertainty”.
57 I.e. that the changes to climatic systems are significant and will, at some level, cause harms (although these 
need to be defined), though  see chapter 2, part B, section 3.1, for why it is inappropriate to require certainty 
before taking action 
58 We are already committed to some DACC and are already experiencing its effects – see chapter 2, part A.
59 This may include, for example, the amount of money spent on each or the kinds of measures taken to tackle 
them, which may or may not complement one another.
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and adaptation joint action which I do not explicitly discuss here, such as technology transfer, 
the creation and control of a climate finance fund and how to account for and reduce 
deforestation and maintain other atmospheric sinks which will affect the impact of emissions 
levels60. However, some focus is necessary to do justice to the questions being considered. So 
for simplicity I concentrate on criteria for the reduction of overall emissions levels and their 
distribution between countries. I envisage that the discussions could be somewhat similarly 
applicable to those other issues, but would need careful and separate consideration. I also 
consider policy at an international rather than national or community level, although all are 
vital in moving away from a fossil-fuel based economy and society61.  Finally, there are of 
course ethical and political concerns other than the three main criteria discussed here which 
may also be relevant to international policy on climate mitigation. These include concerns of 
national sovereignty, liberty, flexibility62 and participation and compliance63. Although I touch 
on some other issues, e.g. political feasibility64, I have chosen to focus on the three dominant 
criteria in climate policy debates which have alone generated sufficient controversy but 
received inadequate attention.
Science alone is insufficient to deal with these questions: philosophy needs to broaden its 
engagement in DACC, to help guide us, alongside other disciplines, through the climate crisis 
and the controversies that emerge along the way. This thesis contributes much-needed work to 
this task, by tackling some of the central principles – and the connections between them - 
around global mitigation policy in a thorough and unified way, for the first time.
60 E.g. the “REDD” (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) proposals. See  Lang, 
2009.
61 An international agreement is needed to provide the legal framework for coordinating global efforts and 
ensuring all countries participate: otherwise reductions in one country may be undermined by increases in others. 
But national and local action is equally necessary to produce the cultural, community and structural 
transformations needed to make deep emissions reductions, so that changes are locally appropriate and involve all 
sections of society.
62 Aldy et al, 2003
63 Ibid.
64 See chapter 2, part A, 2.4, and see Kraus, 2009 who considers political acceptability and feasibility as criteria
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Chapter 1 - Three criteria for an agreement – conflicts and priorities.
A: Introduction
0.1 Introduction to the three criteria
Since the IPCC’s first assessment report in 1990 which formally identified that human-
induced climate change posed a significant global threat, there has been ongoing political 
and academic debate as to how an international mitigation agreement should tackle it. The 
1992 UNFCC treaty1 provided the broad guidelines for countries to collectively limit and 
reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) so as to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”2. But only the 1997 Kyoto Protocol provided for binding 
emissions reductions, and this has been widely criticised3, was never signed by the one of 
the world’s largest emitters, the United States, and expires in 2012. In the fierce debates 
over the past two decades over formulating both this initial Kyoto agreement as well as its 
successor, a wide range of policy proposals have been mooted4. Writers have attempted to 
justify, compare and evaluate these proposals using a variety of principles, but have 
increasingly focused on three particular criteria. These are that the agreement should be (a) 
environmentally or ecologically effective5, that it should be (b) efficient and that it should 
be (c) equitable6. Whilst these are not the only ones to be described as necessary7, they are 
the most commonplace to be applied in various combinations8 and roughly reflect the three 
goals of sustainability literature9.
1 The treaty came into force in 1994.
2 UNFCC, 1994, Article 2.
3 Criticisms include: the exclusion of developing countries from binding targets (Soroos, 1998, p33); the 
flexibility mechanisms (See e.g. Brown 2002, p190-200; Lohmann, 2008a, 2008b & 2009); allowing carbon 
sinks to count towards targets (Gardiner, 2004, p25); the inadequacy of the reductions it aims for and 
pessimism over their being met (Gardiner, 2004, p34-36). 
4 See e.g. Kuik et al, 2008; Aldy et al, 2003, or Baer & Athanasiou, 2007 for an overview. 
5 See below for the distinction.
6 I use letters for the time being so as not at this point to imply any particular ordering or priority, which will 
be discussed shortly.
7 Aldy et al, 2003, use: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost-effectiveness, equity, flexibility in 
the presence of new information and participation and compliance. 
8 Stern, 2008, uses effectiveness, efficiency and equity; Agarwal, 2002, p386, requires three criteria, 
“ecological effectiveness”, “economic effectiveness”, and “socially just and equitable” policy solutions. 
Much debate focuses on the “efficiency-equity trade-off”, e.g. Shukla, 2005.
9 E.g. Edwards, 2005, p20 
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These criteria are vital to navigate between competing proposals and particular interests 
and move towards a justifiable global policy on DACC; but since there is little explicit 
debate on how each of the criteria should be interpreted, they can be stretched so widely as 
to lose their normative force. For this reason, I argue for particular interpretations of each 
in chapters 2-4. Equally important, however, is the priority of the criteria, since, in the 
event of a conflict between them, this could have significantly different policy 
implications. Establishing such an ordering is, therefore, the purpose of this chapter. 
First, however, the criteria can be loosely outlined for the purposes of the current 
discussion. Environmental or ecological effectiveness can generally refer to the 
effectiveness of an agreement in lowering anthropogenic emissions to prevent “dangerous 
anthropogenic interference in the climate”10. In policy terms, its formulation will largely 
affect the size of emissions reductions, yearly global emissions trajectory or budget that is 
decided on. For example, interpretations may vary over the degree of effectiveness 
required (e.g. what global temperature rise should be prevented), how this is justified 
(whether through particular impacts on human societies or non-human considerations)11 as 
well as how risk and uncertainty should be accounted for, since particular policies for 
emissions trajectories cannot guarantee any particular temperature rise12. I henceforth 
describe the criterion as “ecological” rather than “environmental” effectiveness, because, 
as argued in Part C of this chapter (and summarised in section 0.3 below), the Green 
Economic perspective that I adopt is built on a recognition of the rest of nature as 
'ecosystem(s)' that human society is a part of, rather than an 'environment' that is outside of 
or beyond us13
Efficiency tends to refer to economic efficiency; either pareto-efficiency, or, more 
generally, minimising the costs / maximising the cost-effectiveness of climate policy14. As 
I discuss in chapter 4, this could mean minimising the costs of achieving particular 
emissions reductions, or minimising overall costs of climate policy (i.e. also determining 
emission reduction levels). Which is held depends in part on whether efficiency is seen as a 
10 UNFCC, 1994, Article 2.
11 See chapter 2 part A
12 See chapter 2, part B.
13 That is: Green Economics embraces “ecologism” rather than “environmentalism”, outlined by Dobson, 
2002, p2.
14 Although this latter is not always what is meant by “economic efficiency” within the discipline of 
economics, it has been understood in this way by many climate policy writers as I explain in chapter 4.
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substitute for ecological effectiveness, as I discuss in chapter 4, sections 1.2 and 2.1. I 
suggest a further, preferable approach to efficiency in chapter 4, but for now assume 
roughly the conventional understanding. 
The equity criterion seeks to ensure the distribution of the burdens from mitigation15 is 
equitable, between (or within) countries. This is often understood in relation to the UNFCC 
guidance that climate change policy should be “on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”16, i.e. 
taking into account countries’ different circumstances, although which are relevant here 
(and how) is subject to debate (see chapter 3). In policy terms, this relates to the 
distribution of emissions entitlements or reductions for each country, and/or the costs of 
mitigative effort. Equity can on occasion refer to inter-generational equity, but I have 
chosen to consider this within the realm of Ecological Effectiveness since it constitutes a 
means of judging the effectiveness of an agreement (i.e. the impacts of different climate 
change policies on future generations) and restrict the equity criterion to the intra-
generational domain.
As suggested, these criteria can conflict with one another, depending on their 
interpretation. Policy proposals invariably meet each criterion to different degrees, and 
there is frequently understood to be a policy ‘trade-off’ between two or more of them17. 
However, there is very little rigorous consideration of how to approach such cases; how, 
that is, the criteria should be explicitly ordered or prioritised. Yet without committing to 
this, these criteria will be a blunt instrument for guiding climate policy, since a wide range 
of alternatives will seem equally justifiable. One of the clearest, (though somewhat 
simplistic) examples is of the (major) difference between international carbon tax 
compared to tradable rationed permits, ‘cap and trade’. Both aim to provide emissions 
reductions as well as economic efficiency in terms of minimising cost. However, as is well 
noted in the literature, they differ in how far they succeed in meeting these criteria. An 
international carbon tax controls price by taxing carbon dioxide (CO2) emitting activities, 
giving firms more predictability for their investments, but without guaranteeing what 
emissions reductions will be achieved. For this depends on the behaviour of firms and 
individuals in responding to the price rises. A ‘cap and trade’ system, by contrast, controls 
15 And/or adaptation, but I do not consider this here.
16 UNFCC, 1994, Article 3.
17 E.g. Aldy et al, 2003, p394
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the amount of CO2 emitted since global emissions are ‘capped’ and divided into permits 
which are distributed amongst countries, firms, or individuals, and can then be traded. But 
here, the price cannot be predicted exactly, since it depends, amongst other things, on the 
behaviour of permit holders – how many want to sell or buy extra permits. This risks costs 
being significantly higher. 
As Goulder and Nadreau have suggested more explicitly, in this example we are faced with 
two alternative uncertainties – of quantity of emissions under an international carbon tax, 
or price under cap and trade. “Which uncertainty is worse?” they ask, concluding, “There 
is no easy answer”18.  However, an answer can be given if we are clear about how we order 
the criteria and our justifications for doing so. 
0.2 Aubrey Meyer’s “prioritized” priorities.
The only attempt at such an ordering apparently made to date is by Aubrey Meyer, founder 
of the “Contraction and Convergence” (C & C) proposal. C & C was one of the first major 
policy proposals aiming to offer an ethically sound international approach to mitigating 
climate change. In common with many other broadly ethical analyses of climate change as 
an international challenge, it supposed a criterion of equity, but tried to place this within 
the context of other criteria (referred to as “priorities”), which, ordered according to 
importance, should ground an agreement on climate change.  These were 1) Precaution, 2) 
Equity and 3) Efficiency, which, if followed, are supposed to give rise to 4) - “ten thousand 
things”19. However, 1 to 3 are all that are significant for our purposes for the time being, 
since 4 largely signifies that “sustainable prosperity”20 can only be reached by adhering to 
criteria 1 to 3 in that order21. 
These roughly correlate to the three main evaluative criteria I have been describing, except 
that “precaution” refers to a narrower aspect of ecological effectiveness22. It assumes that 
18 Goulder and Nadreau, 2002, p134  
19 Meyer, 2000, p33
20 Ibid.
21 4 could therefore be seen as the value basis underlying the order of 1-3 for Meyer– i.e. the (broadly 
anthropocentric) furthering of human prosperity, although, as I argue in appendix 2, there seems very little 
difference in practice between ecologically anthropocentric and ecocentric positions on DACC.
22 See chapter 2, introduction.
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we are already clear about what constitutes “danger” in terms of climatic change23.  Whilst 
for Meyer ‘precaution’ performs largely the same function as ‘ecological effectiveness’ in 
my own analysis (i.e. requiring limits on total GHG emissions), I retain “ecological 
effectiveness” because “precaution” is, I think, too narrow24. For example, ‘precaution’ can 
be misleadingly applied to suggest taking a precautionary approach to our economic 
system and not taking the ‘risk’ of reducing emissions, rather than to imply a precautionary 
approach to climatic systems, as Meyer intends it. We need to more explicitly defend  why 
the danger to climatic systems should take ethical priority, and ‘precaution’ alone does not 
express this.
However, to set this aside for the moment, if “ecological effectiveness” is substituted for 
“precaution”, we can see how something like Meyer’s ordering can guide (or justify) 
policy and allow us to choose in an apparent trade-off. Because in the example above, 
these ordered criteria would imply that ‘cap and trade’ is preferable to an international 
carbon tax, since it gives more certainty over emission levels than prices, reflecting the 
precedence of Ecological Effectiveness over Efficiency25. By considering the way the three 
criteria should be ordered and the relationship between them, we can clarify the reasons for 
preferring particular climate policy proposals, and their respective ethical merits26. This 
helps provide a more transparent basis for comparing policy proposals, making more 
explicit the ethical dimensions of the debate so a more fully informed discussion – and 
solution - can be attained.
0.3 Grounding the order of the criteria.
This requires being clear about the economic value framework that underlies and justifies 
an ordering of the criteria. This is not just an ethical framework. For, as in parallel 
23 “... the precautionary principle focuses on the need for a spatially unified global purpose across time and 
space to avoid danger which is the Convention’s ‘objective’ (prevention by contraction)…”, Meyer, 2000, 
p33
24 Although, as I argue in chapter 2, part B, precaution is an essential component of the ecological 
effectiveness criterion.
25 It is evident that writers do make such choices implicitly in preferring one or the other, but in doing so they 
do not often talk explicitly about ordering these criteria. Rather, they may focus one or more of them, 
claiming for example, that only their proposal meets the demands of equity, or of efficiency/ cost-
effectiveness. 
26 To be clear; I am not suggesting that the criteria are themselves necessarily values, since they cover a range 
of different possible values (for example, ecological effectiveness might involve valuing the environment 
either instrumentally and/or intrinsically). The point is that how we order the criteria does express some 
particular value choices and ethical priorities.
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discussions in sustainability literature27, our ordering and understanding of the three criteria 
also reflect our economic conceptualisation of the world, and in particular, the way in 
which we understand the relationship between three conceptual ‘spheres’ of human 
economic interaction – the economy, (human) society and the environment. This is because 
these criteria can be understood as mapping onto (though not exhausting28) these spheres in 
the following way: Ecological Effectiveness as a guide or limit to economic interaction 
with respect to the environment, Equity as a social guide to economic relations between 
humans, and Efficiency (as conventionally understood) as an economic imperative for the 
functioning of the economy itself29.   
But in addition to the conceptual aspect of this value framework there is inevitably an 
important ethical dimension. For any ordering of the criteria also embodies value 
judgements made in the context of a particular conceptual economic picture. Otherwise 
they would hold no normative moral force and constitute description alone. Any ordering 
of the criteria and the economic value framework that underlies it is, in this way, what I 
shall term ‘ethico-conceptual’. I discuss this, and the conceptual and ethical dimensions 
more fully in part C of this chapter.
In parts B and C that follow I want to look at two such opposing economic value 
frameworks which imply two very different ways of ordering and understanding the 
criteria. But ‘economic’ here does not imply simply alternative economic systems, tools or 
brands, but alternative political economics; alternative ways to understand economics in 
context of society and the environment – two “eco-political-economies”.  The first is what 
I consider to be the conventional economic paradigm30, largely based around the neo-
classical economic model (but which also has variants in environmental economics, which 
I consider in part B). Here, the economic sphere is potentially infinitely expandable in 
relation to society and the environment; both in terms of economic reductionism whereby 
social and environmental concerns can be fully captured by narrow economic calculations, 
27 E.g. Edwards, 2005, p21-23
28 They are not exhaustive in part because of scope; equity, for example, does not exhaust the scope of social 
concerns.
29 The phrasing “economic imperative for the functioning of the economy itself”, from a conventional 
economic perspective implies norms internal to the economy. But by the end of the chapter 4 (and 
consideration of green economic efficiency) “the economy itself” (and “economic imperative”)  does not just 
imply an entirely separate domain with distinct norms, but an activity as necessarily nested within the society 
and ecosystem, and with guiding norms only understandable in relation to them.
30 In the west/affluent north at least in the last century, and in the past few decades in the globalised south.
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and physically, in terms of the growth of the economy. These can be represented by three 
distinct but overlapping spheres (where, that is, the latter are represented at all, see 
discussion in part C section 2.1). The successful functioning of the social and 
environmental spheres can, under this view, be increasingly understood in terms of what 
are taken to be the internal concerns of the human economy – an economy constituted by 
market mechanisms mediating between and optimising across competing rationally self-
interested human preferences . The kinds of climate change policies that result, as I will 
argue in part B, implicitly prioritise Efficiency over Ecological Effectiveness and Equity. 
Yet under this perspective there is not necessarily any conflict between the criteria; for 
those adhering to this picture-driven analysis, the latter two can be understood and justified 
in terms of the former.
The second approach is an alternative that has emerged from criticism of the conventional 
paradigm and an awareness of it as a characterisable and particular conception of eco-
political economy, as opposed to representing an allegedly value-neutral approach as is 
often presented31. This alternative is “Green Economics” (explored in part C), which 
understands the economy as embedded within both society and the environment (or rather, 
the ecosystem); as a subset of it, and, properly, subservient to the ends of both 
environmental protection and the fulfilment of human needs and social well-being32. Both 
ends are, however, as I argue in section B, failed by the current economic system in part 
because the paradigm underlying it does not recognise this embeddedness and never allows 
their qualitatively distinct and long-term dimensions to be fully reflected in its 
quantitatively based decision making process which prioritises narrow, short-term 
economic value. 
Instead, Green Economics requires that these social and ecological ends should be directly 
assured through non-market mechanisms such as regulation, taxation and institutional 
structures, though for most Green Economists the market and other conventional economic 
tools may still have some role to play as well. For its advocates, Green Economics is the 
culmination of mounting tensions both within the economic discipline (manifested through 
31 Reardon, in a survey of 17 US economic principles textbooks, has highlighted how “mainstream 
economics” encourages “students to think in terms of deductive logic, partial equilibrium analysis and 
marginal cost/benefit analysis” which are “presented as 'value-free'”. Reardon, 2007, p383.
32 See Scott-Cato, 2009, chapter 11.
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critiques from heterodox economics33) and between core economic assumptions and 
evidence from in particular environmental and ecological science on, for example, the 
physical limits to economic growth. Whether or not we are in fact on the brink of a 
paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense34 will be judged by future generations, but for Green 
Economists this is the kind of process required in order to shift to a more appropriate 
economic way of conceptualising the world and managing our economic activity, from one 
whose tensions can no longer be reconciled.  
A Green Economic perspective implies, I will argue, an ordering of the criteria  similar to 
that proposed by Aubrey Meyer, with Ecological Effectiveness first, Equity second and 
Efficiency third. This will be explained in part C, along with further consideration of how 
we should understand this ordering as above and beyond simple “prioritisation”. However, 
it should be emphasised that the Green Economic positioning of Ecological Effectiveness 
as the first criterion need not imply an ecocentric conception of environmental value, nor, 
similarly that the difference between the green economic and conventional economic 
perspectives can be straightforwardly construed according to the intrinsic/instrumental 
divide. Green Economics can also be understood as advocating ecological effectiveness for 
anthropocentric (strong as well as weak forms35) reasons, as I examine in appendix 1.
0.4 Theoretical Clarifications.
Both positions in this analysis function to represent distinct theoretical approaches – 
groupings of positions at either end of a spectrum regarding the eco-political economic 
picture they adhere to and advocate. This is not, then, to ignore other heterodox economic 
approaches and political economies which have critiqued the neo-classical ideology prior 
to green economics (e.g. Marxian, Institutional, Feminist economics, a tradition which is 
acknowledged by green economists36). Neither does this deny the significant theoretical 
divisions within both approaches in terms of position along the spectrum as well as 
33 Kennet & Heinemann, 2006; Scott-Cato, 2009, p8; 
34 I.e. historical, where in Kuhn, 1996, the paradigm (“accepted examples of scientific [in this case economic] 
practice” that “provide models from which spring particular  coherent traditions of scientific [economic] 
research” (p10)) suffers from increasing tensions with observation and experience – a “failure of existing 
rules”(p68) - creating anomalies which cannot be accommodated into the paradigm (p52), resulting in crisis 
(p76) which, if not dissolved, can “end with the emergence of a new candidate for paradigm and with the 
ensuing battle over its acceptance” (p84). 
35 See Dobson, 2000, p51 on the distinction between weak and strong anthropocentrism 
36 See Kennet & Heinemann, 2006 for a thorough examination of the intellectual economic heritage of Green 
Economics
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regarding other dimensions (such as values like liberty and autonomy), which are not being 
considered here. Rather, the purpose of defining the two ends of this spectrum is to 
emphasise a particular divide in the way that relations between the economic, social and 
ecosystemic spheres can be conceptualised and valued which is especially relevant for 
climate change policy. It is to draw out how our basic picture of these relationships, our 
“pre-analytic vision”37, affects how we conceptualise and analyse the problem of 
anthropogenic climate change and the criteria by which we judge the solution. 
This forms the basis from which I argue in favour of a Green Economic position and the 
corresponding ordering of the criteria which it would imply. I make this argument from the 
point of view of someone whose own ‘pre-analytic’ perspective lies within a Green 
Economic approach. But I do not see this as problematic since a neutral position outside 
either approach is not attainable. The two perspectives should not be regarded as 
theoretical lenses that can be removed to reveal a neutral or truer state of affairs – rather 
they should be understood as paradigmatic world views38, more comparable to perception 
itself, without which no conception can be formed of ontological entities – economy, 
society, ecosystems or associated values in the first place. 
The form of the argument through sections B and C is, therefore, to argue from a Green 
Economic perspective that the conventional economic paradigm does not form an ethically 
appropriate or conceptually tenable model  for analysing the problem of anthropogenic 
climate change or for its corresponding ordering of the three criteria for an international 
mitigation agreement. I proceed through examining how each perspective treats climate 
change as a “global commons” problem and their underlying assumptions and value 
judgements.
37 Daly and Townsend ,1993, p 5, building on Schumpeter’s tern.  
38 Although, as I clarify in Part C section 1, not wholly in the Kuhnian, strictly scientific sense; paradigms for 
social analysis operate differently.
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B. The tragedy of the commons or the tragedy of economics? “Efficiency first” & neo-
classical economic approaches to climate change.
1. The tendency towards overexploitation: public goods and common goods.
In this part of the chapter I look more closely at the neo-classical economic approach to the 
problem of DACC and highlight significant difficulties with the kind of explanation it 
offers. These relate to its analysis of common or public good problems. As I explain in 
section 1, the overemission of GHGs that constitutes DACC can be understood in terms of 
failure to protect either a global public or a common good.39 This good can be described, 
roughly speaking, as the atmosphere’s capacity to absorb GHG emissions without 
destabilising the earth’s climate regulation system. Diagnoses of the cause of this failure, 
however, can vary enormously, and lead to the prescription of very different solutions. 
Conventional neo-classical economic analysis employs game theoretical assumptions about 
human economic relationships to locate the cause of this failure in an inherent tendency of 
common or public goods towards overexploitation. But this is based, as others have 
shown40, on flawed value and conceptual judgements: an individualistic treatment of 
common goods which assumes that features of a market-based mode of interaction are 
features of human society. Whilst this may then be used to argue for possible solutions in 
either privatisation or state control of the commons in question, it can at worst be used to 
show that global co-operation on climate change policy will never be reached (see section 
2.1), and at best, limits our capacity to respond by making particular policy (i.e. market-
based) pathways seem inevitable(see 2.2). Such market-based policy solutions, I will 
argue, promote the criterion of economic efficiency at the expense of both equity and 
ecological effectiveness(see section 3). For they omit more egalitarian ways of making the 
transition to low-carbon societies, as well as obscuring other features of the economic 
system that have contributed to our current precarious situation. In this way, I conclude, 
DACC and the failure to tackle it arises not from the structure of the global climate 
commons itself but from the conventional economic approach, its concrete policies and 
game theoretical view of the world that dominate decision-making.
39 Depending on whether it is thought of as rivalrous or non-rivalrous; more on this shortly.
40 E.g. Ostrom, 1999; Buck, 1998 (see section 2.2).
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First, however, I shall explain how the atmosphere's climate regulating function can be 
considered as either a public or common good. This is a standard distinction made within 
economics between two different kinds of shared, or non-excludable goods. Public goods 
are defined as being non-rivalrous in that one individual’s 'use' of the good does not detract 
from another’s 'use'. Classic examples include street lights, security or clean air. Common 
goods, or commons, however, are defined as rivalrous, in that one individual’s use of it 
reduces or detracts from another’s ability to use it. Examples include fisheries, forests and 
other limited resources, limited either in absolute quantity or regenerative rate. Both 
descriptions are used in climate policy literature, but emphasise different features of the 
climate change problem. 
There is a clear sense in which aspects of the emergence and continuation of DACC can be 
construed as public good problems, and the atmosphere as a public good. Firstly, in so far 
as we consider the atmosphere’s use for us as a sink for GHG emissions, it seems non-
rivalrous. My emission of GHGs does not in itself (without limiting overall emissions) 
affect your ability to emit. Secondly, the sense in which we understand the 
overexploitation of this function of the atmosphere is in terms of its climate regulation role, 
and the associated stability of ecosystems and natural cycles (e.g. carbon, water and so on) 
which we depend on for survival. This ecological 'use' to us of the atmosphere; regulation 
of climate, seems also non-rivalrous, in that my receiving the benefits of a stable climate, 
will not subtract from your doing the same. Both 'uses' of the atmosphere could be said to 
constitute public goods, although the second is that normally emphasised as threatened in 
DACC, and the first use as the means by which the second is either preserved or exploited. 
Indeed, this is the way in which the problem is understood by Lord Stern, as I will 
highlight shortly. 
In what sense, then, can the atmosphere be considered a commons if both relevant “uses” 
described above are non-rivalrous? Clearly, once a global emissions cap has been set, the 
first use becomes rivalrous – any emissions made from country A will detract from the 
‘space’ available for country B to emit; a zero-sum game. But a commons reading is also 
frequently used to explain the development of the problem of DACC itself, as a case of a 
‘tragedy of the commons’. This draws on Garrett Hardin’s now classic scenario to 
represent what he viewed as the inevitable deterioration of common lands, shared by 
villagers to graze cattle in Britain prior to enclosure in the eighteenth century. In Hardin’s 
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analysis, a village commons has a certain “carrying capacity” of cattle, beyond which it 
would be damaged, overgrazed, and no longer be able to support so well the cattle that 
used it41. He argued that where there is free access to the commons, each herdsman, 
wanting to maximise their personal benefit from the land, would always want “to add 
another animal to his herd”42, since the utility gained from an additional animal to sell is 
greater to each herdsman than the (shared) costs from overgrazing and reduced 
effectiveness of the land. The “commons” scenario is a tragedy for Hardin because “ruin” 
is inevitable in any situation where there is “Freedom in a commons” and people are acting 
rationally, i.e. “each pursuing his own best interest”43  (often described as a “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma involving a common resource”44).
How does this apply to the emergence of DACC? In the Hardinian commons example the 
costs of overexploitation are felt through the deterioration in quality of each unit of use – 
past a certain point (the carrying capacity of the land), each additional sheep will cause all 
sheep to be less well fed. This is the “rivalrous” element. But in the case of the atmosphere 
as a potential global commons, the effects of exceeding carrying capacity are felt in 
(indeed carrying capacity itself is defined in terms of) the second, ecological 'use of' the 
atmosphere as a climate regulator, rather than in a deterioration of its use as a dump for 
emissions that caused the overexploitation45.  
A commons-based reading of DACC, then, must recognise the relationship between the 
two senses in which we have benefited from the atmosphere's absorption of GHGs; that 
increased use in the first sense subtracts from and deteriorates use in the second sense. This 
means the atmosphere’s use as an emissions dump is understood as  limited, even before 
any kind of cap is in fact implemented. Recognition of the carrying capacity of the 
atmosphere, implies a zero-sum game, in which its use as a sink is rivalrous. 
The “tragedy of the commons” scenario can, therefore, be used to explain the continued 
overexploitation of the atmosphere’s absorptive capacity for GHGs as a global commons. 
The Hardinian analysis is imported to explain the continued degradation of the global 
41 Hardin, 1968, p1244
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Gardiner, 2006, p400.
45 I.e. people are affected in other ways: it does not (directly) make the act of emitting less financially 
rewarding.
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atmospheric commons46 through rising emissions. This can crudely be seen as a result of 
rationally self-interested actions of emitting actors – individuals, businesses and other 
groups – but in particular nations, since a “global commons” can be “loosely defined as a 
domain that is beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of any one nation but one that all nations 
may use for their own purposes”47. Each nation operates analogously to Hardin’s villagers, 
acting only in consideration of the private costs and benefits of emitting activities until the 
carrying capacity of the atmosphere has been breached. With free access to this capacity, 
(non-excludability), the model says, even knowing the danger, each actor will ‘rationally’ 
carry on GHG emitting activity, because the benefits to them from the cheap energy of 
fossil fuels outweigh the costs from this additional unit of emissions – because these are 
costs that are shared globally, by many more people, now and in the future48. 
The public good reading of DACC describes the same kind of phenomenon. Both 
commons and public goods are, within the current economic paradigm, analysed in a 
similar way and supposedly subject to the same inherent tendency towards 
overexploitation. Whilst a commons risks deteriorating because each actor seeks to 
maximise their individual benefit by continued use despite the shared costs that arise as a 
result, a public good can suffer from the analogous problem of free riding. A public good 
deteriorates for conventional economists either when its protection is ignored altogether in 
economic decision making (it is treated as a 'negative externality'), or, when its protection 
is agreed on but each individual privately benefits from not contributing its maintenance 
and attempts to free ride on the contributions of others. This kind of analysis is made, for 
example, by Stern49 and by Grasso50.  DACC arises from “market failure” since the “full 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions, in terms of climate changes, are not immediately… 
borne by the emitter, so they face little or no economic incentive to reduce emissions. In 
this sense, human-induced climate change is an externality, one that is not ‘corrected’ 
through any institution or market, unless policy intervenes”51. Whilst this is “market failure 
on the greatest scale the world has seen”52, it does not imply a problem with the market 
46 See Soroos, 1998, p7; Rowe, 2005, p56. NB I suggest that the term “atmospheric commons” should be 
seen as shorthand for the climate system as a whole as it interacts with the atmosphere, including sinks – the 
earth's capacity to absorb GHG emissions from the atmosphere. 
47 Soroos, 1998, p7.
48 See e.g. Gardiner, 2006, p402.
49 Stern, 2006, p25.
50  Grasso, 2004.
51 Stern, 2006, p24. 
52 Stern, 2006, p25.
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itself, but with its incomplete accommodation of costs to direct the economic decision-
making; without being tweaked in the right way, the economic self-interest of emitting 
actors will inevitably lead to climate exploitation. 
So conventional economics reads both commons and public goods as facing analogous 
tendencies towards deterioration, caused by the same mechanism; the marginal benefit for 
‘rational, self-interested’ actors of not cooperating to protect the good in question. Whether 
conventional economists describe the problem of DACC in terms of a global commons or a 
global public good, therefore, its explanation is located in the same place; the apparent 
tension between shared costs and benefits with  the individual rationality of each GHG 
emitting actor (individuals, companies or governments), for whom the benefits of reducing 
emissions by them alone are seen as negligible compared to their personal cost in reducing 
emissions.
2. Relevance of game theory to understanding DACC.
2.1.  The deadlock problem
One immediate concern with this analysis is that there seems to be no prospect for 
emerging at all from the deadlock53. Because, of course, it applies to national actors, and 
implies that none of the solutions argued over – either market-based or state-based - will 
ever be implemented without an international agreement and binding commitments. But 
why should any current government at an international level commit to an agreement in the 
first place, if it will have to make an immediate sacrifice which outweighs any immediate 
benefits?
Stephen Gardiner draws out these kinds of pessimistic conclusions from the Hardinian 
commons analysis (although it applies equally to “public good” game theoretical 
descriptions of DACC54). The deadlock is particularly entrenched in the case of climate 
change, Gardiner argues, because the commons problem is spread between generations55. 
Applied to DACC, the Hardinian analysis implies a prisoner’s dilemma scenario, not only 
53 Although this does not constitute a reason for believing it to be incorrect, i.e. we may in fact be all doomed.
54 E.g. Grasso, 2004, p13 
55 Gardiner, 2006, p402
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because the costs of climate deterioration are shared amongst all people globally, but 
because “climate change impacts are seriously backloaded... and the full, cumulative 
effects of our current emissions will not be realised for some time in the future”.56 This is 
“likely to undermine the will to act”, since “the benefits of emissions accrue largely to the 
present”57. This means, Gardiner suggests, that even if  an international agreement is 
needed to resolve the cross-nation prisoner’s dilemma through co-operation, some current 
national governments lack incentives even to co-operate in the first place because “one 
cannot appeal to a wider context of mutually beneficial interaction, nor to the usual notions 
of reciprocity [i.e. those used to explain co-operation between contemporaries]” between 
current and future generations58.  
But if this is so, solving the deadlock appears to require pursuing the market-driven 
policies of the neo-classical agenda, even though Hardin originally argued that either state-
based or market-based policies can present solutions to commons problems.  This is 
because, following game theoretical logic, what is required at an international level (where 
there is no equivalent of the state that to operate beyond individual national interests) are 
policies that can ensure that an agreement comes to be in the economic interests of each 
(international) actor, through, for example, flexibility mechanisms, carbon trading and 
other forms of carbon pricing59. And for neo-classical economists, this is not only a 
pragmatic solution, but the preferred approach over, say, regulation or rationing, in order to 
economically optimise use of the global commons. Because the market can then perform 
the trade-offs between the environmental damage from one extra unit of emissions against 
the economic benefit gained by its emission in a way that governments cannot. It is, under 
this view, therefore, economically more efficient, lowering costs overall, and promotes 
economic growth, stimulating the global economy through the new market activity. This is 
the logical extrapolation from understanding the dynamics of DACC as grounded in 
marginal cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which I return to later in section 2.2.  
However, as I shall suggest next, this kind of game theoretical analysis does not fully 
capture the structure of DACC as an international problem and overlooks the social, 
56 Gardiner, 2006, p403
57 Gardiner, 2006, p404.
58 The analogy of intergenerational and intragenerational cooperation seems in any case to be spurious 
because of the dependence of future generations on our actions now. I consider this asymmetry further in 
chapter 2, section 3.3.
59 See Hamaide, 2003 which I discuss in section 2.2.
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historic and economic context. And if the diagnosis is wrong, the market-based solutions it 
implies may not be appropriate. The following criticisms focus on the “commons” 
description of DACC by conventional economics, but again hold equally for the alternate 
“public good” description, since what is criticised is the shared game-theoretical 
understanding of the structure of the problem.
2.2 The inevitability problem
A significant difficulty for Hardin’s game theoretical analysis as an explanation for DACC 
is that it suggests a structural feature of all commons goods such that they will inevitably 
descend into overexploitation. It assumes, as Feeny et al highlight, a necessary “divergence 
between individual and collective rationality”60. But the problems with this kind of claim 
have been highlighted through widespread criticism of the original analysis and contention 
over whether Hardin’s village commons scenario is historically accurate. Hardin, Dietz et 
al have pointed out, “missed the point that many social groups, including the herders on the 
commons that provided the metaphor for his analysis, have struggled successfully against 
threats of resource degradation by developing and maintaining self-governing 
institutions”61. Similarly, Rowe reiterates E.P. Thomson's reminder “that the commoners 
themselves were not without common sense'.”62, and co-operated on commons 
maintenance. Rather, Rowe argues, the tragedy thesis was a justification for enclosure, “a 
mass eradication of a [common] property right”63. Only in an “ownership society” does the 
idea of something that “belongs to all of us together” seem problematic when we are used 
to thinking of things belonging “to each of us apart”64. He argues that Hardin’s proposed 
privatisation solution in fact has a greater tendency towards overexploitation because of 
motivations to maximise short-term profits from the resource.  
Susan Buck likewise argues that decline in the commons was the result of other historical 
forces, and not inherent overuse. Those who shared access were also responsible for its 
care, and access was restricted to those in the village, whose use was regulated; the aim of 
common use was not to maximise personal gain but to co-operate in its management as a 
60 Feeny et al, 1990, p2
61 Dietz et al, 2003, review section (no page references since html file only available)
62 Rowe, 2005, p57
63 Rowe, 2005, p56
64 Rowe, 2005, p54
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community. Ostrom examines many such cases65, as do Feeny et al who argue that, “In 
many societies… the capacity for concerted social action overcomes the divergence 
between individual and collective rationality”6667  Buck highlights van Potter's suggestion 
that “the tragedy of the commons” is not “a defect in the concept of ‘commons’ but... a 
result of a disastrous transition period between the loss of an effective bioethic and its 
replacement by a new bioethic that could once again bring biological realities and human 
values into a viable balance”68. Dietz et al have similarly argued that “A set of rules crafted 
to fit one set of socio-ecological conditions can erode as social, economic, and 
technological developments increase the potential for human damage to ecosystems and 
even to the biosphere itself”69. What is suggested, then, is that there is nothing inherently 
problematic or tragic about commons which were “managed successfully by communities” 
for centuries and continue to be so managed in other countries70. The problem arises when 
human systems change, and governing “rules” do not “evolve”71 to ensure these conditions 
are still met. 
These criticisms are more than disagreement over a particular historical event . They have 
implications for the kind of economic analysis itself involved in understanding DACC, its 
assumption of the inevitability of degeneration of commons and the structural 
understanding of human economic relations to them72. For, Hardin presents the “tragedy of 
65 See e.g. Dietz et al 2003; Ostrom 2000. In both, design principles are considered that seem to guide 
successful commons management. Ostrom, 1999 also shows how evidence from “experminents of 
appropriation dilemmas” does not support the model of  “human actor” as a “norm-free, myopic, and 
maximizing individual” (p496).
66 Feeny et al, 1990, p13. Similarly, Norberg-Hodge observes how in Ladakh society the “good of the 
individual is not in conflict with that of the whole community... Ladakhis are aware that helping others is in 
their own interest... Mutual aid, rather than competition, shapes the economy. It is, in other words, a 
synergistic society”. Norberg-Hodge, 2000, p51, 
67 Hardin later acknowledged that not all commons were free access, and that his analysis should have 
alluded to “unmanaged” commons. However, even here, he seems to understand “managed commons” in 
terms of “either socialism or the privatism of free enterprise” (Hardin, 1998, p683). Whereas, as Feeny et al 
(amongst others) have highlighted, commons management is not merely limited to “state institutions under 
representative government”(Feeny et al, 1990, p13). There are a variety of formal and informal ways of 
communities managing commons use, such that even if nominally use is unlimited, users can recognise moral 
and social restrictions on their own use, as part of a wider community, and do not necessarily act according to 
a distinct individual rationality. 
68 Van Potter, cited in Buck, 1985, p54
69 Dietz et al, 2003, section: Why a struggle?
70 Buck, 1985, p54.
71 Dietz et al, 2003, section: Why a struggle?
72 The argument here is not, therefore, that if Hardin’s original explanation was factually incorrect then it 
must be incorrect for all other commons scenarios. It is that we have no reason to believe that the failure of a 
commons is inevitable without intervention since communities can self-manage, and are not necessarily 
motivated individualistically.
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the commons” problem as arising from the “inherent logic of the commons”73 as though 
individualism – acting according to rational self-interest - were a feature in any commons 
scenario, of society itself; a rationality of the individual always in conflict with common 
interests. But there seem good reasons to understand this as reflecting instead a particular 
kind of decision-making which need not prevail. I return to this shortly.
But the question will be how far this yet applies to DACC as a global phenomenon, where 
the moral and social norms governing a small community are not present. Even then, it is 
not clear that the logic of individualism must determine the fate of all global commons.  De 
Sombre points to the success of the Montreal agreement to highlight the inadequacy of 
game theory in explaining the decision-making behind global  commons problems. 
Montreal was, she suggests, a recent case where a solution to the global commons ozone 
problem was agreed on, even though the reduction of CFCs bore a significant industrial 
cost. Additionally, that nations recognised the need for a climate change agreement and 
began the process at all suggests that something more than narrow self-interest is at work. 
She argues:
"That we can cooperate on these issues where most of the benefits accrue to 
those not yet alive suggests that the kind of self-interest assumed in game 
theory is inadequate to explain decisions by policy-makers"74
Similarly, Hamaide has emphasised that there are very different ways of looking at 
international cooperation on DACC  which lead to potentially very different outcomes. He 
distinguishes “economic” forms of cooperation, based on “economic rationality” from 
“political cooperation” which includes other, predominantly ethical, concerns, such as 
“equity and historical responsibility”75. 
The “economic” approach to cooperation follows game theoretical lines. Hamaide 
examines the estimated costs and benefits for five different international regions from 
emissions abatement action. If each region seeks to maximise its own benefit76, it takes a 
non-cooperative strategy. Accordingly, Hamaide’s figures imply that United States and 
73 Hardin, 1968, p162
74 De Sombre, 2004, p42
75 Hamaide, 2003, p172-173
76 Hamaide, 2003, p172
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China would not abate since “their own abatement cost is larger than their own benefit”77. 
Alternately, if it is decided to maximise global rather than regional benefits, “internalizing 
the externality”, then “full cooperation” can be achieved. But only if “developing nations 
bear most of the abatement burden… because their marginal abatement cost is lower than 
in the developed world” and if “south-north transfers are accepted, that is as long as poor 
countries attract rich countries in the coalition by side payments”78. Clearly Hamaide's 
precise figures are subject to debate. But even if the thresholds change for countries 
economically benefiting from  mitigative action, the costs and benefits of different 
countries will still vary, as will, according to this economic rationality79, who will agree to 
mitigate. The overriding concern driving mitigation negotiations is economic efficiency; 
cost minimisation either at a national or international level. 
However, as Hamaide points out, cooperation on DACC can be understood “politically”, 
and “other considerations” are also relevant, and even overwhelming. He rightly argues 
that “ even if it is economically efficient, it is not politically acceptable” to have “ transfers 
from the south to the north”, and “Cooperation in the economic sense should be... 
supplemented and even overthrown by cooperation in the political sense incorporating 
equity and historic responsibility”80. The difficulty is that the “economic” understanding of 
cooperation has in fact tended to dominate the DACC debate. This means that whilst De 
Sombre and Hamaide are correct in highlighting the possibility of other bases for policy 
decisions, the problem of DACC has arguably conformed to the game theoretical analysis 
in a way that Montreal and other agreements did not. 
And this indeed is the kind of point Gardiner himself makes in considering the implications 
of the Hardinian analysis for DACC. He agrees that  game theory is “misguided in 
general... because it assumes that individuals and states are motivated exclusively by self-
interest.”81. But he thinks that it is applicable in cases like DACC where “some form of 
self-interest happens to be dominant”82.  Whilst he believes that “any solution to the 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 I say “this economic rationality” because I do not think it applies to all economic approaches. This is worth 
emphasising since there is a tendency to make “economic” logic synonymous with “neo-classical economic” 
logic.
80 Hamaide, 2003, p173
81 Gardiner, 2004, p25.
82 Gardiner, 2004, p26
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problems... will require calling on motivations other than... narrow, economic self-
interest”83, elsewhere he has argued that the “perfect moral storm” of the “features of the 
climate change problem” themselves “threaten our ability to behave ethically”84. Certainly 
this kind of explanation does seem to reflect the way in which both actors and 
commentators often talk about DACC and the barriers to successful mitigation efforts85. 
Governments are unwilling to threaten  national economic growth and competitiveness, 
and political actors, as Gardiner highlights, could also risk their electoral future because of 
the threat to their voters of immediate sacrifice86.  But my caution is against sliding 
towards an acceptance that game theoretical logic is largely unavoidable “in this case”, 
which Gardiner's analysis sometimes suggests. For the crucial question is why the problem 
seems to conform to the modes of behaviour predicted by Hardinian analysis. Gardiner 
alludes to the dominance of “unreflective consumption behaviour”, “based on perceived  
self-interest” which is “often narrowly economic”87.  Whilst broadly right, this needs to be 
qualified, for several reasons. 
Firstly, DACC affects our lives to a degree that the ozone problem did not, evident from 
the lock-step between economic growth and emissions88. Fossil-fuel dependency is integral 
to most aspects of our lives: the transport we use, the distance we travel to work and access 
services, the design of communities and of buildings, the food we eat89 and the supply 
chains of the goods that we buy. In this sense the problem is not straightforwardly that, as 
individuals, people act self-interestedly to continue high carbon-emitting activity which 
benefits them(although arguably this is also true90). Because fossil-fuel dependency 
permeates every aspect of our lives, emitting activities are the default, and take a very 
particular effort to avoid. And, even if an individual actor (either a person or a nation) 
significantly lowers their contribution, the pre-existing emissions-dependent structures 
83 Ibid.
84 Gardiner, 2006, p398.
85 See for example the following media reports:  Vidal, 2007, regarding the US refusal to participate without 
China or India; Black, 2006, on reluctance to act if it will “damage competitiveness”, and  Hunt & 
Townshend, 2011, who argue that more progress may be made in the 2011 talks because of “increasing 
recognition of the significant co-benefits of climate legislation”.
86 Gardiner, 2004, p32
87 Gardiner 2004 p26
88 E.g. Meyer, 2000, p28
89 Some food products require vast energy inputs, e.g “2100 kcal are invested to produce zero to 1kcal of 
consumable energy” for a can of soda (Pimentel et al, 2008, p467) See also McMichael et al, 2007; Friends 
of the Earth, 2007. 
90 It is evident, for example, the attitudes expressed over the UK switch-over to low-energy lightbulbs. See 
Derbyshire's Daily Mail article, Derbyshire, 2009.
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themselves do not change - the goods and services are used by someone else. It therefore 
takes an incredible, coordinated effort to severely cut our GHG  emissions through altering 
these structures, and the national impacts of an international mitigation agreement are of a 
different order to those from Montreal, implying huge financial costs. This does not imply 
that such a change should or could not happen; so long as the need for the change is 
recognised. But it makes it far more difficult. It is at this level that “narrow economic self-
interest” particularly seems to play a role, in so far as the sacrifices that this might entail 
constitute a reason to avoid such wide-scale systemic change, and can engender 
hopelessness or cynicism about the prospects of success. 
But secondly, in so far as self-interest does also operate at both individual and national 
levels, it is not enough to assert, as Gardiner does, that it “happens to be dominant”91 in the 
case of DACC. If “motivations other than those of narrow, economic self-interest”92 are 
possible, it must be questioned why they are not more prevalent. Part of the problem is that 
this question is not always asked. It is not always recognised that, as Daly and Cobb have 
argued, neo-classical economic analysis does  not simply model how people always behave 
in the way that physics does in describing physical laws93. It abstracts from a particular 
form of behaviour and human interaction to formulate assumptions about the processes 
underlying all decision-making. This, they suggest, is what Whitehead described as the 
“fallacy of misplaced concreteness”, i.e. “neglecting the extent to which our concepts are 
abstract, and therefore also neglecting the rest of the reality from which they have been 
abstracted.”94  
This precludes the possibility of the alternative modes of behaviour and systems of 
governance suggested earlier by Buck and Ostrom. Because these abstractions in turn 
influence reality: economists are not merely neutral observers, but promote a particular 
world view. Daly and Cobb describe, for example, the neo-classical economic abstraction 
of “Homo economicus from real flesh and blood human beings”95. Homo economicus 
builds in two assumptions: that human “wants are insatiable”96 and people are indifferent to 
91 Gardiner 2004 p26
92 Ibid.
93 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p28-32. See also Read 2007a, p318, cited in the thesis' Introduction 
94 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p36
95 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p85
96 Ibid.
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the desires of others97, i.e. “extreme individualism”98 or 'rational' self-interest. Whilst 
economists often recognise this as abstraction99, they “typically identify intelligent pursuit 
of private gain with rationality, thus implying that other modes of behaviour are not 
rational... economists have taught us to think that checks on self-interest are both 
unnecessary and harmful. It is through rational behaviour, which means self-interested 
behaviour, that all benefit the most”100. Thus “the use of the model influences actual 
behavior away from community-regarding patterns towards selfish ones”101. 
This also influences society through guiding policy that structures it, e.g. the operation of 
the market and pursuit of growth in GNP as “a measure of economic success”102  - ignoring 
“the degree of abstraction” or “connection to the real world”103. For, as Schumacher has 
also highlighted, “Although it is, of course, society that produces the production system, 
once a particular system has come into existence it begins to mould society: it... insists that 
the members of society respect the immanent logic of the system and adapt to it by 
accepting its implicit aims as their own... The prevailing concept of efficiency rules the 
modern world not by itself but by the type of technology and organisation it has 
produced.”104. The mode of economic organisation promoted by conventional economics – 
individualistic, high-consumption, growth oriented, around which our society is 
constructed –  is both what feeds and locks in our economic dependency on fossil fuels105 
and what limits our ability to move to a cooperative solution106; to move to a different 
“bioethic”107, which, as suggested earlier, would allow for more effective commons 
management. Because, as I argue in the next section, the neo-classical economic model, 
97 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p86
98 Daly & Cobb, p87
99 Including Milton Friedman, who as Rowe highlights, “famously argued that it made no difference whether 
or not homo-economicus was an accurate portrayal. The economy worked as though it was, and so what 
difference did it make?” (Rowe, 2009)
100 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p5-6
101 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p92
102 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p63
103 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p95-96)
104 Schumacher, 1993b, p166
105 See e.g. Benton, 1999, p217- 222 on the tendency of “commercial logic” to “stretch and override its 
boundary conditions” socially and ecologically, at a global level. Also Meadows et al, 2005, considered in 
section 3.1.
106 Hirsch, for example, argues that “The social morality that has served as an understructure for economic 
individualism has been a legacy of the precapitalist and preindustrial past.” and has “diminished with time 
and with the corrosive contact of the active capitalist values... As individual behavior has been increasingly 
directed to individual advantage, habits and instincts based on communal attitudes and objectives have lost 
out.” (Hirsch, 1976, p117-118)
107 Van potter, cited in Buck, 1985, p54
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through CBA as a decision-making tool and its institutional form of the market, does not 
recognise the social and ecological features of reality necessary to redirect economic 
activity according to either ecological effectiveness or equity. 
In so far as game theoretical analysis seems relevant to understanding the global climate 
commons, I am suggesting that it points not to an inevitable structural feature of all 
commons and public goods, but the way in which narrowly economic considerations have 
dominated decision-making on DACC, over and above other ethical or political 
considerations. Rather than a “tragedy of the commons”, it is better described as a “tragedy 
of economics”108.
3. The Tragedy of Economics; the elimination of ecological effectiveness and 
equity.
The relevance of game theoretical analysis to DACC is not simply its explanatory limits 
but the barriers it places towards reaching a solution.  For, the neo-classical economic 
approach promotes an understanding of the world and a means of decision-making that 
precludes explicit consideration of ecological effectiveness and equity.  This is through 
CBA, or, relatedly, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market. Both operate through interpreting 
qualitatively distinct aspects of social and ecological reality in a quantitative manner, so 
that they can be made commensurable on a single monetary scale109.  This is then amenable 
to aggregating different costs and benefits in CBA, or to theoretically justify how the 
market mechanism optimally allocates resources through arbitrating between different 
individual preferences, expressed and unified through price. This includes, as I discuss in 
section 3.2, and as Marx noted110, the exchangeability of different kinds of goods and 
services, more recently criticised as the lack of substitutability between different kinds of 
capital – ‘social’, 'human-made', 'human' and ‘natural’111. It also includes, as alluded to 
108 Rowe has also made this suggestion, in Rowe, 2009, although I developed the phrase independently.
109 I.e. it assumes “strong commensurability” - see O'Neill, 1993, p99 for the strong/weak distinction
110 I.e. the notion of commodity fetishism whereby the exchange value of commodities is mistaken for being 
its objective property , the “physical nature of the commodity” and “the fantastic form of a relation between 
things”(Marx, 1990, p165) But this is impossible because of they have different (qualitative) use values – 
their “sensuously varied objectivity as articles of utility” (p166), and exchange value is created by the process 
of exchange whereby men “equate their different kinds of labour as human labour”(p166), and therefore in 
fact reflects the “definite social relation between men themselves”(p165).
111 Daly, 1997, p76 and Goodland and Daly, 1996, p1006
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earlier, a quantitative reductivism of the various goals or values which often guide decision 
making and which emphasise as relevant these qualitatively distinct features of reality. 
These  are reconceived as individual preferences or utility functions, which can be satisfied 
to varying quantifiable degrees, and understood on one financial scale of costs and 
benefits112. 
The difficulty is that this conceptual approach ignores crucial social and ecological 
qualitative features of reality. These need to be accommodated both to explain how the 
problem of DACC has emerged  in conformity to a commons tragedy and, therefore, to 
work towards a policy solution.  In particular, the conventional economic approach 
undermines two of the criteria for an agreement described in section A, ecological 
effectiveness and equity. Because these are reduced to and thereby replaced by the third 
criterion, (economic) efficiency, which seeks to optimise financial outcomes across all 
kinds of costs and benefits.  Whilst conventional neo-classical economics fails to 
acknowledge the concerns of the other two criteria at all, more recent extensions such as 
environmental economics attempts to accommodate them, I will argue, equally 
unsuccessfully. I will outline some of the main problems with such reductivism here, but 
will return to these difficulties in more detail when I discuss the interpretation of 
Ecological Effectiveness (chapter 2) and Efficiency (chapter 4).
3.1. Core Neo-classical Economic treatment
The core of the conventional economic paradigm, in its neo-classical form, ignores social 
and ecological aspects of reality in a straightforward and well established manner. That is, 
as standardly explained in economic textbooks, costs and benefits to the environment and 
to wider society that do not accrue directly to economic actors involved in a particular 
transaction are considered “externalities”113, and are not accounted for by economic 
analysis, or the market itself. Concern for wider social and ecological ends are 
accommodated only in so far as they are counted as preferences of individuals that hold 
them. These in turn affect economic activity only in so far as they alter supply and demand 
which is itself driven primarily by financial cost.
112 See O'Neill, 1993 chapter 7 regarding the failure of CBA to accommodate the plurality of  values.
113 Reardon, 2007, p385.
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A key ecological feature ignored in this way is the ecological limit to total economic 
growth, which is crucial to recognise in preventing overexploitation of a commons. It was 
discussed in 2.2. that the equation of a “commons” with a free access good was 
problematic because in a genuine commons scenario users do not see access as “free” – 
they are self limiting, either informally because they recognise the impact of their use on 
others and overall limits, or more formally through community regulation of the commons. 
It is this recognition and the ability to act in accordance with it that has allowed for 
successful commons management, and which has been undermined by conventional 
economic models. Under the methodological individualism of neo-classical analysis, there 
is no means to account for these limits since economic transactions are understood at an 
individual level, guided by the immediate costs and benefits to those actors alone.  
The problem of DACC can be seen as the result of a failure to recognise the limits to 
economic growth from the atmosphere’s carrying capacity for GHGs. In so far as there has 
been a historic ignorance of the existence of an atmospheric ‘carrying capacity’ for 
emissions or the importance of emission sinks, this might be argued to be a circumstance 
unrelated to economics. But the problem can be seen as the reverse, lying precisely in the 
initial assumption of the limitlessness of economic growth and the failure to anticipate or 
acknowledge the possibility of limits of an ecological kind. 
This is the kind of point made by Meadows et al in their famous consideration of the 
“Limits to Growth”. They describe the concept of system “overshoot”; a combination of 
rapid change, limits to that change and delays in perceiving the limits or in controlling the 
change in a system means that it “overshoots” its limits114. When this occurs in an 
economic system overshooting environmental limits, this can lead to “catastrophic 
overshoot”115. This can occur either in terms of  reserve limits (a “nonrenewable resource 
crisis”), or pollution limits (a “global pollution crisis”). In the former, short reserves of 
non-renewable resources are not recognised by the economy which continues to use them 
at an increasing rate, then overshoots and collapses because it has exhausted the resource 
base for its growth, and in the latter, longer reserves of non-renewable resources mean that 
increased production by a fast growing economy proceeds too fast to recognise pollution 
signals until it is too late116. It takes, for example, significant time for “forests to regrow... 
114 Meadows et al, 2005, p1 
115 Meadows, et al, 2005, p2.
116 Meadows et al, 2005, p171-174
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pollutants to work through the ecosystem, for capital plants to depreciate”117, during which 
time increased quantities of these reserves have been used by the expanding economy. 
They argue that “overshoot comes from delays in feedback” and “is possible because there 
are accumulated resource stocks that can be drawn down”. Accordingly, “If a society takes 
its signals from the single availability of stocks, rather than from their rates of 
replenishment [or, in the case of pollution limits, their effects], it will overshoot”118
In the case of DACC, the physical basis for economic growth has been the availability of 
cheap energy in the form of fossil fuels. But the conventional economic model has no 
mechanism for recognising limits: either to future availability, or to the polluting effects of 
their use. The “physical momentum”119 of the economic system, is driven and limited only 
by current stocks of fossil fuel reserves. Although, therefore, economics is conventionally 
understood as describing the allocation of scarce resources, it does not recognise all aspects 
of scarcity. For, a further crucial feature of this tendency towards overshoot comes, as 
Meadows et al argue, from the “pursuit of growth”. Delays in feedback can be handled “as 
long as the system is not moving too fast to receive signals and respond before it hits the 
limit”, but the increased industrialisation and economic growth over the last fifty years has 
put this at risk. Even since the commencement of the UNFCC in 1992, emissions rose 38% 
by 2007120.
Meadows et al offer an alternative to Hardin's explanation for commons degradation. They 
argue that, “An unregulated market system governing a common resource with a slow 
regeneration rate inevitably leads to overshoot and the destruction of the commons”121. 
This describes the “tragedy of economics” in so far as its structures create the conditions 
for commons overuse. But part of the tragedy is also that conventional neo-classical 
economic analysis would be unable even to recognise or model the problem in this way. 
Why this is so is evident from Daly’s criticism that conventional economic analysis is 
designed for efficient allocation, but unable to cope with issues of economic scale. He 
argues that it fails to model the environment's existence in even a minimal way. Daly 
117 Meadows et al, 2005, p175.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 http://www.globalcarbonproject.org
121 Meadows et al, 2005, p253
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recounts122 how a diagram depicting the economy-environment relationship in a draft 
World Bank report, “Development and the Environment”, only represented the interaction 
through “a square labeled “economy” with an arrow coming in labeled “inputs” and an 
arrow going out labeled “outputs””. There was, he highlights, no representation of limits 
on the flow of these inputs and outputs. But this is not unique to that report; Reardon 
notices this omission in economy-environment representations in economic textbooks123. 
The neo-classical core of conventional economic analysis cannot, therefore, recognise the 
criterion of ecological effectiveness to guide an international solution to the problem, since 
it does not have the conceptual tools to recognise the ecologically limiting features of the 
world on which the criterion depends. 
And, as Daly points out, neither does it recognise or promote distinct social ends such as 
distribution124, which includes the second criterion for an agreement, equity. This manifests 
in conventional economic approaches to DACC. Padilla highlights how for conventional 
economic CBA, the goal of “global efficiency” can be achieved by mitigating emissions 
primarily in poorer countries which are assumed to have lower reduction costs125126. 
Because, as Toman argues, conventional economics blurs distribution issues by treating the 
world “as a single unit”, across which costs and benefits are optimised irrespective of the 
unequal outcome in emissions distribution between nations127. Similarly Shue has criticised 
Stewart and Wiener’s proposal for a “comprehensive” treaty that allows for 
“homogenizing calculations” of cost-effectiveness of mitigation for each country. This 
“comprehensiveness”, Shue argues, “obscures distinctions that are fundamental”128. He 
criticises the “standard economic analysis” treatment of all welfare considerations as 
reducible to preference, irrespective of qualitative differences. For, he argues, “The 
satisfaction of some ‘preferences’ is essential for survival, or for human decency”129. I 
discuss this further in chapter 3 in considering the Equity criterion. 
122 Daly, 1997, p6
123 Reardon, 2007, p385.
124 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p59
125 Padilla, 2004, p534
126 Or, even more worryingly, as noted in 2.2., the implications of operationalising the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation criterion for pareto efficiency are that compensation should be paid by the poor to rich for 
mitigating at all (Padilla, 2004, p531).
127 Toman, 2006, p2
128 Shue, 1993, p56
129 Shue, 1993, p55.
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Accordingly, neo-classical economic analysis does not consider inequities in use of 
emitting activities between countries, and promotes efficiency at the expense of equity. But 
importantly, to return to the discussion in 2.2, advocating this economic model to guide 
policy also promotes acting in accordance with unmitigated self-interest as the rational 
basis for policy, in order to determine what is optimal, or economically efficient. The 
conformity of international actors to the methodological individualism of Hardin's 
commons tragedy is thereby justified by economic theory. 
The neo-classical core of conventional economics, then, does not accommodate either 
ecological effectiveness or equity, both of which are essential for avoiding a commons 
tragedy. As Daly and Cobb put it, “the market sees only efficiency – it has no organs for 
hearing, feeling, or smelling either justice or sustainability”130. Where other criteria are 
recognised as relevant independently from economic analysis, no attempt at ordering or 
prioritising is made. Rather it is seen straightforwardly as a trade-off. Baert Wiener, for 
example, describes how “Earlier reductions may protect the climate more because they 
prevent the build up of gases that reside in the atmosphere for decades afterwards. But later 
reductions may cost less.”131. This trades-off ecological effectiveness and efficiency 
(understood as cost-minimisation). His response is not to consider their relative importance 
and offer a justification, but to treat both analogously to competing preferences in 
economic analysis. That is, a compromise is proposed for “optimizing” abatement over 
time, by giving ten year emissions budgets to countries who then use CBA to decide how 
to spread reductions over that period132. However, there have been some attempts to 
accommodate ecological limits in adjustments to the paradigm, which I consider in 3.2. 
130 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p145
131 Baert Wiener, 2002, p174
132 Baert Wiener, 2002, p174-175
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3.2. Environmental Economic accommodation of ecological concerns.
In recent years, as damage of economic activity on the environment has become 
increasingly evident, conventional economics has attempted to adapt.  This is through 
efforts in Environmental Economics133 to internalise externalities; by pricing environmental 
(and to some extent social) costs and benefits134 for inclusion in the calculations of the 
market and in CBA to guide business or policy decisions135. This attempts, to use Daly and 
Cobb’s turn of phrase, to allow the market to hear, feel or smell sustainability. This can 
take the form of Pigovian taxes, estimated so as to reflect the value of the negative 
externality (or subsidies to reflect positive externalities). In CBA, costs and benefits are 
valued through, for example, attempting to reflect the financial cost of the externality, 
(such as the cost to the public purse of treating health problems resulting from localised 
pollution) or through willingness to pay (WTP) assessments, often by surveying how much 
ordinary people would be willing to pay to protect positive or prevent negative 
externalities136. 
These 'internalising' procedures have been subject to numerous criticisms, which I will not 
fully reproduce here, but which range from abhorrence at the thought of ‘pricing’ nature or 
human costs such as health, to concerns over the practicalities in overcoming the 
arbitrariness of prices that individuals suggest they are willing to pay to protect parts of the 
environment137. My main concern, however, is that again, morally relevant and structurally 
necessary features of social and ecological reality are still ignored, even if formally 
acknowledged when treated as commensurable and exchangeable on the same monetary 
scale. Because by so doing, qualitatively distinct values and policy criteria such as 
133 Environmental Economics is broadly distinguished from Ecological Economics as follows: the former 
accepts the assumptions of neo-classical economics regarding the optimising role of the market, and aims 
largely to modify the model to accommodate environmental 'externalities' and correct for particular 
environmental problems; the latter reconsiders economics in the context of the functioning of the ecosystem 
as a whole, the relations between the economy and ecosystem, and brings other values and disciplines to bear 
on economic interactions. See Van den Bergh, 2001 for a more detailed examination. 
134 However, the prominent ecological economist, Costanza, (founder of the “Ecological Economics” 
journal; see Costanza, 1989) has adopted the practices of environmental economists of pricing the 
environment to reflect its economic value (e.g. Costanza et al, 1997). There is, therefore, a question about 
how distinct, for Costanza, ecological economics in fact is in practice from environmental economics, and 
there seems to be some tension within ecological economics to the extent that such practices still occur. 
There is not space to examine this here, but it warrants further consideration.
135 Benton, 1999, p214
136 This involves effectively pricing human lives, a practice that has received much criticism, in particular 
because it normally involves discounting, which I discuss briefly in chapter 2, section 3.2.
137 See e.g. Sarkar, 2005,  p188-195
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ecological effectiveness and equity are effectively replaced by financial efficiency. For 
instance, even in the traditional neo-classical approach to CBA, not even all costs and 
benefits of participants in the economic interaction are included in the monetary exchange. 
For example, consumers might financially benefit but suffer worse medium/ long-term 
health, if they select cheaper processed food options over more expensive but nourishing 
ones.  
But even when these other kinds of (e.g. health) costs are accounted for in economic 
analysis through translation to financial costs, this fails to capture the way in which they 
are important. This materialises in the debate over weak and strong sustainability, and the 
problem of substitutability (a parallel problem to that of commensurability). Environmental 
economics adopts a weak sustainability position138, which, as Goodland and Daly have 
pointed out, assumes the substitutability of different kinds of ‘capital’; goods and services 
that are used and exchanged in our economy, which might be “natural”, “human”, “human-
made” or “social”139. Although weak sustainability recognises the role that so-called 
“natural capital” plays in our economy, it seeks only to maintain the “total capital intact 
without regard to the partitioning of that capital among the four kinds”. This ignores  the 
crucial roles that distinct kinds of of ‘capital’ may play, either directly in our economy, or 
in supporting the social or biological integrity it depends on. If, for example, all forests 
were cleared, the many roles that they had played would not be reproducible with other 
goods and services – the fuel and material they provide, the habitat and local ecosystemic 
role, or their part in wider ecological processes such as CO2 uptake, for instance. 
This emphasises the importance of “maintaining different kinds of capital intact 
separately”140, and supporting instead a “strong sustainability” perspective. How far even 
this is a sufficient improvement may be doubted, since for similar reasons we can highlight 
significant distinctions between different kinds of ‘natural capital’141. But either way, 
assuming total substitutability, as in environmental economics, ignores what Goodland and 
Daly refer to as “complementarity”. ‘Natural capital’, for example, is a complement for 
human-made capital, because it is required for human-made capital, and its destruction or 
138 Van den Bergh, 2001, p17.
139 Goodland and Daly, 1996, p1006.
140 Ibid.
141 This, is the move behind opting for a third category of sustainability, which Goodland calls “absurdly 
strong”. Though perhaps harder to implement in practice, since it simply follows the same logic of the 
previous move there seems no reason to suggest that this is necessarily “absurd”.
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degradation cannot (always) be compensated for in any meaningful way. Daly thus 
criticises Nordhaus for arguing that “global warming would only have a small affect on the 
US economy”142. Nordhaus assumed, Daly recounts, that if agriculture is the main casualty 
of DACC, this only accounts for 3% of gross national product. What Nordhaus ignores is 
the role of agriculture in relation to other industries; that everything else is dependent on it. 
Daly pictures the relationship as a growing “inverted pyramid” with agriculture at or near 
the point at the base. Agriculture is the resource base that everything else depends on, and 
is holding up the “pyramid of value added”143. 
This model of economics will similarly fail to adequately accommodate ecological limits 
to growth. For these are incorporated only as the cost of environmental degradation from 
each additional unit of economic activity, and therefore treated as simply another cost to be 
weighed against other kinds. Indeed, the environmental economic approach dominated by 
economic efficiency still assumes the possibility of and need for continued economic 
growth. Environmental economic assessments of climate change policy imply that 
emissions reductions sufficient to prevent DACC can be achieved with only a negligible 
affect on growth144. However, this seems to overlook the effects of mitigation on growth 
itself. To return to Goodland and Daly's earlier points, it ignores the relationship between 
different kinds of 'capital'. As was highlighted, economic growth has arisen from the 
availability of cheap energy from fossil fuels. Many have noted the lockstep between 
emissions growth and GDP145. Whilst some, like Meyer, remain in theory open to the 
possibility that the lockstep can be broken, if economic growth remains the goal, even were 
the relationship to be widened, increased economic growth requires ever deeper emissions 
reductions to compensate, and growth pressures conflict with mitigation efforts146. 
Accordingly, some, like Anderson and Bows, have argued that they are totally 
incompatible. Even with optimistic assumptions, they argue, stabilising emissions at 
142 Daly, 1997, p63
143 Daly, 1997, p64
144 E.g. Stern (2006, p211), argued  that it would cost between -1 and 3.5% of GDP per year to reduce 
emissions by three-quarters by 2050, which he envisaged as consistent with a 550ppm CO2e stabilisation 
level (see chapter 2 section 4 for my concerns with this target). Even Padilla (2004, p526), otherwise critical 
of conventional economic techniques, suggests that only 2% of global GDP is required “to make a significant 
difference in the control of emission”, equivalent to postponing “the GDP of 2050 to 2051”.
145 E.g. Meyer, 2000, p28
146 Because, as Li points out, even with renewables, “The equipment and buildings required for “renewable” 
electricity need to be built by the industrial sector using fossil fuels and non-renewable mineral reosurces”. 
(Li, 2008, p3)
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450ppm CO2e (which is still reasonably likely to exceed 2 °C global mean temperature147; 
see chapter 2, section 4148)  requires “global energy related emissions to peak by 2015, 
rapidly decline at 6-8 per cent per year between 2020 and 2040, and for full 
decarbonisation sometime soon after 2050”149. However, they argue that these reductions 
are not achievable whilst pursuing economic growth, and highlight Stern’s claim that 
annual “reductions of greater than 1 per cent have only ‘been associated with economic 
recession or upheaval’”, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, which only brought 
roughly 5 % annual reductions150.  They further argue that “orthodox studies” constrain 
reduction rates to “levels thought to be compatible with economic growth – normally 3 per 
cent to 4 per cent a year”151, and conclude that “dangerous climate change can only be 
avoided if economic growth is exchanged, at least temporarily, for a period of planned 
austerity within Annex 1 nations”, i.e. a “planned economic contraction”152. Others have 
drawn similar conclusions153.
 
3.3. Accommodation of equity in conventional economics.
Whilst Environmental Economics was an attempt to internalise environmental 
externalities, there has been no fully analogous move to accommodate distributional 
concerns into neo-classical economics. Attempts are sometimes made to reconceive them 
as problems in economic efficiency. For example, although the World Bank's 2006 report 
on Equity and Development highlights the moral, religious and developmental significance 
of equity, it emphasises its key concern that, “With imperfect markets, inequalities in 
power and wealth translate into unequal opportunities, leading to wasted productive 
potential and to an inefﬁcient allocation of resources.”154. This enables them to suggest that 
“equity is complementary, in some fundamental respects, to the pursuit of long term 
147 Meinshausen, 2006, p266.
148 I argue that both the temperature target and atmospheric concentration should be far stricter
149 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3877.  Total CO2e emissions would require 4 per cent per year reductions, but 
much of these emissions are from non- CO2e GHGs such as methane and nitrous oxide which are mostly 
from food production. Anderson and Bows have assumed non- CO² GHGs can be reduced to 7.5Gt CO2e by 
2050, a halving of the emission intensity of current food production, with alternative early, mid and late 
peaking years. (p3869-3871).
150 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3878.
151 Anderson and Bows, 2011, p40
152 Anderson and Bows, 2011, p41
153 Li, for example, argues that to achieve the emission reductions necessary for a 445 ppm CO2e stabilisation, 
given various scenarios in energy & emissions intensity declines, the maximum world growth rate permitted 
runs from -3.4 to -0.7%, i.e. the global economy would have to contract.  (Li, 2008, p6-7).
154 The World Bank, 2006, p7. This point is also made by  Woodward and Simms, 2006, p7.
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prosperity”, and that the solution lies in “pro-poor” growth155, or “some forms of 
redistribution— of access to services, assets, or political influence” to “increase economic 
efficiency.”156. This latter approach is also evident in the social democratic trends of 
Western market economies which, whilst adhering to the growth model of the market 
economy, simultaneously advocates a degree of social justice through the welfare state and 
progressive taxation to correct for the inequities of the market (for example, in former UK 
Prime Minister Blair's “Third Way”.157).
However, Woodward and Simms have highlighted that attempts to promote both economic 
growth and equity assume “conceptual separation of income growth and income 
distribution”158. Whereas, they argue, these are, rather, “two ways of summarising the same 
set of variables… so if one changes, the other will almost certainly change too”. They 
suggest the question is overlooked regarding “whether economic policies designed to 
promote growth affect distribution”159. Just as conventional economists argue that certain 
redistributive measures weaken growth, growth policies increase inequalities because 
richest incomes also increase. This is, after all, the purpose of pursuing poverty alleviation 
through economic growth, to create a “positive sum game”, where all gain. Relative 
poverty, they also highlight, then increases, which is as relevant for poverty as absolute 
wealth160. The most effective way to reduce poverty, they argue, is instead through 
redistribution161 from the richest to the poorest, instead of 'pro-poor' growth.
Recognising the ecological limits to growth also emphasises why equity is integral to 
alleviating poverty, because, as suggested in section 1,  these limits create a zero sum 
game. As Galbraith has put it,
“Were growth to come to an end, income would no longer increase, and the 
overwhelming question would be ‘How is the fixed total to be shared?’  For each 
155 The World Bank, 2006, p127.
156 The World Bank, 2006, p2.
157 Dickerson, 1999.
158 Woodward and Simms, 2006, p7.
159 Ibid.
160 Woodward and Simms, 2006, p10. This is because many social “goods” and “bads” are competitive. See 
my discussion in chapter 3, section 5.2., and see Hirsch, 1976.
161 See Woodward and Simms, 2006, p18 for figures.
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person’s increase there would have to be a decrease somewhere else. Income 
distribution would become an extremely urgent issue…”162
I examine this further in chapter 3, where I consider the implications of emissions limits 
for principles of equity. But conventional economics does not recognise growth limits or 
see equity as being of central economic relevance. It requires, as with attempts to address 
environmental externalities, 'political' values imported from outside of the model, which, 
as has been suggested, are in tension with the outcomes it promotes. Daly and Cobb have 
described all such ways of dealing with externalities as “ad hoc corrections introduced as 
needed to save appearances, like the epicycles of Ptolemaic astronomy”163. The overriding 
goal of neo-classical economics remains financial efficiency, which obscures the reasons 
that different kinds of costs and benefits are valuable, their relative importance and the 
embeddedness of the economy within a social and environmental context. This threatens 
our ability to understand how these relationships work. In the context of DACC, the 
content of an international agreement must rest instead on an approach that better models 
these relationships and why they are important. 
162 Galbraith and Salinger, 1979, p155.
163 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p37.
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C: The Green Economic alternative
4. The need for a new economic paradigm.
Part B considered the problems presented by the way in which conventional economics 
understands DACC and the three criteria for an international agreement on mitigation. I 
suggested that conventional economic understanding of DACC as a “tragedy of the 
commons” or public goods problem mislocated the cause as arising from an inevitable 
structural conflict between individual and collective rationality.  However, I argued that, 
rather, this conflict arises in DACC in so far as it is promoted by the game theoretical 
dynamics of neo-classical economic theory and practice which prioritise economic 
efficiency at the expense of ecological effectiveness and equity. In this part of the chapter, 
I explain how Green Economics offers an alternative approach that accommodates these 
concerns; its understanding of the environment-society-economy relationship, the 
implications for the three criteria for an international climate agreement, and how it might 
help reframe the concept of a commons.
The criticisms I offered in Part B of the conventional neo-classical economic approach 
were directed at both conceptual and moral flaws. It is conceptually flawed, because the 
way in which it guides policy and behaviour misportrays the dependence of economic 
activity on social norms and ecosystemic functioning. In doing so, as Daly similarly argues 
in his  “biophysical” critique of the “means” of “growth economists”, economists 
undermine the biophysical basis for their own existence164. It is morally flawed because its 
economics, supposedly value-neutral, leaves no place for explicit moral direction of 
economic activity, but is nonetheless guided by efficiency which is a normative value165 
and overrides other values – rights, duties, well-being, equality, respect, and so on, which 
would otherwise shape economic interactions166. Here too, I roughly echo Daly's criticism 
of the “ends” of “growth economists” on an “ethicosocial” basis167. For, as Daly and Cobb 
argue elsewhere, “If all value derives only from satisfaction of individual wants, then there 
164 Daly, 1993a p21-22 
165 Efficiency may be considered a moral value in so far as it is defended using some form of preference 
utilitarianism. I consider this in chapter 4 
166 This is not to suppose that conceptual and moral dimensions are entirely distinct. Rather, as I shall clarify 
later regards to my position on the fact/value distinction, I see them as two aspects of the same problem.
167 Daly, 1997, p35.
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is nothing left over on the basis of which self-interested, individualistic want satisfaction 
can be restrained”.168169
What is increasingly called for is a different economic way of thinking – and, 
correspondingly, of operating - which better reflects conceptually the interactions between 
the economy, society and the environment, and which allows for ethical direction of 
economic activity. Andrew Simms, of the New Economics Foundation, suggests that “A 
paradigm shift is emerging not from politics or ideology, but from a deep fissure opening 
up between two great continental plates – on the one hand, the way the world does 
business, on the other, the limited tolerance of the earth’s environment that business 
depends on”170. Likewise George Monbiot has argued that “The crisis we face demands a 
profound philosophical discussion, a reappraisal of who we are and what progress 
means”171.
As suggested in part A, it is this kind of new paradigm that green economics, and its 
variants in ecological economics, attempts to present172. It offers an alternative paradigm in 
so far as it fundamentally reconceives relationships and descriptions of entities within the 
domain of economics, as well as economic practice. The economy is understood as 
physically embedded within a social and ecological context and thus subject to their limits, 
but also, therefore, morally embedded, such that it should operate in accordance with 
ethically identifiable social and ecological ends which form an inseparable part of the 
model. I explore this in section 2.
This picture constitutes what Daly calls a new ‘pre-analytic vision’ to underpin our 
economic understanding. This term is borrowed by Daly from Schumpeter, who describes 
a “pre-analytic cognitive act that supplies the raw material for the analytic effort”173. It 
implies a particular ontological conception which is brought to reality prior to ones attempt 
to analyse it – a starting picture or model of how the world is set up which shapes our 
168 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p50-51
169 They also highlight here that in this sense the market erodes its own moral foundations, since “the market 
still depends absolutely on a community that shares such values as honesty, freedom, initiative, thrift and 
other virtues whose authority will not long withstand the reduction to the level of personal tastes...” (Daly 
and Cobb, 1990, p50).
170 Simms, 2001, p1, 
171 Monbiot, 2007.
172 Although Herman Daly is, strictly speaking, an ecological economist, his writings have provided the 
theoretical underpinnings for green economics.
173 Joseph Schumpeter, cited in Daly and Townsend, 1993, p5.  
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perception and interpretation of it. This can be thought of as the starting point which 
frames economic thinking in a particular economic paradigm. This understanding uses the 
term “paradigm” as roughly analogous to Kuhn regarding scientific activity, where he 
suggests that in a paradigm “some accepted examples of actual scientific practice – 
accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples which include law, theory, 
application and instrumentation together –provide models from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of scientific research”174. In the case of conventional, broadly neo-
classical economic traditions, these examples would include practices such as CBA which 
were considered in Section B.  
However, such a use is, as Daly acknowledges, to adopt “a bit of poetic license”175. 
Because, firstly, there is a distinction between physical and social sciences176. As Daly 
highlights, the supposed laws “explemplified by… societies” which are said to describe 
social reality are, unlike physical sciences, not universal, and “become unapplicable as 
those types of society give ways to others”177.  In other words, the structure of social reality 
changes, and, furthermore, as suggested earlier, is influenced by our description of it178 in 
contrast to the physical sciences (even if our ontological categories for physical reality do). 
Secondly, it should be noted that for Kuhn each paradigm defined scientific practice for its 
duration, that is, what is considered to count as “normal science” at any point179. In 
economics this is not the case to the same extent; other heterodox economic trends have 
always been present. However, it is arguably the case that the broadly neo-classical 
conventional economic approach is more than just a dominant trend of thinking – it defines 
the field through the way economics is taught at least at an undergraduate level180.
Thirdly and lastly, Kuhn also used the notion of paradigm shifts historically, to describe 
the process of sudden change between one scientific model (and its corresponding network 
of beliefs and ontological assumptions) to another, whereas here it is being used 
normatively, to suggest the need for such a shift. However, the term functions here, as 
174 Kuhn, 1996, p10.
175 Daly, 1993a, p15.
176 See Winch, 1990, p66-71. Hutchinson et al, 2008, have argued that social sciences should not be 
considered sciences at al. 
177 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p29.
178 Read, 2007a, p318, (cited in the Introduction) and Daly and Cobb, 1990, p93, referenced chapter 1, part B, 
section 2.2.
179 Kuhn, 1996, p10.
180 See Reardon, 2007.
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summarised in section 0.3, to emphasise that what is required is not just a different 
economic system consisting in distinct tools or brands, but an alternative eco-political 
economy – a different way to understand and organise the economy and conduct economic 
analysis in the context of distinct social and environmental assumptions and values.
 
5. Green Economic alternative picture/ ordering of criteria.
5.1 Picturing/modelling the economy-society-environment relationship
I now consider in more detail the “pre-analytic vision” of the economy-society-
environment relationship portrayed by the conventional economic paradigm. The core, 
neo-classical picture would, as discussed in part B, section 3.1, fail to represent these 
relationships even minimally. The diagram I alluded to, recounted by Daly from a World 
Bank draft report of the environment-economy relationship, is representative of the “pre-
analytic vision” of the conventional economic paradigm. Its depiction of the “square 
labeled “economy” with an arrow coming in labelled “inputs” and an arrow going out 
labelled “outputs””181 represents the economy as unbounded, with no sense of the nature or 
constraints of its environment (see Fig 1. A) . Daly relates how, on asking the World 
Bank’s chief economist what he believed was the “optimal scale of the macro economy 
relative to the environment”, he replied, “That’s not the right way to look at it”182.
Thus, the economy is depicted as continually expandable, and so far as  society is 
concerned, Daly reminds us of Polanyi’s observation, that according to the conventional 
economy view, “instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations 
are embedded in the economic system”183.  It then becomes clearer why, under this picture, 
it appears reasonable to move to an environmental economic position and internalise the 
environmental (and social) externalities through simply expanding the economy and ignore 
the concerns raised in section B; there are no limits or constraints, just alterations to the 
efficiency of the system.
181 Daly, 1997, p6.
182 Ibid.
183 Daly and Cobb, 1990 p8.
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The environmental economic approach might conceivably, however, be represented with 
another starting point, taken from some forms of the ‘sustainability’ approach184. Here, the 
three domains of environment, society and economy are depicted as three equally 
overlapping circles, and has been argued as being the best and most “well-balanced” way 
of understanding sustainability185, by giving “equal weight to all three aspects” (see Fig. 1 
B)
This, however, is not a significant enough improvement on the neo-classical picture since 
the structural relationship between the three domains is unclear. It gives no sense as to how 
each might be dependent on the other, to potential conflicts between concerns of each and 
what it would mean to give each “equal weight”. Scott-Cato has similarly criticised this as 
representing another “conventional economic view of the interaction between economy, 
society and the environment”186, noting that here the domains “interact but are not 
interdependent”. Indeed, Scott-Cato argues that the conventional picture of sustainability 
“makes clear why economists refer to the negative consequences of production 
processes… as an ‘externality’, because in their view of the world what happens to the 
environment and the people who live in it happens somewhere else. It can be pushed 
outside the ‘economy’ circle and dealt with elsewhere”. Although this is more pronounced 
in the conventional economic picture suggested by Daly and here there is some overlap, it 
still appears that the domains are largely separated from one another. Conversely, from an 
environmental economist’s perspective, in the conventional sustainability picture the 
184 Indeed, Scott-Cato describes this as the “conventional economic view of the interaction between economy, 
society and environment”, Scott-Cato, 2009, p37.
185 Friedman, 2007, p7
186 Scott-Cato, 2009, p37.
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A) adapted from Daly, 1997, p6 and B) from Friedman, 2007, p7
economic circle could potentially expand infinitely, accommodating and internalising 
increasing areas of the other two domains.
At the heart of the alternative Green Economic paradigm is a very different picture of the 
relationship between the environmental, social and economic domains. This shift in 
conceptualisation is an central part of what it means to move to an alternative paradigm in 
this context. For Herman Daly, the appropriate “pre-analytic vision” of the economy-
environment relationship is of the “economy as subsystem”187 (see fig.2, A) – a subsystem 
of the environment, which is itself understood as “ecosystem” to reflect the way in which it 
functions as a series of interrelated systems, rather than a static collection of resources. The 
economy is then understood as “not exempt from natural laws”188 which impose limits on 
the rate at which production can be undertaken and total economic growth. This is in 
contrast both to seeing the economy as infinitely expandable in relation to the ecosystem 
and also to an “ecological reductionism” where human values are understood wholly by 
“the same evolutionary forces of chance and necessity that presumably control the natural 
world.”189 The human economy is a distinctive system contained within – part of - the 
ecosystem.
It should also be noted that the limits that constrain the size of the economy relative to the 
ecosystem are not just absolute physical limits – before we reach this point, there will be 
187 Daly, 1997, p6.
188 Daly, 1997,  p11
189 Ibid. 
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Fig. 2:
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Picture A adapted from Daly, 1997, p49, Picture B from Scott-Cato, 2009, p37
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different degrees of tolerability in terms of how we and our economy can live. That is, “the 
maximum scale is not likely to be the optimal scale”190. These tolerability limits need to be 
considered ethically, as I discuss later in 5.2. Additionally, these boundaries should not 
simply be considered as defining limits or constraints but possibilities; those possibilities 
offered by the ecosystem for economic activity. For, it should be recalled, the picture aims 
to convey the idea of dependency of the economy through its embeddedness in the 
ecosystem. The latter does not prevent the former from further developing in a wholly 
negative sense, therefore, but rather it provides a constrained set of possibilities for 
economic activity (beyond which further economic expansion initially diminishes quality 
of life or ecosystemic functioning and ultimately becomes physically impossible). These 
limits might best be described as ‘constrained possibilities’191.
What is clearly missing from this description of alternative picture is an explicit mention of 
society as an additional domain, which, I suggest, reflects the ecological rather than green 
economic focus of Daly’s approach192. Green economist Scott-Cato has described a slightly 
varied picture (see Fig 2, B) which sees the economy as a subsystem embedded in both 
society and the environment, to reflect an understanding of the economy as limited by, 
unexhaustive of and formed by, social interactions193. That it is “formed by” society is 
important, since the content and qualities our of economic interactions are forged from our 
social norms and relationships – Scott-Cato is clear that embedding the economy within 
society is a call for “a humanizing of economic relationships”, rather than operating merely 
as “production and consumption units”194, i.e. the notion of “homo economicus”, as 
described earlier by Daly and Cobb195. As with the embedding of the economy within the 
ecosystem, then, the embedding is both positive and negative, reflecting possibilities as 
well as limits.  
190 Daly, 1997, p51,
191 I owe this suggestion to Dr Tom Greaves (personal conversation).
192 The distinction between ecological and green economics is otherwise not yet well-defined. Scott-Cato 
(Scott-Cato, 2009), describes it as partly methodological, in that ecological economics , like environmental 
economics “still places considerable emphasis on measurement and valuation, and considers itself a scientific 
discipline, drawing many concepts and techniques from mainstream economics.” (p7) whereas “green 
economists have a different orientation” and have “taken much from the work of other areas of heterodox 
economics, particularly ecofeminist and ecosocialist economists, as well as development economists.... When 
green economists do engage in measurement they try to do it in a more human and accessible way” (p8). 
Green economics might therefore be understood as having a more explicitly political-economic mandate.
193 Scott-Cato, 2009, p41-45
194 Scott Cato, 2009, p42
195 Daly and Cobb, 1990, p85
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The Green Economic picture, therefore, understands two of the domains as embedded in, 
or part of, another; that “economic activity takes place within a network of social 
relationships”196, a “subsystem of human society… which is itself, in the second instance, a 
subsystem of the totality of life on Earth (the biosphere). And no subsystem can expand 
beyond the capacity of the total system of which it is a part”197.  This better captures the 
green economic concern with both social and environmental considerations for economic 
activity alike. As with the previous Ecological Economic picture, we can describe each 
subsystem as dependent on and limited by the constrained possibilities offered by the 
system within which it is embedded.
What I have termed the ‘Green Economic picture’ is criticised in Friedman198 for 
supposedly regarding “nature and natural resources as encompassing and influencing 
decisions in other realms”, thereby enlarging the environmental realm “at the expense of 
others”199. But Friedman and advocates of this conventional view of sustainability ignore 
the fundamental function of the picture – in Green and Ecological Economics the economy 
is depicted as a subsystem of the ecosystem because it is understood as part of it, and 
dependent on it; not because it is seen as crudely less important. Friedman's simplistic idea 
of importance implies commensurability between the spheres in order to make the 
comparison between two apparently competing areas of preference, but fails to recognise 
the nature of the relationship between them.  
A further improvement to the Green Economic picture of the three concentric circles which 
would offer a clearer, more nuanced representation of the Green Economic position, might 
be to consider variances in their size and shape. With regards to the former, it seems clear 
that ecosystemic constraints and possibilities for human and non-human life may vary 
significantly as the ecosystem changes. For example, at times when the earth has been 
significantly cooler or significantly hotter, the constraints on possibilities for life would be 
much higher. This might be represented by reducing (or, at other times enlarging - see fig. 
3) the outer circle as the total boundary of the ecosystem. This might also alter as a result 
of human social or economic activity ‘from within’ the inner two circles.  This could help 
196 Scott-Cato, 2009, p37
197 Porrit, cited in Scott-Cato, p37
198 Though here the picture is said to represent “environmentalism” – tellingly misconstruing the position as 
an arbitrary promotion of the “environment” rather than an attempt to understand our relationships with our 
“ecosystem”.
199 Friedman, 2007, p7.
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describe the current concerns with DACC, where, for example, human activity in 
increasing GHG emissions is altering the function of the climatic process of our ecosystem 
such that at some point possibilities for life are, overall, reduced, again represented by 
diminishing the outer circle.
Similarly, it might then seem reasonable to alter the depiction of the embedded boundaries 
of the ecosystem and the society and economy subsystems from circles to irregular areas 
(see fig 4), so as to recognise that constrained possibilities may be expanded for some 
forms of life or human activities but reduced for others. For example, again regarding the 
outer ecosystemic boundary, some ecosystemic changes such as in temperature may allow 
some life forms to flourish but mean others struggle.
These dynamics should be recognised as features of the green economic picture so as to 
reflect the non-static nature of the processes involved and the interdependencies between 
them. For such changes are a feature of the very problem we are seeking to describe and 
resolve in DACC. However, for simplicity’s sake, I will continue to represent and refer to 
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Fig. 3: Changes to the size of ecological constrained possibilities
Fig. 4 Changes to the shape of ecological constrained possibilities
this picture in the more abstracted form of embedded circles, but with the caveat that both 
size and shape of the boundaries are variable and non-static200.
5.2 Implications for the criteria for climate policy
The three criteria for a DACC agreement; ecological effectiveness, equity and efficiency, 
can be understood as mapping onto these three domains. For they reflect a normative 
recognition of constraints and guidance for economic activity that arise from these domains 
– i.e. ecological effectiveness as an ecosystemic constraint, equity as a social constraint 
and efficiency as an economic constraint. The picture described in 2.1 is therefore the 
conceptual basis for ordering the criteria. The Green Economic paradigm will accordingly 
order the criteria with ecological effectiveness first, equity second and efficiency third, 
because each is subject to the constraints of and possibilities afforded by the earlier 
criterion. In this sense the criteria are not ‘prioritised’ as such, in terms of one trumping 
another in order to deal with potential conflicts between them. Rather, they might be 
understood as being ‘ordered’ such that each is understood in terms of those prior, and 
conflicts between them can be resolved. 
In fact, when Aubrey Meyer describes the “prioritizing” of his four priorities (from which 
this thesis was provoked), he does not appear to consider their ordering to be exclusively 
one of priority201, but regarding the structural relationship between them. He says, for 
example, of his first priority, precaution202, that the “first crucial division of oneness is into 
two-ness [i.e. equity]”, and of his second priority, equity, that this “does not displace but 
does contain and does take precedence over… threeness [i.e. efficiency]”203. Whilst the 
creative language is somewhat obscure and philosophically ambiguous, it seems clear that 
Meyer’s idea is at least in part that each “priority” should be understood and treated in 
terms of, as part of, those preceding it. For Meyer it is only in so doing that “prosperity”, 
his fourth priority will be attained – each comes from and depends on the previous, which 
he makes clear by citing his inspiration:
200 However, these diagrams should not be taken as spatially literal. They aim to conceptually represent the 
fact that the functioning  of the ecosystem can change. But the diagramatic representations of all three 
spheres should not be understood as implying that all three could literally be captured on one scale such that 
their relative size and shape could be measured, i.e. strong commensurability.
201 Although it is also this – I return this question of prioritisation later.
202 Which very roughly performs the function of my “ecological effectiveness” criterion
203 Meyer, 2000, p33, my emphasis.
66
“The simple timeless device of the Tao – ‘from one comes two, from two comes 
three and from three come the ten thousand things' – creates an ‘architecture of 
understanding’ for what are otherwise the random and conflicting priorities…”204
This becomes slightly less obscure if we understand this as akin to Jonathan Porritt’s 
attempt to reconcile two “potentially irreconcilable imperatives”205 – the “biological 
imperative” and the “political imperative”. He views the former as an “absolute” 
imperative to “live sustainably on the planet” if we are to avoid extinction, and the latter as 
a “relative” imperative “to aspire to improve our material standard of living year on 
year”206. However, such “social and economic goals” are “secondary goals: all else is 
conditional upon learning to live sustainably within the Earth’s systems and limits”. By 
this he means that such “biophysical sustainability” is “pre-conditional”207 to the success of 
social and economic goals, not that these are of lesser moral importance. 
Porritt does point out that “they are really two sides of the same coin”208. That is, there is 
also a sense in which achieving this “biological imperative” might also be said to be 
dependent on achieving social and economic goals because, for example, poverty and 
inequality creates pressures for growth which in turn impacts on environmental processes. 
One might then be tempted to say that equity is also “preconditional” for achieving 
ecological effectiveness, and question the suggested ordering. However, this sense in 
which equity might be described as “preconditional” is different. To return to the Green 
Economic picture, what this signifies is that human social and economic interactions can 
influence and alter the outer ecosystemic sphere that contains us, from the inside (as 
discussed at the end of 5.1). But our very existence within which equity becomes relevant 
is the constrained possibilities created by the ecosystem and how it changes. Ecological 
effectiveness, like Porritt’s “biophysical sustainability” is then “preconditional” in the 
sense that, although clearly alterable by human economic activity (which is the basis for 
204 Ibid.
205 Porritt, 2007, p1
206 Although one could contest this statement of the political imperative and prefer, for example to better 
distribute what we currently have and regard continuous material improvement to our standard of living to be 
unnecessary above a certain point, as I suggest in chapter 3, section 4.5.
207 Porritt, 2007, p8, my emphasis.
208 Porritt, 2007, p8.
67
this very discussion), its fulfilment creates or maintains these conditions for our social and 
economic existence – these particular constrained possibilities. 
Similarly, both ecological effectiveness and equity are preconditional to efficiency, since, 
as I argue in chapter 4, efficiency cannot be understood in isolation. Rather, one has to be 
efficient at something, and it is misleading to speak of an economy as efficient without 
reference to important ecological and social ends. Hence Scott-Cato has argued that “It is 
hard to consider as 'efficient' a system which allows some people to starve while others are 
so over-endowed with resources that they consume so much as to make themselves 
unhealthy...”209. I develop this idea further in chapter 4.
The ordering is in part, then, a structural one. This is also evident in Daly’s related 
description of three conflicting general values for economic activity: allocation 
(efficiency), distribution (justice) and scale (sustainability)210, which broadly correspond to 
the three criteria of efficiency, equity and ecological effectiveness. As Daly implies, it is 
only once a limit to scale and ‘natural capital’211 is recognised that the relevance of 
distribution (and therefore equity) can be understood. For, the neo-classical view does not 
understand economic activity as sharing a “global pie” but “a lot of separate tarts, which 
some statistician has stupidly aggregated into an abstract pie. The tarts are the product of 
value added by the labor and capital of the nations that produced them…” whereas once 
“nature’s value added” really is understood as “a global pie... the demands for justice 
regarding its division and stewardship cannot be subsumed under the traditional notion that 
value belongs to whoever adds it.”212. 
However, the ordering clearly also in this sense has an ethical constituent, and I consider 
the three ordered criteria to be ethico-conceptual. For, as I discussed in 2.1. with regards to 
the relationship between the embedded spheres, they do not just describe absolute 
constraints in a lawlike fashion. They are also normative, in that they reflect an ethical 
judgement about the appropriate level of prevention of problems that would result as 
209 Scott-Cato, 1999, p41
210 Daly, 1997, p51.
211 I have some concerns about this terminology which seems to revert to a neo-classical conceptual scheme. 
However, what is meant is the resource base for our economy – those aspects of capital, the material goods 
and services required for economic production, which arise from and are limited by ‘nature’ – the ecosystem.
212 Daly, 1997, p70. Galbraith has made a similar point (see start of chapter 3).
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absolute limits are approached. For, again, the conditions for bare survival are different 
from conditions for flourishing. 
Firstly, they involve minimally ethical judgements, in that given the green economic 
conceptual understanding of the relationships between the ecosystemic, social and 
economic domains, most conventional ethical approaches would advocate the general, 
'thin' ordering. The general ordering itself does not require or imply that ethical priority be 
given to non-human nature, or even that it is valued non-instrumentally.  The ordering of 
“ecological effectiveness” as prior to “equity” and “efficiency” requires, as a minimum, 
only belief in the value of human life and well-being or flourishing – a degree of existence 
above mere survival – the conditions of which must be preserved through the ‘ecological 
effectiveness’ of an international agreement on DACC. 
The ethical commitment required for the ordering of “equity” as prior to “efficiency”213 
has two elements. The first element is a belief that all humans have an equal moral status, 
and the second an agreement that this implies distributional equity rather than simply fair 
treatment in procedure as, for example, Nozick does in requiring that fair rules guiding 
transactions are more relevant than the resulting distribution (see discussion in chapter 3). 
Those who hold either to this latter view or to some form of preference utilitarianism - 
which is sometimes said to justify the  individualism of the conventional economic 
paradigm - will not consider that equity should be ordered above efficiency since they will 
not see it as a moral social norm or constraint to guide economic interaction. I will not 
rehearse here the traditional arguments against these positions. However, I consider 
arguments in chapter 3 that may persuade those not in principle concerned about 
distributive equity but about alleviating poverty and meeting basic human needs (see 
chapter 3, section 5.2).
Secondly, however, the thin ordering itself is still general in that it does not yet determine 
the content of each criterion, and hence the possibilities for and constraints on one criterion 
by each prior. For example, “ecological effectiveness” could be understood eco-centrically 
rather than anthropocentrically214, as in the minimal conception described above. This may 
213 I.e. for considering equity as a social ends which guides economic activity.
214 Although, as I argue in chapter 2, part A, section 2, I think it ultimately unnecessary to make the 
distinction with regards to DACC.
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be thought to influence the degree of warming seen to be ethically acceptable – how 
ecologically effective an agreement is required to be - and will in turn affects the size of 
the “global pie” of emissions within which all countries need to be restricted. And there 
will be disagreements over the “demands of justice” with regards to interpreting the 
criterion of equity for distributing this “global pie”, and within which the concerns of 
efficiency must in turn operate. These considerations will not alter the order of the criteria, 
but they will alter their interpretation. The thin ordering of the criteria, then, as I have 
elucidated it so far, does not entail controversial ethical commitments or by itself tell us 
much about which kinds of agreements would be acceptable according to the criteria. 
Nonetheless, this ordering emerging from a Green Economic perspective and 
reconceptualisation of, the embeddedness of human economy and society in the ecosystem 
does, I believe, in fact influence the content of the criteria, to provide a thicker 
understanding of the ordering. But further argument is needed for this more controversial 
ethical approach, which is part of the function of later chapters that discuss each criterion 
in turn.
In suggesting this ethico-conceptual ordering I do not fall on either side of the “fact-value” 
distinction debate, and commit to whether or not the thicker ethical aspect of the Green 
Economic paradigm and its ordering of the criteria are wholly distinct from its conceptual 
basis. It may be argued, for example, as Callicott has suggested, that there is a 
“psychological connection” which exists “between the way the world is imagined or 
conceived and what state of things is held to be good or bad, what ways of behaving are 
right or wrong, and what responsibilities and obligations we, as moral agents, 
acknowledge”215. Or it may be considered more strongly that no distinction exists 
altogether. However, I wish to move beyond the fact-value debate and consider both as 
aspects of ways of seeing the world, and recognise, as Daly has, the importance of the 
“physical, the social and the moral dimensions of our knowledge” being “integrated into a 
unified paradigm”216. 
This does not, however, mean that there will not be further disagreements within the 
paradigm over its “physical”, “social” or “moral dimensions”, (such as the degree to which 
215 Callicott, 1989, p40
216 Daly, 1993b, p357
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it is eco- or anthropocentric). What follows in subsequent chapters will therefore be an 
attempt to highlight some of these disagreements as they arise in the three criteria for an 
agreement on DACC, and flesh out how I suggest that they should be resolved. This is in 
addition to the arguments above over how the Green Economic conceptualisation will 
influence the content of the criteria and provide a thicker understanding of the ordering. 
To offer a little more concreteness, I will briefly suggest one common example of how the 
order of the criteria might be understood and implemented with regards to an agreement on 
DACC. The idea of tradable permits, which have recently become one of the most popular 
international GHG reduction policies, has been described by Daly with regards to his 
broadly analogous three goals, as “a beautiful example of the independence and proper 
relationship among allocation, distribution and scale”217. The scale of a particular economic 
activity with regards to the ecosystem is determined by the total number of permits, these 
are then distributed according to one’s favoured principle of equity, and then traded in 
order to achieve efficiency218. How far this does in fact fulfil the ordered criteria is 
disputable in that, as I discuss in chapter 4, fulfilment of ‘efficiency’ through trading 
permits may yet undermine equity, and ecological effectiveness through altering where 
emission reductions occur. However, it is a plausible example for the moment, of the way 
in which the ordered criteria might be said to be fulfilled and operate in practice to guide 
international policy.
Irrespective of the thicker conception of the criteria, one major significance of their general 
ordering is the Green Economic reversal of the conventional economic starting point for 
global emission reduction policies; to tackle DACC in the most economically efficient 
way. Aubrey Meyer has put this more directly:
 “GCI thought that the truly objective question was, ‘how well does the 
economic system serve people and planet’ rather than ‘how big can we get the 
economy to be’, we agreed that the economists were asking the wrong 
question”219.
217 Daly, 1997, p52
218 Which is roughly the approach of Meyer’s C & C policy framework. See Meyer, 2000.
219 Meyer, 2000, p14
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This requires relinquishing assumptions about the need for continual economic growth and 
cost minimisation, a misframing of the problem which, Larry Lohmann has argued, has led 
to overlooking solutions for DACC. He argues, “there has never been a lack of materials or 
ingenuity for dealing with climate change… For the world’s majority, global warming 
remains a problem for which they already have the solution; forgoing excessive use of 
fossil fuels”220. But this is obscured, and responsibility is distanced (in the West) onto 
“future car-hungry Chinese or Indians”, as part of a conceptualisation where 
“overconsumption is the universal human destiny”221. The policy question of “trade-off” 
between the criteria must be based instead, as Daly suggests222, on “an ethical judgment 
about the quality of our social relations rather than a willingness-to-pay calculation”223. 
That is, an understanding of human prosperity in terms of development – qualitative 
improvement – within ecological limits, rather than continuous individual or collective 
economic growth. In arguing for the thin ordering of the criteria I am suggesting that 
policies must start by judging the degree of DACC that is ethically and biophysically 
important to prevent; then, whatever this is, to consider how to do so in a way that is 
globally distributively equitable, and lastly consider the most efficient means of achieving 
this equitably shared emissions reduction.
To return momentarily to the idea of “ordering”, I argued at the start of 5.2 that under the 
Green Economic ordering of the criteria I have developed, they are not 'prioritised' as such, 
but, rather, each is understood in terms of the constraints of those prior. However, as I later 
alluded to, Meyer seemingly does refer to the order of his parallel “priorities” in part in 
terms of prioritisation. Might this also be useful here? To return to Meyer's principles, the 
only place in which the ordering is specifically described as prioritisation is the 
relationship between his priorities two and three – equity and efficiency. To recall, he said 
that equity “does contain and does take precedence over… threeness [i.e. efficiency]”224. I 
suggest that this occurs because he still conceives of efficiency largely in conventional 
economic terms, i.e. financial cost-minimisation of emissions reductions, as (in allocative 
efficiency at least) does Daly. I discuss this in chapter 4, section 3.1. But conceived thus, it 
is still in conflict with and thus can be trumped by equity, since it presents an alternative 
220 Lohmann, 2008b, p3
221 Ibid.
222 Of what he terms the goals of scale, distribution and allocation, Daly, 1997, p51
223 Daly, 1997, p55.
224 Meyer, 2000, p33
72
rather than complementary mode of distributing resources. Under a Green Economic view, 
equity (and ecological effectiveness) would clearly be prioritised over such a conception of 
efficiency, and the ordering understood in part as a relationship of prioritisation. However, 
as I suggested earlier, it would then be unclear what would be left of this conception of 
efficiency to implement as a criterion without it undermining the other criteria. My aim in 
chapter 4 will, therefore, be to consider how far this would be the case, and to begin to 
reconceptualise efficiency so as to complement the other criteria. The idea of prioritisation 
would then be unnecessary.
6. Revisiting the commons
I want finally to return to the idea of a global commons and sketch an alternative 
conception to that of game theory, discussed in section B. Richard Starkey has identified 
several variations in what can be meant by a commons, which he argues are often 
conflated. Particularly relevant here is whether a commons should be considered as a 
resource that is “commonly-owned”, (Starkey refers to this as “C1”) or “unowned”, 
(referred to as “C2”).  Under the former, the resource is a remaining part of the world 
originally owned by all225, and under the latter not owned by anyone. Starkey argues that 
C1 is more philosophically dubious than C2 for “the majority of contemporary 
philosophers”226 because of the difficulty in establishing the basis for such original 
common ownership without invoking religious arguments which view a commons as a gift 
from God227.
However, I would suggest that the distinction between C1 and C2 is too literal a view of 
the relationship between common resources and their users. Rather, one can say that the 
term “commons” describes a particular practical and moral relationship between users of 
the land or resource in question. I here draw from Baer, who offers the following 
definition:
“any system in which the use of a resource by one party causes harm to another can 
be used as a commons. Those harmed necessarily have a moral stake in the use or 
225 Starkey, 2008, p14.
226 Starkey, 2008, p18.
227 See Starkey, 2008, p14-18
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conservation of the resource, even if they don’t have the ability to exploit it in kind 
and thus to cause a symmetric harm… it is when each party can cause harm to the 
others that we have a classic commons problem”228
This description clearly reflects aspects of the game theoretical conception of a commons; 
however, I read Baer as reversing the imperative in the relationships between individuals in 
such a scenario. Each party “can cause harm to the others”, but if the “moral stake” of 
those harmed is recognised, each individual cannot see their actions in isolation from the 
effects they collectively have on all affected by the use of the resource, and instead act 
with this in mind. Recognising a resource as a commons under the view I am suggesting 
entails recognising that this implies limits on individuals (even if we may disagree about 
where exactly those limits lie). 
Hence as Baer later argues:
“in a commons, individuals typically gain much more from their use of the 
resource than they suffer from the degradation their use causes; thus one can 
increase one’s own well-being by overconsuming and harming the other users… 
a common resource establishes a moral community. To protect the resource and to 
protect themselves the parties must grant each other the right to a fair share...”229
Crucially, here, a moral community is defined as a community where “Each party can 
harm or be harmed by the other, and depends on the other’s cooperation” - it is a 
relationship of interdependency. For Baer, it is the very possibility of causing harm in such 
a way in the case of DACC that creates these obligations.  “Because one country’s use [of 
the GHG gas assimilative capacity of the earth] affects all others, the moral community 
and moral obligations exist whether they are respected or not”230. The idea of a global 
moral community in this sense is distinct from traditional communitarian conceptions of 
community which would require, for example, that “some values and some attitudes 
towards moral and political questions are common to most people and serve as a 
background or framework when the members engage in discourse on their political and 
228 Baer, 2002, p396
229 Baer, 2002, p397
230 Baer, 2002, p404 
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social life”231 - that is, wider ideological or moral similarity, which are not present at a 
global level. 
Rather, the “moral community” as described by Baer is a community only by virtue of the 
moral and practical relationships of its members regarding the resource in question. Since, 
Bayer argues, the “whole world” cannot “obtain... the emissions levels of the industrialized 
countries” without causing “catastrophic climate change” and “this risk puts a limit on 
Greenhouse Gas emissions, one can think of the limit as defining the available 
“environmental space”... the particular environmental space at issue here – the atmosphere 
– must be brought under common governance; global rules for its use and allocation must 
be discussed, decided and enforced”232. This conception of a commons as a “moral 
community” held together by “moral obligations” established by the harm each can do to 
another is, therefore at the heart of Baer's – and my – approach to an international climate 
change agreement.  Here, an agreement should recognise the presence of a carrying 
capacity for GHG emissions, represented by a global emissions cap to define a global 
'budget', and the resulting moral obligations to share its use fairly. And in this way, such an 
understanding of a global climate commons encapsulates the general ordering of the 
criteria which I described in 5.2.
What is as yet unclear is, as Baer suggests, the “rules for its use and allocation” which 
“must be discussed”; in terms of the criteria, how exactly these should be interpreted. This 
discussion will form chapters 2-4 of the thesis, where I discuss the three criteria in order. 
As I have suggested, the controversy lies not only in questions of distribution – in one's 
interpretation of equity and efficiency. For, though we may recognise the existence of a 
carrying capacity for GHG emissions, this is not in itself a straightforward quantity, but 
depends on the point at which we believe further damage from DACC would be too 
detrimental. This, along with how we should deal with risk and uncertainty in the damage 
that might be caused, is the question for the next chapter, which examines the first 
criterion: ecological effectiveness. 
231 De Shalit, 1995, p27
232 Baer, 2002, p393. Although, as described in 2.1. this should not be thought of as a fixed space since it will 
alter over time, and indeed, our current and future emissions levels will 'contract' the space still further. 
Additionally, it should be remembered that this is not only a “space” but constrained set of possibilities for 
human existence and activity. However, the term “environmental space” can still be a useful way to convey 
the concept of a “carrying capacity” and limits to particular economic activities.
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CHAPTER 2 – Ecological Effectiveness.
0. Introduction
I now consider the first criterion for an agreement on DACC, ecological effectiveness, 
which defines the ecological limits within which human societies should operate. In an 
international climate change agreement, it will guide the emissions space: the quantity of 
(capped) global emissions and the emissions trajectory judged to be ecologically effective 
in preventing DACC1.  This is in contrast to the practice that has emerged during 
international negotiations, and agreed in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, of countries simply 
tabling individual offers or pledges of reductions, irrespective of the resulting total global 
reductions2. The global emissions ‘budget’ is thereby effectively defined by these pledges, 
rather than by common, justifiable goals. As one observer from the WWF has commented, 
“They say they want 2C, the pledges don’t get to 2C. It is like the emperor has no clothes”3 
For an ecological effectiveness criterion to be operational, it must normatively define these 
limits to emissions space. It is insufficient to simply require that DACC should be 
prevented, since, as increasingly noted,4 ““danger” is a contested term”5, and requires value 
judgements to be made. Crucially, therefore, it must be clear about what is meant by 
“danger”, or harm. Harms occur as the earth is increasingly less able to absorb further 
GHGs from the atmosphere, raising global mean temperature (GMT) through radiative 
forcing and altering climatic systems. We need, therefore, to judge both the point at which 
this process causes morally relevant harms, but also  how to take account of the uncertainty 
over the corresponding quantity of global GHG emissions. This will affect the level of 
emissions judged to be “dangerous” under the criterion, and which need to be prevented. 
These two dimensions of danger6, harmful effects and the uncertainty of their occurrence, 
1 Ecological effectiveness will not be limited to climate impacts but other environmental/ ecological impacts 
and risks that might come from our response to climate change. Although the focus here is on international 
policy (affecting emissions targets and trajectory), national policies responses would need to consider these 
wider impacts, including, for example, drives for increased nuclear power as a means to reduce GHG 
emissions.
2 Vidal, 2010.
3 Lou Leonard of WWF, cited in Black, 2010.
4 E.g. Schneider, 2006, p609; Harvey, 2007a, p2; Smith et al, 2009, p1; Brown, 2002, p226
5 Lorenzoni 2005, p1388.
6 See e.g. Harvey, 2007a, p2, Schneider and Lane 2006, p8, drawing from the definition of risk as 
“probability X consequence”. In section B, however, I consider the limits to using risk quantitatively in this 
fashion in order to respond to potential harms.
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are considered in Sections A and B respectively, although, as I shall argue, they are 
significantly intertwined. 
Part A examines the harm dimension of danger. I look at why the question of what counts 
as morally relevant harms from DACC might be thought to be contentious . What we are 
intuitively concerned with is preventing harms to the well-being of future generations. 
What we mean by such harms generally is, and should be, I argue: undermining the 
ecological conditions of functioning and flourishing of future generations.  But the varying 
ways of framing the answer by philosophers, politicians, climate scientists and economists, 
mean that it can appear less straightforward. We are misled into philosophical/ethical 
difficulties which in turn weaken our moral imperatives7. These imperatives are, I 
conclude, that we have already passed the point of danger, and our task must now be to 
reduce emissions as quickly and fairly as possible, aiming to limit the overall level of GMT 
rise to 1-1.5°C.
Section 1 outlines some of the key sources of disagreement and confusion in talking about 
harms from DACC. In particular, the question of what constitutes harm is 
(problematically) treated empirically, as discovering and arbitrating between pre-existing 
subjective values, interests and beliefs. Rather, I argue that what counts as relevant harm 
can be settled on relatively uncontentious moral grounds.  Section 2 considers an 
apparently more entrenched dispute: how far harms to future generations should be 
balanced against harms and benefits to current generations. I argue that although an 
intergenerational equity approach is a significant improvement on the attempts of CBA  to 
‘optimise’ benefits over time, it is ultimately misleading as a representation of the 
asymmetry and directionality of intergenerational moral relationships. Rather, I argue in 
section 2.4, they should be approached developmentally8; by considering how best to 
evolve the conditions and structures from which future societies will emerge, be able to 
survive and flourish.   
7 I do not offer a conceptual definition of harm here, i.e. consider explicitly whether harm should be best 
conceived as well-being in terms of interests, rights, needs, happiness or preferences. Rather, I counter 
concerns about the moral relevance of different kinds of harms from DACC to different groups and entities, 
by understanding harm in terms of ecological enabling conditions necessary for any conception of well-
being.
8 NB developmental as analogous to e.g. a child's or an ecosystem's development, rather than the neo-liberal 
idea of economic development.
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In part B I consider how uncertainties in relating harmful levels of climate change 
(indicated through GMT) to anthropogenic emissions should be accommodated in defining 
ecological effectiveness. Section 3 examines possible responses to uncertainty, and the 
problems in attempting to define unacceptable or dangerous likelihoods in terms of 
calculable “expected utilities”. This assumes uncertainties can be fully quantified as 
probabilities, relies on CBA and requires a high-stakes moral gamble. Instead, I consider 
how the precautionary principle, which can accommodate both probabilities and wider 
uncertainties,  should  be formulated to guide DACC policy. This must be understood, I 
argue, as a moral principle, and not reduced to individual taste or personal ‘risk aversion’. 
Given current understanding of risks and uncertainties in climate science I conclude that 
precautionary action requires aiming to reduce atmospheric emissions concentrations to 
levels with insignificant risks of a 1-1.5°C GMT rise, i.e. pre-industrial levels, or as close 
as possible without risking comparable harms from the action taken.
Part A: Morally relevant harms
1. Why we (shouldn’t) disagree about (harms from) Climate Change9
1. 1 Causal chain of harm
When people refer to threats from DACC, the harms being considered are, not,  generally, 
the emissions levels themselves, but the ultimate effects of these emissions rises10. 
Increased GHG emissions which are not absorbed in planetary sinks lead to increases in 
the atmospheric concentration of GHGs. Increased concentrations, over time, lead to a rise 
in GMT through radiative forcing which impacts on human societies and ecological 
systems, both directly (e.g. through impacting vegetation which flourishes in particular 
temperature ranges) and indirectly through changes to climatic patterns. Whilst this causal 
9 I allude here to Hulme, 2009; whilst he makes an important contribution to understanding some of the the 
reasons for disagreement over DACC, my concern is with the relativistic normative conclusions he, and some 
other climate scientists, draw.
10 Harvey, 2007a, has emphasised the distinction between Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference (DAI) in 
the climate system – increases in human emissions which may provoke dangerous climatic changes - and 
Dangerous Climatic Change (DCC) – changes in the climate which may cause “unacceptable harm”(p3).  My 
term “DACC” covers consideration of both, and though both involve dealing with uncertainty, I broadly 
consider DCC in Part A and DAI in Part B.  
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chain is vastly simplified11, and not all harms are mediated by GMT rise, for simplicity, I 
focus on the effects of GMT1213. This causal chain is summarised in Fig.5. If international 
limitations on emissions are to be judged “ecologically effective”, this arguably requires 
defining which harmful effects of such rises are morally relevant, working backwards to 
set limits on the corresponding rise in GMT and ultimately to the emissions levels that 
would prevent their occurrence. 
This is not straightforward, since considerable scientific uncertainties exist over what the 
corresponding emissions levels are, which impacts would occur at particular GMT 
increases14, and the complex feedbacks between them (see appendix 2, Fig.7). Although 
such an approach (i.e. of working backwards through the causal chain15) is broadly right, 
the uncertain nature of the relationships means that we cannot define a particular point at 
which emissions levels become dangerous, and it should instead be understood in terms of 
11 It does not include feedbacks, discussed in appendix 2.
12 For example, it has also been noted that GHG concentrations  have a direct effect on ecosystems e.g. 
through increased CO2 absorption altering the PH of the oceans, destabilising marine life (Harvey, 2007a, 
p2-3), and that this in turn can alter the climate.
13 Any comprehensive consideration of harms should also take account of more Lenton's recent concerns that 
“Global average warming is not the only kind of climate change that is dangerous, and long-lived greenhouse 
gases are not the only cause of dangerous climate change.” (Lenton, 2011a, p7). E.g. different atmospheric 
aerosol distributions can cause “localised warming” which “cannot be meaningfully linked to global 
temperature”(Lenton, 2011b, p456 and  2011a, p7). This and other kinds of effect risk crossing tipping points 
in the locality (e.g. ice-sheet loss which could cause massive feedbacks, or changes to monsoons). Lenton 
(2011b, p454) accordingly advises that danger metrics should include different regional warming, “spatial 
gradients”, and the rate of climatic change (e.g. per decade). The latter used to feature in discussions of 
danger from DACC, since it affects the ability of ecosystems to adapt to warming, but since the mid 1990s 
research has focused more on the effects of total GMT change. (Randalls, 2010, p600-601). 
14 There is considerable uncertainty as to how particular ecological or social systems will be impacted  by 
particular GMT rises – in part because of uncertainties over regional temperature shifts,  climatological 
responses, and the capacity for adaptation of non-human and human systems.  Socio-economic structures and 
inequalities can make some groups more vulnerable to harm than others. For example, hurricane Katrina in 
2005 was found to disproportionately affect African Americans and socially isolated elderly people in New 
Orleans (Sharkey, 2007). Clearly, as highlighted in the Climate Vulnerability Monitor report (DARA, 2010, 
p16), inequalities should themselves be challenged and held partly to blame for the resulting harms, but 
neither can they be ignored when defining the range of effects of DACC, particularly when climate impacts 
also in turn “wears down progress towards the Millennium development Goals”.
15See e.g. Harvey 2007a, who takes this approach.
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Fig. 5: The causal chain of harm in DACC
precaution, and ensuring a resilient climate system. But this is considered in part B. What I 
consider first is which harms we should classify as morally relevant, unacceptable harms 
that an international agreement should seek to prevent, and why this might involve 
contention. My argument is that there are no justifiable points of contention regarding 
which harms are relevant which would be significant enough to alter which GMT rise 
should be considered “dangerous”. For, whilst different value judgements can be made, 
approaching this question ethically rather than accepting all possible judgements as fixed 
can undermine much contention and ambiguity about the definition of climate ‘danger’. 
This contention can, on a political level, serve to justify failure to agree to more stringent, 
legally binding global targets. 
In a broad sense, harms from DACC that we are seeking to prevent are to the well-being of 
future generations16. The concern is that harmful impacts to well-being may be valued 
differently. That is, different kinds of harm may occur in different degrees to different 
groups, entities and processes, and it is contestable which should be taken into 
consideration. And, if different temperature rises result in different kinds of impacts, it also 
seems to be contestable which temperature rises - and international emissions levels - are 
dangerous. 
As such, a range of approaches to categorising and measuring DACC impacts have been 
developed17. Most renowned as a tool for such judgements is Smith et al’s “burning 
embers” diagram which appeared first in the IPPC’s TAR, and has since been revised18. 
They present five broad “reasons for concern” about DACC: “risks to unique and 
threatened systems”, “risk of extreme weather events”, “distribution of impacts”, 
“aggregate impacts” and “risks of large scale discontinuities”. Each category of impact is 
plotted against temperature rise in a coloured bar according to a combination of possible 
increasingly severe impacts and the increased likelihood of their occurrence. As the 
authors highlight, it is not an exact science, and the colour changes that represent different 
16 Which includes some people alive today.
17 Schneider and Lane, 2006, p4, Oppenheimer, 2005, p1399-1400. The IPCC's fourth report also describes 
“key vulnerabilities” which would be affected by climatic change, so as “to provide guidance to decision-
makers for identifying levels and rates of climate change that may be associated with ‘dangerous 
anthropogenic interference’ (DAI) with the climate system” (IPCC, 2007c, section 19.1.1).
18 Smith et al, 2009. These revisions have, in all “reasons for concern”, lowered the temperature at which 
more severe risks occur.
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severity levels are accordingly blurred, but it aims to give an indication of the increased 
risks of different kinds of threats for half degree rises in temperature.
Similarly, Schneider has argued for “five numaires”, representing the range of impacts per 
ton of carbon: market impact (measured in dollars), human lives lost, biodiversity loss 
(measured in numbers of species lost), distributional impacts (measured in income 
redistribution) and quality of life (measured in terms of “loss of heritage sites, forced 
migration, disturbed cultural amenities, etc.”)19. 
The problem is (setting aside empirical questions about correctness) that these are still seen 
as highly contentious in some quarters because the inclusion of any or all of these metrics 
as relevant “reasons for concern” requires a value-judgement which may be contested20. 
This is in part because of debates over what constitutes a person’s well-being (and 
accordingly when and how it can be harmed), but also from contention over which harmed 
entities should be morally taken into account (e.g. groups of humans, and the relevance of 
non-humans), and this latter is the larger part of my focus in section A. In general, my 
position is that whilst the need for value-judgements rather than scientific investigation per 
se might understandably make climate scientists hesitant about making claims one way or 
another, the kind of value-judgement required is less ethically controversial than it is 
normally judged to be. 
1.2 Defining danger: philosophy versus social science
It is worth firstly reflecting on what kinds of questions these are and what kinds of answers 
can be expected. Climate scientists increasingly point to the limit of climate science in 
determining policy on DACC, because of the need to form such judgements21. However, in 
most cases, they turn to the social sciences for answers, rather than philosophy or ethics 
through moral argument, and tend to assume that all perspectives must be taken into 
account in formulating an answer. Lorenzoni, for example, argues that “we need to 
19 Schneider, 2006, p634.
20 Some authors of the forthcoming IPCC fifth report have indicated a general institutional reluctance to 
include them in assessments which might be contested by different governments, although  this is anecdotal 
and  I have been unable to locate concerns expressed in writing.
21 E.g Oppenheimer, 2005, p1399, and most recently, Hulme, 2009, passim, in addition to those listed in 
footnote 4.
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determine what values society will bring to bear in making a judgment of unacceptable or 
intolerable climate risk as part of the wider question of society deciding what to do”22. 
Oppenheimer argues that in addition to “natural science… Social science may also make 
important contributions by helping policymakers understand the way in which values 
arising from cultural and ethical considerations ought to contribute to determining the final 
outcome”23. 
Similarly, Dessai et al lament the lack of a “universally established methodology or 
process for deciding what constitutes a dangerous level of climate change, and for 
whom”24. They criticise the inadequacy of “external” definitions of danger in “top down” 
approaches, where economic and scientific “experts” make use of “physical measures” and 
“system characteristics of the human or non-human world”. They argue that “internal” 
definitions of danger are also required to make sense of danger as a phenomenon that is 
also necessarily experienced, and experienced differently by different groups and 
individuals. However, whilst there may be such a role for researching “internal” 
definitions, and recognising the “socially constructed” origin of different interpretations of 
danger, the value debate at an ethical level (i.e. about the content of values themselves) is 
wholly ignored. Dessai et al assume that it is at the “bottom up” level that issues of value 
primarily feature, considering “moral” alongside other inputs which are already ‘given’, 
including “psychological, social… institutional and cultural processes that influence 
perceptions of individuals and societies about what constitutes danger and significant 
impact”25. For Dessai et al, and for Lorenzoni, it is social sciences which, it is supposed, 
should supplement climate science to influence policy by researching the various 
perspectives on danger which are held and finding out what people do value.  But such a 
perspective relies on a relativist understanding of values, construed as equally validly held 
by different cultures or individuals. Those venturing outside of climate science seem 
largely to be entrenched in postmodern narratives. 
This is exemplified most clearly in Hulme's approach to disagreements on DACC26. He 
argues, for example, that “One of the reasons we disagree about climate change is because 
22 Lorenzoni et al, 2005, p1388.
23 Oppenheimer, 2005 p1406
24 Dessai et al, 2004, p12-13
25 Dessai et al, 2004, p14.
26 Hulme, 2009.
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we believe different things about our duty to others, to Nature and to our deities”27, but he 
sees these ethical beliefs relativistically, arguing that “it is one thing to recognise the 
inescapable ethical character of climate change debates. Quite another is to find ways of 
reconciling what can be apparently contradictory ethical stances...”28. This value-neutral 
relativist approach is problematic29. It is only informative of how people happen to think, 
and focuses on the perspectives and interests of current rather than future people who may 
not consider the needs of future people or of non-humans, or understand the processes 
involved in DACC. If attempts to define values such as danger are to influence policy and 
play a normative role, it is not enough to survey how people currently think about danger 
and seek simply to 'reconcile' different beliefs. We need to debate explicitly how 'danger' 
should be conceived, and consider what is morally relevant, i.e. the content of such 
values30. This is fundamentally a question for ethics, as Schneider has also recognised31, 
and is where philosophy can make a distinctive contribution32. 
1.3. Contentions over morally relevant harms.
How, firstly, should we deal with contentions about how well-being is constituted and 
when it has been harmed? My suggestion is that, even in so far as there are different (e.g. 
cultural) perspectives on harm that arise from different conceptions of well-being33, they 
are all subject to common ecological enabling conditions. That is, that if the ecosystemic 
processes which our society(ies) are a part of and dependent on are damaged and can no 
longer sustain us, our various conceptions of the good, of well-being are also harmed. And 
it is harms at this level – which undercut the various relative conceptions of harm to well-
being – that we are concerned with from DACC. Relativity does not extend to this more 
fundamental level, even if this is not formally recognised by different perspectives. If we 
care about the value of human life, even if we disagree about certain aspects of its content, 
therefore, any harms to these ecological enabling conditions from DACC are morally 
27Hulme, 2009, p144
28 Hulme, 2009, p174
29 To emphasise, this is not to suggest that there is no role for such research – it is crucial to look at in terms 
of climate change communication and awareness, and to encourage involvement in debates as to what action 
should be taken. The point is that the prescriptive values and proposed actions themselves should not be 
determined by such research.
30 I consider a similar problem with climate policy literature’s treatment of equity in chapter 3.
31 Schneider, 2006, p635. 
32 This is not to suggest that 'ordinary people' should be excluded from the decision, rather that the answers 
cannot be adjudicated through surveying them, but through debate about principles.
33 I.e. even if some form of moral relativism is accepted.
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relevant34. We can and should then, agree that the “dangerous” level of climate change is 
that which harms these conditions by damaging ecosystems.
What climate scientists sometimes seem to be concerned with, however, is that whilst in 
general rising GMT involves global climate instability, particular effects will differ at local 
levels. That, where a particular level of DACC seems to imply harms to only some regions, 
or even benefits to others, the moral relevance of such harms is necessarily controversial, 
since it will harm different people and their ecological enabling conditions35. How can we 
then classify harmful effects as morally relevant for global definitions of “dangerous” 
climate change? But this kind of worry seems to assume that danger is defined on the basis 
of regional or national self-interest, i.e. a particular level of DACC is defined as 
harmful/dangerous if and only if one’s own group or region suffers harms from it.  But this 
does not seem to define a moral position, rather another assumption about how countries in 
international negotiations are operating, or about the immediate preoccupations or 
awareness of people within those countries. 
For, even if different levels of DACC will harm different groups, the kinds of harms 
affecting (say) group A do not simply affect the views of morally relevant harms of group 
A, but can and should be of moral concern to groups B, C and D, even if they are not likely 
to suffer themselves. This is a basic premise of moral reasoning – that it moves beyond 
immediate self-interest. And most ethical systems stress the equal moral worth of human 
beings, suggesting that harmful effects to even localised ecological conditions of well-
being of any group that result from DACC, even if they only affect that group, should still 
be considered to indicate a dangerous level of DACC.  
Of course, the argument may be further that at some levels of climate change, there may be 
some temporary benefits to some regions, and that these need to be weighed against costs 
to other regions. Whilst it would seem unjustifiable for some to benefit from the suffering 
of others (e.g. milder weather in already wealthy countries like the UK), the concern could 
be that some of the benefits prevent people from being harmed themselves. For example, 
34 This in turn will restrict the kinds of well-being/conceptions of the good that are possible, and affect their 
content, since only those that are compatible with the preservation of these ecological enabling conditions are 
then morally justifiable. 
35 NB whilst this is not explicit or obviously present in the literature, it is implied in presentations and 
conversations, anecdotally.
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people in Siberia may survive better in a more temperate climate. It starts to look like 
damage to the ecological conditions of some may not be self-evidently morally relevant if 
the ecological conditions of others are simultaneously improved. 
However, this is dubious reasoning on several counts. Firstly, even if there were some 
narrow range of GMT rise that caused climate benefits for some areas, there is no reason to 
think that the climate could be fine-tuned to stay within this 'beneficial' range. The 
presence of tipping points, nonlinearities and other features of uncertainty in our climate 
system give no reason to think that it could be maintained at an “optimal” level36 for some 
parts of the world. Secondly, it is uncertain as to how far any group would in fact benefit. 
Spash, for example, argues that “while benefits will accrue to some members of the current 
generation these are transitory and should not be overemphasised or unqualified”, 
highlighting reasons for doubting the extent of, for example, the “fertilisation effect” of 
increased CO2 levels, said to improve crop yields in some areas37. Furthermore, the benefits 
that may occur in some regions with some small increases in GMT are of a certain kind 
only. Those regions are also still likely to suffer from increasing extreme and chaotic 
weather38 (the second “reason for concern”). For example, whilst the IPCC reports that in 
East and South-Asia, “crop yields could increase up to 20%”, it also states that “heavily 
populated megadelta regions in South, East and South-East Asia, will be at greatest risk 
due to increased flooding”. The combined risks from flooding and droughts mean that 
“Endemic morbidity and mortality due to diarrhoeal disease... are expected to rise”39. 
Similarly, whilst in Europe “most negative impacts” will occur “in the south and east” and 
northern areas are likely to experience some benefits, “e.g., increased forest area, increased 
crop yield”40, the north will also be at increased risk from  “increased coastal erosion and 
flooding”, and “greater winter storm risks”41.
Relatedly, (and even if one is not a universalist about moral worth as suggested earlier42), 
the idea that direct harms to some regions from global warming would not also affect the 
well-being of people in other regions is spurious, given the interconnectedness of societies. 
36 See appendix 2.
37 Spash, 2005, p72
38 IPCC, 2007a, section 3.2.2
39 IPCC, 2007c, Summary for Policymakers, Section C, Asia.
40 IPCC, 2007c, Section 12.7
41 IPCC, 2007c, Section 12.4
42 I am, and think we should be, universalist about moral worth, but my point is that even those that are not 
cannot escape the effects of this as a global problem.
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In particular, in an increasingly globalised world, where regions are dependent on food 
supplies and other resources from elsewhere, with economic interdependence and the 
possibility of migration, it is hard to imagine that harms initially impacting on some areas 
would not also indirectly affect other areas. Moreover, the phenomenon of DACC is a 
global one, affecting global conditions. Even if some particular harmful effects were 
believed to occur to one particular group or region in isolation, they still emerge from 
levels of DACC and rises in GMT that have other harmful consequences in other areas. In 
other words, the climate system/biosphere as a whole must be recognised as part of our 
collective ecological enabling conditions, rather than separate, particular ecosystems.
In light of these arguments, the multi-metric approach should not be seen as trying to 
combine different competing values or conceptions of harm that different people hold and 
contest. Rather, it captures a plurality of indicators for harms to the common ecological 
enabling conditions for well-being. This means that even if different harms to these 
conditions occur at different levels of global climate change, all should be considered 
relevant and any level indicating such harm considered dangerous. This suggests that one 
indicator, the CBA metric, is superfluous. For, if the main task is to determine the point at 
which ecological damage occurs to the ecological conditions underlying different concepts 
of well-being, there is no need to resort to CBA as an apparently ‘neutral’ way of 
aggregating different harms and benefits to determine when they become relevant. 
This is in addition to concerns (about the appropriateness of the reductivism of CBA), 
which I considered in chapter 1; that important qualitative differences in the kind and level 
of costs CBA ranges over are ignored, and simply replaced by a new single financial value 
metric. Interestingly, Schneider and Lane suggest that it is acceptable as part of a “multiple 
metric” view on harm, and is problematic only when seen as the exclusive measure of 
harm43. But this is unnecessary and inappropriate for inclusion alongside other metrics44 
since it functions rather as an alternative way of assimilating all other kinds of harms – a 
replacement, as I argued in chapter 1, rather than a supplement to other metrics or “reasons 
for concern”. 
43 Schneider and Lane, 2006, p13
44 Other than perhaps for tactical reasons when seeking to persuade conventional economists who are entirely 
sceptical of the need for any mitigation measures.
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One concern might be, however, that whilst I have appealed to ecological enabling 
conditions rather than the particular content of well-being, these conditions might be 
harmed in different ways, to different degrees, and perhaps not all of which are morally 
relevant. To the extent that this is a concern over what constitutes damage to ecosystems, 
which are  non-static systems that can continually evolve and adapt, this seems to be a 
question for ecologists to determine, as part of the process of understanding and observing 
ecosystemic functions. However, the concern may be that not all damage to ecosystems 
will affect humans.
For, what has been said so far seems to present a distinctly anthropocentric ethical view on 
harm, but what about non-anthropocentric perspectives? For example, damage to 
vegetation growth in a particular region may be considered harmful by anthropocentric 
approaches only in so far as it impacts negatively on human agricultural production, 
whereas ecocentric approaches will consider this harmful in itself, if ecosystems and 
natural processes are of direct moral value. This might cause controversy if, as Donald 
Brown has argued, the position one holds on this is significant for policy decisions on harm 
from DACC, and affects the “level of protection from global warming that the world 
should agree on”45. This is because, “different amounts of warming will affect different 
species of plants and animals”46.   
However, I suggest that if one holds an ecologically sensitive anthropocentrism, the policy 
outcomes will be not be significantly different47. That is, if one's anthropocentrism 
recognises humans as ecologically located, and recognises our dependence on the 
ecosystem(s) we are a part of48, then all ecological harms also pose a threat to humans and 
their avoidance is in our (fully described) self-interest. For those unconvinced by this, I 
have offered further arguments in appendix 1, on the grounds both that the theoretical 
distinction between the approaches is in fact very slim, but also that it is implausible that 
damage to ecosystems as a whole (as opposed to entities within them) should not harm at 
45 Brown, 2002, p62
46 Brown, 2002, p61
47 This does not mean there are no differences between the positions. I suspect, on a personal level, that 
ecocentric positions are ultimately stronger since they explicitly encourage us to be other regarding, to 
respect non-human nature directly rather than justify its protection through its usefulness, and can capture 
many of our moral instincts about non-human nature that are not adequately expressed, I believe, as forms of 
self-interest (including aesthetic approaches). But my point here is that I don't think this will make any 
significant difference in climate policy terms, in so far as people do hold (ecologically-sensitive) 
anthropocentric positions.
48 Which is how Read argues we must conceive ourselves. Read, 2007b, Chapter 1.
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least some humans, either directly or indirectly49. There may still be concern that some of 
the ways that humans will be harmed may be through relatively peripheral human 
activities, which may be considered less morally relevant. However, it is hard to imagine 
examples that would be genuinely peripheral. For example, the loss of coral reefs may 
seem to have a less fundamental effect on well-being than, say, the loss of rice paddies; the 
latter constitutes a major food source for societies that cultivate them, whereas coral reefs 
may be said to have largely aesthetic value50, or affect the tourist industry, which could 
then shift to other areas. However such a view would be exceedingly short-sighted; the 
wider role that corals play in marine ecosystems may turn out to be extremely important, 
and in any case signals a wider shift likely to be more generally and fundamentally 
harmful, in this case, increase in water temperature and ocean acidification; i.e. it is an 
earlier sign of 'overshoot'51.
However, these considerations should not affect the main argument here.  Brown in any 
case still concludes that both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics would 
recommend an “atmospheric stabilization target” at the “lowest possible level”52.  The 
expected inevitable warming from current emissions concentrations53 means that it is 
“already very likely too late to prevent damage to ecosystems around the world”54t, which 
he suggests an ecocentric ethic would require.  And, it should be added, this harm to 
ecosystems is already seriously affecting humans. For example, the Climate Vulnerability 
Monitor report has estimated that “climate change is already causing an estimated 350,000 
deaths – and more than 10 million cases of illness every year”, not predominantly from 
chaotic weather events, but “climate sensitive disease” such as “malnutrition, diarrheal 
infections and malaria”.55 Additionally, 2.6 million people per year are estimated to be at 
risk from “climate-related desertification”56.
49 The reason that anthropocentric approaches seem to differ substantially from ecocentric approaches over 
the harmfulness of DACC, is, as Brown acknowledge, because of taking only certain current human interests 
into account, using CBA (Brown, 2002, p230).  But harmful impacts to ecosystems should be considered 
even under an anthroprocentric approach, because of their effects on some current and future humans.
50Although I personally see nothing peripheral about 'aesthetic' appreciation of non-human nature. If it is 
understood in a deeper way than merely personal taste; as being about love of, respect for, non-human nature, 
loss of such phenomena would truly be worthy of grief. 
51 See chapter 1, section 3.1 and appendix 1.
52 Brown, 2002, p232.
53 See sections 2.4 and 4 for a brief discussion of warming “in the pipeline”.
54 Brown, 2002, p231.
55 DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum, 2010, p13. See thesis Introduction, footnote 3 regarding 
methodology of the report.
56 Ibid.
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Further warming looks likely to increasingly harm both humans and non-humans. To 
return to the “burning embers” diagram, the first two “reasons for concern” become severe 
at just over a 1°C GMT rise – lower than the subsequent three – but relate to both human 
and non-human harms. The first, “Risk to Unique and Threatened Systems”, considers 
damage or irreversible loss to “coral reefs, tropical glaciers, endangered species…” but 
also to “small island states, and indigenous communities” which are similarly vulnerable to 
this temperature rise. The second, “Risk of Extreme Weather Events”, relates to “increases 
in extreme events with substantial consequences for societies and natural systems”57, and 
“includes increase in the frequency, intensity, or consequences of heat waves, floods, 
droughts, wildfires, or tropical cyclones”. 
The IPCC’s fourth report presents a similar diagram of “key impacts” plotted against 
“increasing global average temperature change” relative to 1980-199958. Whilst after 1°C 
GMT change (i.e. around 1.6°C relative to pre-industrial temperatures)59, it reports 
significant harms to ecosystems -  that 30% of species would be at increasing risk of 
extinction and that most corals would be bleached, it also reports from 0°C (i.e. any further 
temperature rise) that coasts face “increased damage from floods and storms”, that there 
are “complex, localised negative impacts on small holders, subsistence farmers and 
fishers”, and “increased morbidity and mortality from heat waves, floods and droughts”. 
Additionally, more recent work has highlighted that “tipping points” (at which “elements 
of the Earth's climate system” are tipped “into a different state”60 and can cause feedbacks) 
may be reached before GMT rises of 2°C61. Lenton62 has argued that “Estimates of the 
location of large-scale thresholds... give no particular justification for 2°C above 
preindustrial as a policy target”. Although the latter does “sit within” probability ranges of 
temperatures at which different tipping points could be crossed, “most recent estimates of 
the risk of large-scale discontinuities have brought them closer to the present temperature”. 
For example, the studies summarised by Lenton suggest that tipping points in the 
57 Smith et al, 2009, p2, emphasis added.
58 IPCC, 2007c, Summary for Policymakers, section C.15
59 Lenton states that the IPCC's 1980-1999 reference interval was about “0.6°C above the less accurately 
known preindustrial level” (Lenton, 2011b, p452).
60 Lenton, 2011a, p7
61 Additionally, GMT rise is not the only driver for crossing them -  see footnote 13.
62 Lenton, 2011b, p452
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Greenland Ice Sheet could occur between a 1.6-2.6°C GMT rise, and the Arctic summer 
sea ice between 1.1-2.6°C63.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that we have already reached the point of 
dangerous climate change, and to agree with Anderson and Bows' suggestion that, given 
such recent upward revisions of  the impacts expected at each GMT rise, it would be “more 
reasonable to characterise '1°C as the new 2°C'”64. In fact, they suggest that, considering 
the severity of impacts now anticipated at temperature rises above 2°C, it “now more 
appropriately represents the threshold between dangerous and extremely dangerous climate 
change”65.  
2.  The moral relevance of future harms. 
I now turn to a possibly more substantial challenge to identifying morally relevant harms 
from DACC which should constitute the definition of “danger” in an ecological 
effectiveness criterion. That is the aspect of futurity:  the moral implications of such harms 
affecting future, rather than current generations. One such significant concern regards the 
uncertainty over a harm’s occurrence, which may be thought to dilute its moral relevance. I 
deal with this in part B, where I consider the uncertainty/likelihood dimension of danger 
and our responses to it. 
The main concern addressed through section 2, however, is how future harms from DACC 
should be balanced against harms to current generations from mitigative (preventative) 
activity, or even against possible benefits from DACC. I do not survey different ways of 
grounding our obligations to prevent harms to future generations, but focus on how they 
should be understood in relation to obligations to current generations. In 2.2-2.4 I outline 
two dominant approaches to this question, and present a third which understands the 
problem developmentally. Prior to this, however, I would like to deal with a preliminary 
worry which may seem to undermine this task. This is the suggestion that harming future 
people is not straightforwardly possible – Parfit’s problem of “non-identity”.
63 Ibid.
64 Anderson and Bows, 2011, p40 (footnote 31)
65 Anderson and Bows, 2011, p41.
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2.1 The problem of non-identity.
Parfit draws attention to the fact that the very existence of future people is contingent on 
current policy decisions; different people are likely to be born as a result of different 
decisions66. But, he argues, how can future people then be harmed (e.g. in this case, by 
implementing an ineffective climate change agreement) if those particular individuals who 
would exist are different to those who would have existed under a different policy choice? 
Because, Parfit suggests, harming a person involves making things worse for that person. 
We cannot have made things worse for future people if they would otherwise not have 
existed – different individuals would have lived and experienced the better set of 
conditions created by the alternative policy. These are “different people choices”67. And if 
no person has been made worse off by the policy, how can it be said to be harmful? 
This argument should not be confused with the claim that future people cannot have any 
sorts of rights or claims against us because they do not yet exist. I do not consider this here, 
since it has been adequately countered elsewhere68. The non-identity problem has been 
dealt with in varying ways: by arguing in favour of consequentialist conceptions of harm 
which do not depend on particular individuals being made worse off69, or through other 
non-comparative accounts of harm, such as Meyer’s threshold conception70. I will not 
examine these alternatives here, or consider the non-identity problem in depth. Rather I 
wish simply to highlight why, in the particular case of DACC at least, non-identity should 
not be seen as a problem for the view of harm that I have been advocating. 
I have identified the relevant harms as being to the ecological conditions for the 
functioning and flourishing of future generations. We thereby harm future generations 
when we create conditions in which their ability to survive is compromised. Here we need 
not understand harm in terms of alterations to the well-being of particular individuals, but 
to the conditions for well-being of any individuals – the conditions under which they will 
come to exist. The harms we are obliged to prevent from DACC are thereby such that 
whoever will live in this particular society will be less able to survive and flourish under 
66 I.e. because future events are subtly altered over time, and even slight differences in the times people 
reproduce will combine different spermatozoa and/or ova. Parfit, 1984, p351-355.
67 Parfit, 1984, p356
68 See Meyer, 2004, p22-23.
69 See Broome et al, 1992
70 See e.g. Meyer, 2004.
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the resulting temperature rise (A), than those would live under no (or a substantially lower) 
temperature rise (B). 
This may still sound slightly awkward. The thrust of Parfit’s concerns in the non-identity 
problem is to explain how an act that we intuitively understand as being wrong for a person 
or persons can be harmful if they are not made worse-off.  So the question may persist: if 
we choose (A), do we then harm those particular people who live as a result? Possibly one 
could say: yes, if the approach I have just outlined is interpreted as offering something akin 
to Meyer’s threshold conception of harm - a non-comparative view of harm, which would 
view future people as being harmed if they did not exist in sufficient ecological conditions. 
Or we might suggest that those particular people are not harmed, if what I have said is 
interpreted as retaining the comparative view of harm but directed towards the group or 
community as a whole of the “future generation” rather than the individuals within it.
However, this is the wrong kind of question to ask. For it stems from the way in which we 
deal with harms intragenerationally, where the moral discourse is more familiar, and 
attempts to apply this to a very different kind of context – intergenerational morality. And 
this seems to be partially motivating the drive to resolve the Non-Identity Problem. Parfit 
and others do recognise that the features of intergenerational moral relationships are very 
different from those with contemporaries – the very purpose of the Non-Identity Problem 
is to look for the “moral reason”71 which explains our intuitions if it cannot simply be that 
particular peoples’ lives are made worse in “different people choices”. But in seeking to 
offer such further explanations and search for “theory X” which tell us “which set of 
principles… we ought to accept”72 as justifying our intuitions, they are succumbing to the 
attempt to reduce the former to the latter – to apply the rules from one kind of case to 
another.
What I am suggesting is that rather than understanding non-identity as a problem to resolve 
as a special case of our ordinary interactions, this should instead be understood as 
identifying a defining feature of our moral relations to future generations.  That in certain 
important respects they are not analogous to intragenerational relationships, since we 
create future generations and their conditions, and should not think of them as in any way 
71 Parfit, 1984, p363
72 Parfit, 1984, p361
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already existing at another temporal location73. This structure, and our intuitions about how 
to deal with it, should be seen as constituting a different paradigm case and set of 
intuitions, which cannot be explained in terms of other more fundamental principles, or a 
wholesale theory to ‘explain’ it. It only seems to pose a problem when we try to import 
inappropriate modes of ethical thinking. 
The question then becomes – what kinds of future lives and circumstances should we 
create? And it seems to me that, in the case of DACC, we at least have an obligation to 
create lives that exist in ecologically secure communities, and we cause harm when we 
impair these future conditions74. This is central to the main concern which I outlined at the 
start of section 2, of how far harms to future generations should be balanced against those 
to current generations. For the main two competing ethical approaches to balancing our 
obligations to future generations against those to current generations – CBA and 
intergenerational equity – largely ignore this defining characteristic of intergenerational 
moral relationships. Whilst, therefore, we must also take account of climate policy impacts 
on current generations when considering prevention of harm to future generations, both 
approaches are misleading in the way they do so.
I now consider these two main ethical approaches, which, I argue, inadequately capture our 
moral instincts and defining moral features of intergenerational relationships in trying to 
weigh harms to current and future generations from DACC. The first, economic CBA, may 
seem strange to describe as an ethical approach. But, as suggested in chapter 1, it is 
committed to a particular set of value judgements which assume that price can and should 
be used to reflect different costs and benefits to make them commensurable. The second, 
intergenerational equity, reflects a justice-based metaphor that judges our obligations to 
future generations in terms of distributional equality between different generations (e.g. of 
well-being, capabilities or resources). Whilst this does capture something useful and 
important about the way we ought to think about future generations, it is not exhaustive 
and as I shall suggest, is misleading if applied in a wholesale way as an ethical theory, 
since it ignores intergenerational asymmetries.
73 On the wider disanalogy between time and space, see Read, 2003, p33 and p24 (footnote 1).
74 This is not to say that we create a whole new set of claims and intuitions – they exist already in the way in 
which we think about future generations in other contexts – as, e.g our children, which I outline in 2.4
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My subsequent approach in 2.4 is not to present an alternative ethical theory. Indeed, a 
theory as such is unnecessary for guiding actions here75 – as Donald Brown has argued, 
most ethical positions can76 come to the same broad conclusions regarding policy for 
climate change mitigation7778. Rather, such approaches can be regarded as conceptual 
metaphors which can aid ethical thinking about the problem in hand. My aim in 2.4. is to 
highlight moral aspects of our relationship with future generations which are either missed 
or accommodated only indirectly and in potentially misleading ways in the approaches of 
2.2. and 2.379. These should, I suggest, guide our definition of unacceptable harms in 
DACC and the temperature rises that should be prevented.
2.2. Cost-benefit analysis
Probably the most well known approach to defining our obligations to future generations 
given impacts on current generations (and therefore ‘unacceptable’ future harms) is 
economic CBA.  This seeks to trade-off present and future economic costs and benefits of 
particular levels of GMT rise (or, in terms of mitigation, of reducing to particular global 
emissions levels). I have already argued in chapter 1 against such an approach generally as 
a determinant of mitigation levels. My discussion in section 1.3 focused on its use in 
aggregating intragenerational costs and benefits, but it is also used to trade-off costs and 
benefits across time to define acceptable or optimal levels of harm between generations. 
The general criticisms also apply here: of its reductivism and inability to distinguish kinds 
of harm. This has a particular force in light of the distinction I have drawn attention to in 
2.1., between the distinct ways that we can harm future generations and contemporaries. I 
return to this shortly.
But first, it is worth considering briefly one particular widely criticised CBA feature in this 
context: the practice of discounting future costs. I will not address this in any detail 
because it has been adequately countered elsewhere, and is now relatively widely accepted 
75 To say that ethical theory is unnecessary for guiding actions may seem a fairly controversial claim to make, 
but please see the thesis Introduction, for an outline of my position on the role of theory in ethics. 
76 I.e. they may not; it depends on how they are applied, as I argue next.
77 Brown, 2002, p232.
78 This is what should be expected if, as suggested in the thesis Introduction, ethical theories are designed to 
reach conclusions which match our moral intuitions. 
79 For this reason I do not consider every distinct ethical approach to our obligations to future generations, 
e.g. forms of utilitarianism other than CBA, rights-based accounts or communitarian approaches (see De 
Shalit, 1995, for a good overview). Rather I aim to focus on aspects of ethical thinking which have been over 
or under emphasised, and which should guide the way we think about unacceptable harms in DACC.
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as inappropriate (at least regarding DACC). But it is worth highlighting the main concerns, 
to distinguish them from criticisms of CBA in general. Padilla has argued, for example, 
that discounting “devalues and practically removes from the analysis the impacts that occur 
in the distant future in such a way that for these models the maintenance of the necessary 
conditions of life far in the future is of negligible present value.”80. He highlights that 
“conventional models assume that future individuals will be richer”81, whereas, as Singer 
has pointed out “a major change in the climate of our planet would have such drastic and 
widespread effects that we really have no idea what it would do to prices”82. 
And in any case, as Brown argues, whilst discounting makes some sense for investors 
wanting maximise returns from an investment, when applied to environmental issues, “this 
technique makes current investors’ interests, not future generations’ welfare the focus of 
concern”83.  Similarly, Broome has partially defended the economic practice of discounting 
as aiming not to discount the well-being of future generations, but commodities, so as to 
reflect the values and interests of present generations84. But he concludes that this amounts 
to discounting future well-being, and, therefore, that “It is certainly unreliable for 
evaluating long-term projects that have large effects on future generations” such as 
“mitigating global warming”85.  Problematically, then, discounting practices assume the 
continuation of a functioning economic system, ignoring the relevance of harm to 
ecological conditions and the insight in 2.1. that the shape of future generations is 
contingent on current decisions.
In recognising the inadequacy of discounting, we have therefore come a long way from 
Lomborg’s (discounted) economic criticisms of Kyoto86, to the extent that Stern also felt 
unable to justify anything other than a negligible discount rate in his 2006 review87. 
However, even if discounting is avoided or reduced to a negligible level, CBA is still a 
highly problematic method for balancing future and current costs to define unacceptable 
levels of harm from DACC. It assumes, as Toman has noted, that it is “possible as well as 
80Padilla, 2004, p527
81Padilla, 2004, p528
82 Singer, 2006, p417
83 Brown, 2002, p178
84 Broome, 1994, passim.
85 Broome, 1994, p156.
86 Lomborg claimed that the Kyoto protocol would “lead to a net loss of $150 billion”, but based this on a 
discount rate of 5%. Singer, 2006, p417. 
87 Stern 2006, p31. Although Stern was still much criticised in some quarters for his discount rate e.g. from 
Nordhaus, see Hulme, 2009, p127.
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socially acceptable to admit a wide range of tradeoffs between climate change damages 
and other economic values”88.  Whereas, as I have suggested, the kind of harms we are 
concerned with from DACC are to the ecological (pre-) conditions of well-being, and are 
of a fundamentally different kind to the various different costs of mitigation to current 
generations. Of course, these are not also all purely “financial” either and may also include 
harms to well-being in other ways, for example, reductions in standard of living, changes 
in lifestyle and possibly even fears of economic collapse triggered by sudden and deep 
restrictions on economic growth. But the ways in which we might weigh these possible 
harms against one another cannot be straightforwardly captured by a single economic 
metric. Instead, we need to consider the kinds of impacts these have, which, as Toman has 
argued, should include “a variety of different kinds of information about climate change 
risks and policy impacts, including information about physical consequences as well as 
economic benefits and costs”89.  I attempt to do this in 2.4. 
These criticisms hold even if the costs aimed at fully reflecting ecological impacts were 
less narrowly anthropocentric, through pricing costs to ecosystems and cost implications 
for future human societies, for example to health, or agriculture. Whilst such calculations 
might help make the case for some degree of mitigation for those as yet unpersuaded, they 
may still under-represent the severity of future harms from DACC, since different costs 
and benefits are nonetheless assumed to be commensurable. It still assumes, that is, that the 
costs of these harms should be straightforwardly traded off; against the costs of mitigation 
to present generations (which may be high for reasons unrelated to their societal 
importance)90 and against benefits to some future groups at lower levels of warming to 
define acceptable, or 'optimal' levels of harm91.
Stern, for example, attempts to improve on conventional CBA, arguing for it to “be 
thought of in terms of the expected impacts on well-being over time, appropriately 
discounted, not simply monetary amounts.” to accommodate “risk weighting, risk aversion 
and considerations of fairness across individuals and generations”92 His approach gives 
ethics an unprecedented role in the economic analysis. However, in practice, well-being is 
88 Toman, 2006, p371.
89 Toman, 2006, p370
90 That is not to say that they should not be accounted for – rather, they should not be made commensurable 
in a single-metric calculation, irrespective of the kind of impact at stake.
91 I discuss similar concerns from Lohmann in section 3.2.
92 Stern, 2006, p291.
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still approximated in his CBA using a social welfare function93 which commensurates in 
terms of consumption. Even though this is broadly conceived, it still makes fixed 
assumptions about, for example “the distribution of consumption across individuals” and 
the “difference” it should make “if a given loss of consumption opportunities affects a rich 
person rather than a poor person, or someone today rather than in a hundred years’ time”94, 
and assumes that such ethical considerations can be aggregated effectively. 
Problematically so, since there also remain aspects of well-being which cannot be reflected 
at all in economic cost (for example, if people die and therefore incur no further medical 
costs). This ignores, as Brown and many others have pointed out, the widely supported 
intuition that rights or certain levels of well-being should be protected irrespective of 
cost95:“If persons have duties not to deprive others of life, health, or liberty without their 
consent, then welfare considerations cannot justify policies that kill people or damage their 
health”96  Similarly, Padilla has criticised  CBA for misframing the issue in terms of 
weighing costs for current generations against “benefits” for future generations (i.e. from 
DACC prevention), whereas, “This is not to ‘give’ anything to future generations, but 
rather to stop taking away something to which... they are entitled”.97  Even a more broadly 
conceived CBA will, therefore, still allow for more severe harms to well-being from 
DACC to be outweighed by economically costly mitigation measures, even though they 
will not threaten well-being so fundamentally, by undermining its ecological preconditions. 
This might be prevented through, for example, assigning infinite financial values to certain 
kinds of fundamental harm – but then CBA would be superfluous to the process of making 
the cost-benefit judgements in the first place, since the decision would already be made at 
the level of assigning financial values98.
93 Stern, 2006, p30
94 Ibid.
95 Brown, 2002, p171
96 Brown, 2007
97 Padilla, 2004, p536
98 Interestingly, this is exactly the kind of phenomenon evident in Ackerman et al’s work on DICE – an 
Integrated Assessment Model of the costs and benefits on climate change. They acknowledge that it is 
“known for projecting that the optimal climate policy is one of very gradual abatement” – which would be 
inadequate to prevent higher temperature rises – and “investigate whether, with slightly different 
assumptions, DICE might recommend a trajectory that begins abatement much more rapidly, and leads to 
stabilization at 350 ppm CO2”. That is, they try to change the initial assumptions and parameters in order to 
produce an outcome that already seems preferable (Ackerman et al, 2009, p30).
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2.3 Intergenerational equity
However, this should not mislead us into thinking that balancing current and future harms 
is straightforwardly and predominantly an issue of intergenerational distribution either, 
which, as I shall suggest, can be problematic. Yet this is the alternate route that is often 
pursued. Commentators are often keen to counter the CBA approach by turning to concepts 
of intergenerational equity or justice. Since CBA trades costs to future generations against 
costs to contemporaries, this second broad approach seeks to emphasise the equal worth of 
future people and treat our obligations to them as analogous to obligations of distributive 
justice to others within our current generation99. The problem with CBA as applied to 
intergenerational policy issues is therefore diagnosed as unfair cost-bearing between future 
and current generations, just as occurs between countries and regions100. 
For example, the Pew Center for climate change describes international equity as “The 
fairness of the distribution of the costs and benefits of a policy when costs and benefits are 
borne by different generations”101. More explicitly, Page understands it as part of the same 
“set of questions” for “global distributive justice” vis a vis climate change, i.e. “how bene-
fits and burdens should be distributed within and between generations”102. Similarly, Anand 
and Sen argue that our obligations to future generations are “a matter of distributional 
equity”103. Crucially, this conception of intergenerational equity or justice goes beyond a 
more general concern for intergenerational obligations; “the basic belief”, which Anand 
and Sen also express104, “that the interests of future generations should receive the same 
kind of attention that those in the present generation get”105. Rather, the concept asserts that 
such attention be interpreted distributionally, “sharing the capacity for wellbeing between 
present people and future people in an acceptable way... which neither the present genera-
tion nor the future generations can readily reject”106
99 I explore the concept of (intragenerational) equity in DACC in chapter 3.
100 Although these approaches often seem more narrowly anthropocentric, one can more generously think of 
intergenerational equity as  using human measures as a proxy for wider, ecological harms/ harms to humans 
as situated within ecosystems (i.e. as using ecologically sensitive anthropocentrism).
101 (Glossary entry): http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-basics/full_glossary/glossary.php
102 Page, 2007, p225, my emphasis.
103 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2038, discussed in the context of sustainability.
104Though they do not recognise it as a distinct claim.
105 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2030
106 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2038. Although it should be noted that Anand and Sen seem here to ground the 
distributive view on a contractual basis. Intergenerational justice can, as Page notes, be justified also through 
other approaches – he argues -  “communitarianism... and impersonal consequentialism” as well as 
reciprocity (Page, 2007, p226).
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Under this view, unacceptable harms to future generations from DACC should, roughly 
speaking, be determined by ones principle of justice or equity. Page, for example, has 
examined how our obligations to future generations can be understood according to ones 
views as to the “currency”, “shape” and “scope” of justice107; i.e. what it is that should be 
distributed fairly, whether according to equality, priority or sufficiency, and which people 
count as relevant for such just distributions. Under this family of approaches, future 
generations can be understood as unacceptably harmed when the distributive arrangements 
under ones chosen position are not met108. However, I do not consider any of these 
particular variants here109, since my focus is to consider limitations of the intergenerational 
equity metaphor more generally.
Aspects of this approach seem very reasonable. In particular, its grounding in the kind of 
appeal made by Anand and Sen to the “universalism” of the “shared claim” that all humans 
have “the basic capability to lead worthwhile lives”110 highlights the needs and 
meaningfulness of lives for those living in the future. Our use of resources and interaction 
with the ecosystem now can diminish their ecological conditions and abilities to meet their 
needs -  can, in this sense, leave them less than we have. This approach can provide a 
helpful counter to practices of discounting and aggregation of future costs of DACC 
against current benefits of refraining from mitigation, by framing the relationship in terms 
of fairness. But the extension of this metaphor – of inter-temporal fairness as strictly 
analogous to inter-spatial fairness - is problematic.
In part this is a difficulty in the applicability of  distributive justice or fairness and the 
conditions for justice to intergenerational relationships. As Page has highlighted, “The vast 
majority of future individuals that will benefit from the modest amount of climate change 
avoided will never be in a position to repay the present generation for their sacrifice”111 
since they will no longer be living. Page calls this the “non-reciprocity problem”112. It is a 
107 Page, 2006, p50-51.
108 Since the aim is to establish the just “profile of benefits and burdens that we should aim for in our dealings 
with contemporaries and future generations”, Page, 2006, p96.
109 Although I do consider them in chapter 3 in the context of intragenerational equity in sharing the 
emissions budget/use of the atmospheric commons.
110 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2030.
111 Page, 2007, p231
112 Ibid.
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problem, because justice conceived as a mutually beneficial arrangement cannot be 
applied113. For, as Gardiner has described elsewhere, in DACC, “control of the situation 
rests completely within the current generation”114.  And since the current generation has 
already inherited an overpolluted planet, it is not in its (narrowly conceived, at least) self-
interest to “cooperate” with future generations – it “will achieve nothing for itself by 
holding back”115. Page argues that the problem can be largely circumvented by some 
version of an “international stewardship”116 modification, at least in the case of public 
goods such as having a “hospitable climate system”117. This means, broadly, that we 
reciprocate to the previous generations for benefits they left us not directly to them, but 
indirectly by passing on benefits to future generations118, so that reciprocity is understood 
in terms of “fairness” rather than mutual “self-interest”119. 
But this seems problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it means that we have no such 
intergenerational duties if we have not received certain benefits - Page is explicit, for 
example, in stipulating that “there can be no duty of fair reciprocity to pass on what one 
has not received”120. To justify the “sacrifices” of current generations in mitigative action 
against climate change, Page is forced to assume that “members of the present generation 
have been bequeathed an atmospheric system largely devoid of dangerous impacts”121. 
Whilst rising concentrations will significantly worsen the harms from DACC, the changes 
to the climate system that we have already inherited, as discussed in sections 1.3 and 4, are 
such that Page's assumption can no longer be made with confidence. This perspective 
could worryingly undermine the case for mitigative action, and makes our obligations to 
future generations oddly dependent on our being 'repaid' by previous generations.
113 Rights-based accounts share aspects of the intergenerational justice metaphor in this respect. As Jonas, 
1985, p38-39 has highlighted, “the traditional idea of rights and duties” is “grounded upon reciprocity, 
according to which my duty is the counterpart of another's right, which in turn is seen as the like of my own 
right...”. “This scheme fails” in the case of future generations” since the “nonexistent” do not yet have rights 
(until they exist) and cannot have reciprocal duties to us; the rights/duties scheme therefore needs to be 
significantly revised so as to preclude the possibility of asking the question, “What has the future ever done 
for me? Does it respect my rights?”. There is not space here to consider rights-based accounts further with 
regards to intergenerational obligations, but any such account but would need to consider how far it can 
embrace the features of intergenerational relationships that I outline as important in 2.4, and how far it relies 
on a variant of the intergenerational justice metaphor.
114 Apart from, that is, where generations overlap, when Gardiner supposes that there is some degree of 
reciprocity in preserving the advantage of social cooperation. See Gardiner, 2004, p30
115  Gardiner, 2004, p30.
116 Page, 2007, p232-238
117 Page, 2007, p234
118 Page, 2007, p232-233. 
119 Page, 2007, p227
120 Page, 2007, p237.
121 Ibid.
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But secondly, it glosses over the fundamentally asymmetrical and non-reciprocal 
relationship between generations, since it is not then clear that indirect reciprocity should 
still count as reciprocity at all. And Read has questioned whether it is meaningful to talk 
about fairness between generations, since “there is no fairness, no genuine equity… 
between two utter unequals…Such fairness is a standing invitation to bad faith; because 
there is no actual ‘contract’ here, no agreement, no negotiation: just whatever you decide 
‘is’ fair.”122.  It might be said that Read's concerns have force only against the procedure 
for rather than the content of fairness; that it is precisely in situations of inequality that 
fairness becomes relevant at all, as a moral norm above and beyond mutual self-interest. 
However, the intergenerational scenario is unequal in a very particular way; the very 
existence of one depends entirely on the actions of the other. This goes beyond fairness, 
and beyond intergenerational distributive justice more generally, howsoever it is 
theoretically justified, in the following ways. 
The intergenerational justice metaphor implies, in the first place, that what is morally 
required is an evenness in distribution (of goods, or wellbeing) between generations. And, 
tied to the concern that we have no obligations towards future generations without 
receiving parallel benefits from previous ones, this risks inviting concerns that in “saving” 
for a future generation, a previous generation could leave them too much. Indeed, Solow 
has worryingly put forward such a suggestion, which it is worth reproducing in full123:
“You could make a good case that our ancestors, who were considerably poorer 
than we are, whose standard of living was considerably less than our own, were 
probably excessively generous in providing for us. They cut down a lot of trees, but 
they saved a lot and they built a lot of railroad rights-of-way. Both privately and 
publicly they probably did better by us than a sort of fair minded judge in thinking 
about the equity (whether they got their share and we got our share or whether we 
profited at their expense) would have required. It would have been okay for them to 
save a little less, to enjoy a little more and give us a little less of a start than our 
generation has had.”
122 Read, Forthcoming(a), p4
123 Cited (uncritically) in Anand and Sen, 2000, p2035.
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This is both conceptually and morally problematic. It is conceptually misleading because 
by definition the process of learning and development of knowledge and technology means 
that any resulting improvements to the standard of living to future generations could not 
meaningfully be said to be distributed more fairly between generations. In terms of the 
improvements brought by such development124, future people will necessarily have more or 
better in some senses than previous generations – this is simply the notion of development. 
Solow, as a development economist is clearly aware of this125. But its implications are 
overlooked in nonetheless considering this development distributionally, as though 
between two discrete societies, already existing in different temporal (as opposed to 
spatial) locations, rather than as a process whereby one emerges from the other. For it is a 
necessary feature of development that future generations of any functioning society will 
“profit” at the “expense” of previous generations.
But there is also something morally abhorrent about the idea that we should withhold 
improvements to human society simply because more of the benefits are experienced by 
future people. We surely want to improve our societies for the better, to leave future 
generations a better world than the one we inhabit, to improve their chances of surviving, 
flourishing and living fulfilling and secure lives. Whereas, as Anand and Sen suggest, the 
“universalism” in intergenerational distributive equity perspective implies “an obligation to 
preserve the present-day economic opportunities (such as productive capacity) for the 
future, not necessarily to increase them.”126. I do not mean to suggest that we should 
increase “economic opportunities”, because of the limits to economic growth considered in 
chapter 1. But given that economic opportunities, for Anand and Sen, stand as a proxy for 
well-being, the implication is also that there is no obligation to improve well-being.
Rawls, on the other hand, does seem to conceive of his notion of “just savings” in the 
context of building and improving ones society or civilisation, and criticises those who 
124 This is not to suggest that all development does bring improvements, or, where it does, that it always 
brings uniform improvements to subsequent generations. As has been suggested in chapter 1, this is precisely 
not the case for much economic growth.
125 Indeed, he offers a similar criticism of applying a maximin principle to intergenerational relationships, 
which is unsatisfactory because “the maxi-min criterion is so much at the mercy of initial conditions. If the 
initial capital stock is very small [following the principle would imply that] no more will be accumulated and 
the standard of living will be forever low” - i.e. no investments, improvements or savings would ever be 
made for future generations because current generations, as the worst off, would worsen their position by 
improving that of those in the future. Solow, 1974, p33
126 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2035.
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have lamented the “chronological unfairness” of this directionality127. Indeed, he is clear 
that the “just savings principle can be regarded as an understanding between generations to 
carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society... during the 
whole course of a society's history”128. This, then, is a significant improvement. But it is 
difficult to see why this should be understood in terms of distributive justice - how, if later 
generations are properly to enjoy a better life than previous ones, it makes sense to talk of 
the intergenerational “understanding” in terms of a just distribution between generations at 
all. 
This may seem plausible from Rawls' description of the generational burden, (the savings 
left by one generation for the next), as a “fair equivalent in real capital... in return for what 
is received from previous generations”129.  But what he means by a “fair equivalent” is not 
an economically equivalent quantity (which would, in any case seem odd to require of each 
generation, with different circumstances and different challenges). It is, in fact, “what is 
reasonable for members of adjacent generations to expect of one another at each level of 
advance... balancing how much at each stage they would be willing to save for their 
immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their immediate 
predecessors”130, i.e. there is a different “rate... for all stages”. This continues until the “last 
stage at which saving is required”, after which  sufficient wealth has been accumulated to 
bring about “the full realization of just institutions and the fair value of liberty”.
But this way of understanding intergenerational relations, is worrying. One would need to 
significantly stretch this metaphor to apply it to DACC, or other environmental crises. For 
Rawls imagines society like a savings account – where a regular investment over time (in 
socio-economic infrastructure) can provide regular interest repayments (i.e. the wealth 
generated from this size of economy) which increase in size until it has accumulated 
enough for society to live justly and sufficiently from the interest131. But, even if we 
(generously) assume that the savings need not represent accumulation, but a curb on each 
generation's (rate of) use of natural resources and pollution sinks, it is not clear why the 
127 Rawls, 1972, p291.
128 Rawls, 1972, p289.
129 Rawls, 1972, p288, where “capital” is “knowledge and culture... techniques and skills” as well as 
“factories and machines”.
130 Rawls, 1972, p289
131 Although , in terms of the economy's size, this latter point is preferable to assuming a need for continuous 
economic accumulation, which Rawls correctly counters in this section, arguing that “great wealth is not 
required” for a “just and good society”. Rawls, 1972, p190.
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process of  defining different appropriate savings rates at each stage is best understood as 
one of “just savings”, or fairness. Such a characterisation is worrying, especially when 
Rawls says (foreshadowing Solow, cited above) that just savings “places an upper bound 
on how much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later generations... Each 
age is to do its fair share... but beyond this more cannot be required”132.
For, under Rawls and other approaches to intergenerational equity, the emphasis on 
“distributive justice” seems a misleading way to consider  and define unacceptable harms 
to future generations from DACC, when what is at stake is the health, development and 
resilience of our ecosystems, our ecological preconditions, rather than simply a stockpile of 
a resource being distributed133. Even if our “currency of justice” is construed as well-
being134 rather than resources, the metaphor still suggests a distribution through time, when 
what is considered is a process, an evolving state. In contrast, the commons metaphor from 
chapter 1 section 6 defines the bounds of the commons - within which each generation can 
operate and fairly share use - as what will allow it to continue to function healthily into the 
future. 
Let me explain my concern with the justice metaphor by describing several analogies. 
Solow had referred to a theoretical “fair minded judge”. But this is reminiscent of the 
biblical story (if I can be forgiven such an excursion) of the judgement of Solomon, which 
offers a useful metaphor. In the story, two women both claim to be the mother of a baby 
and ask King Solomon to adjudicate. Solomon then feigns a threatened 'fair' solution to 
determine the baby's true mother, ordering: “Cut the living child in two and give half to 
one and half to the other.”. Whilst the false mother agrees with the ruling as a fair solution, 
the true mother “was deeply moved out of love for her son and said to the king, “Please, 
my lord, give her the living baby! Don’t kill him!” But the other said, “Neither I nor you 
shall have him. Cut him in two!””135 Thus the king recognises the true mother for her 
concern for the welfare of the baby – her recognition that its worth and value lies in its 
continued health, and that it is not the kind of thing that can be divided fairly.
132 Rawls, 1972, p298.
133 Apart from, possibly, the cumulative emissions budget, once set, over time, but see footnote 139.
134 I expand on the idea of “well-being”, which I understand as an objective concept, in chapter 3.
1351, Kings 3:24-27, New International Version 
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Here is another, more direct analogy to the case of DACC. I plant a rosemary bush. There 
are a few small sprigs, say five, in the first year, and I know it will grow many more next 
year. How many should I take now?  If I  think in terms of an even distribution over time, I 
will encounter problems. Left as is, and tended to, the bush may have, say, 4 times as many 
sprigs next year and I will be able to harvest more. But if I try and act 'fairly' to myself in 
the future by taking five now, and five next year my plant will probably die. I could take 
three or four sprigs, and then try to take the same amount next year, but my plant probably 
will not be very healthy, may still die, and there are likely to  be far less than twenty sprigs 
next year. What I need to do is take an amount that won't impede the growth and integrity 
of the plant – i.e. maybe one sprig. Then next year I can take at least five times the amount 
(i.e. five sprigs) without impeding its growth or health. Clearly, in this case it is I that 
benefit both now and in the future; one might object that I am simply acting in my longer-
term self-interest, dis-analogously to the case of future generations. But the point of this 
particular analogy is not motivational; rather it is to highlight the limits in understanding 
the process of development over time distributionally136.
As I outline in section 2.4, prevention of harms to future generations from DACC should 
instead be seen developmentally. That is, developing our society in a way that protects and 
enhances its ecological pre-conditions to enable its continued functioning and flourishing, 
and any current ‘costs’ considered in terms of how they alter its development, rather than 
straightforwardly as burdens that might be fairly or unfairly distributed 
intergenerationally137. For, if the concern of intergenerational equity or justice for future 
generations is to ensure equivalent burdens are placed on each generation, then the 
scenarios posed by DACC will create morally dubious outcomes, although this may not 
seem obvious initially. On the one hand, since burdens to future generations from DACC 
will be significantly heavier and more serious than those to current generations if we do 
not adequately mitigate emissions, an “intergenerational equity” approach might require 
reasonably radical mitigation targets so long as equivalent intergenerational burdens or 
levels of well-being were likely. However, on the other hand, the current and emerging 
136All such analogies will be imperfect, because, as I suggested in 2.1, our relations to future generations are 
unique, and constitute a distinct ethical paradigm. But analogies can be used to draw out different aspects of 
the relationship. When the intergenerational justice metaphor is used, however, it is not sufficiently 
recognised as a metaphor, but rather as identifying future relations as the same kind of relations as between 
contemporaries. 
137 As I explain later, this does not justify just any costs; there must be a genuine transition, since we cannot 
immediately live within our means without fundamentally threatening the existence of society, and in this 
sense, the “costs” of mitigation are spread across e.g. a couple of generations. 
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generation, in committing to any such “burdens” or drop in standard of living could be 
arguably treated inequitably vis a vis the previous generation, which (at least in 
industrialised countries) benefited from high emitting development but which contributed 
to the burdens from DACC and the requirement for significant cuts if further GMT rises 
are to be avoided. To treat our generation “fairly” might then seem to imply less radical 
mitigation targets. 
Furthermore, the prospect of  radical mitigation targets might seem unfair if the current 
generation is considered in comparison to further future generations. For, if we were 
fortunate and extremely strong mitigation levels successful in averting a 1°C GMT rise, 
once infrastructure is in place adapted to low-emitting and a marginally altered climate, 
further future generations could conceivably end up substantially better off in many 
respects and facing fewer burdens than the current generation. This could be deemed unfair 
or unjust from the perspective of intergenerational justice but would surely be morally 
preferable to a more 'just' outcome, where the current generation only marginally 
diminishes its average138 standard of living but future generations increasingly suffer the 
impacts of increased GMT rises.139
In general, then, use of the approach of intergenerational equity or justice to determine our 
obligations to future generations can be misleading in considering harm prevention from 
DACC in terms of fair harms, burdens, or costs in current and future generations140. I turn 
138 I use “average” standard of living because of intragenerational inequities, which may and should become 
more equitable (see chapter 3).
139 NB it may be thought that a “sufficientarian” understanding of intergenerational equity might be able to 
deal with this better, i.e. interpreting the conclusions of section 1 as guaranteeing some minimum, 
“sufficient” conditions for well-being of future generations. E.g. Page, 2006, p70, considers an 
intergenerational application of Nussbaum's basic capabilities approach, such that “It will not be the aim of 
distributive justice to secure a resource base for future generations which is equal to that enjoyed by previous 
generations, or a non-diminishing social welfare function, but rather to preserve an environment that enables 
future persons to retain the same substantive freedoms to be healthy, well fed, and well clothed that their 
ancestors possessed”. Whilst I think this captures some of the features I have been emphasising, for my view 
to be a version of sufficientarianism it would be radically different to other sufficientarian paradigms. 
Because Page, 2006, p91 has also highlighted how “the sufficientarian ceases to be concerned about the exact 
profile of benefits that pertains once everyone has enough”, whereas I am suggesting that there are some 
respects in which sufficientarianism is not enough to meet our obligations to future generations. Whilst there 
are some things we do not need continually more of (e.g. material consumption), or which cannot continually 
improve (e.g. our ecological preconditions), there are other things which we surely want to see improved for 
future generations (if compatible with living within ecologically effective bounds), e.g. better healthcare. But 
the distributive justice metaphor deforms the way that we think about our descendants, since it stops us 
thinking about (genuinely) developing and improving our society; once we have “given” them what is 
“sufficient”, we need not do more.
140 It may be that the intergenerational equity approach is more applicable in guiding the rate of use of the 
cumulative emissions budget, once limits have been decided (emissions levels are increasingly understood in 
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now to outline the kind of approach which I believe should be taken, to recognise the 
asymmetry in our intergenerational moral relationships and our obligations to improve and 
develop ecological conditions for the well-being of future generations. 
2.4. Becoming the future: Caring for the future as a development of the present
I now sketch the kind of alternative metaphor that I think also needs to be appealed to,  to 
capture those features of intergenerational moral relationships ignored by the distributive 
justice metaphor141. What I have suggested is missing from, or mischaracterised by the 
former approaches in defining harms and obligations to future generations is, firstly, a 
conceptual recognition of the asymmetry and directionality of our relationship with the 
future. That is, an understanding of future generations not simply as another distinct group 
of peoples located elsewhere in time as opposed to space, but as dependent on us for the 
conditions and structures in which they live. This dependency should be understood not 
simply in terms of being recipients of capital, but in the sense that they emerge from us and 
our world; the form of their societies, the health of their ecosystems and their very 
identities, as was considered in 2.1. This is in contrast to the “saving” metaphor which 
implies a stockpile of goods, set aside and given to future generations. Rather, over time 
our generation becomes them142.
This could be seen as enhancing the notion of strong sustainability which was introduced 
in chapter 1 (section 3.2). Strong sustainability, I emphasised, is generally contrasted to 
weak sustainability in considering that particular resources or functioning of processes 
should be sustained, rather than the aggregate of different goods and services. But I suggest 
this distinction should also involve recognising strong sustainability as a process of 
terms of cumulative emissions between now and a set point in the future). Even this would not be 
straightforward, since making the reductions involve changing our systems and behaviours, weaning 
ourselves off emissions-based economies/societies, which means using less in the future. Perhaps aiming for 
equality of objective welfare (as considered in chapter 3, section 4) could be helpful, to avoid an emissions 
trajectory where most of the budget is used now, leaving an insufficient amount to meet needs from, say, 
2025 onwards, whilst a zero-carbon transition is still being completed. We need the trajectory to allow, as far 
as possible, for such a transition. Even then, however, it is not necessarily a question of  intergenerational 
equity, since standards of living could, in some respects improve over this transition (e.g. if people live more 
active lifestyles). 
141 This is predominantly an exploration, and I would like to develop this more in future work.
142 In saying this I have some sympathy with De Shalit's notion of a transgenerational community, as  “one 
that extends into the future” (De Shalit, 1995, p12). However, De Shalit oddly uses this to justify considering 
our obligations to near future generations  in terms of intergenerational distributive justice (i.e. since they are 
a part of the transgenerational community, where conditions of justice apply), so it is therefore very different 
to my developmental approach. 
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protecting and developing functioning over time rather than “a matter of distributional 
equity”143 of quantities of goods and services between generations.  For in any case, the 
form of ecosystems and patterns of life shift, change and evolve over time, and are not 
static – this is, or should be, the distinction between mere preservation and sustainability.
This is secondly, then, relevant for our moral attitude to future generations. We need to 
consider our moral obligations to future generations and the prevention of harms in terms 
of investing in and shaping future conditions for flourishing – our responsibility for how 
our world will become - rather than considering future generations as competitors for 
intertemporal resources. Any gardener will be familiar with this way of thinking, 
exemplified through the rosemary bush analogy described above.  For the land to support 
life in the future requires time and money to be spent working the soil, enriching it, 
planting seeds (which means, if they are from a previous crop, not consuming them) so that 
they can grow productively in subsequent years. More will be harvested in the future than 
now but this is a defining feature of the (directional) process. And this means holding back 
from some ‘opportunities’ now in use of particular resources and ecosystemic processes 
such as the GHG absorption capacity to ensure that future lives are liveable, even if quality 
of life ends up being better subsequently than ours is now. 
For us to do this even when we ourselves will not directly benefit involves a bias towards 
the future; an attitude of love/care to future generations, as both Read and Jonas have 
suggested is analogous to our relationship with our children144. Future generations 
(including the wider ecological community) are not our competitors because they are our 
creations, our inheritors and, one might say, the development of our communities. This 
need not imply the kind of communitarian position advocated by De Shalit, which derives 
obligations to future generations from their membership of our particular 
“transgenerational” communities whose identity we want to prolong145. Such a position 
means we have fewer, weaker obligations to those outwith our community(i.e. to other 
transgenerational communities), which would risk, for DACC, collapsing back to a 
position of national self-interest. But for both Read and Jonas, our caring for future 
generations is not merely premised on our connection with our biological/community 
143 Anand and Sen, 2000, p2038
144 Read, Forthcoming(a), p4; Jonas, 1985, p39.
145 De Shalit, 1995, p63
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descendants; rather, in so far as we control both their existence and condition it functions 
as a metaphor on which we can model our responsibilities to future generations146.
The costs or harms from DACC to future generations, therefore, should not be thought of 
in terms of an aggregate cost-minimising exercise or exclusively as an unfair intertemporal 
distribution of resources or well-being, but as a process that is diminishing/threatening the 
health or liveability of the earth's ecosystems in the future. It is in this sense that, as I 
suggested at the end of section 1, whilst a 1°C GMT rise seems clearly147 to risk significant 
harm to our ecological preconditions, i.e. the impairing the stable functioning of many 
major ecosystems, in fact every increase in GMT over the past century has already begun 
to undermine their functioning, even if some areas may experience some temporary 
benefits.
This does not mean that possible current harms from mitigative action should not be taken 
into consideration. There is a sense in which we should balance these against harms it is 
intended to prevent. But this is not best understood as an attempt to equitably distribute the 
harms and benefits between generations, but about the society we want to be and to 
become. In fact, I suggest that so long as those threatened harms are not comparable – to 
the kind or degree of those we are trying to prevent from DACC, which damage the 
ecological preconditions of future generations148 - they should not constitute justifiable 
reasons to rule out such a mitigation level. Mitigative action which fundamentally harmed 
current generations could be quite rightly objected to on the grounds that the lives of the 
current generation have value and no society which values human life could countenance 
causing significant suffering and live with itself.  This can be taken quite literally if it is 
recalled that future generations originate from the current generation.
For it should be remembered that, as I have emphasised through section 2, future 
generations should not be thought of as a distinct society or group living at a different 
temporal location, but as what/who we will become, emerging from our generation, and the 
future identity of our society(ies).  This means that whatever suffering we “impose” on 
146 Although Jonas considers the duties to existence to operate slightly differently in the case of future 
generations, 1985, p40-42
147 As I have emphasised I deal in part B with the issue of likelihood and uncertainty separately.
148 I.e. on the basis of the green economic picture in chapter 1 (part B, section 3.2), since the ecosystem is a 
precondition for economic functioning at all. See also chapter 2, part B section 3.4(iii), discussed in the 
context of the response  justified by the precautionary principle.
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current generations, will also be inherited by future generations. This is both in terms a 
psychological collective inheritance through their origins and history,  but also affecting 
the conditions for social structures. If, therefore, solutions are pursued that result in total 
social disintegration, conflict, poverty, this will also threaten the social conditions for 
future generations – to an extent, it will be borne by them, as well as current generations. 
Indeed, it is a core concern for campaigners. For example, the TUC's report, A Green and 
Fair Future, which argues for a “just transition” to a lower carbon economy, highlights 
that past significant “economic restructuring” that was “chaotic” not only left “ordinary 
workers, their families and communities to bear the brunt of the transition” but “many 
individuals and communities in the UK are still paying the price from the rapid shift away 
from industrial production  over the last 30 years”149.
This means, therefore, that if achieving a particular mitigation level involved destroying 
the infrastructure of current societies overnight, the chaotic legacy left to future 
generations would not allow for stable or resilient future societies either. Although some 
revolutionaries might disagree (!), I mean here to imply the destruction of social, economic 
and industrial systems without effective replacement structures, in a way which would not 
allow effective transition to an alternative way of living or sustaining ourselves; i.e. they 
sever our (current) ability to make use of and survive in our ecological conditions. By 
contrast, it seems to me that the kinds of harms we can and should accept will include 
some limitations to what we can do – how far we travel and how frequently, the food we 
consume, other energy-intensive activities, and consequently some drop in standard of 
living, at least in industrialised countries150. These surely do not constitute harms of the 
same order as those we risk from DACC. 
However, one concern may be that, even short of extremes such as immediate cessation of 
emissions, a deeper, rapid mitigation to achieve lower GMT targets risks exactly this kind 
of widescale economic collapse, because of the effects on economic growth, on prices and 
employment, resulting in disruption to food and energy access, and corresponding poverty 
and mass suffering. This might conceivably constitute comparable harm to that which we 
are aiming to prevent. And these sorts of harms might be seen to render deep mitigation 
149 TUC, 2008, p3
150 Though see chapter 3 for a discussion of how the burdens of the mitigation target should be shared 
equitably between countries, since this would affect the kinds of costs imposed on each country.
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targets not only as morally prohibitive but socially, economically, or politically impossible 
to implement. 
But these questions – of moral appropriateness and of possibility - are deeply intertwined. 
Because whether or not such comparable harms would emerge from massive, rapid 
emissions cuts, depends largely on the possibilities created by our socio-economic system 
and the kind of measures governments (and communities) put in place. Of course, at one 
extreme, reducing the world’s carbon budget to zero within days would clearly cause such 
immense chaos that almost no society would be able to function, let alone feed itself (i.e. 
because of the current dependence of socio-economic systems on high-emitting activities). 
However, excluding such extreme scenarios, the possibilities of making deep emissions 
cuts without significant harm depends on how people are (collectively) prepared to act, or 
change. And here it is a mistake to assume that attitudes, preferences and lifestyles are 
fixed or ‘given’, as I have argued in 1.2, and thereby treat the question of socio-economic 
possibility as a scientific one151. Attitudes, social and political modes of organisation and 
the way our economies work can alter and be altered such that some changes become 
possible (for example, because people are less driven by continuous economic 
consumption or because employment patterns are less reliant on long-distance travel), and 
will also, therefore, impose fewer harms from the same mitigation target under a different 
scenario. 
This gives a deeper meaning to the concept of a transition to a zero-carbon society.   What 
is increasingly argued by campaigners is that fairly radical mitigation targets could be 
achieved through a period of rapid planned transition  – an “emergency climate 
stabilization program”152 to reshape infrastructure to a zero carbon economy akin to the 
socio-economic shift in the second world war153. This need not involve significant ‘harms’ 
to the current generation if the transition adhered to the demands of intragenerational 
justice and was a “just transition”154, involving for example, rationing of key goods and 
services within each society and between nations (see chapter three). Indeed as others have 
151 I develop this distinction between scientific uncertainty and social indeterminacy in appendix 2, section 1.
152 Baer et al, 2009, p7
153 Which would include massive investments in the energy sector – it could not occur based on the current 
investment levels. But this and other step-changes – to consumption, to waste reduction, to public transport - 
could occur, some, (eg Simms, 2011; Roodhouse, 2007) have argued, were Britain on “the equivalent of a 
war footing to tackle climate change” (Caroline Lucas MP, preface to Simms, 2011, p4). 
154 TUC, 2008.
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pointed out, there could also be significant improvements – for example, to health through 
more reliance on physical skills and activities – walking, cycling, farming, and increased 
community cooperation as evident in the Transition Towns movement155. Low or zero 
carbon living need not be seen as a sacrifice156, but as adapting ones aims and lifestyle to a 
new set of limitations and arrangements157. This therefore involves fundamental cultural, as 
well as socio-economic change158. It is in this sense that the questions of possibility of 
change and degree of harms to current generations are interrelated: in practice, some 
mitigation targets may seem socially, politically or economically ‘impossible’ largely 
because within current structures and change mechanisms the sorts of harm they impose on 
current generations would lead to social unrest, disintegration or economic collapse.
The aim, therefore, of policy, should be to ensure these changes are possible, to shift these 
parameters and transition towards socio-economic structures such that significant, 
comparable harms would not occur. This needs to be pursued at the same time, as part of, 
pursuing particular mitigation targets159. This might appear to side-step the issue. I do not 
mean to imply that it is possible to make such a transition or achieve this scale of 
mitigation without imposing any harms on current generations. As I have suggested, there 
are things people will be unable to do or have to do significantly less of (e.g. flying abroad 
regularly, high-energy consuming activities, meat consumption). But even these may not 
eventually appear as significant sacrifices if and as attitudes shift to recognise these 
activities as unnecessary and other benefits emerge (such as healthier, more active 
lifestyles). My point is that deep harms of a kind or degree approaching those we/future 
generations face from DACC need not arise for current generations, and the question of 
what is ‘possible’ or not to achieve is largely dependent on how we choose collectively to 
act160.
155 See http://www.transitionnetwork.org/
156 Although it would clearly still involve some sacrifices for some people adapted to high-emitting lifestyles, 
and used to e.g. frequently travelling long distances, car travel, high consumption.
157 For this reason many Transition Town movements have a “heart and soul” group, a woolly sounding 
name, but which refers to a group focusing on psychological adaptation to a different way of living and the 
mental and spiritual challenges that accompany such changes.
158 Ernsting & Rughani, 2008, p72 – 80 examine the kinds of changes that would need to occur. 
159  More work needs to be done on the viability of emissions reductions at this more (currently) radical end 
of the scale, and on how far (and with what kinds of policy mechanisms) a minimum sufficient but decent 
standard of living for all could be consistent with these kinds of reductions.
160 I include here both political will and general social acceptance of the need for this kind of shift – these are 
clearly major barriers (!) in practice, but this is where the argument needs to be had.
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This is not always fully recognised by those who consider the question of what degree of 
climate change is now inevitable, and what is/ is not possible to prevent161. There may be 
some DACC warming outcomes which may not be geophysically possible to achieve162, 
because we are already committed to some additional warming resulting from the climate 
forcing of the existing atmospheric concentration (which takes time to emerge)163 and the 
concentration will take considerable time to significantly reduce, even if all emissions 
immediately ceased164. Although there are still significant uncertainties surrounding 
warming already “in the pipeline”165 and some of the assumptions in discussions around 
this also depend on some human choices, for example, over whether we can or should 
more immediately reduce current atmospheric concentrations of GHGs by removing 
carbon from the atmosphere.166 
What, then, are the implications for specifying what constitutes a harmful GMT rise? 
Firstly, from what I have examined in section 1.3, any further temperature rise is harmful 
(given harms already occurring) and may risk more serious harms. This is important to 
recognise, since in this sense there is no ‘safe’ level of DACC (as I examine further in 
sections 3.2 and 4). However, it is still important for an international agreement to include 
particular limits which are plausibly achievable, which prevent even more serious harms, 
and around which common effort is rallied to keep within, at least on transition to more 
genuinely ‘safe’ limits in the future. That is, the ‘ecological effectiveness’ of an agreement 
can be understood in terms of short-term damage limitation, and an attempt to return us, 
globally, to a more resilient ecological set of conditions. This makes specifying GMT rise 
limits a difficult balance between being both plausibly achievable but not unnecessarily 
permissive/apologist for particularly severe and/or irreversible moral harms which might 
occur. 
161 See Hare and Meinshausen, 2006, for discussion of four interpretations of “warming we are committed 
to”.
162 Hare and Meinshausen, 2006, p115
163 This is because of delays in feedbacks, for example, the slow response of the oceans. (see IPCC, 2007b, 
section 10.7.1)
164 Matthews and Caldeira, 2008, p3; Hare and Meinshausen, 2006, p126
165 Because equally, climate inertia means that the current atmospheric concentration may be lowered before 
all of the expected warming from current concentrations is realised, but it is unclear just how much. (Hansen 
et al, 2008, p225).  See also Hare and Meinshausen, 2006, p117-121
166 I.e. by using some form of geo-engineering in carbon capture or sequestration, much of which carries its 
own risks and is fairly controversial. See Ernsting & Rughani, 2008.
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Given the discussion in 1.3 over recent understanding of the current impacts of climate 
change, those expected from a GMT rise of 1°C onwards, and the possibility of even more 
severe harms and crossing crucial tipping points as 2°C is approached, the widely-cited 
2°C (above pre-industrial levels) GMT limit certainly now seems far too high. At the lower 
end, it is extremely difficult to determine what GMT rise we are likely to be already 
(physically) committed to. Of course, it may turn out that even 2°C is unachievable as a 
limit (see discussion in section 4), but this does not constitute a reason for keeping this as a 
mitigation target.167 Given that it is likely that around a 0.8°C GMT rise has already 
occurred over the last century168, it seems both plausible and morally incumbent on us to 
aim to create the possibilities to limit warming to between 1-1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels, i.e. to attempt to stop any significant further warming. I discuss in section 4 how far 
this might be achievable, what it might correspond to in terms of emissions levels, and how 
far it might be compatible with a managed socio-economic transition that does not impose 
comparable harms to current or future generations.
Before I move on to consider the importance of uncertainty and likelihood, however, the 
question still seems to press: what if the socio-economic shifts required to achieve 
mitigation to prevent a 1-1.5°C GMT rise do not in fact occur, or cannot occur without 
comparable harm to current generations? Or, what if the situation turns out to be even more 
serious, or emissions reductions are further delayed, so that in several years time it emerges 
that even a just transition emergency pathway would not prevent GMT rises of 4°C or 
more, risking runaway DACC and maybe even a Planet Venus scenario169?  Are the 
possible harms to current generations necessary sacrifices, which are trumped by the 
longer-term nature of harms from DACC? If so, does this imply a moral justification for 
their imposition through authoritarian rule? Here, I do not think there is any morally clear 
answer170. Were we truly to find ourselves in this position, we would be between a 
proverbial rock and a hard place. Perhaps in such a scenario one would need to revert to 
some form of utilitarian calculation in terms of numbers of people that would suffer, or the 
time for / ability of society to recover, particularly if we were speaking of very high GMT 
167 Because, even if it is ultimately missed, every effort will be needed to prevent even higher temperature 
rises. It may, of course, constitute a reason for adaptation preparations (as far as possible) to be made for this 
and higher temperature targets such as 4°C, as New et al (2011) have argued.
168 IPCC, 2007b, Summary for Policymakers, p5
169 Ernsting and Rughani, 2008, p72
170 My application of the precautionary principle (see 3.4 (iii)) is to prevent the specified harms without 
causing comparable harms. However, I do not suggest that this rules out such action were such harms to 
occur; rather I think it is merely morally silent, in choosing between two pretty awful scenarios.
115
rises, where the permanent end to human civilisation, and much other life on earth could be 
a possibility. I will not attempt to provide an answer here. But what I have tried to show in 
this section is that the framing of such a scenario, in terms of a trade-off between harms to 
two different temporally located group is misleading; because the conditions from one 
emerge from the other, harms from one define the next, the choice faced in such a scenario 
is not the one that may initially appear.
Relatedly, the suggestion that such severe changes might need to be imposed through and 
justify authoritarian rule171, seems likely to be another misleading choice. Briefly, I see no 
reason why ecologically-minded authoritarian governments who understood the need for 
urgent mitigation measures would be any more likely to emerge and take power, if a 
democratic system was unable to produce such rulers. But I also follow Achterberg172 in 
believing that any changes that were so imposed could not be of the substantial and lasting 
kind necessary to achieve radical mitigation targets, and that it is a “necessary condition 
for a structural solution to the environmental crisis that it is permanently supported by as 
many people involved (citizens) as possible.”173. For this, we need, at least in general, for 
society to be on board.  
There does not seem to me to be any kind of moral principle that could guide us through 
such a scenario, in advance. Once we recall that future generations grow from and are 
formed by the structures and conditions of current generations, the dynamic is not simply a 
question of harms to ‘them’ versus harms to ‘us’. Rather, the focus should be on how we 
can effect a transition to enable us to live within our ecological limits and boundaries of 
our global commons174, and how we can achieve the transition without significant harms. 
But this is not merely a question of what we should give and take, but of the society and 
wider ecological community we want to create and to be. It is, therefore, also the question 
of how we can become the future.
171 As Ophuls and Heilbroner had reluctantly argued in the 1970s, as being eventually necessary to limit 
economic growth and prevent conflict. See Ophuls, 1977, p145, and Heilbroner, 1975, especially p108-110.
172 Who writes on participatory and liberal democracy. Although I depart from him in his faith in the 
suitability of Rawlsian Liberal Democracy.
173 Achterberg, 1993, p82.
174 Ernsting and Rughani, 2008, p72, consider similar questions.
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Part B: Normative responses to Uncertainty in Climate Science
3. Uncertainty
The implications for mitigative efforts of the discussion above might seem to be 
complicated by uncertainties in climate science. This is the second component of ‘danger’ 
outlined in section 0 – how likely, or uncertain a harm is to occur. In particular, there are 
uncertainties in how far various potential climatic outcomes of rising GHG emissions – the 
harmful outcomes we are morally obliged to prevent – are likely to arise from any given 
level of emissions. As I suggested at the start of the chapter, this makes it unclear as to 
which mitigation target should be selected as corresponding to the GMT rise limit that 
should be prevented, which I have argued should be set at 1-1.5°C. The ultimate purpose of 
Part B of this chapter is to think through how this decision should be made, and define the 
mitigation target for the ecological effectiveness criterion. Uncertainties also clearly 
mediate the relationship between harmful effects of climatic change and the corresponding 
GMT rise that I considered in Part A. I do not (re)consider these uncertainties explicitly in 
part B, but the conclusions I reach about how we should respond to uncertainty can be 
equally applied to justify the approach I took in Part A175.
I argue that the nature of the uncertainties present in climate science (considered in 
appendix 2) is such that they do not justify inaction, but neither should they imply 
responses which attempt to turn uncertainties into expected values which would allow a 
gamble on the outcome. Scientific uncertainty should be understood primarily in contrast 
to “risk” rather than to “certainty”. This will form the basis in section 3.3 for understanding 
and defending an approach to the precautionary principle, and tackling some of the 
problems it has been argued to face. In sections 3.4 and 4 I am then able to consider the 
implications for selecting mitigation targets which should be pursued as morally sufficient 
and consistent with preventing the 1-1.5°C GMT rise limit that was advocated in Part A. I 
ultimately argue that the ecological effectiveness criterion would require moving towards 
atmospheric concentrations of 350ppm CO2e, and a global transition to zero-carbon as 
soon as possible (without causing comparable harms) this century. 
175 I.e. broadly precautionary, but not significantly so;  since we are already experiencing dangerous climate 
change, all that we can be precautionary about is preventing more severe/dangerous impacts. 
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In considering these responses, I allude to different ways of categorising uncertainty. 
Whilst the climate science literature on uncertainty has highlighted several major 
categories and kinds of uncertainty, there is nothing that systematically overviews the 
different ways of drawing distinctions and the levels at which they operate, in a 
conceptually sophisticated way. Therefore, I have attempted to delineate them in a 
technical appendix (appendix 2). There I describe four different levels relevant to climate 
policy, which I will outline briefly here for the purposes of the forthcoming discussion. 
Firstly I distinguish domains of knowledge: uncertainty in  climate science is distinct from 
“theoretical uncertainty” over the truth of greenhouse gas theory and, further, from 
“uncertainty” over future human emitting actions, which I have termed “social 
indeterminacy”176. Secondly, I distinguish broad areas of climate scientific uncertainty, 
over: climate sensitivity, carbon sensitivity and the ecological impacts of global climatic 
change. Thirdly, I define the methodological sources of error and uncertainty that arise in 
these areas of climate science uncertainty. Lastly, I summarise the conceptual categories of 
scientific uncertainty which can be applied to these areas/sources of uncertainty offered by 
Stirling177 and O’Riordan et al,178 which are based on Knight’s risk versus uncertainty 
distinction179: risk (probability known, outcome well-defined), uncertainty (probabilities 
unassignable, outcome well-defined), ambiguity (probabilities assignable but outcome 
poorly defined) and ignorance (neither probabilities or outcomes can be defined).  
I now briefly consider the first possible response - that mitigative action requires certainty, 
or less uncertainty, before action is taken - which seems to misunderstand the nature of 
scientific uncertainty.
3. 1 Requiring Certainty 
The presence of uncertainty is held by some180 to undermine the need for strong mitigative 
action on DACC, not withstanding our obligations to protect the interests of future 
generations which would otherwise be triggered. The implication is that strong mitigative 
action requires near certainty, and that climate science currently rests on “unproven 
176 It should not count as genuine uncertainty, since human actions are dependent on decisions as yet unmade 
and can be altered, unlike scientific phenomena. 
177 Stirling, 2001, p79, 
178 O'Riordan et al, 2001, p24-25.
179 Knight, 1921, p20
180 E.g. fossil fuel producers, previous US administrations, discussed in Brown, 2002, p101-102
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assumptions”181. The first general approach is therefore to postpone significant mitigative 
action to prevent possible harms from DACC until scientific understanding has further 
reduced or eliminated uncertainties in the areas described in section 2 of appendix 2.  
Not all climate science uncertainties can even be quantified in terms of probability, and not 
all effects are wholly definable. Hence Stirling's distinction of “risk”, not only from 
“uncertainty, but “ambiguity” and “ignorance”182, as discussed in appendix 2. However, 
whilst the terminology might appear derisory, it should not be taken to imply inadequacy 
in the science. What these categories of uncertainty tell us is that it is not possible 
currently, whether in practice or in principle, to describe specific quantifiable relations 
from emissions level through to impacts. But, as Hulme has argued, to require certainty 
from science misunderstands how science works and our relationship to it. In particular, 
“scientific knowledge about climate change will always be incomplete and it will always 
be uncertain. Science always speaks with a conditional voice, or at least good science 
always does....Certainty is the anomalous condition for humanity, not uncertainty.”183 
Uncertainty should not therefore indicate that science is insufficient to be action guiding184.
One can have credible grounds for believing that harm will result from an action even if 
the relationship cannot be precisely quantified. By analogy, if I consume a high amount of 
salt, my uncertainty as to the exact level of salt that will cause me serious harm or heart 
failure does not justify my continuing to consume large quantities. As Claude Henry has 
argued, “If a decision-maker a priori rejects as ‘scientifically unsound’ any act which is not 
unambiguous… he neglects a large array of scientific information which, however 
uncertain, might be reliable and decisive”. Henry reminds us of such an approach by 
British “public regulators” at the start of the twentieth century to the uncertain relationship 
between lung disease and asbestos exposure. UK authorities refused a ban until 1985185, 
leading to severe “human and economic consequences”186.
181 Brown, 2002, p139.
182 Stirling, 2001, p79, 
183 Hulme, 2009, p106
184 Indeed, for Hulme, what counts as knowledge depends on social, public processes that require trust, and 
participation in the application of science (Hulme, 2009, p106-107), but I do not consider this procedural 
dimension here.
185 Laverty, 2006
186 Henry, 2006, p4
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The “Uncertainty” of a future harm’s occurrence can seem (psychologically) inadequate, or 
even reassuring in comparison to the gold standard of certainty. But one only needs to 
recall the corollary of the uncertainty of a given harm to revise this view; that the harm’s 
non-occurrence / a benign outcome is also uncertain, and may be even less likely – it 
cannot be considered the default outcome. In the case of DACC, where, for example, 
harmful GMT rises of between 1.1 and 2.9°C above pre-industrial temperatures (i.e. which 
I have considered in part A as ranging from harmful to extremely harmful) are described 
by the IPCC187 as “likely” to occur from emissions concentrations of 600ppm CO2e, 
temperature rises below 1.1°C are, therefore, unlikely.
Whilst I will not consider here in any further depth such arguments against this approach, 
which has been adequately countered elsewhere, it is worth summarising two other main 
objections.  The first, discussed by Donald Brown, concerns the time taken to resolve any 
(potentially resolvable) uncertainties. Brown argues that an ethical framing of the science 
and uncertainty of DACC would not ask “Is there enough scientific information?”, since 
this does not account for the purposes of the information. Rather, the question should 
further add “…coupled with not enough time to resolve scientific uncertainties before harm 
occurs, to trigger an ethical responsibility to act now?”188.  Even if scientific uncertainties 
might be potentially resolvable, therefore, this cannot be required if doing so at the expense 
of preventative action might allow possible harms to occur. Similarly, Yohe highlights how 
uncertainties of climate science, in particular, the range of the parameters in “climate 
sensitivity”, are “so profound that they will never be resolved in a timely fashion”, and 
that, therefore, proposals which seek “to delay immediate action in favor of waiting for the 
results of a “crash research program” to narrow their ranges is not viable”189.
The second objection surrounds unresolvable uncertainties. These uncertainties are 
unresolvable either in theory, due to the source of error being “objective uncertainty”190, or 
in practice, arising from complexity and deterministic chaos191. Requiring certainty in these 
cases would therefore require the impossible. Of course, the question still remains as to 
how much uncertainty is reasonable for action on possible threats to be taken, and whether 
187 IPCC, 2007a, Summary for Policymakers, section 3
188 Brown, 2002, p6
189 Yohe, 2009, p337.
190 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p460-462. See appendix 2, section 3
191 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p461. See appendix 2, section 3
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mere possibility of harm is sufficient to trigger action. This will be considered in 3.3 and 
3.4 when I consider the precautionary principle.
3.2  Accommodation of uncertainty in Cost-Benefit Analysis through “expected 
utility”.
A second possible approach is the conventional economic treatment of uncertainties which 
attempts to accommodate them within the decision-making schema of CBA. This occurs 
either by ignoring uncertainties altogether and adopting “best guesses about likely 
outcomes”192, or by basing calculations on the expected value or utility as a function of the 
scale and probability of a possible harm. The former is problematic in that it side steps 
questions about how far action should be taken in anticipation of other more or less costly 
outcomes. And where likelihoods cannot be determined at all or only for ranges of 
outcomes (as in estimates for climate sensitivity, see appendix 2, section 4), “best guesses” 
are not meaningful.
The latter approach based on expected utility is the approach taken by Stern. He explains:
“Where we embody uncertainty formally in our models, we add utilities over 
possible states of the world that might result from climate change, weighting 
by the probability of those states. This yields what is known as ‘expected’ 
utility.
This is essentially the extension of the social utility approach to an uncertain 
or ‘stochastic’ environment. As in a certain or ‘deterministic’ environment, it 
has its ethical difficulties, but it has the virtues of transparency, clarity, and 
consistency. Again, it is fairly standard in applied economics.”193
This depends on formulating uncertainties as formal risks (in the sense of Knight and of 
Stirling considered in appendix 2), where the likelihood of a harm is assigned a probability, 
and the impact of the harm is described as a magnitude194. As such, as Stern acknowledges, 
it faces significant problems. 
192 Ackerman et al, 2009, p305.
193 Stern 2006, p33
194 Stirling, 2001, p68
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Firstly, it has been increasingly criticised for its dependence on the ability to assign 
numerical probabilities. Stirling emphasises that what he terms the “narrow risk” approach 
(which with only one ”yardstick of performance”195, i.e. through CBA) is unable to cope 
with uncertainty or ignorance where there is “no basis for probabilities”196. And, this is 
often not possible because of the sources of uncertainty197. Even 'best guess' probabilities 
are subject to uncertainty and ignorance since they fail to reflect non-linearities or what 
have been termed “climate surprises”198. Schneider makes a similar point in acknowledging 
that  “In reality... complete or perfect knowledge of complex systems, which would permit 
the credible calculation of objective or frequentist probabilities rarely exists. Likewise, the 
full range of potential outcomes is usually not known. Thus, risk almost always is 
accompanied by varying degrees of uncertainty”199
Larry Lohmann has likewise argued that climate surprises “render problematic reliance on 
probabilistic bell curves and conventional ‘risk management’ which assume that individual 
variation averages out and no single event is capable of changing overall trends”200. He 
argues that because of conventional economic dependence on CBA for decision-making 
there is pressure to “reduce these ‘monsters’ to (or frame them as) probabilities” and a 
“Weberian drive to use such numbers to tame chance”201. This tendency is clear in 
Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti's approach, despite their concern for awareness of climate 
surprises202. Although they criticise most “integrated assessment methods” which “rarely 
consider low-probability, high consequence events”, and instead “bracket the 
uncertainty”203, they argue that the solution is to  cast results “in probabilistic terms”, i.e. 
ensuring the assessments include “as wide a range of eventualities (and their attendant 
possibilities) as possible”204. Whilst, as I suggest later, use of broad probabilities can be a 
195 Stirling, 2001, p69.
196 Stirling, 2001, p78.
197 See appendix 2, section 3.
198 Although this should not be taken to imply, as has Henry, 2006, p6-7, that were the uncertainties of 
climate science fully quantifiable as risks, that decisions should be based wholly on expected CBA, for the 
reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
199  Schneider, 2001b, p4673. 
200 Lohmann, 2009, p514
201 Lohmann, 2009, p514
202 It should also be remembered that although termed “surprises”, Schneider & Kunz-Duriseti remind us that 
they are better referred to as “imaginable surprises”, since often conditions for the surprise to occur can be 
identified (Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p58).
203 Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p58
204 Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p79
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helpful guide in some circumstances205, Lohmann is criticising the (in any case somewhat 
arbitrary) assignment of probability for CBA-based policy decisions, which will under-
play worse-case scenarios, since their importance in such calculations is directly 
proportional to their likelihood, which might be outweighed by benefits of a higher 
likelihood. 
Because, importantly, this approach suffers from the same kinds of reductivist problems as 
the use of ordinary CBA in decision-making (see chapter 1 section 3.2, and section 3.2 of 
this chapter).  It attempts to by-pass value-judgements by trading-off and making 
commensurable combinations of different levels of danger and likelihoods206. This is 
inappropriate in part because, as Stirling argues, this “risk science” does not reflect how 
science works.  He argues that a “scientific rationale” should fully recognise and represent 
“issues like multidimensionality, incommensurability and ignorance [which is, i.e. “an 
acknowledgement of the possibility of surprises”207]”208. 
But it is also problematic on an ethical level. For example, to decide between an action 
with a high likelihood of a low impact negative outcome and an action with a low 
likelihood of a high impact negative outcome, the product of the likelihood and the impact 
is factored in as an expected cost in each case. The action with the highest expected utility 
value would then be considered optimal. But whilst gambles of this kind might pay off for 
businesses in the long-term, in repeated runs of the process where the only relevant 
dimension is financial gain over time, when the potential costs are multi-dimensional, 
once-off and life-threatening as in DACC, the approach is morally misguided. 
One aspect of this is how risk-aversion is treated. Stern argues that “The standard 
expected-utility framework involves aversion to risk and, in this narrow sense, a 
‘precautionary principle’”209. But this is only in the sense that more likely and more costly 
205 E.g. in sections 3.4(ii) and 4, where I use them to highlight the non-negligible likelihood of harms 
associated with raised emissions concentrations
206 See also Stirling, 2001, p69, on the importance of multidimensionality and incommensurability. He points 
out that even where risks can be “adequately represented” through a “single metric”, they will still be 
“inherently multidimensional in nature”, e.g. considering severity, reversibility, geographical distribution of 
effects.
207 Stirling, 2001, p78
208 Stirling, 2001, p81-2
209 Stern, 2006, p33. Stern is clear that this “narrow” approach to precaution  is distinct from applying a 
precautionary principle; “The analytical approach incorporates aspects of insurance, caution and precaution 
directly, and does not therefore require a separate ‘precautionary principle’ to be imposed as an extra ethical 
criterion.”
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threats will be reflected as higher expected costs overall when expected utility is 
calculated.  It fails to acknowledge the crucial ethical dimension of such judgements which 
might consider the prevention of some kinds of potential harms as non-compromisable. In 
such cases a more risk averse approach is appropriate, minimising the worst case negative 
impacts rather than maximising the most likely benefits. In other words, where lives and 
basic well-being are at risk, it is arguably preferable to settle for fairly likely moderate 
costs than less likely severe costs. This implies that for certain potential harms, as soon as 
the likelihood is non-negligible, risks should always be mitigated, irrespective of the 
likelihood of its occurrence. For example, a company considering an action carrying a low 
but non-negligible likelihood of causing human injuries or deaths would be judged 
irresponsible if it pursued this over an alternative action carrying a higher likelihood of less 
harmful impacts or with lower expected benefits, and judged therefore to have a higher 
expected cost.
It may be argued that what is contested in such scenarios is the weighting given to the 
impact of the possible negative outcome. This would then be resolvable by assigning very 
(perhaps infinitely) high values to morally reprehensible outcomes. But this masks the 
qualitative differences between different kinds of costs which require explicit ethical 
debate in forming judgements about them. Even if quantitative values were assigned to 
reflect their moral ranking, the expected utility calculation, as was argued to be the case for 
CBA across time in 3.2, would not then have any particular normative force above and 
beyond what had already been determined, and would at best be superfluous. Similarly, 
whilst some economic CBAs are more sophisticated and attempt to accommodate the 
decision maker’s “aversion for uncertainty”210 or degree of risk aversion211, this only 
sidesteps the substantive normative issue.
Such tactics are also argued to problematically underlie the general drive to specify 
harmful (or safe) levels of DACC. Hence Lohmann argues:
“immense effort has been expended in trying to determine a maximum ‘safe’ level 
of temperature rise (the by now famous 2C figure) as well as the probabilities that 
one or another course of action will keep temperatures below that level. This 
210 Henry, 2006, p8
211 Ackerman et al, 2009 p302
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framing arguably follows the strictures of rational choice theory more closely than 
those of atmospheric science. It attempts to integrate different types of value and 
uncertainty as a prelude to evaluating alternative outcomes based on probabilistic 
predictions about their consequences.”212
Similarly, Foster has argued against over-reliance on quantification and predictive models 
to argue from policy drives to formulate specific long-term safe targets213. Because of the 
uncertainties inherent in the oversimplications214 of  “any predictive model of a real-world 
natural system”215, he suggests that “we create uncertainty by trying to be precise”216.  This 
is all too evident from the analogous financial crisis and the “market in complex new 
financial derivatives that lies at the root of the recent global economic crash”, which 
Lohmann highlights. Here, use of “risk measurement models” to turn uncertainties into 
calculable risks “gave the illusion that everything was under control”217. We cannot afford 
this kind of catastrophe with the climate218. We should not, therefore, take an approach to 
policy setting that relies on such specificity: “identifying any target cut in CO2 emissions... 
achieving which would enable us to avoid dangerous climate change is a kind of 
scientifically disguised whistling in the dark”219. For Foster, this does not mean such targets 
should be totally eradicated. He argues instead for “broad spectrum predictions” which are 
“quantitatively modest... seeking to predict in terms of directions, trends, broad magnitudes 
and possible scenarios, rather than anything more numerically specific”220.  
The implications go beyond a shift in the framing of scientific knowledge on climate 
change, to what we are aiming for. Although this is not explicitly articulated by Foster, it is 
suggested through his preferred approach to global carbon rationing as “the least we can 
now do to ensure that life goes on”, rather than “the most we can now have while meeting 
our obligations to the future”221. This is taken further by Lohmann, and more tentatively, 
212 Lohmann, 2009, p514
213 Foster sees this as a tendency in what he refers to as the “sustainable development framework”,  as 
opposed to a “deep sustainability” perspective. (Foster, 2008)
214 I.e. of the kinds considered in appendix 2, section 3 in model parameters, reliance on representative data, 
non-linearities, etc. (Foster, 2008, p28)
215 I.e. because of its complexity. Foster, 2008, p28
216 Foster, 2008 p29
217 Lohmann, 2009, p175
218 Monbiot has made a similar argument in Monbiot, 2008.
219 Foster, 2008, p30.
220 Foster, 2008, p29.
221 Foster, 2008, p129.
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Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti222, who point towards use of the precautionary principle as 
part of a resilience-based approach.  Lohmann argues that we should replicate the practice 
of “many small farms and indigenous peoples” in scenarios of environmental threat, who 
“tend… to value resilience and ‘safety first’ practices over probabilistic calculations of 
gain and loss or arbitrary, numerical ‘safety margins’”223. This, he argues, is the contrast 
“between a resource or accumulation conception of livelihood and one oriented around 
commons regimes and community survival”224. If we really want to avoid the dangers of 
DACC, we should not seek the highest emissions level or temperature limit the world may 
get away with, but the levels least likely to risk damage to our ecological preconditions: a 
resilient climate system is the most precautionary225. 
3. 3 The Precautionary Principle 
This brings me to the third approach to uncertainty on which I believe justification for 
mitigative action on DACC must rather depend; the precautionary principle (PP), which is 
gaining increasing support and recognition in international law226. Support has been drawn 
to its common-sense moral basis in the “everyday concept of precaution”227. Hence, in its 
most common form, it expresses “the intuitively simple idea that decision makers should 
act in advance of scientific certainty to protect the environment (and with it the well-being 
interests of future generations) from incurring harm”228, although it has also been invoked 
for non-environmental harms, such threats to human health from BSE in cows229. Unlike 
the quantitative approach of expected utility, the PP does not, therefore, require assignment 
of probabilities to potential harms before they can be factored into decisions (although they 
may also guide the precautionary response to harm – see 3.4 (iii)). Rather, it requires only 
a reasonable, albeit uncertain, basis for assuming that harms may occur230, for preventative 
action to be required. As such, it is able to accommodate Stirling’s distinct kinds of 
uncertainty discussed in appendix 2, and allow for “breadth of framing, recognition of 
222 Schneider, 2001b, p4674. Schneider recommends “exploring the `resilience' paradigm (e.g., precautionary 
principle) alongside the `optimization' paradigm (e.g., aggregated cost-benefit analyses)”
223 Lohmann, 2009, p515
224 Ibid.
225 This will become clear in section 4 when I examine current evidence of likelihoods and uncertainties 
associated with different post-industrial era concentration levels.
226 O’Riordan et al, 2001, passim.
227 Sandin, 2004, p462. Also see O'Riordan et al, 2001, p13
228 O’Riordan & Jordan , 1995, p3
229 Henry, 2006, p9.
230 I return in 3.4(ii) to the idea of what constitutes a “reasonable basis”.
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incommensurability and acknowledgement of ignorance” which are, he argues, features of 
scientific knowledge and understanding. Thus, as Stirling argues, “a precautionary 
approach… might arguably be seen to be more scientific than the traditional ‘narrow risk’ 
approach”231.
However, despite the appeal of its general moral approach, the PP can vary significantly in 
its form, interpretation and implications, a fact which has drawn criticism.232 This 
vagueness could potentially undermine its normative application in policy decisions on 
DACC mitigation and justify both weak and strong mitigative action, a concern which 
O'Riordan and Jordan share:
“precaution... may well run the risk of following the dangerously successful 
pathway pioneered by sustainability some time ago... To date, precaution 
provides few, if any operable guidelines for policy makers nor does it 
constitute a rigorous analytical schema”233
For example, Sandin distinguishes between “prescriptive versions” (such as the starting 
formulation) which state that action to prevent possible harms should be taken in advance 
of scientific certainty, and “argumentative” versions, which merely state that uncertainty 
may not be used as a justification for inaction to prevent harms, i.e. they define “a principle 
for what arguments are valid”234. The latter can be seen in, for example, the 1992 UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change which asserts that “where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing such measures”235. A more general distinction is described by 
O’Riordan and Jordan, between “weaker” versions that are “relatively protective of the 
status quo” and “stronger” versions “that predicate the need for much greater social and 
institutional change”236. These vary in emphasis on different aspects of the PP which 
O'Riordan and Jordan identify237. For example, “stronger” versions of the PP might require 
shifting the burden of proof for harm away from those calling for precautionary action and 
231 Stirling, 2001, p81-82
232 Sandin 2004, p462 and Sandin et al, 2001, p288-9
233 O'Riordan & Jordan, 1995, p2
234 Sandin 2004, p470
235 UNFCCC, 1994, article 3
236 O'Riordan & Jordan, 1995, p7
237 From O’Riordan & Jordan, 1995, p4-6
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assume vulnerability of and therefore advocate minimal interference with ecological space, 
thereby allowing for a significant degree of scientific uncertainty238. “Weaker” versions, for 
O’ Riordan & Jordan, will concern predominantly “life-threatening substances or 
activities”, emphasise economic “cost-benefit analysis” in justifying action to avoid 
potential harms, and require a stronger knowledge-base of “sound science” of the harm and 
of the action required to prevent it239.
One immediate concern, therefore, given the argument of 2.2, is that it seems perfectly 
possible for versions of the PP to embrace CBA in the same way as the “narrow risk” 
approach, and therefore to suffer the same limitations240. Indeed, Dupuy and Grimbaum 
read the PP as embracing this same conventional economic ideology by relying on CBA; 
that it ignores objective uncertainty241 and cannot deal with human choices appropriately, 
treatin them as additional parameters of future scenarios242. However, although it is 
sometimes framed in these ways, this is not normally the case243. 
These concerns underline the need for those applying the PP in any particular case to be 
explicit about and justify their interpretation of the varying elements of the PP. To do this, 
it is helpful to have a clearer general formulation of the PP which frames its contentious 
dimensions. In the subsequent section I draw from two similar attempts at a common 
formulation to show how I believe it should be applied to the case of DACC such that it 
does not rely on CBA or a misrepresentation of uncertainty244. 
238 O’Riordan & Jordan, 1995, p7
239 Ibid.
240 This is how Henry  understands it, (Henry, 2006, p9), arguing that “precaution requires that the decision 
maker optimizes on a set larger than the set of scientifically unambiguous acts”, i.e. that CBA calculations 
should include uncertain outcomes.
241 Dupuy & Grinbaum, 2005, p462. 
242 Dupuy & Grinbaum, 2005, p464
243 Sandin, 1999, p894 emphasises that CBA is unnecessary.  Sandin does seem to frame uncertainty 
epistemically (p894) rather than regarding objectively unknowable phenomena, in the way that Dupuy & 
Grinbaum criticise. However, Sandin does also criticise formulations of the PP which require precautionary 
action “before full scientific proof is established” as though “'full scientific proof' is something that is to 
expected” because some issues are “trans-scientific” (p893).  The PP need not, then, refer to epistemic 
uncertainty alone. Additionally, the use of scenarios by the IPCC include human choices as uncertain 
parameters as Dupuy and Grinbaum criticise (see appendix 2, section 1), this is not true of the PP per se. It 
should instead be understood as a principle intended to guide human decisions. Indeed, Stirling, treats it in 
this way, emphasising that it should “Allow iteration, reflexivity, and open-endedness in the interaction 
between sustained scientific monitoring, continued analysis and inclusive deliberation in appraisal. The 
process is never definitively complete” (Stirling, 2001, p 90). This largely encompasses the ideas behind 
Dupuy and Grinbaum’s proposed “ongoing normative assessment” (Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005)
244 However; as I explain shortly I do not consider this general formulation to be the basis for one universal 
“rigorous analytical schema” (as O'Riordan and Jordan imply) that could / should be applicable in all cases.
128
3.4 Refining the Precautionary Principle
As has been highlighted, versions of the PP can significantly vary – so much so that it 
might be better considered as a group of principles245. Both Sandin and Manson have 
offered alternative logical formulations of the PP which attempt to capture its “generic 
elements”246; a “core structure” common to all formulations which differ in how these 
elements are interpreted. 
 Manson describes three main elements: “e-activities”, “e-effects” and “e-remedies”, such 
that “for a given activity that may have a given effect on the environment [the prefix “e-”], 
the PP is supposed to indicate a remedy”247. “E-effects” therefore include potentially 
harmful outcomes and “E-remedies” are interpreted broadly, to include an “outright ban on 
the e-activity… strict regulation of it, and further research into it”. Manson suggests that 
these can be seen as related by a “three-part structure” composed of three conditions. The 
“damage condition” “specifies the characteristics of an e-effect in virtue of which 
precautionary measures should be considered”. The “knowledge condition “specifies the 
status of knowledge regarding the causal connections between the e-activity and the e-
effect”. Lastly, the third (nameless) condition “specifies the e-remedy that decisions 
makers should take in response to the e-activity”. 
Sandin similarly highlights four “dimensions” to the PP. First, the “threat dimension” 
which “concerns the possible threat”, the “uncertainty dimension” which “concerns the 
limits of knowledge”, the “action dimension” concerning the “response to the threat”, and 
the “command dimension” which concerns how strongly action is prescribed248. The 
common structure relating these dimensions is then cast as follows:
“If there is (1) a threat, which is (2) uncertain, then (3) some kind of action is (4) 
mandatory.”249
245 Sandin, 2004, p468
246 Manson, 2002, p264
247 Manson, 2002, p265
248 Sandin, 1999, p891.
249 Ibid.
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These therefore broadly correspond to Manson’s three conditions (with 3 and 4 jointly 
approximating Manson’s “e-remedy”).  Both remarkably similar structures could allow for 
the “weaker” and “stronger” forms of the PP distinguished by O’Riordan and Jordan. For 
example, as Sandin highlights, “the smaller the threat that triggers precaution, the stronger 
(i.e. more cautious) is the principle”. The formulation is therefore “very general indeed, 
allowing considerable room for variation”250. Any appeal to the PP must make clear how 
each of the “dimensions” or “conditions” is being applied.  I now sketch this for the case of 
the threats posed by DACC. I shall predominantly use Manson’s language of “conditions” 
rather than Sandin’s “dimensions”, since the former more explicitly express their function 
as part of the principle.
It should be emphasised that my aim is to clarify how I apply these conditions of the PP in 
the case of DACC. Here I treat the PP as a framework for reflection, not a theory, where 
the conditions guide considerations in each case. This is in contrast to the tempting, but 
ultimately unhelpful, approach of specifying a universally applicable formulation of each 
condition of the principle, a particular weaker or stronger version, such that it can be used 
to wholly determine in advance all possible cases, including DACC.  This is to treat the 
formulation as a calculating mechanism for determining decisions in advance of each 
particular case, where values can simply be in-putted to produce appropriate e-remedies or 
determine whether precaution should be applied. This is tempting because, for supporters 
of either weaker or stronger applications of the PP, there will be a concern to make it 
applicable to cases which most clearly merit precaution, and to exclude those which seem 
clearly ridiculous (in that they would prevent any action being taken at all for fear of 
harmful impacts). However, I think it unhelpful, in that moral 'grey areas' (across which 
stronger and weaker formulations attempt to delineate the principle so as to allow or 
exclude them) will still exist and require debate, and no degree of specification in advance 
can remove the need for such moral argument as new cases emerge. 
I elucidate further on this in considering each condition. But additionally, seeking such a 
specific formulation would also be unhelpful because the conditions are inter-related and 
different combinations of damage, knowledge or e-remedy conditions might be advocated 
concurrently. This makes it possible and entirely consistent to advocate different versions 
of the PP at the same time. For example, one might support both A) “If there is (i) a 
250 Manson, 2002, p265, of his own formulation.
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catastrophic, irreversible threat to human health (e.g. a risk of widespread infertility) for 
which there is (ii) not conclusive scientific proof but significant evidence, then (iii) all 
necessary steps to prevent the threat should be taken” and B) “If there is (i) a minor threat 
to human well-being (e.g. headaches from a food additive) which (ii) cannot be ruled out 
from scientific study, then (iii) further research should be undertaken and alternatives used 
where possible.”.
i) The Damage Condition.
Regarding the damage condition, then: I do not think this is best understood as a condition 
which must be met or specified to trigger use of the PP per se251. Rather, because of the 
range of possible precautionary actions - ‘e-remedies’- it should be considered jointly with/ 
in relation to the other conditions. That is, in a particular kind of case, given the nature of 
the harms under the damage condition (i.e. for any given values of the damage condition), 
combined with the knowledge condition, it should be argued why this merits a particular 
precautionary response252. We need not, therefore, as Sandin, suggests, specify ‘criteria’ for 
the damage condition, although it is still helpful to consider such features of the possible 
harms, in conjunction with the knowledge condition, to argue for the appropriate e-remedy. 
Thus, the features which Sandin cites from Fleming, of “severity… reversability… and 
preventability”253 might be mapped to the e-remedy in warranting strong regulatory action 
to limit or eradicate the activity in question, even if they are not criteria for use of the PP 
per se254.
In the case of DACC, I have, in Part A, argued that the kinds of harms we are concerned 
with are to the ecological preconditions for functioning and flourishing of future 
generations, (which, as argued in section 1.3, includes harms to humans and non-humans). 
They are therefore harms of the most severe and fundamental kind, and, whilst in other 
cases of less severe harms it might be justified to argue for application of the PP and 
251 Other than in very general terms understanding it as relating to harms to well-being of humans or certain 
non-human entities.
252 This might seem to unfairly move the burden of proof away from potential perpetrators of environmental 
harms. However, it could equally be considered as applying to potential perpetrators: as a requirement that, 
for all actions where harms are possible, they must consider whether the combination of damage and 
knowledge conditions merit stopping their activity, and, if not, they must demonstrate why they do not.
253 Sandin, 1999, p892,
254 Even “preventability”, which might appear to be a necessary requirement for any use of the PP, on 
reflection may not be necessary for some possible ‘e-remedies’, which, in some cases, might involve other 
forms of preparation or adaptation. 
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corresponding e-remedies of particular kinds, it is unnecessary in the case of DACC. I take 
here as defining harms in the damage condition the 1-1.5°C and above GMT rise that I 
discussed in Part A (in so far as it may also be preventable).
How far are these harms also irreversible255? On the one hand there is contention over how 
far the process as a whole of DACC – i.e. of rising atmospheric emissions concentrations 
and GMT – is ultimately irreversible, or, rather, at what point “runaway climate change” 
might kick in256. Such an outcome might imply, in the e-remedy condition, an even 
stronger preventative action for these higher GMT rises. However, in any case, Solomon et 
al point out that GMT rises from DACC are still “essentially irreversible” from the point of 
view of humanity257. Because, excluding the possibility of geo-engineering removing 
existing atmospheric CO2, “atmospheric temperature increases...are not expected to 
decrease significantly even if carbon  emissions were to completely cease”258, over a 
timescale “exceeding the end of the millennium in year 3000”. 
We might also consider how far damages to local ecosystems and global ecological 
processes that result from GMT rise are also reversible in the long run. However, when we 
consider the harms in terms of the effects of GMT rises on ecosystem functioning, the idea 
of reversibility is problematic. Ecosystem damage cannot be reversed in a straightforward 
sense since ecosystems constantly alter and develop in structure over time and should not 
be thought of as static entities which could be preserved, even if GMT rises were to be 
reversed. Rather, it seems preferable to consider how far and how quickly any such 
damage to ecosystems would be remediable, such that they can continue to function in a 
relatively stable and rich way once again. The same would be applicable for human 
communities functioning as part of that ecosystem. How far this is the case is also 
255 Manson expresses concerns about the conceptual clarity of including “irreversibility” as a damage 
condition because of the potential for including insignificant irreversible processes. Sandin’s approach to this 
seems self-evident, in suggesting that “irreversibility in itself does not make a threat severe”, but rather that 
“a threat is rendered more severe by irreversibility” (Sandin 1999, p892, my emphasis).  This is certainly how 
irreversibility is understood in the DACC literature, see e.g. Solomon et al, 2008, abstract, first line, “The 
severity of damaging human-induced climate change depends not only on the magnitude of the change but 
also on the potential for irreversibility” (my emphasis).
256 Even, ultimately, a “planet venus” scenario, Ernsting & Rughani, 2008, p72
257 Solomon et al, 2009, p1704
258 Solomon et al, 2009, p1704. This in part because of the atmospheric lifetime of CO2, which, after a 
millennium, is still estimated to be about 40% of the highest atmospheric concentration reached that  is 
additional to pre-industrial levels (p1705). But also because of the earth's climate inertia in warming 
according to the level of radiative forcing (p1706).  And if concentrations decline, warming can still continue 
to increase “and remain elavated for at least several centuries”, meaning these are changes that are 
“effectively irreversible on human timescales” (Matthews & Caldeira, 2008, p1). 
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uncertain (and, in the latter case, partly indeterminable – see appendix 2, section 1). 
However, even if some are ultimately remediable in the longer term, the intermediate 
effects on near-future generations are arguably irreversible from a near-future perspective, 
in that they may still affect and undermine the preconditions for well-being through several 
generations. 
These features will need to be recalled when I return to the e-remedy condition. But the e-
remedy condition will also need to be considered in light of the knowledge condition, 
which concerns the status of uncertainty, and which I turn to now.
ii) The Knowledge Condition
This condition might seem to require some degree of specification in advance, unlike the 
damage condition. It does not seem sufficient for the PP simply to state that a threat be 
“uncertain” to trigger an e-remedy of any kind, because of what Sandin refers to as the 
“argument from absolutism”. This is the concern “that the PP will prohibit every action, 
and thus offer no action guidance whatsoever”. This argument assumes that the PP 
prohibits any action that “might lead to damage”, and, as Sandin suggests, “every activity 
is associated with some risk of damage”:
“My wearing of a bow tie at a party might, for instance, through a highly 
complex causal chain, result in the end of the World. Far-fetched, but not 
impossible”.259
This might appear to require delineation of the knowledge condition to rule out, as I 
suggested earlier, clearly ridiculous claims. For they can be countered if one contends, with 
Sandin et al, that although the PP “requires that actions be taken when there is lack of full 
259 Sandin, 2004, p470. A similar concern is also described in Manson’s depiction of the “Catastrophe 
Principle” where “the mere possibility of catastrophe” (Manson, 2002, p273) forms the knowledge condition 
and allows for e.g. arguments undermining an international treaty on emissions reductions based on the 
possibility that it sparks a “global economic depression… Massive social unrest…Totalitarian 
dictatorships…” which instigate a nuclear war. This is also, as Manson highlights, a (negative) variation on 
the problems facing Pascal's Wager. Pascal “contends that one is compelled by rational self interest to believe 
in God. So long as the probability that God exists is nonzero, the infinite nature of the reward if one correctly 
believes that and acts as if God exists makes belief in God rational—no matter how low that probability is.”, 
but this can “lead to contradictory practical demands” when other “possible deities” are introduced (Manson, 
2002, p272).
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scientific certainty”260 this “does not mean that precautionary measures are required when 
there is no particular evidence, scientific or other, of the presence of a possible hazard” 261. 
One could, therefore, specify the circumstances under which a possible threat is held to be 
reasonable. I.e. the knowledge condition could “state a degree of evidence”262 required. 
Alternatively they suggest a “de minimis principle”; identifying a “threshold”263 below 
which threats are ignored. However, as they acknowledge, this seems to move “towards a 
risk-based approach”264. Whilst Sandin et al consider this merely as a “rhetorical” concern, 
and less important than that the PP is “applicable as a decision rule”265, it should be 
recalled that it must be able to accommodate the conceptual categories of scientific 
uncertainty (see section 4 of appendix 2), and different kinds of threshold may be 
appropriate in different kinds of case.
My suggestion would be simply to supplement the notion of uncertainty with a general 
requirement (in my view, already implicit) that the threat must be more than merely 
conceivable or logically possible. Such a requirement might run as follows:
An action can only be considered to pose a threat under the precautionary 
principle if there are particular and reasonable grounds to believe that the 
threat might be caused by actions of this particular kind, rather than from any 
action generally.266
It may be then tempting to seek further refinement to rule out unreasonable grounds, such 
as the claims by an Iranian cleric reported in 2010, that “women who do not dress 
modestly… spread adultery in society which increases earthquakes”267. But I think this is 
260 Although, as Sandin emphasises elsewhere, full scientific certainty is “a rare or non-existent commodity” 
(p893). See my comments in section 3.1 on the problems in comparing uncertainty to certainty.
261 Sandin et al, 2002, p291. Sandin also initially suggests another approach. This is to imply that the 
argument/criticism is only valid against “any principle that prescribes globally precautionary acts”, but that 
by specifying a particular “outcome x with respect to which a course of action is meant to be precautionary… 
the argument from absolutism does not necessarily apply”. However, this is somewhat unsatisfactory, it must 
still be explained why precautionary action with regards to this particular outcome is justified. Counter-
examples might be provided of where outcomes similar to x would not warrant precautionary action, e.g. 
when such outcomes might plausibly result from any action.
262 Ibid.
263 Ibid.
264 Sandin et al, 2002, p292
265 Ibid.
266 This is similar to Sandin's preferable “reasonableness criterion” elsewhere (Sandin, 2004, p467); however, 
I have emphasised the role of causality in reasonable beliefs to rule out the kind of far-fetched interpretations 
suggested earlier.
267 BBC Online, 20th April 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8631775.stm
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unnecessary, since different kinds of cases will call for different grounds. For example, one 
counter to the earthquakes case might be to require “scientific” grounds. However, there 
might be non-scientific grounds for judging a threat to exist, for example, social grounds 
for the particular detrimental social effects of an activity. And even the idea of what 
constitutes ‘scientific’ grounds would require further specification, if one is considering 
ideas outwith or at the edge of the current scientific paradigm268. Ultimately, I suggest, the 
thinking needs to be carried out in each case, and my treatment of the Sandin-Manson PP 
is to apply it as a framework, not a theory. We should trust that we already know, roughly 
speaking what kinds of examples do or do not clearly constitute reasonable grounds or 
credible beliefs in the possibility of a harm’s occurrence269, and to fulfil the knowledge 
criterion we need to argue why ambiguous cases are more like Henry’s asbestos example 
from 3.1 than the case of the Iranian cleric.
And we can do this in the case of DACC, where it is clearly of the nature of the former, 
rather than the latter. There are widely accepted and evidenced270 grounds for believing that 
GMT rises within a certain range will occur from particular levels of GHG emissions. 
Aspects of this evidence and understanding of the mechanisms display risk, uncertainty, 
ambiguity and ignorance (see appendix 2, section 4), but the grounds are nonetheless 
credible for believing that the harms considered in Part A will occur at some level of 
increased GHG emissions. The uncertainty therefore constitutes a reason for implementing 
an e-remedy. In this way the PP framework also allows for these different categories of 
uncertainty, without requiring likelihood to be expressed formally in terms of probability 
or a detailed understanding of harmful effects. 
It might be asked whether it matters for the knowledge condition how uncertain or likely a 
harmful effect is to occur. Again, I suggest this is better considered on a case-by-case basis 
than delineated in advance, since one should consider the interplay between the kind of 
harm being considered, the e-remedy, and the nature of the uncertainty (i.e. in so far as it 
falls into the categories and sources of uncertainty considered in sections 3 and 4 of 
268 Sandin attempts to encompass both by suggesting that “good reasons” just constitutes reasons that are 
“somehow externally good, external to the agent” (Sandin, 2004, p467)
269 I am making a roughly Wittgensteinian point in suggesting that the “reasonableness” of grounds or beliefs 
cannot be straightforwardly defined as having a particular empirical scope, but is a judgement we must know 
how to apply if we understand the meaning of the word. Unless we disregard some odder possibilities we can 
never move forward. See Wittgenstein, 1974 (passim).
270 I.e. through the four IPCC reports published since 1990.
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appendix 2). Generally, there might seem an increased imperative for stronger action the 
more likely and less uncertain the harm; however, as I argued with regard to “expected 
utility” approaches to uncertainty, when we are considering one-off ‘games’, with such 
severe harmful outcomes, it should not be treated so straightforwardly. I briefly consider 
this in the case of DACC when I examine the e-remedy condition shortly, and suggest 
how the different uncertainties and likelihoods of GMT rises of over 1-1.5°C occurring 
from different emission levels might lead via the PP to particular mitigation imperatives. 
Lastly, there may be concerns that the requirement of reasonable grounds for concern 
places the burden of proof on those seeking to prevent harm, rather than the perpetrators, 
as the PP is normally envisaged as doing. However, there is no reason this should be the 
case. The existence of reasonable grounds is not a requirement that the concern be 
underpinned by years of expensive research and demonstration of a connection. Rather, 
that there are grounds for believing harm could result from an activity; an argument that 
shows why it might be thought to arise. Those wanting to undertake the possibly harmful 
activity would still have to demonstrate why these grounds do not bear out. In this sense, I 
am countering Manson, who argues that the PP can either place a high burden of proof on 
perpetrators or, (which he points out could be equivalently strong) place a low burden of 
proof on advocates of the principle, i.e. establish very weak standards to trigger it271. I do 
not think that one has to choose. In fact, I suggest that the defining feature of the PP as an 
approach to uncertainty is what I suggested in 3.1: that it asks us to frame uncertainty 
about harm not in the context of certainty (i.e. and require proof that a harm will occur 
from an activity) but in the context of uncertainty about harm-avoidance (i.e. considering 
our confidence that harm will not occur from an activity). The latter still requires some 
reason for believing that harm could arise (for doubting harm-avoidance in the first place) 
so there is inevitably also some justificatory burden on those wanting to apply the PP.
iii) The E-remedy Condition. 
The third condition, highlighted earlier, might vary significantly in what precautionary 
actions it advocates, from complete prohibition of an activity to further research. Whilst 
particular policy tools are best decided elsewhere (e.g. particular tax or regulatory 
mechanisms), I consider here the appropriate level of response to the threat, given features 
271 Manson, 2002, p268-9.
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of DACC from the damage and knowledge conditions. Donald Brown has stated that the 
precautionary response should be “proportional to the magnitude of the harm”272. But it 
needs to be made clear how “proportionality” could be understood non-quantitatively, and 
without resorting to CBA. 
A similar concern arises in what Sandin calls the “argument from risk trade-off”. This 
argument criticises the PP for creating further risks from strong precautionary actions. For 
example, “substitution of hazardous chemicals” poses risks that “we are driven to use 
substitute chemicals that might be less neurotoxic, but may instead be carcinogenic”273. 
However, as Sandin et al have responded, “this problem does not depend on the PP itself 
but on the limited framing of the decision problem to which it is applied”274, and rather, 
“the PP should be applied also to the precautionary measures prescribed by the PP 
itself”275. This might sound suspiciously like the start of an infinite regress. But in fact, 
what it reminds us is that we must consider harmful effects of both the initial activity and 
the mitigating actions, and decide whether it is more precautionary to pursue one or the 
other. This should be a common-sense notion, and is what, I suggest, is implied by 
‘proportionality’: that in pursuing precautionary measures, one clearly should not create 
worse276 threats than were initially faced. What seems less clear is how such a comparison 
should be made, and using which standards.
At this point, CBA might seem to provide the most obvious mechanism for judging 
proportionality277  which takes it very far from the resilient-based notion of precaution 
considered at the end of 3.2. The appropriateness of the e-remedy could be judged by a 
comparison of costs from the e-effect and from the e-remedy. However, this is then subject 
to the same problems as the “narrow risk” approach, reliant on “expected utility” and the 
formal combination of likelihood and impact, so cannot constitute part of a genuinely 
precautionary approach. But judging the proportionality of response and comparing 
potential threats need not involve such a narrow quantitative analysis. Rather, as I have 
suggested in Part A, section 3.3, they can be considered on the basis of qualitative (and 
272 Brown, 2002, p143. 
273 Sandin et al, 2002, p293.
274 Ibid.
275 Sandin et al, 2002, p294.
276 In terms of severity or likelihood
277 Indeed, US legislation weighs the costs and benefits of precautionary action, and “prevention or 
anticipation is framed in choices of possible options, and payoff” O'Riordan et al, 2001, p27
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broader quantitative) aspects – the kind and degree of threat that is posed to human and 
non-human well-being. Whilst disagreement will exist about the moral criteria for such a 
ranking, the basis available here is precisely that outlined in chapter 1, following a picture 
of the human economic and social spheres as part of and dependent on the ecosystemic 
one. That is, the seriousness of the threat can be judged on how fundamental to human and 
eco-systemic well-being the harm would be, making use of Daly’s notion of an “inverted 
pyramid” (see Chapter 1, section 3.2) of dependency. 
This would counter arguments from risk trade-off used in the case of DACC which 
contend that the risks posed to the economy from strong emissions reductions undermine 
the use of the PP to prevent the harms from DACC. For the risks to human and ecological 
well-being, as discussed in Part A of this chapter, are far more fundamental to survival and 
flourishing than the economic costs posed by mitigative action, and of course, they are also 
therefore risks to our economic system in threatening its ecological preconditions278. 
Accordingly, the application of the “e-remedy” condition which I am advocating  runs as 
follows:
Given the severity of harms from DACC, the action taken to prevent them should be  
proportional to the potential harm, in that it is the strongest action available which  
does not pose threats of a comparable or more serious kind to human and 
ecological well being.
What about different categories or degree of uncertainty? Or, where known, the likelihood 
of a harm’s occurrence? I suggest that in the case of DACC, this should hold largely 
irrespective of the kind or degree of uncertainty (so long as they have fulfilled the 
knowledge condition of having reasonable grounds). Even if likelihoods are assigned, 
because we are considering such severe and fundamental harms, unless the likelihood is 
extremely negligible we should not divert from the idea of proportionality to the potential 
harm. 
278 Although  some economic harms might be comparable in threatening our well-being, as discussed in part 
A, section 2.4, (e.g. if society was left literally at the point of collapse), in that they would remove the basic 
organisational structures which currently enable us to make use of and survive in our ecological conditions at 
all, e.g. to enable us to feed ourselves, to live in communities, etc, and which provide us with the basis to 
shift our society towards a zero carbon alternative. We have to be able to actually make a transition, and for 
this reason cannot be required simply to stop emitting activities tomorrow.
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Again, it should be emphasised that this is not to propose a universal specification of the 
“e-remedy” condition, since it may not be morally appropriate for other cases to which the 
PP is applied. The harms may be of a different kind or severity, and the uncertainties may 
be different. Rather, this is a clarification of how I believe the e-remedy condition should 
be applied in the case of DACC. Another concern may be what counts as an “extremely 
negligible” likelihood. This is not clear, but again, it is unnecessary to delineate in 
advance. As with the issue of “reasonable grounds” in the knowledge condition, some 
cases of negligibility are clear, and others need to be taken on a case by case basis. For 
example, even a 5% likelihood of GMT rises of 1-1.5°C or more still seems non-negligible 
when the severity of accompanying harms to our ecological pre-conditions is recalled. 
Whether or not a 0.5% likelihood or less of the same harms counts still counts as non-
negligible might be more doubtful, but either will in any case depend on whether they are 
higher than the probability of such a rise at pre-industrial atmospheric concentration levels, 
i.e. prior to marked anthropogenic interference279. However, in any case, these are not the 
kinds of likelihood that we are faced with here. Sadly280, in the case of DACC, since our 
mitigative responses have to be in theory and in practice achievable (in the senses of 
“possible” that I outlined at the end of Part A), all plausible atmospheric concentrations 
which we could globally keep within this century have a clearly non-negligible likelihood 
of exceeding 1-1.5°C. I examine this in the last section.
4.  Implications.
I now draw out the policy implications of applying the PP as elucidated in 3.4, to the harms 
I described in Part A, by referring to research on uncertainties of the temperature that is 
likely to result from particular levels of GHG emissions281. I look first at what the 
279 I.e. since there will always be uncertainties surrounding the global climate system and fluctuation of 
GMT.
280 Or, rather: frighteningly, miserably and soberingly. Whilst neutral, non-emotive language is customary in 
philosophical writing, when applied to an issue such as DACC that threatens the very future conditions of our 
(and other species') survival, some degree of rhetoric seems warranted, indeed appropriate.
281 Although I focus on aggregated  GHG concentrations and GMT, as I suggested in section 1.1, this is 
largely for simplicity;  measures of harm other than GMT are needed to reflect other ways in which 
emissions cause climatic harms (Lenton 2011a & 2011b), as well as implementing separate caps/ reduction 
levels for different GHGs. The latter is also implied by Solomon et al, 2009 (p1709), who argue that because 
of the “unique long-term effects” of CO2, it should not be seen as interchangeable with other GHGs on the 
basis of its similar radiative forcing effects in the scale of a century, as it is currently. We need a separate cap 
at least for CO2. 
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precautionary atmospheric concentration of emissions might be given current scientific 
understanding, before considering the implications for levels of emissions reductions. As is 
discussed in appendix 2, any probabilities describing the relationship between emissions 
level and GMT rise are themselves subject to uncertainty because of uncertainties about 
climate sensitivity, carbon cycle feedbacks and climate inertia. The aim is not, therefore, as 
criticised in 2.3 and 3.2., to determine a maximum ‘safe’ level from formal quantified 
risks282, but, following Foster, to identify a “broad-brush prediction”283 of the emissions 
levels that are most likely to allow liveable ecological conditions to pertain, and to indicate 
those where non-negligible probabilities of DACC still exist.
Most research examining the relationship between emissions levels, atmospheric 
concentrations and likely GMT rise focus on probabilities of exceeding or staying below 
2°C, since this has been the most widely proposed target in policy circles. I therefore 
examine some of this as well as those considering lower targets in order to give an 
indication of the rough emission reduction levels at a precautionary e-remedy would imply 
to prevent GMT rise of over 1-1.5°C (Current atmospheric concentrations284 are roughly 
390ppm CO2285 and around 375 ppm net CO2e or around 460ppm CO2e for Kyoto 
GHGs286). 
282 I.e. because it is not clear that this notion makes sense with regard to ecosystemic functioning.
283 Foster, 2008, p127
284 NB some authors consider CO2e, which attempts to aggregate different GHGs in terms of the amount of 
CO2 to which they would be equivalent in terms regarding their radiative forcing. Other authors consider just 
CO2, concentrations i.e.the quantity of CO2 alone as the most significant long-lived atmospheric GHGs. See 
also footnote 284. This makes research and authors' conclusions difficult to compare, although, as suggested 
in section 3.2 and an earlier footnote, it is in any case spurious to pose such equivalences; they can only be 
used a rough indication for relationships, and are all the more reason for precaution to be taken. 
285 http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/global.html
286 Data from http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2007/10/co2-equivalents/ . The article highlights 
that there are two ways of defining “CO2 e”. Either we calculate the combined effects of all forcings in terms 
of the equivalent CO2  forcing (this is the former, “net” figure), or we tries combine just the Kyoto GHGs (the 
latter figure). The first includes substances that have cooling effects (e.g. from aerosols); the figure is 
therefore close to the CO2  concentration level since at the moment cooling effects roughly cancel out non-
CO2  Kyoto GHGs. Whilst the CO2 e net metric more accurately reflects the current forcing levels, arguably 
the latter Kyoto GHGs levels should be assumed as the current level when setting precautionary emissions 
limits, since the proportion of coolants in the atmosphere is likely to decline and “net” CO2 e concentrations 
will move closer to the Kyoto GHGs CO2 e metric. (I am suggesting, for example, that if we decide to reduce 
to 350ppm CO2 e net, then we should still aim to limit just the Kyoto gases to 350ppm CO2 e).
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Meinshausen287 famously examined 11 climate sensitivity studies288 to derive probability 
ranges of exceeding 2°C289 in equilibrium290. Crucially, he found that an atmospheric 
concentration of 550ppm CO2e291 (previously a common policy target for limiting GMT 
rise to 2°C292) was between 63% and 99% likely to exceed 2°C. For a 2°C GMT limit, 
550ppm CO2e would, therefore, be far from a precautionary atmospheric concentration. 
Even at 450ppm CO2e, Meinshausen found that there was between a 26% and 78% 
likelihood of exceeding 2°C. And at 350ppm CO2e, the lowest concentration examined 
(and far lower than current concentrations), this still gives between a 0% and 31% 
likelihood of exceeding such a target. Meinshausen’s 2006 study also examined the 
likelihood of exceeding a 1.5°C temperature target, and found a concentration of 450ppm 
CO2e gives a roughly293 55% to 98% chance of exceeding 1.5°C, and 350ppm still gives 
approximately between a 3% and 48% likelihood294 of exceeding it. 
Taking a precautionary approach would, therefore, imply moving towards a stabilisation of 
about 350ppm CO2e. This is confirmed by recent work suggesting that climate sensitivity 
could be higher than previously thought295 and Hansen et al have argued that it could be 
substantially higher  -  6°C rather than 3°C296 - when slower feedback processes are taken 
into account297. This means that climate sensitivity is more likely to be towards the higher 
than lower end of the probability ranges considered by Meinshausen. In fact, Hansen et al, 
suggest that current atmospheric CO2 concentrations (385ppm CO2 in 2008298) are already 
likely to lead to an equilibrium GMT rise of 2°C, and therefore recommend an “initial 
target” of 350ppm CO2299. Although specified in CO2 rather than CO2e, this figure 
effectively recommends a similar concentration level to Meinshausen's 350ppm CO2e 
scenario, since Hansen et al assume that coolant effects balance out the non- CO2 Kyoto 
287 Meinshausen, 2006
288 These try to assign probabilities to the possible range of climate sensitivity (Meinshausen, 2006, p266).
289 Other temperatures are examined, but less prominently.
290 Although it is “not clear how fast the climate system reaches equilibrium” (p266)
291 Meinshausen is looking at net CO2 e (Meinshausen, 2006, p266)
292 See e.g. Stern, 2006, which focused on CBA of concentrations of 450-550ppm, although even this cited a 
77-99% chance of exceeding 2°C at a 550pm CO2 e level.
293 These figures have been read from the graph on Meinshausen, 2006, p272; Meinshausen was contacted 
but the original data was unavailable.
294 See previous footnote.
295 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3864.
296 Hansen et al, 2008, p218
297 Hansen et al, 2008, p217
298 Hansen et al, 2008, p221
299 Hansen et al, 2008, p226
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gases (and therefore that net CO2e approximates the CO2 level)300 (see footnote 284). 
However, given that this approximation may not continue (e.g. if use of coolants decline), 
a 350ppm CO2   level does not seem precautionary. Indeed, Hansen et al argue that “a case 
already could be made that the eventual target probably needs to be lower”301 and at one 
point suggest 300-325ppm CO2 302303.  This therefore suggests a move back towards the pre-
industrial levels of 280ppm CO2304. These implications illustrate my earlier suggestion 
towards the end of 3.2, that a precautionary approach requires taking a resilience-based 
perspective; that there is no “safe” level of emitting activity, and avoiding DACC instead 
requires preserving the ecological conditions and levels of functioning which have 
previously supported us. The question will be how far anything approaching this is 
possible to achieve; both physically, and socio-economically (in the sense that I described 
in section 2.4, without causing comparable harms).
Regarding physical possibility, although even Hansen et al's suggested 350ppm CO2 limit 
is lower than current CO2 concentrations, we may be able to stabilise at lower atmospheric 
concentrations and not reach the GMTs associated with higher temperatures because the 
relationships discussed above are between atmospheric concentration stabilisation levels 
and their equilibrium temperatures. Because it takes many centuries for the climate to 
reach the equilibrium temperature from a particular atmospheric concentration, reaching or 
passing an atmospheric concentration level should not mean its equilibrium temperature 
will also be reached, if concentrations are lowered fast enough and deeply enough. This is 
not particularly reassuring, since it is unclear exactly what the effect on transient (pre-
equilibrium) GMT would be from such a temporary peak and subsequent lower 
stabilisation305. It is also not possible to immediately lower concentrations, even if all 
atmospheric emissions ceased today306 because of the atmospheric lifetime of GHGs307. 
300 Ibid.
301 Hansen et al, 2008, p229.
302 Hansen et al, 2008, p226
303 The work of Hansen et al has been taken up through new campaigns for a “350ppm emergency pathway” - 
see Baer et al, 2009 and campaign group 350.org (www.350.org)
304 The work of Harvey, 2007b implies similar conclusions.
305 The effects on GMT rise are unclear in scenarios where atmospheric concentrations first peak and 
subsequently reduce. Although, due to climate inertia, we would avert the equilibrium temperature associated 
with the peak concentration level, we are likely to reach a higher GMT than otherwise likely from the lower 
concentration level. See Meinshausen, 2006, p271-272.
306 Hare & Meinshausen, 2006, p126, in such a scenario, find that “CO2 concentrations would fall slowly and 
approach levels that were found at the beginning of the 20th century towards the end of the 22nd century, 
namely 300ppm”. 
307 Other than the possibility of removing atmospheric emissions using geo-engineering, which is as yet 
unproven and has its own risks and critics as I highlight shortly.
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However, atmospheric concentrations can be brought down over time, although this 
requires steep global emission reductions, as I now briefly consider.
In so far as we set concentration targets, this will not, therefore, be according to a 'safe' 
level, since current atmospheric GHG concentration levels are already unsafe, but rather a 
question of how fast we are able to reduce emissions so as to bring atmospheric 
concentrations back towards more precautionary levels. I argued in section 2.4 that these 
possibilities should not be constrained by what is currently thought to be socio-
economically possible, but considering the range of socio-economic modes of organisation 
that might allow for different possibilities of making a transition to zero-carbon societies. 
This might seem too radical; however, it should be considered that even stabilising at 
450ppm or 550ppm CO2e would require such deep and fast global emissions reductions 
that Anderson and Bows have argued that even this is not possible “without a sea change in 
economic orthodoxy”308.  Anderson and Bows find that “stabilizing at 450 ppmv requires, 
at least, global energy related emissions to peak by 2015, rapidly decline at 6-8 per cent per 
year between 2020 and 2040, and for full decarbonisation sometime soon after 2050”309, 
and that “Stabilization at 550 ppmv CO2e... requires global energy and process emissions 
to peak by 2020 before beginning an annual decline of between 6 and 12 per cent”310311. 
They argue that there is no precedent for emission reductions on this scale, and, as alluded 
to in chapter 1312, remind us of Stern’s assertion that “reductions of greater than 1 per cent 
have ‘been associated only with economic recession or upheaval’” and that even “the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union’s economy [only] brought about annual emission 
reductions of over 5 per cent for a decade”313.
Similarly, Ackerman et al have produced several scenarios for reducing to 350ppm CO2314 
by different future dates without allowing negative emissions315, and for different climate 
308 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3877
309 Ibid. Their figures make assumptions about our ability to reduce non- CO2 GHGs such as methane and 
nitrous oxide from food production. (p3869-3871).
310 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3878-9.
311 Anderson and Bows seem to use “CO2 e” regarding total forcing of Kyoto GHGs rather than as net CO2 e 
forcing (they do not include radiative forcing from aerosols). Their figures for necessary reductions might 
therefore seem precautionary. However, their figures are still slightly optimistic, since neither do they take 
account of “non- CO2 aviation emissions, evidence as to the reduced functioning of carbon sinks or other 
underestimated emissions sources”. (Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3866-7).
312 Chapter 1, section 3.2
313 Anderson and Bows, 2008, p3878.
314 NB CO2 not CO2 e.
315 I.e. removing emissions from the atmosphere, as Hansen et al suggest (Hansen et al, 2008, p226-227)
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sensitivities. For a climate sensitivity of 6°C (a more pessimistic, but therefore 
precautionary guide) reducing to 350ppm CO2 by 2200 requires emissions reductions to 
53.4% of 1990 levels by 2020 and 3.2% by 2050; to achieve 350ppm CO2 by 2100 requires 
reductions to 3.1% of 1990 levels by 2020316. And Matthews and Caldeira have argued that 
in order to reduce atmospheric concentrations enough to “stabilise” the climate at either 1, 
2, or 4 °C requires decreasing to “near zero future carbon emissions”317 by different times 
this century. The question is, therefore, not whether a zero-carbon transition should occur, 
but how fast. 
This recent work has other implications. What determines atmospheric concentrations is 
cumulative emissions (the total quantity of emissions released) from an emissions 
reduction trajectory  rather than the final percentage reductions. In fact, more recently, 
climate science has shifted away from directly considering atmospheric concentrations. 
Because of uncertainties and complexities over the relationship between atmospheric 
concentration stabilisations and both equilibrium GMT and emissions levels318, research 
has started focusing directly on the “better constrained”319 relationship between cumulative 
emissions and the maximum GMT that could be reached 320 321. It is now increasingly 
suggested that policy targets should be specified in terms of cumulative emissions budgets 
rather than aiming to stabilise at particular concentrations322. There is not space to examine 
possible cumulative emissions budgets here. However, as an indication, the lowest budget 
considered by Meinshausen et al is 890Gt CO2  (or 1356 Gt CO2e) or lower between 2000 
and 2050, which they suggest would give a probability of between 8 - 37% of exceeding 
2°C323. By comparison, in 2010 we released 30.6 GtCO2 324; if released every year between 
2000 and 2050 we would almost double the 890Gt CO2 budget. And given the 
precautionary approach I have been advocating and the need for GMT limits of lower than 
2°C, a precautionary budget would be even less.
316 To achieve 350 any earlier (2085) requires immediate 100% reduction (Ackerman et al, 2009, p44)
317 Matthews & Caldeira, 2008, p1
318 Allen et al, 2009, p1163
319 I.e. with fewer uncertainties. Ibid.
320 See e.g. Meinshausen et al, 2009.
321 Allen et al, 2009 p1164. This leads them to define a new measure, “Cumulative Warming Commitment 
(CWC) as the peak warming response to a given total injection of CO2 into the atmosphere”, to replace both 
climate sensitivity and carbon cycle uncertainties (p1165). Matthews et al, 2009, define a similar measure, 
the “carbon-climate response (CCR)” (p829)
322 E.g. Allen et al, 2009, p1163, Zickfeld et al, 2009, p16132, Anderson & Bows 2011, p21, New et al, 2011, 
p16
323 Meinshausen et al, 2009, p1161
324 Harvey, 2011.
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Either way, however, what seems clear is that any of the above scenarios would require a 
massive global transition325 to zero carbon. We must, therefore, seek ways to make 
reductions on this scale, bearing in mind the notion of “proportionality” discussed in 
section 3.4. That is, as argued in section 2.4, what is sought is a genuine transition that 
does not cause comparable harms, that aims to create both the ecological and socio-
economic conditions for a society/ societies that can function and flourish into the future, 
even if (by virtue of need to reduce energy demand) material aspects of standard of living 
(i.e. consumption) are lowered. This will involve changes of the sort alluded to in 2.4, 
being pioneered at community levels by the Transition Towns movement, but which need 
to be taken up by governments to provide a regulatory framework and financial support, 
along the lines of what is suggested in the “Zero Carbon Britain 2030” report326.  
Because of concerns that even this may be inadequate, some authors have considered the 
possibility of negative emissions, i.e. removing CO2  from the atmosphere using CO2 air 
capture technologies or “improved agricultural and forestry practices” to “draw down 
CO2”327. However, it is unclear how successful this might be, so others have emphasised 
that this must be additional to emissions reductions328. There is also significant controversy 
about the risks of some suggested approaches such as biochar329 and the PP must be applied 
here too, with a view to proportionality, as discussed in section 3.4, i.e. that precautionary 
action should not itself risk comparable harm. Yet some approaches based in rebuilding 
ecosystems and carbon sinks that have been depleted should certainly be enacted, as 
suggested by Ernsting and Rughani330.
Because most suggested emissions budgets/trajectories assume conventional economic 
constraints I cannot here advocate a particular emissions budget (this is a crucial challenge 
for future research; to look at how quickly a radical global transition to zero carbon 
emissions could be made, and what emissions budget could be adhered to). However, I 
325 Even Ackerman et al’s 350 ppm CO2 by 2200 scenario would require strategies of this kind since this 
requires global reduction to 20.9% of 1990 levels by 2030 (Ackerman et al, 2009, p44).
326 Helweg-Larsen & Bull, 2007
327 Hansen et al, 2008, p226-227
328 E.g. New et al, 2011, p14-15
329 See e.g. Monbiot, 2009, Ernsting & Rughani, 2008
330 Ernsting & Rughani, 2008, p77-80.
145
conclude that an “ecologically effective” international agreement on DACC would roughly 
require a global mitigation plan that: 
• Recognises that any further GMT rise is harmful, and constitutes dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change.
• Aims to and stands a good chance of preventing not only a 2°C GMT rise above 
pre-industrial levels, but a GMT rise of above 1-1.5°C.
• In as far as atmospheric concentrations are considered, aims to reduce atmospheric 
concentrations at least to 350ppm CO2e net forcing (but towards pre-industrial 
levels of both CO2331  and other GHG concentrations332), as soon as possible333 and 
aims for a cumulative emissions budget consistent with as low likelihood as 
possible of exceeding 1-1.5°C.
• Therefore aims for a global zero carbon transition as soon as is possible this 
century, as well as examining the possibility of negative emissions in so far as they 
do not pose additional, comparable risks.
• Recognises that “as soon as possible” is dependent not merely on the limits 
dictated by current socio-economic structures but by transitioning to other socio-
economic models compatible with such changes, and without causing comparable 
harms to the socio-economic conditions for continued functioning and flourishing 
of our societies.
Because of the limits that will be imposed on economic growth under and after such a 
transition, this latter point is crucially intertwined with the second criterion of equity, 
which I turn to in the next chapter.
331 I.e. not to rely on cooling effects from aerosols.
332 Because, as suggested in an earlier footnote, they are not fully equivalent in effects, and reductions in one 
cannot necessarily be substituted by those of another.
333 For anyone who still thinks this too radical, recall that a 350ppm CO2e concentration still implies up to a 
31% chance of exceeding 2°C and up to an 18% chance of exceeding 3°C; higher concentrations, e.g 400ppm 
give up to a 17-18% chance of exceeding 4°C, which would be utterly catastrophic. (NB figures approximate 
since read from graph in Meinshausen, 2006, p272)
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CHAPTER 3 - Equity.
0. Introduction.
This chapter considers the second criterion for an international climate change agreement: 
equity. It may seem unclear why this should be important for an agreement. Given the 
urgency in limiting emissions as quickly as possible, why complicate matters with lengthy 
considerations of equity? It may in any case appear pointless to attempt to influence 
ethically negotiations that seem driven by power politics and competitions of interests, 
regardless of any ethical ‘idealist’ demands. However, it is worth recalling why many 
campaigners, lobbyists, and particularly developing countries1 consider equity issues to be 
central to the issue of climate change mitigation. Once we treat the climate as a commons, 
as discussed in chapter 1, recognising the dangerous implications of these levels of 
emissions and limit their growth with an emissions cap, this creates a ‘zero-sum game’ for 
emissions considered as a resource. And, since emissions are tied to our economic systems, 
inequities in emissions distribution will be intertwined with wealth inequalities. The cap 
must be set so low  – indeed, I argued in chapter 2 that we need a global “zero-carbon” 
transition -  that these differences will have significant economic impacts. Equity then 
becomes a key issue for determining how to distribute the emissions space during the 
transition, to ensure it is “just”2. And if countries do not feel they are being treated fairly 
they may not commit to an agreement at all. So there are both moral as well as pragmatic 
reasons for considering the equity of an agreement to be central to our survival; as Aubrey 
Meyer has argued3, “equity is survival”. 
There are further reasons why it should merit particular philosophical consideration. Many 
climate change proposals claim to exhibit equity, but what is meant by this is rarely 
examined, and even less frequently, given justification.  If equity is to be required from an 
international climate change agreement, we must examine how it should be equitable, and 
why this is preferable to any other conception. As I argue in 1.2, one need not and should 
not be relativist towards alternative conceptions by resorting wholly to ‘fair process’ to 
decide between them4. Rather, we should debate explicitly what constitutes an ethically 
1 See Najam et al, 2003
2 TUC, 2008.
3 Meyer, 2000, p17.
4 Although, of course, the process for international negotiation itself should be fair.
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defensible equitable distribution of emissions, a debate which will have a role to play in 
influencing policy positions.
Accordingly, in sections 2-5 I scrutinise four of the five main contending conceptions of 
equity for climate change mitigation that have been put forward, as summarised by Ashton 
and Wang5. These are what Shue has termed “no fault” principles6: Equal Effort, Equal Per 
Capita Allowances, Capacity, and Basic Needs (see fig. 6 for theoretical groupings). I draw 
on philosophical literature on equality and distributive justice, which has only recently 
begun to be applied to the climate change debate7. I have considered the fifth, Historical 
Responsibility, as a fault-based conception elsewhere8.  
Section 1 considers and clarifies some methodological concerns about the scope and nature 
of distributive equity in this context. In Section 2 I examine the problems with Equal Effort 
as a principle of equity for mitigation policy, which, I argue in 2.2, fails to understand 
equity within the context of ecological limits – as resource-sharing as well as just burden-
sharing. The resource-sharing framework is the appropriate starting point for principles of 
distributive equity which arises from the pre-analytic vision of green economics as outlined 
in part C of chapter 1, and underlies only the remaining three conceptions of equity which I 
consider in sections 3-5. (see fig.6)
In sections 3-5 I argue that, despite the intuitive appeal of “Equal Allowances”, the 
principle of “Capacity”, interpreted through a capabilities approach9, is the most ethically 
defensible conception of distributive equity.  The first four principles constitute what Shue 
has called ‘no fault’ principles10, in that they do not try to take account of moral 
responsibility (see fig. 6.).  The fifth, “fault-based” principle, Historical Responsibility, 
whilst ethically appealing, is only egalitarian in so far as it is inextricably linked to 
Capacity. I have argued this elsewhere11, and summarise my arguments in the conclusion 
of this chapter.
5 Ashton & Wang, 2003, p3-5
6 Shue, 1993, p51-2,where a 'no-fault' principle assigns obligations to a party to pay or contribute (e.g. based 
on capacity), but any “past misbehavior” is not accounted for. A fault-based principle on the other hand, is 
“based precisely on fault or causal responsibility”, although “The kind of fault here need not be a moralized 
kind”.
7 E.g. Ashton and Wang, 2003; Singer, 2006; Brown, 2002, p206-207; Page, 2008; Starkey, 2008
8 Makoff, 2011.
9 As put forward by Amartya Sen in Sen, 1979 and 2001
10 Shue, 1993, p52
11 Makoff, 2011
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This chapter assumes a global emissions “cap”, which rapidly descends (e.g. annually) 
over time towards zero (i.e. a global zero-carbon transition), and which can be distributed 
between countries.12 However, I will not refer to exact figures, or the level of the ‘cap’13, 
since I consider predominantly the principles on which an equitable distribution might be 
based. Likewise, I do not discuss intergenerational equity, since, as discussed in chapter 2, 
this is best considered an aspect of ecological effectiveness, affecting the total size of the 
cap, rather than how we distribute emissions within it (in so far as it is appropriate at all for 
intergenerational moral relations14). 
1. Methodology; Scope of research, definitions, and structure. 
1.1 Scope of equity concerns.
I firstly clarify some questions of scope based on four areas of concern for equity in DACC 
mitigation that Henry Shue highlights15, so as to avoid potential confusion as to the 
particular focus on equity of this chapter. However, I believe these areas of concern are 
12 The chapter assumes that we will distribute this budget on a ‘nation-by-nation’ basis. There is a case for 
other means of distribution that by-pass nation states, for example, through upstream auctions of permits. 
However, it is not clear how these would meet the demands of international equity; these warrant 
consideration, although there is not space to do so here.
13 See Chapter 2, section 4
14 See Chapter 2, section 2.3
15 Shue. 1993, p40, also called “domains of choice” by Ashton and Wang, 2003, p6
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best expressed as three sets of distinctions, since some cut across others16. These are; 
between equity in mitigation and adaptation17; between equity in procedure18 and 
distribution; and lastly, between equity in distribution of emissions themselves19 and 
distribution of costs through resource-transfers20 for reductions. 
Although the questions of equity in adaptation and equity in procedure are extremely 
important, I do not address either here21. My focus is on equity in climate change 
mitigation22, and I restrict my focus to the distributive concern: regarding the content of the 
outcome of the negotiations that should be pushed for. Of course, there are links between 
procedural and distributive equity, as well as between mitigation and adaptation; regarding 
the latter, as Shue points out, the commitments a country will have under one may 
influence its ability, or its obligation to make commitments in the other. However, these 
questions are beyond the scope of this thesis. It may be, therefore, that my conclusions 
surrounding equity in mitigation would need revising once these other areas have been 
examined in a similar way elsewhere.
Regarding the last distinction, between the distribution of emissions allowances (which 
limit the ability of each country to produce emissions), and the direct distribution of the 
cost of reducing to these emissions limits, I focus in this chapter on the former. To clarify 
the distinction; although it may seem that equitable distributions in both could coincide, 
there may be reasons to suppose that they should come apart. For example, it might be 
16 E.g. one can consider equity in mitigation in terms of procedure or distribution; similarly, distribution of 
costs might relate either to equity in mitigation or to adaptation.
17 Equity in adaptation is Shue’s second question of equity. This is related to the underlying inequity in the 
effects of climate change; that the burdens and benefits of DACC impacts (some of which we are already 
committed to from past emissions) will be very unequally distributed across the globe. Whilst we cannot alter 
this distribution, we can alter the distribution of the costs in responding to these impacts.
18 Procedural equity is Shue’s third question of equity. This surrounds fairness in the process of negotiations, 
such as whether all countries have equal numbers of delegates, equal training opportunities or political 
weight. Inequities here have historically lead to the concerns of poorer countries being overlooked, with only 
a handful of trained delegates who are often kept out of discussions. Shue, 1993, p47
19 Shue’s fourth question of equity
20 Shue’s first question of equity. I take this to be distinct from the 'burden-sharing framework' as described in 
2.3, which still considers emissions as what will be distributed (even if it focuses on the 'burdens' of 
emissions reduction as opposed to the end allocation); whereas equity in cost distribution I assume to refer to 
the financial costs associated with emission reduction (or with adapting to a particular allowance).
21 Though this is somewhat regrettably the case – it seems clear to me that this is an area of research greatly 
overlooked in general and in need of ethical scrutiny.
22 Unlike, e.g. Caney, 2005, who considers the more general “burdens of climate change where the latter is 
silent on the choice between adaptation and mitigation”(p752). However, I think it important to treat 
mitigation separately, in recognition of this aspect of climate change as a particular problem of distribution of 
emissions space in the global atmospheric commons, and in consideration of the socio-economic relevance of 
emissions, rather than treating all climate change “burdens” as equivalent.
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argued that countries A and B should have equal access to atmospheric space and both 
limit their emissions to 10 units. But country B may find it harder to limit its emissions if it 
is significantly poorer than A. One could then choose to argue that their total costs for the 
emissions reductions should be borne largely by country A, say on a 3:1 split, with A 
meeting half of the costs for B’s emission reductions through finance and technology.  This 
might be achieved through an equitably funded/accessed climate mitigation fund, or 
through tradeable emission permits.
For simplicity I focus in this chapter on distribution of emissions themselves, rather than 
the associated costs, although I suggest in section 4 how “Capacity” might be 
accommodated through a combination. I return to the idea of tradeable permits in chapter 
4, as a means often proposed of promoting ‘efficiency’ in emissions allocations, whilst 
allowing equity to be promoted through distribution of costs, but which I regard as 
problematic. However, I will generally treat equity in ‘distribution of mitigation costs’ as a 
policy variation (i.e. instead of or as well as distribution of emissions) which would require 
separate consideration over how far it could meet the objectives I argue for here. 
A few further points of clarification. Although as suggested in chapter 2 section 4, 
mitigation efforts must include protection or enhancement of sinks as well as emissions 
reductions, for simplicity I narrow my distributive focus to emissions reduction, because of 
the further (including very technical) complications that would be raised by consideration 
of sinks, and their unequal distribution. I also consider emissions reductions in this chapter 
as though they were one magnitude, although, as emphasised in chapter 2, there are 
different GHGs and each cannot be made exactly equivalent because of uncertainties over 
their respective atmospheric lifetime and radiative forcing strength. It may be that my 
approach to equity could be applied separately for each greenhouse gas, although this 
could make their application very complicated. Additionally, I do not consider here how 
equity should be applied within countries. Whilst there are important concerns of national 
equity in emissions space, it is a further question how far an agreement should specify 
each nation's use of its national emissions allowance, and my discussion here makes no 
assumption one way or the other.
Lastly, it might be asked whether the task of evaluating an equitable distribution of 
emissions to a climate change agreement is not hampered prima facie by the kinds of 
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criticisms made against the notion of global justice23. That is, that the ethical considerations 
of the “equality of what” literature that I draw on are (allegedly) relevant only at a national 
or community level, and cannot be simply writ large to the global scale. But this objection 
is premised on a 'social contract' understanding of justice which ignores the significance of 
globalisation and, more importantly, the existence of global commons. One can 
legitimately debate morally preferable principles of equity to guide a global climate change 
agreement without committing oneself to a wholesale liberal cosmopolitan view of global 
justice (which would include issues like citizenship, the role of the (global) state, political 
liberty and distribution of entitlements). I do not propose or consider here any theory of 
global justice or assume the need for a global social contract. I examine the 'equality of 
what' literature as a way to understand interpretations of 'equity' as a guide to moral 
relations between people in the world as a whole, since such distributive issues have 
clearly arisen. Sen has made a similar point, countering Nagel's belief that “In the global 
context” in the absence of a world government, the “demands of justice” are inapplicable 
and we should concentrate instead on “minimal humanitarian morality”. This ignores, Sen 
argues, that “When people across the world agitate to get more global justice... they are not 
clamouring for some kind of 'minimal humanitarianism'. Nor are they … agitating for a 
perfectly just world society”24.
1.2 Definition versus moral content: What do we mean by ‘equity’?
I now consider what is and should be meant by ‘equity’ in this context. Why, in the first 
place, should this not be replaced simply by the term ‘equality’? I interpret ‘equity’ in the 
distributive case, as ‘fair equality’, or ‘removal of unfair inequality’. For ‘Equality’ itself 
may not always relate to morally relevant features. Firstly, since some forms of equality 
might not be thought to be justified (one could, as I explore during the chapter, choose to 
equalise effort, resources, welfare, etc, and not all might be thought fair). Secondly, 
because there are sometimes inequalities in our given value that might be thought to be fair 
– because they are, for example, as a result of human choices. And lastly, because equity 
may take on a prioritarian guise. It may aim, for example, to meet basic needs, and may 
23 E.g. Nagel, 2005.
24 Sen, 2008, p340-341. Pogge similarly argues that advocating global justice need not depend on a “strong 
cosmopolitan” position (Pogge, 2002). He justifies extending a Rawlsian difference principle to a global level 
(Pogge, 1989 section 23.2) because we do not belong to “closed, self-contained societies”; our lives are 
“profoundly shaped and affected by events reverberating through an international scheme of trade and 
diplomacy” (p263).
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not, strictly speaking, seek to equalise anything25, yet prioritarianism is typically seen as a 
form of egalitarianism26. 
Since various conceptions of equity exist, it has been argued that a specific definition of 
equity is not possible27; it is a ‘dialectical’ rather than ‘analytic’ concept28. This is 
particularly clear with regards to climate change negotiations, where Ashton and Wang 
argue that  “Competing parties champion different notions of equity, not surprisingly those 
coinciding most closely with their interests”29. These are, (Historical) Responsibility, Equal 
Allowances, Capacity, Basic Needs, and Comparable Effort, and together they argue, they 
can be taken as “dimensions of equity” to “define a notional ‘equity space’” 30. However, 
there is an important distinction between defining the concept of equity, and advocating a 
particular principle of equity (and its appropriateness for a particular context). I want to 
distance myself from the kind of approach subsequently taken by Ashton and Wang with 
their treatment of these “dimensions”, which seems to conflate this kind of concept-
conception distinction (as understood by Rawls31). For, they see their definitional task not 
simply as defining equity through looking at use of the term, but further, in ‘discovering’ 
the moral content, assuming that each, (for them) subjective dimension is equally morally 
valid.
They want to “understand the essence of equity, uncluttered by other self-interested 
considerations”32 through examining the different “dimensions” of equity, as though there 
were some hidden moral unity between them. But, since they also argue that one cannot 
decide between these “dimensions”; some of them are “competing”, and “lead in different 
directions”, they conclude that, “There is no single objective way to reconcile them or to  
calculate tradeoffs between them… We need to allow space for the politics to arrive at a 
rough balancing of competing equity demands”33. Thus their methodological approach 
embodies a moral relativism with regards to what are, for them, equally valid “dimensions” 
25 For a fuller definition and discussion see section 5.2
26 See Parfit, 1995
27 E.g. Ashton and Wang, p3; Rose and Stevens, 1993, p118
28 Daly, 1997, p2 ; Dialectical concepts have “evolving penumbras which partially overlap with their 
“other”.”, but with “analytical concepts... the law of contradiction holds”.
29 Ashton & Wang, 2003, p3. Schelling and Cooper also make this point, cited in Goulder and Nadreau, 2002, 
p121
30 Ashton & Wang, 2003, p3.
31 Rawls, 1972, p5-6
32 Ashton & Wang, 2003, p3
33 Ashton & Wang, 2003, p13
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of equity, which leaves the demands of equity to be ‘balanced’ by political process, rather 
than scrutinised by ethical consideration. Whilst I agree that each ‘dimension’ could 
reasonably be said to fall under (and together ‘define’, in a fuzzy sense), the concept of 
equity, we still can – and should - argue for a particular 'dimension' as a justified 
conception / principle of equity, rather than aim simply to achieve a ‘rough balancing’. 
They err, I believe, in supposing that the variable but legitimate use of the term equity in 
language – the ‘equity space’ – must also commit us to moral content. Brown has argued, 
similarly, that “the lack of consensus of what equity means under the UNFCCC does not 
mean that any proposed operational definition of “equity” is entitled to respect as a matter 
of morality.”34
It is not, therefore, necessary to conclude like Ashton and Wang that determining the 
content of equity must rely on political negotiation to ‘balance’ the associated competing 
interests (although in practice politics has a significant role to play), as a form of 
procedural arbitration35. And, if the decision to choose between competing principles is 
thus left wholly to ‘politics’, assumed to be driven, as Ashton & Wang argue, by particular 
interests, the outcome would be a result of “raw power”36, reflecting the current interests of 
countries wielding the most influence at the negotiating table. Rather, “The better way to 
proceed is to first make proponents of various definitions of equity demonstrate how their 
criteria for equity comports with acceptable moral principles.... Only those definitions that 
survive this ethical analysis should be the subject of ethical compromise.”37. That is, as 
Brown and others38 have emphasised, it should be understood as an ethical enquiry. One 
can explicitly argue and debate the different conceptions as principles, and consider the 
grounds for each as appropriate in this particular context, in order to decide which option is 
worthy of support; an approach that not considered by Ashton and Wang.  And, 
surrendering discussion to political negotiation rather than ethics could threaten the 
34 Brown, 2008 
35 They conclude this in the absence of an “objective” calculation of trade-offs to “reconcile them”, which 
they view as the only other alternative to relativism. But to even imagine that this is possible treats 
conceptions/principles of equity as equivalent to tastes or preferences in the neo-liberal marketplace, where 
(following the principles of rational choice theory) choice is grounded on a trade-off between individual 
preferences, all seen as commensurable, whether the so-called “preferences” are ethical positions, needs, or 
tastes
36 Brown, 2002, p206
37 Brown, 2008
38 E.g. Baer, 2002
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likelihood of an agreement, since, as Brown argues, “no global consensus is likely to 
emerge on national allocations unless nations perceive that global allocations are fair”39.  
But what is the role of the ethical discussion of equity here in this wider context? After all, 
political interests will, in practice, be highly influential over the outcome of negotiations. 
My suggestion is, along with Brown, Baer and others, that the ethical discussion must play 
a part of the decision-making process40, as it is already for activists, NGOs, and some 
voters and politicians. If grounds for competing principles are examined and certain 
conceptions of equity argued to be unjustifiable, it will be much harder for the associated 
‘raw’ interests to dominate in the face of public scrutiny, and especially given the need to 
be seen to reach a fair outcome. 
I therefore follow Baer in focusing on the fairness of principles “not because I believe that 
it is better to be morally righteous than to be practical but because what a government and 
its citizens believe is fair is one justification of country’s [sic] negotiating positions”41 “The 
analyst” in an “ethical analysis”, as Baer argues, “is a participant” in the debate “and 
equity is something to be defined and argued for in order to influence the world”42. The 
terms of debate in academic policy circles can be shifted, and this is literature which can 
have some influence both for policy-makers and their researchers, but also for lobbyists, 
campaigners and pressure-groups who may still be uncommitted to particular policy 
proposals. Of course, the formulation of the principle of equity I argue for in this chapter 
represents an ideal which may be too strict in practice. The end negotiation will be a result 
of compromises which take account of the (current) limits of political possibility as well as 
other practical and ethical concerns (surrounding, e.g. ‘national sovereignty’) and 
disagreement over the demands of equity. But it is still important to try to define this ideal 
to guide political decision-making as far as possible. 
To this end, I next consider four of the five “dimensions of equity” highlighted by Ashton 
and Wang as possible interpretations for a principle of equity in a mitigation agreement. 
They will be examined in the following order - Comparable Effort (section 2), Equal (per 
39 Brown, 2002, p206
40 Baer has also criticised authors who “suggest possible allocation formulas that they believe could be 
acceptable to all parties” because “the interests and preferences of countries are taken as given” Baer, 2002, 
p395
41 Baer, 2002, p398-9
42 Baer, 2002, p395
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capita) Allowances(section 3), Capacity(section 4)  and Basic Needs (section 5) 43. There 
are some alleged conceptions of equity that do not stand up to even minimal ethical 
scrutiny, which I will not consider in any depth here. I assume that equal distribution per 
country (which does not allow for population size) is self-evidently unfair44. I also ignore a 
further possible principle of equity suggested by another PEW paper45, ‘opportunity for 
reductions’, which does not seem to constitute primarily a principle of equity, but rather a 
principle of efficiency46, understood as differences in “the number and cost of opportunities 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions… the energy intensity of an economy”47. Although 
linked to equity (in that countries emitting inefficiently are using more emissions space 
that could otherwise be allocated elsewhere), I turn to this idea in chapter 4, where I 
consider ‘efficiency’, but understood in the context of ensuring equity and ecological 
effectiveness.
2. Comparable Effort.
2.1. The moral relevance of effort
  
The idea that equal ‘comparable effort’48 should be understood as a principle of equity for a 
mitigation agreement has been associated with the position of the United States49. The 
suggestion is, as Ashton and Wang describe, that “In assessing whether an outcome is 
equitable, parties will invariably compare the effort they are being asked to make and that 
required of other parties… if some parties seem to be getting a better deal from others – if 
their commitments are, in some sense, disproportionately easy – the deal may still be 
denounced as unfair”50.
43 Taken from Ashton and Wang, 2003, p3-5, also considered in a similar form in Vattenfall, 2006, p23. The 
order of consideration is mine.
44 Even if there are concerns about allowing entirely for population size (because of concerns this could 
incentivise larger populations), not allowing at all for population seems obviously wrong, because it would 
allow a country the size of Luxembourg the same emissions allowance as a country the size of the United 
States.
45 Claussen & McNeilly, 2000, p14
46 Brown makes a similar point in Brown, 2002, p216.
47 Claussen & McNeilly, 2000, p18.
48 Sometimes known as ‘comparable burdens’
49 Baer, 2002, p395
50 Ashton and Wang, 2003, p5.
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This is the kind of criticism launched by the US against the Kyoto Protocol, because of the 
lack of commitments for developing countries, and supposedly unfair higher burden in 
emissions reductions placed on industrialised countries51.  What might constitute an ‘equal 
effort’ for this kind of position is typically understood as emissions reductions requiring an 
equal percentage of each country’s GDP to implement52. This will also approximate to 
‘grandfathering’ (equal percentage reductions based on “prior use levels”53), since “if all 
countries are required to make the same percentage reduction in their emissions, and if 
emissions are roughly proportional to income, then everyone will face roughly the same 
costs relative to their income”54. Although this ‘comparable effort’ approach is often met 
very sceptically by activists because it typically allows higher emitting countries to 
continue emitting at higher levels than others, it is important to clarify where the inequity 
lies. 
Why might effort be relevant? For, at first glance, the idea that countries should make an 
‘comparable effort’ might seem reasonable as a principle of equity, in implying a principle 
of equal sacrifice – that we should share burdens equally in face of our common global 
danger55. One concern, however, is why such effort56 should be morally relevant, if, given 
the existing unequal emissions distributions, the outcome may be similarly unequal. It 
seems fair that if a society expects equal effort from its members, they might also expect 
that an equal ‘reward’ be received from this effort – these are the kind of practices that are 
promoted in a meritocracy, and certainly by liberal egalitarians, who consider that outcome 
should be in proportion to effort alone57 (and would vary with it, so that equal efforts 
receive equal returns). But these are in cases where all else is equal. In the case of 
emissions reduction, however, not all else is equal – we start, as has been said, from a 
51 This was expressed in the “Byrd-Hagel” Senate resolution adopted in 2007 (Meyer, 2000, p63-64), which, 
as Meyer points out, is in fact consistent with the “Contraction and Convergence” policy proposal, based on 
convergence to equal per capita allocations, even though previously the US had argued for national equal 
percentage reductions.
52 Brown, 2002, p207.
53 Definition of ‘grandfathering’ from Brown, 2002, p209
54 Baer & Athanasiou, 2007a, p16.
55 Baer, 2002, p395
56 I assume for the moment that such effort would be equal – but I return to this shortly.
57 E.g. Cohen, 1989, p914 who reads John Rawls as arguing in A Theory of Justice that “not all effort is 
deserving” because it is “influenced by” ones “natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him” 
whereas what matters is effort that is wholly a result of personal responsibility. He continues on p916 to say 
that the “purpose” of egalitarianism “is to eliminate involuntary disadvantage, by which I (stipulatively) 
mean disadvantage for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible, since it does not appropriately reflect 
choices that he has made or is making or would make”. See also Dworkin, 1981b, p304-6.
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position of unequal emissions, so the ‘reward’58 of emissions a country is allowed to emit 
will be very unequal. From this perspective, ‘effort’ can not be considered as morally 
relevant until other morally irrelevant factors – i.e. factors that are not a result of choice or 
responsibility - have been eradicated, including, in particular, previous/current unequal 
emissions distribution, which can be taken as a ‘given’ prior to effort being taken 59.
If effort is to be a morally relevant dimension of equity for mitigation, supporters of an 
‘equal effort’ principle will therefore need to argue that the existing distribution of 
emissions is fair(or irrelevant) and that the unequal outcome rendered by ‘equal effort’ is 
just. I suggest that the only option open to them at this point is to depart from a liberal-
egalitarian approach to justice and embrace the kind of libertarian argument offered by the 
Lockean-Nozickean story60. That is, that ‘end-patterns’ are not the relevant objects of 
fairness, and judgement should instead be passed on the fairness of resource ‘transactions’ 
themselves so long as the resource in question was justly acquired at its origin.
But in this case, ‘equal effort’ is no longer a clear conception of distributional equity. 
There is a loose sense in which it could be, if the definition of justness for the “original 
acquisition” of a resource as property, which Nozick has termed the “Lockean proviso”61, 
is considered to be a form of distributional justice. Locke famously states that a man [sic] 
can take as property all that, through labour, he “removes out of the state that nature hath 
provided” so long as “there is enough, and as good left in common for others”62. If this 
requires a form of initial distributional justice, then it might be considered a possible 
grounds for ‘comparable effort’ as a conception of equity for mitigation.  
However, if interpreted in this way, the condition will not be met in the case of emissions 
distribution (even aside from other concerns about this kind of approach to justice) if the 
current distributional arrangements are preserved, as I now explain. The ‘initial 
58 Although I am not suggesting that emissions allowances should be seen as a ‘reward’ – they are, however, 
presently, useful.
59 In so far as these are a result of relevant choice and responsibility, they would constitute arguments for an 
inverse relationship between emissions level and burden of reduction because the choice to emit more 
emissions is a choice in the wrong direction – what we would reward, presumably, is choices for lowering 
emissions. This relates, therefore, to the principle of historical responsibility which I consider in Makoff, 
2011.
60 Donald Brown has also noted the Nozickean approach as a theoretical grounding for grandfathering of 
emissions.(Brown, 2002, p210)
61 Nozick, 1974
62 Locke The Second Treatise, chapter 5, para 27, in Laslett, 1960, my emphasis.
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acquisition’ can reasonably be understood as the distribution of emissions at the point of an 
agreement63. This is because the distribution up until the point of an agreement was not 
based on a restriction of total emissions - anyone could emit any quantity (setting aside for 
the moment the very real political, socio-economic and ecological barriers to so doing). As 
soon as restrictions on total quantity come into place, whatever distribution is determined 
will then be fixed as a country’s allowance, as an appropriation akin to the process of 
initial acquisition, where land is removed from use by others64. An international agreement 
to limit emissions is, then, in this sense, the ‘original acquisition’. But, therefore, the 
Lockean proviso is not then met if current unequal emissions distributions are preserved 
through, for example, distribution according to equality of effort (as it has been interpreted 
so far). Because in this case, it would not be true that “enough and as good” is left for other 
countries – in this zero-sum game, if one country is allocated an allowance equivalent to 
20% of total emissions capacity, the other 20265 cannot all access this same quantity.
Against the second part of this argument, one might highlight Richard Starkey’s point that 
for right-libertarians, the term “enough and as good” is not interpreted in this sense. 
Starkey cites Narveson’s claim that the Lockean proviso only requires that we should “not 
interfere with what others already have”66 and Nozick’s view that, even if this is not the 
case, appropriation is acceptable if those that lose out are compensated through being 
provided with work by the appropriators. But in this case it is clearer that to adopt such a 
view would involve a move away from a position of distributional equity altogether and 
towards a different approach to morality which would reject the inclusion of equity as a 
criterion altogether. As Parfit has argued, Nozick rejects “the ethics of distribution” 
altogether; for Nozick, resources are “not up for distribution… they are goods to which 
particular people already have entitlements, or special claims”67. I will not attempt to 
analyse such a position, since my task here is to consider conceptions of distributional 
equity, rather than argue for the basis of equity itself. But it seems clear that if ‘comparable 
63 I differ here from Richard Starkey’s consideration of the Locke-Nozick story with regards to emissions; he 
assumes that “the right-libertarian approach can most easily be framed in terms of [prior] ownership of fossil 
fuel, something straightforwardly amenable to private ownership”, Starkey, 2008, p21
64 This is not, however, to imply that such a process creates property, or that permits should be considered as 
such (see chapter 4, footnote 40). I mean only to imply that the cases are analogous with respect to fixing a 
quantity of a natural resource as usable by one party that was previously available to others.
65 Assuming 203 countries in the world.
66 Naverson, cited in Starkey, 2008, p12,
67 Parfit 1995, p82.
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effort’ relies on this kind of interpretation to justify unequal outcomes, it cannot be 
considered as a valid conception of distributional equity.
2.2 Comparing effort
However, supporters of ‘equal effort’ might still argue that even if effort is not the 
overriding dimension of equity, it is still of some relevance, and must be balanced against 
other ‘dimensions’. Ignoring equality of effort might be argued to lead to other kinds of 
unequal outcomes. Ashton and Wang, for example, argue that there might be concerns of 
‘competitiveness’; “Any regime that puts some countries under tighter carbon constraints 
than others alters the terms of trade and conditions for investment between them”68. But 
concerns such as ‘unfair competitiveness’ only take hold when the understanding of 
‘effort’ is particularly narrow. Once more, it ignores the initial emissions of each party, 
and, accordingly the different kinds of effort each country would have to make. For, as 
Claussen and McNeiily highlight, “given that everyone does not start from the same place, 
the additional effort required on the part of some countries and the lack of effort required 
by others clearly would not indicate a fair strategy”69. This is analogous to arguments for 
progressive taxation – advocates do not believe that the same rate of taxation should apply 
to all income levels, because for those on lower incomes the burden arguably has a more 
significant effect on their lifestyle70.
If effort is thus to be compared qualitatively, one needs to consider initial levels of 
emissions use and the uses of emitting activity, as Shue does71. But this wider 
interpretation of ‘comparable burdens’ then requires moving from considering equitable 
reductions alone to towards a focus on emissions allocations and their relationship with 
standard of living, either through principles of ‘Equal Allowances’, ‘Capacity’ or ‘Basic 
Needs’ which I return to in sections three, four and five. These two subtly different 
perspectives have been noted by Paul Baer. The “burden-sharing framework” sees the 
68 Ashton and Wang, 2003, p9.
69 Claussen & McNeilly, 2000, p12.
70 This point has also been made by Robin Attfield: “[the Comparable Burdens Principle]… is objectionable 
on the same grounds of justice as proposals to tax individuals in direct proportion to their income; for those 
people with little or no disposable income still have to contribute the agreed proportion, despite not being 
able to afford it. Similarly countries obliged to reduce their emissions to a fixed proportion of GDP would be 
obliged to deplete their economies and forego use of available resources, even if these resources could 
instead have been used to provide for the unsatisfied needs of their populations.” Attfield, 2008, p3.
71 Shue, as considered in section 5, distinguishes between ‘luxury’ and ‘survival’ emissions. Shue, 1993.
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costs of global emissions reduction as “a burden that must be shared globally…In this 
framework it makes sense to say that the burden should be shared equally unless there are 
compelling reasons why it shouldn’t be”72. But the alternative, “resource-sharing 
framework” begins by considering the “finite... atmospheric space”, or global common 
resource (as defined in chapter 1, section 6), and asks how that resource should be 
distributed, and “whether a person or country has received or will receive a fair share of 
the benefits”.73 
This distinction should not be overstated, since, as Baer's later approach shows, it seems 
reasonable to combine the frameworks. For example, Baer's later advocacy of a combined 
Capacity and Responsibility conception of equity is framed as “effort-sharing”74, but the 
“effort” is clearly also understood in the context of diminishing emissions space75. What 
seems problematic is an exclusive focus on burden-sharing without consideration of the 
commons-sharing context. This ignores “the disparity between the average American who 
emits just under 20t of CO2 per year while the average Indian emits less than 1t and the 
average Chinese about 1.3t” but overemphasises “[the disparity] between a US that is 
required to reduce emissions and a China that is not”76. It can then be claimed that “Equal 
percentage reductions perpetuate inequities by allowing countries with historically high 
levels of emissions to continue releasing a disproportionate share of total pollutants”.77
I now consider the three further principles of this chapter which all start from this resource-
sharing perspective. However, this is not to suggest that all principles that embody such an 
approach are equally defensible. Indeed, the first, most straightforward of these, equal (per 
capita) emissions allowances, is not as equitable, I will argue, as it might intuitively seem.
72 Baer, 2002, p 395
73 Baer, 2002, p396. NB: Baer makes these points to explain why we should consider historical responsibility 
as a principle of equity. I do not consider this principle in this thesis, however, the same arguments that Baer 
makes here apply equally to the other three principles that I consider in this chapter; Equal Entitlements, 
Capacity and Basic Needs.
74 Baer et al, 2008, p28
75 Baer et al, 2008, p27-28
76 Najam et al, 2003, p224
77 Soroos, 1998, p33. My emphasis.
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3. Equal allowances – can they be inequitable?
3.1 The problem with equal allowances 
Under Equal (per capita) Allowances (EPCAs) the global yearly emissions budget would 
be allocated to countries on an equal per capita basis – i.e. depending on their population, 
on the basis of every person having an equal share78. Justifications tend to appeal to the 
idea of ‘global emissions space’ as a shared commons resource, and imply that dividing 
this resource equally between people who use it follows directly on. Peter Singer, for 
example, says that EPCAs are a “a self-evidently fair way to divide a common resource”79. 
Similarly, Donald Brown argues that they are “based on the notion that every human being 
has an equal right to use the absorptive capacity of the global commons”80. I describe this 
as embodying a strict ‘equality of resources’ view – (not to be confused with Dworkin’s 
version of equality of resources, which I discuss later). 
This relies on the assumption that the equal moral worth of all humans translates into an 
equal right to use resources. However, whilst it might seem more equitable to allocate 
emissions allowances on an equal per capita basis than, for example, by giving each 
country a quantitatively equal allowance (but not allowing for differences in population 
size), it is not self-evident that this is nonetheless the most equitable way to allocate a 
commons resource. For it is emphasised in Green Economic approaches that the value of 
resources lies in what they are used for and how they are used, rather than in possession of 
the resource itself81. Equalising the distribution of the resource may then mislocate the 
value that it holds. This concern is supported by much of the philosophical literature on 
equality of the last 30 years – in particular the so-called “equality of what”82 debates. 
Richard Starkey has highlighted that “There is widespread agreement” that the 
78 This is most famously advocated in Meyer's “Contraction and Convergence” framework (Meyer, 2000).
79 Singer, 2006, p419
80 Brown, 2002, p158
81 E.g. Scott-Cato, 1999, p45, for whom income and wealth function as means to meet our needs. See also 
Daly's critisms of fetishism of economic growth and its assumption of “infinite wants” rather than “absolute 
needs” (Daly, 1993a, p17-24 and p40-44). 
82 Sen, 1979
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“appropriate equalisandum”is “not resources”83 (i.e. what should be equalised84), because 
equal resource possession does not lead to equal welfare85. 
In the next section I shall outline why this is the case, before explaining why one apparent 
exception, Dworkin's version of equality of resources86, will lend no more support to this 
than any other position on equality.
3.2 Welfare versus resources
I first examine briefly the main concerns of the ‘equality of what debates’ on welfare 
versus resources. This will enable me to clarify in 3.3 why none of the main positions of 
this debate, including ‘equality of resources’ will justify an EPCA position. A useful 
formulation to consider here87 is “A uses X to do Y” where A is a person, X is the resource, 
and Y is the ends for which the resource is used. What we choose to equalise (henceforth, 
the ‘equalisandum’), whether it is X or Y, makes a difference because the relationship 
between A, X and Y changes from person to person. I suggest that the reasons for this fall 
into two categories88:
i) Differences in how far a given Y can be achieved from a given X
People’s circumstances can vary for reasons beyond the control of the individual (which 
are reasons generally agreed to be morally relevant89). These 'background' conditions can 
83 Starkey, 2008, p28
84 Page, 2006, instead uses the term “currency of justice”, p51
85 Starkey examines the “equality of what” literature in relation to equity in climate change mitigation, 
although predominantly at the national, rather than international level. However, his main arguments against 
equalising resources are still relevant internationally. See my comments on applicability of distributive equity 
to a global level in section 1.1. Page, 2006 has also extensively reviewed this literature, although he considers 
it primarily with regards to intergenerational equity (other than parts of the concluding chapter); see my 
concerns about the intergenerational equity metaphor in chapter 2, section 2.3. However, I draw from Page 
where relevant.
86 Dworkin, 1981b
87 Formulation adapted from Thomson, 1987, chapter 1, as used to discuss ‘needs’. I owe this point to Dr Ed. 
Anderson. 
88 i) and ii) are my own summary of the main relevant concerns in the literature as to the preferred 
‘equalisandum’, based on Arneson 1990, Cohen, 1989; Dworkin, 1981a & 1981b; Clayton & Williams, 
2002; Sen, 1979 and Starkey, 2008.
89 There is a further debate in the literature on equality which I do not examine here (although I allude to it in 
2.1, footnote 57), regarding how to best reflect the (assumed) intuition that people should be held morally 
accountable for their choices and that resulting inequalities should not be compensated for. This can also 
influence one's choice of equalisandum, including whether it is framed in terms of opportunity for or 
outcome for (resources, welfare, etc), depending on how one makes the 'cut' that defines when an inequality 
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arise from external circumstances or because of differing abilities, so that even with similar 
goals, more resources are required for the same ends. For example, a pregnant woman 
requires more food than a normal adult in order to stay healthy. Similarly, in the emissions 
case, Starkey considers living in a very cold climate; this may require creating more heat to 
live at a comfortable temperature, which then often requires energy90. This can in turn 
imply higher emissions if, for example, fossil-fuels provide the energy. One might here 
think that trying to equalise the goal – the ‘Y’, rather than the resources, ‘X’, is the only 
fair solution, implying an unequal distribution of resources, X. 
ii) Differences in Y: ‘expensive tastes’ and 'cheap tastes'
However, people also have different goals, and different goals require different resources 
(e.g. A enjoys writing, B enjoys fast cars). If it is believed that Y should be equalised and 
Y differs from person to person, how can it be decided what an  equal distribution of Y is? 
B’s tastes – and fulfilment of Y - might require more resources than A’s; should, therefore, 
our principle of equality allow for B’s tastes to be equally fulfilled? Depending on the 
answer to this question we will be led to very different positions. 
It might lead to a return to the position of equalising resources in order to rule out fulfilling 
some very ‘expensive’ preferences; people’s tastes should adapt to equal resource use, and 
not the other way around (particularly, perhaps, if they have a preference for high-emitting 
activities). But equally this means that some needs may not be met, if they cannot adapt to 
equal resource use. So, it might lead to an attempt to accept expensive tastes and the 
proposal of a further variable, Z, representing welfare. This would amend the earlier 
formulation to “A uses X to do Y which fulfils Z”. Z could be understood subjectively, as, 
e.g. happiness – so that each person’s goals or preferences should be fulfilled to an ‘equal’ 
level of Z, and resources distributed to achieve this. However, interpersonal comparisons 
will be hard, the understanding of welfare may be thought to be too thin, and there is still 
what Page calls the “cheap tastes” problem; that even then, some needs may not be met, if 
people are extremely cheerful despite disadvantaged material circumstance91. 
is down to individual choice alone (as opposed to unchosen circumstances, such as family background or 
physical disability). 
90 Although this need not be the case – heat can also be retained by increased insulation, as I suggest in 3.3. 
See also footnote 96.
91 Page, 2006, p57, cites Dworkin's example of Tiny Tim, who has insufficient resources for a wheelchair but 
whose cheerful disposition means that equality of subjective welfare would not require allocating additional 
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Alternatively, some cheap or expensive tastes could be ruled out by instead allowing Z to 
be understood ‘objectively’; by defining objective criteria of welfare to be met to an equal 
level, e.g. keeping warm, mental health, etc. Although one will have to address concerns 
that it will be hard, especially in an international context, to agree on a common welfare 
standard.
3.3 Equal allowances in theory and practice.
I will not yet argue for any one of these positions, though I consider them more closely in 
section 4. What should be noted for the moment is that the discussion so far supports 
Starkey’s assertion that equal allowances cannot be justified through an equality of welfare 
position.  For, if the concerns of 3.2. i) and ii) are resolved by taking a position such as 
equality of (subjective or objective) welfare, this is not guaranteed by equalising the 
resource in question; emission-generating activity.  However, it is also clearly reasonable 
to adopt an ‘equality of resources’ position in response to the problem of ‘expensive 
preferences’, which is the approach taken by Ronald Dworkin92. Perhaps, it might be 
thought contra Starkey, this kind of approach could be taken to justify a principle of ‘equal 
allowances’. 
However, Dworkin does not advocate a strict equality of resources position. For he still has 
to deal with the issues of the debate summarised in 3.2 i), surrounding differences in the 
background conditions of individuals. In order to do this Dworkin understands the idea of 
equality of resources differently. Without dwelling on the details of his argument, the 
crucial difference is that he supposes a “hypothetical insurance market”93 against finding 
oneself in any such disadvantaged position (e.g. being disabled, less talented, etc). Even if 
nominally it is resources that should be equal for Dworkin, extra allowances are allocated 
to people that are particularly disadvantaged. Furthermore, Dworkin’s theory is meant to 
apply to all distributable resources, rather than any one in particular (here, emissions 
space). If, as is the case, other resources are distributed very unequally and are not up for 
grabs (this is an agreement specifically on climate change mitigation), it does not seem 
reasonable to straightforwardly draw the conclusion that this one resource be distributed 
resources to provide him with one.
92 Dworkin, 1981b
93 Dworkin, 1981b, p297-304
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equally, since its use as a resource may be impacted by inequalities in those other 
resources. 
Because, whilst some equality in resources might seem preferable to no resource equality, 
unequal possession of other resources may mean that each party does not even have equal 
use of that one resource. For example, if parties have vastly unequal access to water, an 
equal distribution of rice may not allow parties to equally use the rice, since some will 
have insufficient water in which to cook their allocated portion. This is not to suggest that 
those with less water should be allocated fewer portions of rice; rather, an equal resources 
view would surely require either that they also be given equal access to water in addition, 
or above-average portions of rice which can be exchanged with other parties' excess water. 
Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ is therefore no more able to justify a principle of equal 
emissions allowances (alone) than any variant of equality of welfare. 
However, one remaining concern may be that the examples given so far surrounding the 
variable relationship between resources and welfare need not be applicable, in the case of 
global emissions space. For the discussion centres on international policy, not national 
policy. It may therefore be argued necessary only to consider average per capita emissions 
in a country, since individual abilities or disabilities within a country are likely to cancel 
one another out (and hence can be accounted for by the national policies of the country). 
The only differences that are of concern for international policy, this would suggest, are 
those affecting the ability of a country as a whole to achieve a particular level of welfare 
from its emissions allowances, such as Starkey’s example of living in a colder climate94. 
But even this need not necessarily require the additional emissions that Starkey considers95 
in order to maintain welfare (however one interprets it) – lifestyles and cultural practices 
can and do adapt so that, for example, dwellings are built with more insulation, clothing is 
warmer, more exercise is taken. Indeed, perhaps countries should be expected to adapt, as 
far as possible, to a level of equal emissions allowances96. In practice, then, perhaps ‘equal 
allowances’ may be perfectly justifiable as a principle of equity to guide emissions 
94 Starkey, 2008, p34
95 Starkey, 2008, p57
96 We also, arguably, would not want to encourage populations in areas that would require substantially 
higher energy use to sustain. Dubai, for example, lies within the desert, and in order to sustain its significant 
urban population has substantial energy use and carbon emissions, a substantial portion of which come from 
air conditioning (Groom and Leake, 2008).
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distribution, even if the ultimate goal of equity is equality of (subjective or objective) 
welfare.
Yet even if this is allowed for97, there is one significant ‘background condition98; the 
different levels of economic development between countries which results in great 
differences in the welfare that can be attained from any given level of emissions allowance. 
It is important, surely, to take on board such differences in the capacity of a country to 
function from its emissions allowance, and (analogous to the rice example above), equal 
per capita allowances may not alone be sufficient to imply their equal use as resource99. 
4. Capacity 
I will now, therefore, turn to what I believe to be the most justifiable principle of equity for 
a climate change agreement; what is ordinarily referred to as the “capacity” of a country to 
make limit or reduce emissions. This principle could be understood and defended in 
different ways, depending on the position adopted on the appropriate equalisandum. Yet 
not all are equally robust. I will argue in favour of an equality of objective welfare position 
by sketching a variant of the “capabilities” interpretation of objective welfare. This kind of 
approach, I will argue, is the appropriate way to justify “capacity” as a principle of equity. 
It can most fully make sense of the concerns of the proponents of “capacity” as a principle 
of equity for a mitigation agreement, and allow us to understand why it improves on a 
principle of equal allowances.
97 And it is not clear that this will be the case – a transition to this would take time. And there may be limits to 
such adaptation imposed by people’s abilities, knowledge, ability to move to more inhabitable areas, and so 
on. Starkey offers a list of conditions under which an egalitarian liberal might choose equal per capita 
emissions which includes when adaptation to an equal allocation is possible. (Starkey, 2008, p42). 
98 Although Starkey does consider this in the last section of Starkey, 2008, but restricts himself to a 
framework of liberal cosmopolitan global justice, drawing on Rawls.
99 In arguing this I reach a very different conclusion to Page. Although Page does not consider this in 
significant depth, he does suggest at the very end of Page, 2006, (p178) that the policy proposal Contraction 
and Convergence, which proposes global equal per capita emissions allowances, “seems well suited to the 
promotion of existing and future welfare, resources, basic capabilities and midfare”, i.e. “any of the plausible 
theories of the currency of justice”.
167
4.1 Definition of principle of ‘Capacity’.
It should first be clarified that there are two subtly different ways of characterising 
‘Capacity’ as a principle. It could be described from primarily a ‘burden-sharing’ 
perspective that I considered in section 2.2, where it emphasises a country’s ability to pay 
for reductions from the current distribution of emissions, but ignores the resource-sharing 
context. This would make the principle problematically approximate to that of ‘equal 
effort’, where, as Baer has previously argued, it is a variant of a “principle of equal 
sacrifice” for reduction burdens, when “the wealthy pay a higher proportion of their 
income than the poor do, but the poor still pay something”100. Singer has also described the 
principle in a similar way, when he stated that “it is fair for the better-off to make greater 
sacrifices than the worst-off”101. I have already explained my concerns with the limitations 
of this kind of perspective (which could result, potentially, in the wealthiest making a 
greater “sacrifice” in reductions than the poorest, but with the poorest still receiving lower 
emissions allowances). 
Instead, therefore, I adopt an understanding of ‘Capacity’ that also recognises the resource-
sharing perspective. This emphasises the “capacity to act”102 of each country. But 
“capacity” refers not simply to the “opportunity to reduce emissions” in the sense of 
efficiency highlighted in 1.3. but in terms of the capacity of a country to adapt to 
functioning from a given emissions level. Page has questioned the “ability to pay” 
principle on the grounds that “it leaves unanswered why those who have the ability should 
pay”103. My concern in this section is to consider an ethical grounding for this principle 
under different interpretations of a country’s capacity according to the ‘equality of what’ 
literature introduced in section 3.
Why then, at a political level, would capacity be argued to be an appropriate principle of 
equity for a mitigation agreement? The main argument (which I have framed within a 
100 Baer, 2002, p395. As mentioned earlier, he has, however, subsequently promoted a burden-sharing 
approach in the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (Baer et al, 2008), although, this framework 
still retains the important context of equitably sharing emissions space.
101 Singer, 2006, p419.
102 Ashton and Wang, 2003, p4
103 Page, 2008, p562. He is concerned about why countries that have not necessarily been responsible in the 
past for excessive greenhouse gas emissions but are still comparatively rich should nonetheless “pay” a 
greater amount than poorer countries who have.
168
resource-sharing perspective) runs as follows104: because countries are unequally 
economically developed, and development has so far depended on greenhouse gas emitting 
activities, simply allocating equal emissions to each country (when the level of the 
emissions budget must now be set so extremely low) could “lock-in”105 this inequality. The 
“legitimate economic aspirations” of developing countries may be threatened; not because 
development always requires high levels of emissions, but because of the scale and speed 
of the reductions that are  now needed106. The faster that poorer countries have to 
“decarbonize their economies”107, the more difficult it will be to do this whilst improving 
standards of living to alleviate poverty.  For the latter typically requires “a vast expansion 
of energy services” to provide e.g. “clean cooking fuels  to escape the epidemic of severe 
respiratory illness in poor households... electricity... to treat and pump fresh drinking 
water”108, and will make the process of decarbonisation even more challenging109. 
Crucially, for Baer et al, “the equal sharing of almost-exhausted resources is not equitable” 
and a global agreement should ensure that those already wealthy countries contribute 
sufficiently to global mitigation efforts so that “global emergency mobilization [i.e. in 
reducing emissions] can proceed without stifling development in the South”110. Countries 
that can “pay” should pay, then, if we care about the prospects for reducing global 
inequality or alleviating poverty once emissions limits are in place. The Capacity principle 
could accordingly distribute emissions unequally, so that less developed countries could 
receive higher than average emissions allowances111 to allow them to develop112 whilst they 
104 Adapted from the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework, Baer et al, 2008 
105 Baer et al, 2008, p27. 
106 Baer et al highlight that even if all remaining emissions space were ceded to non-industrialised countries, 
“the dramatic emission reductions demanded by the climate crisis would still require the developing countries 
to urgently decarbonize their economies.”
107 Baer et al, 2008, p27.
108 Baer et al, 2008, p37
109 Baer et al, 2008, p27. Additionally, what Baer et al do not mention here, but which is more widely 
acknowledged is that poorer countries will also have to deal with disproportionately harmful impacts of 
DACC, which, as I have argued in chapter 2 section 4, we are already experiencing and some further levels 
of which are unfortunately now inevitable. Whilst I do not deal directly with adaptation issues in this thesis, 
this is nonetheless an additional pressure on the Capacity of poorer countries.
110 Baer et al, 2008, p27
111 Recalling that these would still be massively lower than the “business-as-usual” emissions of poorer 
countries without a cap – see footnote 106. 
112 The idea of “development” has been subject to much criticism in so far as it often substitutes for 
unrestrained economic growth. However, Baer et al are clear that 'development' should be understood not be 
understood this way, but as “the satisfaction of fundamental needs in a manner that frees people from 
vulnerability and deprivation of poverty and makes possible a decent level of security and well-being.” (Baer 
et al, 2008, p39)
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make the transition; wealthier countries, given their greater capacity would have lower 
than average allowances.
There are some concerns with this argument as it stands. Firstly, one might contest whether 
richer countries would in fact have a greater capacity than the the poorest countries to 
reduce to absolutely lower levels of emissions. Given the scale and speed of the reductions 
needed, other challenges would be presented by having to dismantle and realign a  large 
existing infrastructure designed around fossil-fuel use; in effect, it would require industrial 
countries to achieve a a zero carbon transition in a much shorter timescale, and there may 
be limits to how quickly this could be achieved113 . Whilst this constraint must be 
recognised, equally, some middle-income countries such as China have significant high-
emitting industrial infrastructure; this challenge would therefore not be restricted to the 
wealthiest countries. Secondly, the development of poorer countries that Baer et al point to 
as requiring “a vast expansion of energy services” could, in theory, proceed with low or 
zero emission technologies114. The barrier to this may be, rather, that developing these 
alternatives requires additional resources, technology or financial support, rather than 
higher emissions permits (than under EPCAs – as suggested, it would still require a 
significant reduction from “Business-As-Usual” emissions). 
But how far either concern holds is an empirical question: they give no reason to assume 
that a Capacity principle would in either case coincide with equal allowances alone. I 
therefore suggest understanding the Capacity principle as advocating either unequal 
distribution of emissions (in so far as this is necessary to prevent 'lock-in' of global 
inequality) or supplementing equal allocations by payments from rich to poor nations as 
well as other resource and technology transfers, to enable the latter to switch to develop 
low carbon infrastructure. In fact, the latter is broadly implied by Baer et al, since they 
envisage the trading of allowances115; this means that, in effect, richer countries would fund 
some emissions reductions in poorer countries in addition to steep domestic cuts116.
113 See chapter 2, section 2.4 regarding how the 'possibility' of this occurring should be understood.
114 For example, non-electric water pumps.
115 Not least because Baer et al's calculations of emissions allocations which take account of  both capacity 
and responsibility give some richer countries negative emissions, which (barring geo-engineering alluded to 
in chapter 2 section 4 as problematic) would be impossible to achieve.
116 Indeed, they make clear that this “exists by design”, Baer et al, 2008, p71
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What is yet unclear is the view of equality is being held from an ethical perspective. I 
therefore now consider each of the main positions on equality117 and explain the problems I 
believe they encounter. Prima facie, each could be held to justify the principle of Capacity 
in a way that they could not justify ‘Equal Allowances’. However, not all adequately 
capture the moral instincts behind the principle.
4.2 Resources view of Capacity. 
A resources view of equality might be thought to underlie a principle of Capacity by taking 
total resources - rather than simply ‘emissions space’ –  to be the relevant equalisandum. 
Capacity would then be understood as total wealth, or income (per capita), and the 
differences between industrialised and developing countries seen as differences in the 
quantity of resources possessed.  Distributing emissions allowances according to capacity 
might then be a way to move towards equality of total resources (say, by making 
allowances inversely proportional to wealth), and to take account of possessions by some 
countries of resources other than “emissions space” in distributing the latter. However, this 
does not accurately reflect the force of the capacity argument expressed earlier. It does not 
provide a clear idea of how to take account of existing resources – given that one cannot in 
any case achieve equality of total resources in an agreement specifically about climate 
change mitigation. 
Rather, as considered in section 3.3 through the rice-water scenario, the relevance of 
inequalities in other resources seem primarily to be that they do not enable emissions 
allowances themselves to be used equally as a resource. But in this case, the moral thrust of 
the argument is then directed towards the function of emissions allowances; what they are 
used for – i.e. for development and increasing standards of living. This reflects the problem 
of value that was considered in 3.1, that, as economist Amartya Sen has similarly 
suggested, “The usefulness of wealth lies in the things that it allows us to do”118. Whereas, 
to adopt a ‘resources’ perspective locates the value of a resource in its possession, rather 
than the ends it is used for. There remains the problem (section 3.2, i.) of the gap between 
117 I.e. positions on the ‘equality of what’ debate.
118 Sen, 1999, p14
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possession of resources and their useful ends, a relationship that can vary depending on 
ability, knowledge, social practice, and environmental circumstance, for example.119
These concerns imply a welfare-based position; that capacity should be understood not 
simply in terms of wealth or income possessed, but the welfare level or standard of living 
that is and can be attained.  
4.3 Subjective Welfare view of Capacity. 
It might seem reasonable instead to adopt some version of the ‘subjective welfare’ view, 
and judge a country’s ‘capacity’ to adjust to a particular emissions level in terms of the 
level of subjective welfare that would be achieved by its inhabitants. Variations of a 
‘subjective welfare’ approach try to take account of the different preferences that people 
hold, and their varying ‘utility functions’ – that different goods, or different amounts of 
goods will be experienced differently. This then understands well-being in terms of utility, 
pleasure or happiness, and the relevant ‘equalisandum’ according to which resources 
should be distributed. However, it is hard to see how, especially in an international context, 
one could relate happiness to emissions use in a useful way. Even setting aside the 
problems surrounding interpersonal comparisons of subjective welfare, it does not seem 
promising to try to establish a relationship between emissions use and an overall subjective 
state of mind that depends on so many other factors. 
Firstly, the relationship could clearly not be a direct one. That is, it cannot be assumed that 
increases in emissions use also increase happiness, and that less wealthy countries should 
be given extra emissions because they are less happy. For a little reflection reveals this is 
not the case in any straightforward way; it is not the emissions use itself that increases 
happiness. One can imagine many activities that could require emissions use that will make 
people less happy, for example, an high emitting coal-powered torture chamber, not to 
mention very real scenarios such as DACC. Rather, if there were to be a link between 
emissions use and, say, happiness, it would depend on the activity concerned, the way that 
the emissions allowance is used and individual perceptions. 
119 Baer et al, 2008 make this kind of point; “Capacity reflects wealth...the portion of national wealth that can 
reasonably be tapped to respond to the climate crisis. But all wealth is not equal. Its definition must be 
reconciled with the right to development” (p45, my emphasis).
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At the same time, there is some sort of correlation between emissions use and happiness. If 
there was no desire for the (short term) ‘benefits’ brought by fossil fuel use which clearly 
exist – quick, cheap, easy energy that allows goods and people to travel vast distances very 
quickly, replace manual tasks with automatic processes, etc. – then we would not be in the 
dire situation that we now face. However, research on world ‘happiness’ indices have 
looked at the relationship between overall ‘happiness’ and per capita GDP and 
consumption levels120 (the latter two, as mentioned in chapter 1, are currently tied to 
emissions levels121). These kinds of studies suggest that, in fact, happiness depends on 
various cultural expectations and, above a certain minimum level, does not always increase 
as income rises. There are a multitude of ways that people can be happy irrespective of 
resources used, and it seems reasonable to assume that this will be true of high or low 
emissions use. In fact, there are reasons to believe that (beyond a certain minimum, at 
least) higher emissions use will in general make people less happy, because of, for 
example, DACC, air quality, the impact of readily available energy on transport use that 
replaces healthy activities like walking and cycling, and so on.
So it does not seem correct to suppose even a general indirect relationship between 
emissions use and happiness, even if many people currently have a preference for high-
emitting activities. But it might appear unnecessary in any case to establish a fixed 
relationship between happiness and emissions use in the first place. The Capacity principle, 
understood according to an equality of subjective welfare position would instead seek to 
distribute emissions in so far as they do in fact contribute towards an equal level of 
happiness. However, there is something worrying about this way of characterising welfare. 
For locating the value of emissions distribution in entirely subjective characteristics such 
as happiness or preference satisfaction will depend on existing mental states. And, if we 
acknowledge the existence of endogenous rather than fixed preferences, our happiness and 
personal preferences are based, in part at least, on what one is used to, on “mental 
conditioning”122, to borrow a phrase from Sen.  In particular, regarding the case of 
emissions distribution, it could well be used to justify the ‘grandfathering’ of emissions – 
i.e. distribution of emissions in proportion to their current distribution between countries, 
120 For example, the New Economic Foundation’s “Happy Planet Index” and the World Values survey, 
summarised in BBC articles (2006) and (2003) respectively. 
121 See Meyer, 2000, p28, cited in chapter 1, section 3.2
122 Sen, 1999, p62
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since, for example, inhabitants of richer countries are used to a more emissions-expensive 
lifestyle than poorer countries, and their tastes and preference expectations will reflect this. 
This emphasises the very real problems of the classic “expensive tastes” argument in the 
equality literature. These should not be ignored since, as Sen has argued in a development 
context, it seems “deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived”123, and would 
justify largely maintaining the status quo, no matter how deep the inequalities. There also 
appears to be a circularity in this welfare approach that undermines the normative task. 
That is, an appropriate understanding of an equitable distribution is being sought, but if this 
is done in terms of preference satisfaction or other entirely subjective criteria, these are 
based themselves on the existing distribution. It seems reasonable to require that, just as 
tastes should be altered to reflect other moral criteria (i.e. we do not pander to people with 
a penchant for torture), tastes and lifestyles should be expected to adapt to lower level of 
resource use.  This means that some kind of prior, normative conception of welfare is 
required in order to assess a country’s “Capacity” for emissions limits. 
4.4 Objective welfare view of Capacity
I now consider how it might be possible to understand the principle of “Capacity” as 
grounded in an approach to equality that sees objective welfare as the moral bearer of 
value. If it is determined what kinds of welfare are valuable to possess, then emissions 
could be distributed on the basis of the welfare they will contribute to, and the kinds of 
welfare felt to be right that people hold equally. The most obvious counter is typified by 
Arneson's objection that “perfectionist”124 approaches assume that the same goals in life 
will apply for all. This can be the case with standard ‘needs’ based approaches to objective 
welfare which understand needs too directly in terms of particular resources. I will turn to 
these possible limitations with a 'needs' approach in section 5.1, although I also consider 
there a possible conception of ‘needs’ that is similar to the ‘capabilities’ approach 
discussed below. This could form a plausible alternative conception of objective welfare 
for understanding capacity, but I focus here on ‘capabilities’ because it is unclear how far 
this understanding of ‘need’ would offer an improvement on the ‘capabilities’ view. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Arneson, 1990, p197
174
I turn now to an approach that I see as offering roughly the kind of framework required for 
objective welfare; the ‘capabilities’ approach, first put forward by Amartya Sen125. The 
version that I outline here is my understanding of Sen’s position, although other readings 
may differ and there are further variations on ‘Capabilities’ (such as the work of Martha 
Nussbaum126). I think this promising, but not without difficulties. I suggest towards the end 
of this section how I think Sen's approach would need to be altered to constitute a more 
appropriate conception of objective welfare from a Green Economic perspective and for 
international climate policy.
Sen’s approach understands welfare not in terms of mental states or resources, but in terms 
of the ability to do or be certain things. Capabilities are:
“alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for [a person] to 
achieve”
And the ‘functionings’ we are able to ‘achieve’ are not passive states, but; 
“the various things a person may value doing or being”127 
Examples might be ‘being free from disease’ or ‘taking part in community life’128. In other 
words, capabilities are freedoms to function in different ways that are valuable to human 
flourishing. It is, Sen claims, a “freedom centred perspective” similar to “the common 
concern with quality of life”129 
Caution is needed, I suggest, about how this is understood as an approach to equality, and 
an ‘answer’ to the ‘equality of what?’ question. Firstly, capabilities will depend in part on 
resource use (although they are by no means exhausted by it). They include the resources 
that people may have at their disposal, since “income… has an enormous influence on 
what we can or cannot do”130 Capabilities should not, then, be seen as simply the ‘space’ 
between resources and welfare.
125 See Sen, 1999
126 See Nussbaum, 2000
127 Sen, 1999, p74-5
128 Sen, 1999, p75.
129 Ibid.
130 Sen, 1999, p72.
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Secondly, it is not enough to simply consider ‘capabilities’ as the equalisandum itself, as 
though they can be combined into a distinct, single magnitude that could be equalised. As 
Sen points out, there are multiple capabilities we might think of as constitutive of a good 
quality of life, which cannot be combined into one ‘magnitude’ such as utility. “The 
capability perspective is inescapably pluralist”, he says – in that there is a “Heterogeneity 
of factors that influence individual advantage”131.  Inequalities in standard of living can be 
judged differently depending on which functionings are being considered. And some 
functionings may be considered more important than others, and it will be a question of 
evaluation and debate as to which functionings are more important. This requires what I 
would call an objective conception of welfare, although the process for developing the 
conception need not be seen as rigid, as equivalent to the a ‘discovery’ of a ‘hidden’ truth. 
It is, for Sen, an irreducibly judgemental exercise requiring continual reasoned social 
evaluation. 
There is, clearly, a dilemma as to the level of specifity of capabilities in an international, 
multi-cultural context. Too concrete, and they will arguably be too culture-specific; too 
general and open to interpretation and they will fail to be useful in offering a conception of 
welfare that can guide international policy and, in particular, resource distribution. 
Although some cultural diversity must surely be allowed for, if we lean too far towards a 
more general framing of capabilities it will fail to be sufficiently normative because it risks 
collapsing back into a form of subjective welfare. For example, if one advocates an equal 
capability to nourish oneself, societies that view meat-eating as essential to nourishment 
will require far higher emissions allocations than those that are predominantly vegetarian. 
I would therefore not advocate interpretations of ‘capabilities’ that see them as entirely 
morally ‘neutral’ between conceptions of the good, in the Rawlsian, liberal sense132. For we 
must surely, particularly with in the case of DACC and recognition of the limits to (at least, 
emissions) growth, revise our ideas of a morally acceptable lifestyle in terms of treading 
more lightly on the earth. There will be some (ecologically risky) practices that should not 
be allowed for.133 
131 Sen, 1999, p76
132 It is not clear to me what position Sen takes on this, though this is the interpretation I would hope to be 
correct, if ‘capabilities’ are not just to face the same problems of subjective welfare.
133 This is analogous to the idea that, as I suggested in 4.3, morally acceptable lifestyles already exclude those 
that, for example, cause other kinds of harm, such as torture. The issue, of course, in our emissions case is 
that it is not clear in advance of further discussion how expensive these practices would need to be to be 
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This will therefore require an appropriate balance between the two concerns, through a 
process of research, negotiation and international debate, as has had to occur with 
formulating, for example, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This kind of difficulty does not present itself in the same 
way to Sen, since he understands capabilities within the context of a particular society, for 
that society to determine through “public discussion and a democratic understanding and 
acceptance”134. Nussbaum’s approach may seem preferable in this sense, since she outlines 
ten “central functional human capabilities”135, which are specifically conceived as cross-
cultural136. However, the specific capabilities would need further consideration and 
development with regards to whether they are adequate to express those capabilities which 
may be threatened by an inadequate zero-carbon transition. Her approach is also 
problematic in so far as it is broadly 'sufficientarian' and ambivalent about inequalities 
beyond these basic capabilities, as considered below. 
Further ethical, philosophical consideration would be required to consider how this 
‘balance’ can be achieved. There is not space to develop such content here, but it is worth 
highlighting another very important way in which the capabilities approach would need to 
be amended. This is that, as framed by Sen at least, there seem to be unlimited capabilities 
which could potentially be  met, in the sense of freedoms to do or be certain things. 
However, a green approach to well-being would also need to embrace the concept of 
'enough'; that, in contrast to the conventional economic understanding of “homo 
economicus” highlighted by Daly and Cobb137 and outlined in Chapter 1, humans should 
not be conceived as having unlimited wants and desires, but capable of satiety and 
fulfillment. This is partly important within the context of ecological limits, and the 
impossibility of unlimited material growth considered in chapter 1, section 3.1, because 
“once we recognise the imperative of sustainability we must draw conclusions about 
morally acceptable levels of consumption”138. 
deemed morally unacceptable because this is itself partly determined by the idea of an equitable share. But 
this grey area merely highlights the need for that discussion to take place; the point still holds that in general, 
minimising ecological impact should be considered as a relevant moral limitation on lifestyle. And practices 
will be less grey the more emissions expensive they are and the less important the capability. 
134 Sen, 1999, p79
135 Nussbaum, 2001, p54
136 Nussbaum, 2001, p53
137 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p85
138 Scott-Cato, 1999, p44
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Accordingly, Meadows et al, suggest, the world should adopt a “definition of enough”139, 
where people “establish their status, derive satisfaction, and challenge themselves with 
goals other than ever-increasing production and ever-accumulating material wealth”140. But 
the concept of “enough” is also recognised as important by green thinkers because, as 
alluded to earlier141, research has suggested that “beyond a certain level of growth, human 
well-being clearly declines”142. There is, therefore, a distinction between “frugality” and 
“poverty”143. Rawls also recognised this, arguing that only a certain degree of accumulation 
is necessary for “the full realization of just institutions and the fair value of liberty”, that 
“It is a mistake to believe that a just and good society must wait upon a high material 
standard of life... great wealth is not required. In fact, beyond some point it is more likely 
to be a positive hindrance, a meaningless distraction at best if not a temptation to 
indulgence and emptiness”144.  The level that is required is what Read has called “rich 
subsistence”.145
However, my position here is different to the “sufficientarian” position. Sufficientarianism, 
as Page highlights, requires that “as many people as possible should have enough to pursue 
the aims and aspirations they affirm”146. It has in common with my position that “Having 
enough.. is not the same as living a bearable life... Rather it involves a person leading a life 
that contains no substantial distress or dissatisfaction.” However, briefly, it differs in two 
ways. Firstly, it is sufficiency rather than equality that is important, so that “If everyone 
had enough it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others.”147. 
Whereas I am suggesting that wealth beyond this point is not only unnecessary but 
ecologically, socially and psychologically detrimental. In section 5.2. I also consider why 
relative deprivation is itself harmful to well-being148.  Secondly, neither are sufficientarians 
139 Meadows et al, 2005, p11 & chapter 7, especially p238-240
140 Meadows et al, 2005, p240
141 Section 4.3 (research relating GDP to happiness).
142 Scott-Cato, 1999, p42
143 Scott-Cato, 1999, p44
144 Rawls, 1972, p290. However, Rawls does not integrate this insight into the main body of his theory of 
justice, which fails to recognise the implications of limits to growth, as Read, 2011, has argued.
145 Dr Rupert Read (personal conversation).
146 Page, 2006, p85
147 This is similarly true of Nussbaum's alternative understanding of “basic capabilities”, which, as it stands, 
is broadly sufficientarian in that, as Page suggests, “Inequalities above the point where all have enough of all 
capabilities are not dealt with” (Page, 2006, p69). 
148 Although oddly, Page considers the literature on the harmfulness of relative inequality to imply not that 
relative inequality should be avoided, but that one should be suspicious of equality itself because of 
psychological harms associated with the “preoccupation with comparative economic wealth and status”. 
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concerned with inequality below the level of sufficiency; the concern, as Page emphasises, 
is that “as many people as possible” should have enough. Whereas I have been considering 
a position of “equality of objective welfare” up to the point of sufficiency.
4.5 Application to ‘Capacity’ as principle of equity.
I now outline how the ‘capabilities’ approach could be generally applied to the current 
context as a way to understand the ‘Capacity’ principle. It would, then, judge the ‘capacity’ 
of a country to make emissions reductions in terms of the comparable effects of an 
emissions allowance on the standard of living. And ‘standard of living’ would be 
understood not simply in terms of resources, but objective welfare; the actual capabilities 
to function in different valuable ways which are affected by emissions reductions. For 
example, emissions are a by-product of energy production or energy use for various 
activities ranging from keeping warm and cooking food to manufacture, transportation, etc; 
in fact, they are embodied in most activities in industrialised countries, because of the 
dependence of our economic system on fossil fuel use. So our current ‘functionings’, from 
‘being warm’ to ‘being able to travel far’ are dependent on them. Of course, since it is not 
the resources themselves that matter, but the capabilities achievable that constitute human 
flourishing, if these can be achieved in different ways, that do not rely so heavily on 
emissions activities, then lowering emissions need not also lower achievable functionings. 
And this is indeed the case. Energy can be gained from lower or zero-emissions sources 
such as renewables and through changes to activities to lower the amount of energy spent 
on them, through improved efficiency, lowering distance travelled, and similar measures. 
The question for the Capacity principle, and what seems to be at the heart of Baer et al's 
concern with “developmental equity”149, is what will be the effect on standard of living – 
on people’s capabilities - if the country they inhabit has to lower emissions to any 
particular level in a given time period? And how would a similar level of emissions in a 
poorer country affect its standard of living? In general terms, those living in an 
industrialised country can afford to make many quicker, deeper changes to their economic 
(Page, 2006, p87, my emphasis). Whilst the preoccupation may be harmful, surely what is problematic here 
is not the idea of equality but the fetishism of wealth and accumulation set up as an aspiration. This precisely 
depends on inequality, since one can only acquire economic status relative to the lesser wealth of others; it is 
'positional', as Hirsch argues (Hirsch, 1976, p52).
149 Baer & Athanisiou, 2007b, p31
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activities to lower emissions over time to extremely low levels and affect the functionings 
available to them – their capabilities – in more minor ways, compared to poorer countries. 
The kinds of things it would mean are, for example, importing far less food from abroad, 
travelling less, consuming less, and associated economic changes to job patterns, shifts in 
industry, business and agriculture150. Whilst this would certainly restrict people’s capability 
sets, it would not necessarily impact on more fundamental functionings, such as ability to 
stay healthy, achieve bodily comfort, and so on, because of the ability to invest in low 
emissions technology and initiate other socio-economic changes to support these 
functionings through other means.
But for poorer countries who currently have a far lower standard of living, they would face 
the double task of making the investment to shift to non-emitting economic activities but 
also improving their standard of living  - developing their ‘capability set” to lift themselves 
out of poverty. To make the change to alternative energy sources and alternative means of 
improving standards of living requires an initial energy investment. To sustain and 
improve levels of capability (i.e. to continue to develop) and make this transition so that 
these capabilities operate in non-emitting ways, poorer countries may require an initially 
higher allocation of emissions than under equal-per-capita allowances151, or other kinds of 
support – finance, technology, knowledge-transfer. Under a global equal per capita 
allowance alone, given the size of reductions now needed, poorer countries may not have 
the capacity to do both, placing far more basic capabilities under threat. 
Assessing policies on emissions distribution according to “Capacity” on a capabilities 
view, would, to summarise, mean considering how far the distribution of emissions 
allowances enables a country’s inhabitants to attain certain relevant functionings on that 
allowance. This could either be accommodated by giving higher emissions allocations to 
countries with lower capacity, or through their equal allocations being supplemented with 
transfer of other forms of support and resources152 that would  allow the transition to take 
place and allow for the development of equal capabilities (/standard of living) through low-
emitting means. As suggested in 4.1, how far either is the case is a broadly empirical 
question, requiring knowledge of the political, economic and social organisation and the 
industrial infrastructure of different countries.
150 See e.g. the Zero-Carbon Britain report  (Helweg-Larsen & Bull, 2007)
151 Baer et al, 2008, p27 
152 Although I argue against one potential mechanism for this, carbon trading, in chapter 4. 
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However, I do not suggest that such a principle should be implemented directly and 
literally in an international mitigation agreement with a view to exactly equalising between 
countries all capabilities affected by emitting activity. This would be prohibitively 
complex, and, given that capabilities and standard of living more broadly depend on many 
other factors and take time to be developed, suggests that such an attempt would not be 
meaningful, even in theory. Rather, policies should be assessed and developed with 
Capacity (and the value of objective well-being) in mind as the aim guiding equity; for any 
distribution of emissions entitlements between countries, it should be borne in mind what 
impacts it could have on the prospects for equal objective well-being/capabilities, now and 
in the future, based on an understanding of the scale of the transition challenge in different 
areas of the world. Here a balance must be struck between ethics and pragmatism / 
simplicity153 in working out how far these concerns should affect emissions entitlements. 
I have tried here to cover the main reasons why I believe that the capabilities approach 
offers a promising “objective welfare” understanding of the principle of Capacity as an 
equitable principle for emissions distribution. However, as mentioned earlier, capabilities 
are not the only possible interpretation of an objective welfare position which I have 
argued we need to adopt. A further position is offered through the concept of ‘needs’, 
which is also directly appealed to in the (related) fourth possible principle of equity, ‘Basic 
Needs’. It is to this principle I shall now turn. I suggest in section 5 that ‘needs’ may offer 
a reasonable alternative version of objective welfare to ‘capabilities’ (i.e. an alternative 
equalisandum), although it is unclear how distinct this would be from the approach to 
capabilities which I have suggested. However, I also explain my concerns with the 
prioritarian formulation of the ‘Basic Needs’ conception of equity which is distinct from 
the egalitarian basis for the Capacity principle.
5. Basic Needs
Distribution according to ‘Basic needs’ could be considered an equally reasonable 
contender for a justifiable principle of equity for emissions distribution as Capacity. For, it 
153 This, arguably, is of procedural importance in ensuring the transparency and accountabiliy of policy, to 
ensure it is less susceptible to corruption. However, I do not focus on procedural issues here.
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considers equity within a resource-sharing framework (unlike ‘comparable effort’), and it 
offers a moral grounding for the distribution of emissions space (unlike ‘equal 
allowances’).
In particular, ‘basic needs’ could be seen as a similar kind of principle to the principle of 
Capacity in that it also distributes resources, broadly speaking, on the basis of standard of 
living, but with two differences:
i) It is more clearly positioned in the ‘equality of what’ debate as an objective 
welfare conception(whereas ‘Capacity’ is ambiguous), defining ‘needs’ as the 
relevant ‘equalisandum’, except that….
ii) It takes a prioritarian approach to i), in that it considers distribution of resources 
only in so far as the distribution allows some specified ‘basic’ levels of need to 
be met, rather than seeking equality as such above this level154.
Ignoring for the moment the prioritarian aspect (i.e. the “basic” of “Basic Needs”), I first 
consider i) – whether ‘needs’ offer an alternative, perhaps more obvious, conception of 
objective welfare to the ‘capabilities’ approach that I argued for in the previous section. It 
is important to emphasise that since this initial discussion is about the appropriate 
conception of objective welfare/the equalisandum, it is relevant both to Capacity and to 
Basic Needs, since I have argued in section 4 that Capacity should also be grounded in an 
equality of objective welfare position. I want to suggest why the ‘needs’ conception may 
hold some merit, as an alternative to “capabilities”.
5.1 “Needs” as an alternative version of objective welfare
The terminology of ‘need’ might seem a more familiar, far simpler way of describing 
standard of living. It would mean that emissions distribution would depend155 on the needs 
of the country that they will meet. The problem is that the standard interpretation of ‘need’ 
is in terms of resources156. To return briefly to the simple formula expressing the 
154 For full definition and discussion of prioritarianism, see 5.2
155 “Depend”, that is, either through a prioritarian (Basic Needs) approach or an egalitarian (Capacity) 
approach since it could apply to either.
156 See, e.g. “Basic Needs” entry (Paul Spicker) in Encyclopedia of International Development, Forsyth, 
2005; “A “basic needs” approach to development focuses on providing access to the minimum income or 
items necessary to ensure the continuation of healthy life”.
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relationship of resources and welfare, “A needs X in order to Y”, needs are ordinarily 
defined as the “X” in question, e.g. water and food. But this implies a stronger, necessary 
relationship between X and Y. The problem in the mitigation case is that it does not make 
sense to say this when the resource in question is emissions, since this would not make 
sense of moves away from emissions use.
As an example of the kind of ambiguity in meaning, I turn to Henry Shue, who argues in a 
similar vein to my arguments surrounding ‘Capacity’, that when distributing emissions 
allowances, we should consider what they are used for. He distinguishes between “luxury” 
and “survival” emissions; that proportion of emissions use that is used for ‘luxury’ 
activities, compared to those used for basic survival, such as agriculture; “some sources [of 
emissions] are essential and even urgent for the fulfillment of vital needs and other sources 
are inessential or even frivolous”157. Shue argues that developed countries should have to 
sacrifice their luxury emissions before developing countries should sacrifice their survival 
emissions158. 
In one sense this seems obviously fair159, and not disimilar to the capabilities approach to 
Capacity, except seen in terms of two categories of standard of living rather than a 
continuum. The difference here is that, because of the emphasis on the resource itself, it 
does not say anything about how we should or could use emissions. One might therefore 
conclude that because currently ‘survival’ related activities are currently dependent on a 
certain level of emissions, these emissions levels should always be maintained. But it is 
entirely possible, as has been argued earlier, that these emissions can be lowered whilst 
maintaining (or raising) this basic standard of living (e.g. through improved efficiency, 
alternative techniques, energy and so on). It is not that the emissions themselves are 
necessary for survival – it is that they currently are used for survival activities rather than 
luxury activities. There is therefore something very unsatisfactory about this conception of 
‘needs’.
157 Shue, 1993, p55
158 Indeed, this is sometimes how the Greenhouse Development Rights argument for Capacity is framed, e.g. 
Baer et al, 2008, p45.
159 In as far as it is an argument for considering the use of emissions, against “the principle of least-cost first”, 
Shue, 1993, p55.
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However, one could instead interpret ‘needs’ more in line with the capabilities approach – 
that is, in terms of defining certain ‘functionings’ vital to human flourishing. A more 
satisfying conception of basic needs along these lines is present, for example, in Doyal and 
Gough’s model.160 The ‘needs’ they outline in their theory are not tied to particular 
resources. Rather, they understand the 'objectivity' of 'basic human needs' through the 
conception of basic needs as the 'conditions necessary" for the "avoidance of serious 
harm",161 but harm conceived of in terms of "dramatically impaired [social] participation in 
a form of life".162 Thus they define two ‘basic needs’, ‘physical health’ and ‘autonomy’, 
which they describe largely in terms of an individual’s capacity. For example, lack of 
'physical health' is described in terms of illness that violates  one’s “perceived ability to 
participate” and renders them “functionally incapable of sustained participation in 
practice”.163 Similarly, for 'autonomy'; "individuals express their autonomy with reference 
to their capacity to formulate consistent aims and strategies", autonomy which varies with 
"understanding", "psychological capacity" ('mental health')164 and "opportunities" for 
"socially significant" action165. Indeed, they later point out that their "basic needs for 
physical health and autonomy are closely related to functionings"166 as understood by Sen.
Although the approach is clearly significantly different from Sen's in certain aspects - such 
as the description of only two, broadly conceived basic needs, compared to Sen's larger 
range of valuable functionings - these differences are not tied to the use of a 'needs' versus 
'capabilities' metric. Degree of specificity, as discussed in 4.5, will be an issue for 
conceptions of 'need' and 'capabilities' alike.
And Doyal and Gough draw attention to the theoretical similarities between their theory 
and Sen's 'capabilities' approach in terms of the role of resources and their cultural 
variability;
“While the basic individual needs for physical health and autonomy are 
universal, many goods and services required to satisfy these needs are 
160 Doyal & Gough, 1991.
161 Doyal & Gough, p50
162 Doyal & Gough, p55
163 Doyal & Gough, p57-8
164 Doyal & Gough, p60
165 Doyal & Gough, p66
166 Doyal & Gough, p156
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culturally variable... [these are] our basic needs 'satisfiers'. Basic needs, then, 
are always universal but their satisfiers are often relative. Sen has made a 
similar point in his analysis of poverty: 'Poverty is an absolute notion in the 
space of capabilities but very often it will take a relative form in the space of 
commodities or characteristics'... The existence of  basic needs or 
capabilities which are universal to all people is quite consistent in theory with 
a rich variety of ways in which they can be met and a wide variation in the 
quantity of satisfiers required to meet them”167
So, whilst I do not wish to analyse here the specific content of Doyal and Gough's theory 
of human need, I see no reason here why an approach of this sort could not potentially be 
taken in describing objective welfare (and, therefore, be used as a variant of the principle 
of Capacity). It would need, however, to take account of the kind of criticism made by Sen, 
that the concept of meeting ‘needs’ makes people “passive recipients of the fruits of 
cunning development programs”, whereas, “The people have to be seen as being actively 
involved… in shaping their own destiny”, which Sen argues is crucial to the idea of 
‘capabilities’168169. However, this would require further consideration elsewhere. If ‘needs’ 
were successfully reinterpreted along these lines, I do not then see that there is much to 
choose between the two positions of ‘needs’ and ‘capabilities’, in so far as we are 
considering the ‘equality of what’ question and providing interpretations of objective 
welfare for a principle of equity for emissions distribution. 
5.2 Basic Needs as a prioritarian version of Capacity. 
Since, therefore, both Capacity and Basic Needs could reasonably draw their conceptions 
of objective welfare from either ‘capabilities’ or ‘needs’ based approaches, the primary 
difference remaining between them is the issue outlined in ii) above. That is, that whereas 
Capacity is an egalitarian principle, the ‘basic needs’ position is prioritarian. It seeks to 
distribute emissions allowances so as to prioritise those who have not met a certain basic 
standard of living rather than seeking to remove relevant inequalities170 at all levels. 
167 Doyal & Gough, 1991, p155
168 Sen, 1999, p53.
169 Promisingly along these lines is Benton's understanding of “needs” as part of a “human welfare ecology”, 
which he frames as being active rather than passive; “satisfying and fulfilling work for convivial working 
relations and for democratic participation” (Benton, 1999, p227)
170 I.e. relevant to/dependent on use of emissions space
185
I allude here to a second major debate in the philosophical literature on equality; what 
Parfit has dubbed the ‘equality or priority’ debate171. Here, more specifically, a distinction 
is made between ‘strict egalitarians’ who require a reduction in relative deprivation and 
‘non-relational egalitarians’ – ‘prioritarians’ who require a reduction in absolute 
deprivation. For prioritarians, according to Parfit, when (re)distribution is being 
considered, “benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only because these people 
are at a lower absolute level”172. But strict egalitarians “are concerned with relativities: 
with how each person’s level compares with the level of other people”.
This debate cuts across the ‘equality of what’ debate. As noted by Clayton and Williams, 
the “equality of what” debate is common to both egalitarians and prioritarians173, in 
specifying “the conditions under which some individuals are worse off than others”. But 
the difference to policy regarding the ‘equality versus priority’ issue is that, 
prioritarianism, does not necessarily imply total equality of ones desired equalisandum, 
and may just imply less inequality. It will require that some minimum level (of welfare, 
resources, oppportunity) should be met for everyone as a priority for resource distribution.
However, I think that there are two ways that the prioritarian position might be interpreted 
from Parfit’s description, which will ultimately bear on how the ‘basic needs’ principle is 
interpreted. Parfit says that the prioritarian wants to prioritise the well-being of the worst-
off, “because these people are at a lower absolute level”. But what does ‘absolute’ mean, 
here? It could mean, it seems to me:
a) Consider the collection of people relevant to your distribution174. Decide, of these 
(according to your answer to the ‘equality of what’ question), who is the worst-off, 
and whoever this is, they should receive priority in distributing resources175. 
b) Define a list of criteria (according to your answer to the ‘equality of what’ 
question) that defines what it means to be badly off, or in poverty (e.g. less than a 
171 Parfit, 1995. As noted earlier, Page calls this the “shape” of justice, Page, 2006, p51
172 Parfit, 1995. p104
173 Clayton and Williams, 2002, p8.  
174 I refer to ‘collection of people’ for the moment so as not to complicate things by trying to account for 
inequality within countries as well as between countries. 
175 Rawls’ ‘maximin’ principle (extended at a global level by Pogge, 1989) would be a variation on this. 
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dollar a day, no access to clean water, being unable to be bodily nourished). 
Whoever, in the collection of people, meets these criteria qualifies as the ‘worst-
off’ group. NB: this group could theoretically be 'empty', in a wealthy society.176 
This latter view has some similarities to but is distinct from a further 
“sufficientarian position”, which I do not consider here, since it straightforwardly 
rejects equality as important177.
To explain the difference between these two interpretations (and between these and a strict 
egalitarian position), one can imagine, for simplicity’s sake, that the relevant 
‘equalisandum’ has been decided and that this will be measured in numerical units. 
Suppose the following two alternative scenarios exist:
Scenario 1: Group A Group B
10 units 2 units
Scenario 2: Group A Group B
20 units 3 units
According to Parfit’s description, given this choice, the strict egalitarian, concerned with 
the relative wealth levels, will opt for scenario 1, because the inequality between groups A 
and B is of 8 units, rather than 17 units. But what will the prioritarian choose? Prioritarians 
in interpretation a) (henceforth, ‘PrioritarianA)’ will opt for scenario 2, because even 
though the equality gap is larger, Group B (the worst-off group) receive more units of well-
being. It can also be seen here why interpretation a) might seem to fit Parfit’s description 
176 I do not think that it is clear which version of Prioritarianism is closest to Rawls’ Difference Principle, and 
for this reason I do not consider this here, but I argue elsewhere (Read & Makoff, 2008)  that Rawls’ 
Difference Principle should collapse into a form of strict egalitarianism.
177 As alluded to in section 4.4, sufficientarianism, as Page understands it, considers equality to be irrelevant 
so long as people “have enough”, since, according to a leading advocate, Frankfurt, “If everyone had enough 
it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others” (Frankfurt, cited in Page, 2006, 
p86). This therefore also differs from what I have called “PrioritarianB”. Page argues that Sufficientarianism 
requires “as many people as possible” to have “enough”. Assuming a sufficiency threshold of 50 units, this 
would lead sufficientarians to prefer a  “half at 60, half at 45” scenario, than a “half at 49, half at 46” scenario 
which is more equal, but where no-one quite has a sufficient level (p86). Whereas, PrioritarianB would give 
priority to those worst-off below the threshold, since their absolute wealth is lower. Additionally, I have 
conceived of PrioritarianB as defining a threshold that delineates those in poverty, whereas Page highlights 
that Frankfurt's sufficientarianism conceives of “Having enough” not in terms of “living a bearable life”, but 
“leading a life that contains no substantial distress or dissatisfaction”; so the threshold would be located 
differently in the two cases.
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of prioritarians as focusing on “absolute” poverty; for in scenario 1, Group B are, in 
absolute terms, poorer than in scenario 2.
What about prioritarians under interpretation b) (henceforth, ‘PrioritarianB’)? This will 
depend on the level at which ‘being badly off’ is defined. If the poverty level is set at 2 
units or over, prioritarians under b) will also prefer scenario 2. For suppose the poverty 
level is set at 2.5. Then Group B in scenario 1 will be below the poverty level, and in 
scenario 2, they will be above it – scenario 2 is then preferable. However, if the poverty 
level is set at under 2 units, PrioritarianB will not have anything to say, morally speaking. 
For if what is morally relevant to distribution is attaining some pre-determined minimal 
standard of living, say, 1 unit, then in both scenarios, group B is above this level178. 
It is not clear to me which interpretation Parfit wants to take. Both interpretations could be 
taken to consider ‘absolute’ poverty – PrioritarianA because what matters is the absolute 
allocation of the worst-off group in comparison to their allocation under some other 
distribution, and PrioritarianB because the level of being ‘worst-off’ is fixed, absolutely. 
But in the case of emissions distribution, there are implications for how ‘basic needs’ 
might be understood as a principle. For, PrioritarianA will, given the zero-sum nature of 
the resource in question, collapse in practice into a strict egalitarian position, and ‘basic 
needs’ would, if understood according to PrioritarianA as ‘the most basic needs’, likewise 
become equivalent to the principle of ‘capacity’ (simply expressed and motivated 
differently). PrioritarianB, on the other hand does not seem morally or pragmatically 
satisfying, since it leaves open distributive issues once (and if) pre-determined basic 
needs/capabilities are met. I shall briefly explain why.
Beginning with PrioritarianA, it should be remembered that the difference in practice 
between this and strict egalitarianism is where there is a possibility that the worst-off group 
might receive increased absolute welfare, but the inequality gap would widen (and 
therefore, that relative poverty would increase). However, this is only possible if it is 
assumed that the total sum of resource to distribute can grow. But with emissions space, as 
with any finite natural resource, this is not the case (and in fact the total sum of resource 
will shrink as we lower the emissions cap). The situation will simply not arise where 
supporters of PrioritarianA could opt for an increased absolute welfare level where there 
178 In this regard, PrioritarianB is identical to sufficientarianism.
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would be increased inequality (and therefore higher relative poverty), since this would 
imply an increase in the amount of resources. The only way to allocate more resources to 
the worst-off is to give less to others – which also decreases inequality. 
Seen in this way, ‘basic needs’ could be seen as predominantly a strategy for achieving 
distribution according to ‘Capacity’, and equality of objective welfare. One begins with a 
collection of people, and a fixed amount of emissions to distribute. The worst-off group is 
then defined according to those with the lowest level of need satisfaction (or equivalent 
welfare measure) and they are allocated sufficient emissions (and/or alternative support) to 
allow them to reach above this level. What happens to the remaining emissions, once 
enough have been allocated to ensure basic needs of this worst-off group have been 
met?179. In this case there is a new ‘worst-off’ group (which may or may not contain 
members of the previous ‘worst-off’ group). The same rule would then presumably be 
applied in allocating sufficient emissions to them to lift them from their ‘worst-off’ 
position, in priority to allocating emissions to better off groups whose welfare level is 
significantly higher. And so on. At some point, emissions allocations run out; or at least, 
we risk not having sufficient emissions to prevent other groups from becoming ‘worst-off’ 
themselves. But at this point, the ‘strict egalitarian’ would also stop redistributing; it is, 
because of the zero-sum nature of the resource, as close to a position of equality (of 
objective welfare) that can be achieved with this resource180.
It seems, therefore, that if ‘basic needs’ is understood according to PrioritarianA as looking 
at improving the most basic needs, then (in addition to what was argued under 5.1) it 
becomes equivalent to Capacity. However, perhaps it might be thought that PrioritarianA 
would not still be equivalent to ‘Capacity’ in practice. Possible reasons could include that 
even if the total amount of the initial resource we are distributing is fixed, the benefits that 
one could gain from this would not be ‘zero-sum’, because the possible benefits might 
grow (as, for example, new skills develop, practices are made more efficient, etc). I do not 
examine further these concerns, but I consider reasons for doubting this elsewhere181. But 
179 We should remember, of course, that the measure of standard of living is not, as in the simplified scenarios 
above, the same measure as the resource being distributed; as I argued in section 4, whilst we are distributing 
is emissions, what we consider as standard of living is the objective welfare (capabilities) that is supported by 
this resource.
180 I say ‘as close to’ because the strict egalitarian(and likewise the prioritarian), if following my approach, 
would not seek to equalise(or prioritise) the resource itself, but the objective welfare that is supported by it, 
and this depends on resources other than, and factors other than, emissions allocations.
181 For a fuller discussion see Read & Makoff, 2008.
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even if this were the case, Prioritarian A will still be subject to the following concern 
affecting PrioritarianB.
This concern is that applying PrioritarianB to the case of emissions distribution would, for 
example, require allocating emissions (and other forms of support) to countries in such a 
way that all countries could meet a predefined level of basic needs (or basic capabilities), 
but would not require that inequalities in standard of living above this basic level be 
accounted for. And PrioritarianB seems to be closer to the version of prioritarianism 
behind ‘Basic Needs’ as a principle of equity for climate change mitigation. For the ‘basic 
needs’ principle in mitigation discussions does not offer the potential to look at the worst-
off ‘iteratively’ but seeks either to define a threshold poverty level, below which ‘basic 
needs’ are not being met182, or to define ‘essential’ uses for emissions183. 
But in this case, unlike for the principles considered so far, it will then have to address the 
question, as Shue puts it, of “from whom” we ‘take’ the extra emissions and extra 
resources that are used to ensure basic needs of other countries.184 One response could be, 
“from those with the highest capacity”, but this would require appealing to a further 
principle of equality, rather than priority. For, if there are countries with varying capacities 
above the threshold for ‘basic needs’ and the Prioritarian concern is to meet needs below 
some absolute level, then there is no moral difference in the variations between the others. 
It would be hard, I believe, to offer a convincing argument that there is no morally 
significant difference between distribution strategies above this level, when taking equally 
from countries barely surviving and those with the highest levels of wealth would impact 
far more heavily on the capabilities/ standard of living of those of a lower capacity. But 
whatever one’s instinct on this, the primary concern here is that PrioritarianB, and 
associated ‘Basic Needs’ approach, is morally silent above this level, and would need 
supplementing via a further principle.185
182 For example, the Greenhouse Development Rights' “development threshold”, Baer et al, 2008, p41-44
183 Shue, 1993, p42-43
184 Shue, 1993, p50 distinguishes between “to whom” and “from whom” questions in theories of distributive 
justice. But, I suggest, with principles such as Capacity, and Equal Entitlements, the two will never become 
separated -they are contained within the principle. The questions become separate for Shue because he takes 
a prioritarian approach, considering a particular group of “victims” (p53) (i.e. those who are harmed by 
pollution, or those below a certain standard of living). In such a case, Shue's distinction is indeed useful, 
because it highlights the importance of the “from whom” issue which may well be overlooked by prioritarian 
approaches.
185 Of course, in practice, because the level of the cap must now be set so low, allocating emissions (and other 
support) at a level that developing countries could meet their basic needs/ basic capabilities would not leave 
many emissions allowances ‘left over’ to distribute.
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This is a reason to suggest that the ‘Basic Needs’ principle is not, on its own, as helpful a 
guiding principle as one might want; but it does not, so far, constitute a reason to reject the 
principle in favour of Capacity, since one could argue for other supplementary principles. 
However, the further problem lies in its concentration on absolute, rather than relative 
poverty. That is; that the size of the inequality between group A and B is not seen to be 
directly relevant to the poverty of group B. What matters is the ‘absolute’ level of group 
B’s welfare. But there are strong reasons to suggest that ‘relative’ poverty is as important 
as ‘absolute’ poverty in understanding well-being (and that, therefore, the strict egalitarian 
position in any case better accounts for the relationship between well-being and 
inequality). These include the concerns expressed by the New Economics Foundation, who 
have suggested that;
“people assume that it is only the absolute incomes of the poor which matter. 
Absolute changes in income are undoubtedly much more important at the bottom of 
the global income distribution than they are to the majority of the population of 
developed countries… But, even among the poor, relative incomes may nonetheless 
have some significance, as they do at higher absolute income levels, for example 
through their effects on social status and self-worth.”186
This kind of point has also been made by Hirsch, who emphasises that the impacts of 
relative poverty are not simply ‘psychological’. Many goods are, he argues, ‘positional 
goods’ because of ‘social scarcity’; that is, “the good things of life are restricted not only 
by physical limitations of producing more of them but also by absorptive limits on their 
use”187. This means, he argues, that “Consumers individually find that their access to 
socially scarce goods and facilities, where these are attainable even in part through market 
processes, is determined in accord not with absolute but with relative real income”188. 
There are, in other words, social ‘goods’, which include resource access and high status 
jobs, but also social activities such as higher education, leisure pursuits, etc (which 
arguably constitute an important part of our well-being), which are inaccessible to the 
186 Woodward & Simms, 2006, p9-10
187 Hirsch, 1976, p3. Examples include living in the suburbs, which, as they become more populated (as 
peoples absolute incomes rise), cease to function as suburbs but as urban areas, whereafter those with 
relatively higher income can afford to move still further out, and so on.
188 Hirsch, 1976, p6. My emphasis.
191
relatively poor, no matter how high their absolute level of wealth189. Amartya Sen has also 
argued that, “relative deprivation of incomes can yield absolute deprivation of 
capabilities”, though for the slightly different reason that, “In a generally opulent country, 
more income is needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social 
functioning”190 
The idea implicit through these discussions is that inequality almost always leads to lower 
well-being when understood in its fuller sense (e.g. capabilities, including mental health, 
ability to take part in the community, activities, and so on). To use the terminology of 
capabilities; the increases in freedom of some to do and be various valuable things will 
impact on the existing freedoms of others – on their capability sets. The problem for 
PrioritarianB is, therefore, that there are good reasons to believe that the degree of the 
inequality will affect, in fact, will partly constitute the 'absolute' capability set (or objective 
welfare) of the ‘worst-off’ group. For this reason, I suggest that the PrioritarianB 
conception is fundamentally flawed, and, consequently, that ‘Basic Needs’ should be set 
aside in favour of a principle of Capacity, as discussed in section 4, understood according 
to a ‘capabilities’ or similarly framed ‘needs’ based conception of objective welfare.
6. Conclusions
I have argued that, of the four principles I consider here, ‘Capacity’, interpreted according 
to a ‘capabilities’ position (roughly as developed by Amartya Sen), should be the guiding 
principle of equity for a climate change agreement. Of the other three, I suggested that 
‘equal/comparable burdens’ was flawed because it failed to conceptualise distribution in 
climate change mitigation as a resource-sharing issue, with ‘emissions space’ considered as 
a global commons resource. I then argued that equal (per capita) allowances, although the 
most obvious first attempt at a principle of equity that recognises the ‘resource-sharing’ 
context, could not be justified by any of the main positions in the ‘equality of what’ debate, 
even as a practical approximation, since it does not allow for the (relevant) existing 
inequalities in wealth between countries.
189 Indeed, Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009, provide substantial evidence to show that a society's “poor health 
and social problems” are “related to inequality rather than to average living standards” (p20).
190 Sen, 1999, p89.
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I suggested that this was the motivation behind the Capacity principle, which could be 
justified by any of the main positions on equality. However, I argued that of these, equality 
of objective welfare was the best way to interpret the Capacity of a country, and guide the 
distribution of emissions. I examined how the 'capabilities' approach might offer an 
appropriate way to understand objective welfare, although I suggested that a 'needs' based 
understanding could be similarly developed if it was not specified in terms of particular 
(contingently useful) resources. Lastly, I explained why ‘Basic Needs’, as a prioritarian 
variation on ‘Capacity’ that might equally meet the concerns of sections two and three, was 
problematic. I considered two ways of interpreting this prioritarianism. I found both to be 
problematic, with one collapsing back into a principle of ‘Capacity’ and stricter 
egalitarianism, and the other underestimating the importance of relative poverty.
I have not here examined a fifth principle, “Historical Responsibility”, which I have argued 
elsewhere is only egalitarian in so far as it coincides with the capacity principle.191 
However, I will briefly sketch the argument. One of the significant challenges for 
Historical Responsibility is how moral responsibility can be attributed across generations, 
or even within a generation if different people are in government. Gosseries convincingly 
argues that current generations can be morally responsible because of “transgenerational 
free-riding”, i.e. that they have benefited from past harmful emissions. This implies, I have 
suggested, that only historically high-emitting countries that are still benefiting should be 
liable now, making it mostly co-extensive with the Capacity principle. However, I further 
argue that this outcome of the Historical Responsibility principle only seems equitable and 
therefore receives the support it does because of historical circumstance; “the pre-existing 
wealth differentials between higher and lower-emitting countries”192 which were widened 
by transgenerational free-riding, and which the Historical Responsibility principle would 
serve to reduce. Had free-riding countries been poorer, and those harmed richer, 
application of the principle would not be egalitarian193. It is therefore only the correlation 
between Historical Responsibility and the Capacity principle which makes the former a 
plausible principle of equity, and it cannot then be relied on as the primary principle of 
equity in a mitigation agreement.
191 Makoff, 2011
192 Makoff, 2011, section 3.
193 As I point out there, this is an implausible scenario because of the relationship between national wealth 
and historic emissions. But the thought experiment functions to highlight the structural features that make 
“historical responsibility” appealing to egalitarians, contingently.
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My resulting conclusion of this chapter, that ‘Capacity’ should be the guiding principle of 
equity for an international agreement on climate change mitigation, should, to emphasise, 
be understood as a guide rather requiring literal equality of objective welfare, as suggested 
at the end of section 4. My aim was to make explicit what I believe we should mean by 
describing a climate change mitigation agreement as ‘equitable’, and the considerations we 
should bring to bear in evaluating competing proposals.  There may be different ways to 
implement the criterion, as suggested earlier; rather than accommodating for unequal 
capacities through (inversely) unequal emissions distribution, existing inequalities may be 
better accommodated through additional distribution of the associated financial costs of 
keeping/reducing to a lower allowance, or increasing other kinds of support between 
nations. In the next chapter, I consider how one way of doing this, carbon trading, has been 
argued to preserve equity through the distribution of costs, whilst determining the 
allocation of emissions permits themselves through efficiency. This is therefore presented 
as a way to reconcile the criteria of efficiency and equity which can otherwise conflict. 
However, I argue there that in such a model the equity is in fact undermined; if the 
demands of equity via the principle of Capacity are to be met through cost-distribution, it 
should not, therefore, be through this mechanism. 
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Chapter 4 - Efficiency.
0. Introduction.
In chapter 1 I argued that efficiency should not be prioritised over, or a replacement for, the 
criteria of equity or ecological effectiveness. Rather, it should be understood within the 
context of, limited by and compatible with these first two criteria. I now consider how best to 
interpret the criterion of efficiency in such a framework. I begin by setting out conventional 
economic interpretations of efficiency, which, despite common protestations of neutrality to 
the contrary, are heavily value-laden. I highlight how these narrow economic conceptions of 
efficiency bring the criterion into conflict with the criteria of ecological effectiveness and 
equity as suggested in chapters 1 and 21.  I shall then suggest how efficiency might instead be 
construed as guided by these criteria, to reflect the re-embedding of the economy within social 
and ecological spheres. I consider the main way in which this is supposedly achieved by 
placing limits on its operational space through tradeable carbon permits. I discuss the 
significant criticisms of the practice, which imply that here efficiency is still in tension with 
both equity and ecological effectiveness. I then consider alternative ways in which efficiency 
might be redefined conceptually beyond merely placing limits on its operation, such that it is 
truly re-embedded and complements rather than undermines these criteria. Lastly I draw out 
the implications for policy.
1.  Conventional economic approach to efficiency.
1.1  Conventional economic definitions of efficiency.
Efficiency as a criterion is more often than not assumed to be sufficiently self-evident so as 
not to require specific definition, unlike, for example, equity2. This may in part be a symptom 
1 Chapter 1, section 3 and Chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 3.2.
2 For example, Rose and Stevens, 1993, examine the “efficiency and equity” in tradeable emissions permits, and 
whilst they explicitly consider different equity principles, highlighting that “there is no consensus on a single best 
definition of equity”, there is no parallel exercise for efficiency, and they launch straight into “a theoretical 
analysis of efficiency implications” of carbon trading (p118)
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of its failure to be recognised as a normative concept. As has been suggested in chapter 1, 
efficiency is often assumed to be a feature of the uncontestable standards of supposedly value-
neutral economics, rather than explicitly acknowledged as a value, despite its prescriptive use. 
It is worth bearing this in mind since, as I suggest in section 3.1, it is unclear what its moral 
status is or how it is intended to be justified. Either way, it is clear from the different 
interpretations of efficiency that emerge even within conventional economic writings, that Le 
Grand is correct to observe that “The interpretation of efficiency is as much a complex and 
value-laden business as the interpretation of equity”3. I consider some of these alternatives in 
3.1, but I shall now briefly summarise those distinctions which already exist in neo-classical 
economic interpretations of efficiency in climate change policy.
Strictly speaking, when academic neo-classical economists use the term ‘efficiency’, this 
refers to a particular understanding of allocative efficiency - pareto optimality4. That is, an 
allocation of resources such that it is “impossible to make one individual better off without 
making another worse off”5. It often appears to be understood this way with reference to 
climate change policy, in so far as it is defined at all. For example, Hamaide and Boland, who 
I return to in 1.2, look for a pareto-optimal distribution of mitigative effort between countries6. 
They draw on the Kaldor-Hicks variant of pareto-optimality7 to propose a compensation 
criterion, although this is normally only hypothetical. That is, they argue for side payments to 
be made to parties who would otherwise lose from economic impacts of mitigation, so that “no 
nation would be expected to accept an agreement if it is not at least as well off with it as 
without it.”8. Hamaide and Boland see “pareto optimality” in international climate change 
mitigation efforts as a way of “maximizing total net benefits” and therefore equivalent to 
“global economic efficiency”, whereby “the marginal social benefit of each region’s 
abatement (defined as the marginal benefits accruing to each region summed over all regions) 
[is] equal to that region’s marginal abatement cost.”9.
3 Le Grand, 1990, p566
4 See e.g. McDowell et al, 2009, p183. Also  Begg et al, 2005, p260-270  
5 Le Grand, 1990, p563
6 Hamaide and Boland, 2000.
7 Highlighted by Padilla, p531
8 Hamaide and Boland, 2000, p254
9 Hamaide and Boland, 2000, p242
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This also relates, therefore, to the further “cost-minimisation” approach to efficiency in 
climate change literature. This can be understood in two ways, which are often conflated, 
although it is unclear how distinct they in fact are in practice. The first variant relates to the 
welfare-economic idea of minimising overall costs, or maximising net benefits/utility, and is 
used to determine the optimal  climate target10. For example, Aldy et al assert that “A global 
climate policy that achieves maximum aggregate net benefits is said to be efficient”11. This 
“dynamic efficiency” is different from “cost-effectiveness”, which for Aldy et al, is used as a 
distinct criterion advocating “the least costly means of achieving some given target or goal”. 
But for some, this criterion of “cost-effectiveness” can constitute “efficiency”, apparently 
drawing on the economic concept of productive efficiency, since meeting a CO2 target at 
“least cost” is taken to mean “attaining efficiency in the production of CO2 abatement”12. This 
is, therefore, the second variant of “cost-minimisation” approach to efficiency. “Cost 
effectiveness” forms part of the UNFCC statement, which recommends that “policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits 
at the lowest possible cost”13, and is often taken to be the reference point for efficiency in 
climate change policy14 . However, this idea of cost-effectiveness is confusingly sometimes 
understood straightforwardly in terms of overall cost minimisation over time (i.e. conflated 
with Aldy et al’s concept of “dynamic efficiency”), largely irrespective of how those ‘costs’ 
contribute towards other, non-financial ‘outputs’. For Shukla, for example, the UNFCC 
statement is taken as an aim simply “to ... minimize the cost”15 or “to minimize the total 
burden”16, (i.e. considering the total costs and benefits rather than the cost of achieving a 
particular, pre-defined goal) and states accordingly that “Efficiency in the context of climate 
change means minimizing the extent of the climate change burden and is synonymous with 
cost-effectiveness”17. 
10 I.e. to “subsume” questions of “scale... under allocation”, Daly, 1997, p53
11 Aldy et al, 2003, p375, emphasis in original.
12 Rose and Stevens, 1993, p124
13 UNFCC, 1994, Article 3.3
14 E.g. Shukla, 2005, p122. 
15 Shukla, 1999, p3 
16 Shukla, 2005, p122. See also Bertram, who similarly understands efficiency in terms of “cost effective 
abatement options” - Bertram, 1992, p425
17 Shukla, 2005, p122.
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It may be thought that understanding efficiency as “Cost-effectiveness” of achieving a given 
target should be distinguished from overall cost minimisation/ benefit maximisation, even if 
this is not always recognised in practice. For, such a common-sense idea of efficiency as 
minimising a system’s waste can seem intuitively sensible and entirely compatible with 
environmental and ecological outlooks18. Why use more resources than is necessary to achieve 
the same outcome? This is, in essence, to retain the idea of efficiency as cost-minimisation, 
but to constrain or limit its operability by other goals, which determine the climate target. I 
discuss the problems with this idea, which I term “re-embedded efficiency”, in section 2, and 
why I do not believe it constitutes a significantly different concept. Its common-sense appeal 
is, I will suggest, misleading since in fact a lot turns on what counts as waste (or “cost”) and 
how it is measured, as I consider in section 3.
Other definitions of economic efficiency are also evident in the literature. Efficiency as cost-
minimisation can then further become synonymous for some authors with maximising 
economic growth, as Le Grand has identified19.  Alternatively, efficiency has been described 
as “self-regulation”, i.e. where the system works automatically towards agreed goals requiring 
minimum external interference/ correction, as implied by Bertram20. However, this is primarily 
a supplement to or mechanism for achieving the core interpretation of efficiency as cost 
minimisation or utility maximisation. Similarly, Philibert’s “four... dimensions of flexibility” 
(“‘where’, ‘who’, ‘when’ and ‘where to’ flexibilities”)21 are largely a rebranding of the 
‘dynamic efficiency’ variant of economic efficiency, such that each ‘dimension’ is sensitive to 
and determined by the changing costs and benefits of DACC mitigation.
I go on to consider alternative approaches to efficiency in 3.1, which may suggest a better 
treatment of efficiency, understood as a function. But first I will highlight how the primary 
conventional concepts of economic efficiency come into conflict with the other criteria for 
DACC, before considering attempts to make them compatible in section 2.
18 Indeed, Stein credits the “contemporary environmental movement” post the 1962 publication of Rachel 
Carson's Silent Spring, for the emphasis on ““waste”, then of “conservation”, and then of efficiency as a means of 
protecting and preserving our natural heritage” through the “efficient use of environmental resources”. Stein, 
2002, p50.
19 Le Grand, 1990, p561. 
20 Bertram, 1992, p435.
21 Philibert, 2006, p29.
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1.2 Conflicts with other criteria.
These approaches to efficiency create problems for using efficiency as a criterion for an 
international agreement on DACC, since it is then in conflict with the first two criteria. As has 
been suggested in previous chapters, efficiency can in fact amount to a competing alternative 
criterion to ecological effectiveness and equity. That is, it represents an alternative way of 
addressing their concerns - for the former, in deciding emissions limits and in the latter 
determining distribution.
As was considered in chapters 1 and 2, CBA has been used to attempt to determine the 
“globally optimal timepath of emissions mitigation”22, i.e. to promote “dynamic efficiency”. 
By economically aggregating the economic costs and benefits to different regions across time 
from the impacts of DACC, the total costs of different levels of mitigation can be compared to 
determine which mitigation pathway lowers overall costs. The appeal is to be able to offer a 
non-subjective assessment of the point at which DACC becomes dangerous, which might 
otherwise be contentious. However, as I argued in chapter 1 section 3.1 and chapter 2, section 
3.2, this commensuration process ignores important qualitative distinctions between different 
kinds of cost and benefits, including how fundamental they are to the survival of human 
societies or the wider ecological community.
That this is in conflict with the concerns of ecological effectiveness as I considered in chapter 
2 is not denied by advocates of cost-minimisation such as Philibert, who proclaims that the 
importance of “cost-effectiveness”(here, again, conflated with dynamic efficiency) as a “long-
term issue” lies in “not so much ‘getting a given environmental result for the cheapest possible 
cost’ than ‘getting the best environmental results for a given expense’”23. In other words, the 
need for a limit is seen as relating to expenditure rather than the environmental or ecological 
impacts of DACC. Efficiency is thereby prioritised over, and at the expense of, ecological 
effectiveness. 
22 Toman, 2006, p369
23 Philibert, 2006, p31
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This was the concern of Meyer and others from the Global Commons Institute who attacked 
“Global cost-benefit analysis” and the “quest for efficiency... to reveal the most cost-effective 
climate policy”24 which dominated international negotiations on climate change. Meyer argues 
that “the economists’ aim was to weigh the damage costs likely to result from climate change 
against the costs of cutting emissions so as to prevent these damages” and that when “their 
calculations showed that the cost of preventing climate damage was greater than the cost of 
the damage itself, they began advocating what was, in effect, the sale of planet to the 
economy”25.
Similar problems arise in relation to the equity criterion. Even within a fixed global cap, 
efficiency is often likewise presented as an alternative to principles of equity for distributing 
emission permits between countries (or industries). Chapter 3 considered which principles of 
equity a global distribution of a yearly emissions budget should adhere to. But addressing the 
concerns of allocative efficiency so that costs are minimised requires that where emissions 
reductions occur depends on where it is cheapest to do so - not based on the capacity of that 
society to achieve a decent level of well-being, or on moves to EPCA emissions shares, as 
were considered in chapter 3. For example, if efficiency is understood in terms of pareto 
optimality as cited above in the case of Hamaide and Boland, a country’s financial 
contributions and quantity of emissions reductions are based on the requirement for each 
country to be better off with an agreement than without, rather than according to principles of 
equity.  Similarly, if efficiency is interpreted simply as “least cost”, then what Philibert has 
referred to as “where flexibility” can be introduced to reduce “the costs of achieving a given 
short term target, in allowing emission abatements to take place wherever they cost the 
less”2627. 
However, this brings it into conflict with equity. With regards to equity as historic 
responsibility, as Brown has argued  “Those seriously harming others have no right to 
24 Meyer, 2000, p47
25 Meyer, 2000, p51
26 Philibert 2006, p29
27 The idea of “least cost” is in itself dubious in this context, since many apparent costs have other benefits, e.g. 
creating jobs through establishing new industries (Green New Deal Group, 2008), or health benefits through 
reduced air pollution (Toman, 2006, p375)
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demand, as a precondition for their stopping their injurious behaviour, that the victim agrees to 
a solution designed to minimise the assaulter's cost.”28. And with relation to equity as Capacity 
and equality of objective welfare, the distribution of emissions reductions on this basis does 
not distinguish the effects of these reductions on different countries, as Shue has highlighted:
"To suggest simply that it is a good thing to calculate cost-effectiveness across all 
sources of all GHGs is to suggest that we ignore the fact that some sources are 
essential and even urgent for the fulfillment of vital needs... What if, as is surely in fact 
the case, some of the sources that it would cost least to eliminate are essential and 
reflect needs that are urgent to satisfy...?”29. 
In this way, efficiency present a competing distributive principle, which does not take on 
board Shue’s distinction between “survival” and “luxury” emissions or other considerations of 
equity as discussed in chapter 3.
And, more often than not, efficiency simply provides an alternative for both distribution and 
scale; equity and ecological effectiveness. Hence Shukla has noted that since neo-classical 
economics “assumes existence [sic] of efficient market dynamics universally... climate change 
being a global and long-term problem, the search for efficiency leads naturally into a where 
and when flexibility... i.e. to decide the location and time of mitigation actions which equalise 
the marginal costs across the nations and in time, and thereby minimise the global mitigation 
cost, i.e. the size of the burden” with the “distribution of mitigation burden... considered a 
separate problem, merely a secondary side-payment issue”30.
However, efficiency need not represent an alternative. It perhaps plausibly could be 
compatible or additional, so long as it operates within limits that are set by equity and 
ecological effectiveness. In other words, if it seeks instead to minimise the cost of a pre-
28 Brown, 2002, p192.  It may be argued that suddenly “stopping their injurious behaviour” - reducing emissions 
at the rates required without trading - has other injurious consequences. But this should be accounted for under 
the process for determining the “precautionary” element of ecological effectiveness criterion - the risks incurred 
by the precautionary action, as well as the equity criterion which should look at the effects on well-being of 
different countries of the distribution of emissions limits at particular times. 
29 Shue, 1993, p55
30 Shukla, 1999, p3
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determined ‘ecologically effective’ mitigation target and ‘equitable’ international emissions 
distribution, akin to Aldy et al's “cost-effectiveness”  criterion.
2.   Re-embedding efficiency.
2.1 Attempts to re-embed conventional economic efficiency. 
I suggested in chapter 1, following Daly and Meyer, that efficiency as a criterion must 
(instead) be understood in the context of - guided by - the criteria of ecological effectiveness 
and equity if the three are to function as compatible criteria for an international agreement on 
climate change mitigation. Can this re-embedding be accomplished through retaining but 
limiting the operation of the conventional economic idea of efficiency? This seems the 
obvious and intuitive approach; for efficiency to require us to minimise the costs or maximise 
the utility of meeting particular emissions targets and distributions, as pre-defined by the 
criteria of ecological effectiveness and equity. Both Daly and Meyer amongst others conceive 
the task in this way. They seek to achieve it through limiting the space within which allocative 
efficiency can operate, a space defined by equity and ecological effectiveness (for Daly - 
distribution and scale31). The paradigm case for this is tradeable emissions permits32. I shall 
explain in 2.2. why this is ultimately unsuccessful as a way to re-embed the efficiency 
criterion, where I examine the nature of the problems with and criticisms of carbon trading. 
Rather, in section 3, I pursue an alternative understanding of re-embedding efficiency which 
does not retain the conventional economic conceptions. For now, however, I shall examine the 
way in which Daly and Meyer's strategy is meant to operate as a means of making the criterion 
of efficiency compatible with the other criteria. 
Daly has argued that although allocative efficiency for any resource is best promoted by the 
market, “scale is not determined by prices, but by a social decision reflecting ecological limits. 
Distribution is not determined by prices, but by a social decision reflecting a just distribution 
31 These are Daly's parallel concepts, see Daly, 1997, p51 and chapter 1 part C where I discuss this.
32 Indeed, Daly describes it as “truly a paradigm for many sensible policies”,  as a way to separately address 
issues of scale, distribution and allocation Daly, 1997, p56
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of the newly created assets. Subject to these social decisions, individualistic trading in the 
market is then able to allocate the scarce rights efficiently”33. He suggests, therefore, that 
questions of scale and distribution (which relate to ecological effectiveness and equity) should 
be determined first and “imposed on the market in aggregate quantitative physical terms”, 
which allows the market to promote efficiency within these narrower confines and “achieve an 
optimal allocation of resources”34. Daly’s suggestion is that tradeable carbon permits are the 
paradigm case of re-embedding efficiency in this way; “a beautiful example of the 
independence and proper relationship among allocation, distribution, and scale”35.  This 
operates through first placing a global cap on emissions, determined by the judgements of a 
safe level/scale of emissions (or by, as I have argued in chapter 2, one’s interpretation of 
‘ecological effectiveness’). The global emissions budget is then distributed between countries 
as emissions permits according to one’s principle of equity so that concerns of fairness in 
distribution are met. But, having achieved an equitable distribution, permits can then be traded 
between countries, allowing, it is argued, for efficiency but without compromising climate 
change mitigation targets or international justice. 
Dworkin has argued similarly on a local economic level that trading can allow efficiency to be 
compatible with equality. He acknowledges that the market is often seen as an “enemy of 
equality, largely because the forms of economic market systems developed and enforced in 
industrial countries have permitted and indeed encouraged vast inequality in property"36. 
However, he suggests, so long as the market exchange system begins with an equal 
distribution, and "people enter the market on equal terms"37, the market mechanism preserves 
equality and improves efficiency38.
33 Daly, 1997, p53
34 Daly, 1993b, p349
35 Daly, 1997, p52
36 Dworkin, 1981b, p284
37 Dworkin, 1981b, p289
38 This is because, he argues, through competition in demand the market automatically includes the cost to others 
in the price of a good- if the price is higher, it is because more people want it, and assuming everyone starts on an 
equal footing, those that need the good more will then pay more. This, he suggests, therefore places limits on 
what each person can fairly use (see in particular Dworkin, 1981b, p287-289). I think this dubious for various 
reasons (e.g it does not account for other personal inequalities, manipulation, how much people need etc...), but 
will not examine this here.
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It is along these lines that Meyer’s proposal of Contraction and Convergence as an 
international solution to DACC is formulated. Meyer suggests that the “emissions 
permissible” under a “legally binding cap” can only be traded once they have been 
“predistributed”39, which he argues should be on an equal per capita basis (as discussed in 
chapter 3, although such predistribution could be carried out according to any principle of 
equity), since “the world’s atmosphere belongs equally to everyone if it belongs to anyone at 
all”. This equitable predistribution of “property rights to use the atmosphere” is for Meyer a 
precondition for trading, since “you cannot trade what you do not own, and ownership is 
impossible without limits”40.  Similarly, Shukla argues that “justice” is not just a “virtue” of a 
climate change agreement, but “the engine for ensuring universal cooperation – the necessary 
condition for efficiency”41. Meyer believes that this “management [of emissions] by quotas is 
rationing” and “subordinates the growth economics of efficiency... to the global politics of 
precautionary limits and equity”42. 
Even Zenghelis and Stern,43 more conventional economic writers, argue that:
“A cap-and-trade system is appropriate to manage the risks of climate change by 
imposing an absolute limit on emissions, consistent with the scientific conclusions of 
the risk of catastrophic climate change (effectiveness). International emissions trading 
would also reduce the cost of mitigation by allowing emission reductions to occur in 
whatever sector or country would be least costly (efficiency). The benefits of carbon 
39 Meyer, 2000, p55
40 I do not discuss, in this thesis, the implications of the concept of ‘ownership’ here. The idea that the atmosphere 
(or indeed any part of our ecosystem) can be ‘owned’ is ethically controversial. Not least in the context of co-
managing a global commons, where the model is precisely in opposition to individual private ownership, as 
considered in chapter 1. For in this case it is misleading to consider permits as ownership of part of the 
atmospheric commons, since they would be reduced year on year, and may change according to the demands of 
equity. Therefore, I do not think a “cap and trade” or even a non-tradeable rationing system need conceive the 
permits as ‘owned’ in the way that Meyer implies, and can simply be understood as “temporary [use] rights” as 
Brown has suggested (Brown, 2002, p199)..
41 Shukla, 2005, p123, my emphasis.
42 Meyer, 2000, p55. Although not all advocates who frame the problem in this way will also agree on the 
implications for general “growth economics”. E.g. Agarwal, who also sees cap-and-trade as a means of meeting 
“three criteria” of “ecological effectiveness... economic effectiveness” and being “socially just and equitable 
towards all countries”, sees the aim of the system as being to “create a framework for global cooperation so that 
the world can move as quickly as possible toward a world economy that can keep on growing by using renewable 
energy.” (Agarwal, 2002 p388). Similarly Zengelis and Stern, cited next.
43 Zenghelis & Stern, 2009. See also Stern, 2008. 
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trading could be high, generating private sector financial flows to developing countries 
which could be used for low-carbon development (equity).”44. 
What this highlights, however, is that under cap-and-trade, the demands of equity are met not 
by actual equitable emitting activity, since the location of emissions reductions (and therefore 
also the continuation of emitting activity) is ultimately determined by the market. Rather, 
equity is promoted by the equitable distribution of the cost of mitigation efforts, to be born 
primarily by richer countries through permit trading. There is a separation between where the 
mitigation occurs (determined by efficiency) and who pays for it (determined by equity)45. 
Such a trading system in carbon permits is therefore suggested to promote efficiency in terms 
of both minimising cost and moving to a pareto efficient distribution because it makes the 
overall cap cheaper for all parties compared with their costs otherwise in meeting their 
obligations for emissions reductions. Lohmann (a critic of carbon trading, who I return to in 
2.2) has explained how for two parties trading emissions the theory of trading implies lowered 
costs of emissions reductions46. We can, he says, imagine a cap placed on two parties, A and B 
of “100 tonnes annually”, under which each must limit their emissions to 50 tonnes. Prior to 
this, “A and B each produced 100 tonnes of pollution a year”. If, however, “it is cheaper for B 
to reduce its emissions to zero than it is for A to reduce its emissions at all”, then emissions 
trading will “allow B to make A’s reductions for A” by allowing A to pay “B to reduce B’s 
emissions to zero”. Both A and B benefit, since if “the price B charges for the necessary 
pollution permits is more than B’s cost of reducing emissions to zero, yet less than A’s cost of 
reducing emissions to 50 tonnes, B makes money off the deal at the same time that A saves 
money. Both come out ahead – yet the same environmental goal of limiting overall pollution 
to 100 tonnes a year is met.”  As such, efficiency - here both in terms of pareto optimality and 
cost-effectiveness - is maximised, in theory without sacrificing either equity or ecological 
effectiveness47.
44 Zenghelis & Stern, 2009, p309
45 As alluded to in chapter 3, section 1.1.
46 Lohmann, 2008b, p5
47 Indeed, the famous Coase Theorem argues that, so long as there are no transaction costs, trading in an 
externality will always lead to an efficient outcome, no matter what the initial distribution of property rights: this 
means, in theory, that equity and efficiency should be compatible.
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Although this means that some parties can continue polluting, the argument runs, they can 
only do so if permits are bought from other parties who pollute less - so long as permits are 
kept within the total cap which is continually lowered, ecological effectiveness will be, it is 
argued, preserved. And although there is not a starting point of total equality of resources, as 
in Dworkin’s approach, this is not thought to undermine equity with respect to climate change 
mitigation so long as the money paid to those selling their emissions permits adequately cover 
costs of losing their share of the atmospheric commons. Indeed, this is argued to be more 
equitable because of the supposed potential for massive financial transfers from the North to 
the South. Hence Meyer has argued that “This feature would lead to a steady flow of 
purchasing power from countries that have used fossil energy to become rich to those still 
struggling to break out of poverty” and would “thus not only shrink the gap between the rich 
and poor but also encourage the South to develop along a low-fossil energy path”48.
If this is true, there seems no reason to prevent industrialised countries from meeting some or 
all of their mitigation burden (decided previously by the equity criterion) through trading 
permits, and instead funding emissions reductions elsewhere. This was a possibility raised in 
chapter 349 and seems on the face of it to be compatible with equity if the concern of equity is 
equality of objective welfare and not of the resource itself (i.e. the earth’s absorptive capacity 
for emissions). For, I argued there that this resource is valuable to use only in so far as it 
contributes to well-being, and not for its own sake.  However, meeting the emissions burden 
through trading permits seems for many to be ethically dubious, since it is unclear that equity 
is in fact preserved once permits are traded. It is unclear that equality of objective welfare vis a 
vis emissions space has been preserved if some countries (or companies, industries, groups) 
are permitted to continue high-emitting, polluting activity simply because they are paying for 
it.  The lifestyles and standards of living being pursued by countries continuing higher-
emitting activities would be substantially different, and, by definition, inaccessible to other, 
poorer nations. If those continuing high-emitting activities also have more economic power, 
attainment of which continues to depend on higher-emitting activities, there may also be a risk 
48 Meyer, 2000, p20
49 Chapter 3, section 4.5
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that a cap-and-trade system would still ‘lock-in’ global inequality in the way that was 
considered in chapter 3.50
The concern is, therefore, whether paying for reductions elsewhere rather than making 
domestic reductions does continue to fulfill the criterion of equity. And, as I shortly consider 
in 2.2, there are reasons to doubt that this is the case. Indeed, this approach to promoting 
efficiency through carbon trading seems to undermine both criteria of equity and ecological 
effectiveness. The question is how far this is a result of current practice, or whether they are in 
theory reconcilable.
Beforehand, it is worth briefly considering another approach which may imply a compatibility 
between pareto optimality and equity in distribution. It should be recalled that there is a 
difference between pareto optimality and pareto improvement, as Vatn has pointed out51. 
Whilst the latter implies that “the utility of some agents can be increased without reducing the 
utility levels of others”52, pareto optimality is a distribution such that no such improvement can 
be made. As Vatn then highlights, any potential conflict between the latter and fairness of the 
distribution could be “circumvented by presuming the distribution to be optimal at the 
outset”53. Rawls also takes this approach with regards to the efficiency of just (rather than 
equitable) distributions54. He argues that there exist a variety of equally efficient (which he 
defines in terms of pareto optimality55) distributions of goods, and that whilst some of these 
efficient distributions will be unjust, if we "find a conception of justice that singles out one of 
these efficient distributions as also just... we shall have gone beyond mere efficiency yet in a 
way compatible with it"56. Rawls’ own principle of justice, the difference principle, then 
defines a just subset of efficient distributions for Rawls. Because when it “is fully satisfied, it 
is indeed impossible to make any one representative man better off without making another 
50 Chapter 3, section 4.1
51 Vatn, 2002, p151, (citing Griffin, R.C., 1995, On the meaning of economic efficiency in policy analysis, Land 
Economics, 71, 1-15). 
52 Vatn, 2002, p150, footnote 5.
53 Vatn, 2002, p151
54 Although NB Rawls is considering “an arrangement of rights and duties in the basic structure” of society; 
Rawls, 1972, p70.
55 I.e. “an efficient distribution is one in which it is not possible to find further profitable exchanges” such that 
one person’s “prospects”  cannot be improved without “lowering the prospects of others”. Rawls, 1972, p70
56 Rawls, 1972, p70
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worse off, namely, the least advantaged representative man whose expectations we are to 
maximize.” and is therefore “consistent with efficiency, at least when the two principles are 
perfectly fulfilled.”57.
If so, then it may seem plausible that an equitable distribution of the kind I am considering 
with regards to emissions space is also already pareto efficient, since any further exchanges 
would move away from equity and thereby make some worse off58. This would be true even if 
moving to that particular distribution from a former one would not be a pareto improvement, 
since one can move from one pareto efficient situation to another. How far it is the case that 
any further trading after an equitable distribution will necessarily involve a move away from 
equity in this way is beyond the scope of this thesis, although I examine reasons to think that it 
can undermine equity59 in 2.260. However, even if so, it would not save the efficiency criterion: 
rather it would become effectively redundant, since it would be automatically fulfilled by the 
equity criterion. And this is not in fact how the efficiency criterion has in fact been 
understood: pareto optimality is a separate allocative efficiency criterion and the potential for 
further voluntary market exchanges is taken as a sign that pareto improvements are still 
possible. Therefore, I focus on the primary approach to compatibility between efficiency and 
the first two criteria – re-embedding efficiency (as either pareto optimality or cost-
minimisation) through the paradigm case of carbon trading. 
57 Rawls, 1972, p79
58 This would be so if the resources in question were zero-sum – i.e. one party only gains at the direct loss of 
another, or if relative wealth counts at least as much as absolute wealth (see chapter 3, section 5.2 regarding 
relative poverty), such that even if absolute levels rise, the rise in inequality renders the less wealthy party even 
worse off than at a lower but more equal absolute level of wealth.
59 Which is sufficient for my purposes in demonstrating that re-embedding efficiency along the lines of the Daly-
Meyer approach does not succeed in fully constraining efficiency within the bounds of equity and ecological 
effectiveness.
60 I am tempted, in section 2.2. to make this stronger claim. That is, that if the point of trade is to reduce costs for 
those involved in the exchange (i.e. A won’t buy additional permits from B rather than  reduce its own emissions 
by a corresponding amount unless it is thereby cheaper to do so), the relative levels of resource-use or well-being 
between A and B, or between either party and others has changed, and it does not preserve the equity intended by 
the predistribution: slightly more, in the short-term has been gained/ less cost incurred. This relates to the concern 
regarding (non)commensurability – permits/emissions space are not totally equatable to or fully commensurable 
with financial value. They have different ‘use values’, to use Marx’s term. Whilst this is precisely the purpose of 
exchange (if they were identical there would be no reason for exchange), it means that it does not leave the 
relative positions of the parties in the exchange untouched. However, defending this fully would detract from the 
main thrust of the thesis (i.e. in considering how trivial or significant the changes are), so I do not pursue this 
here, although it does, I believe, warrant further enquiry. NB this is also a different point to Nozick’s “Wilt 
Chamberlain” scenario: there the focus is on the voluntariness of an exchange being in conflict with an equitable 
outcome, but there is no assumption that both sides are meant to gain to the same degree from the exchange, as is 
implicit in the case of carbon trading.
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2.2. Problems with merely ‘embedded’ efficiency - carbon trading in theory and practice.
Increasing criticisms have been launched against the ability of carbon trading to produce both 
the scale of emissions reductions needed and climate justice. The emerging question is how far 
these criticisms bite primarily against the way that current carbon trading schemes have been 
operated and how far they imply further/deeper problems with carbon trading in principle. 
That is, in the terms I have been setting out, how far they also undermine the idea that carbon 
trading can, even with appropriate reforms, allow efficiency to be promoted at the same time 
as equity and ecological effectiveness.
It seems clear that current trading schemes are in practice not operated in accordance with the 
theory examined in 2.1.  Schemes such as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS - used 
between companies rather than nations) ignore the approach to trading advocated by Daly and 
Meyer for a fixed emissions cap and equitable predistribution of emissions. They do not in fact 
operate under a fixed cap for the region. Rather, as critics have highlighted, additional permits 
are distributed in response to industry lobbying61, so that the total quantity of emissions is not 
capped. And flexibility and offsetting mechanisms have allowed companies to meet quotas 
through funding dubious emission-reducing projects outside of the loosely-capped region so 
that emissions within the region have not fallen at all. Ecological effectiveness, in other words, 
has been totally undermined. And distribution has been far from equitable, with permits 
grandfathered - distributed to companies functioning under the scheme according to current 
rather than equitable usage of emitting activities - for free, generating “windfall profits” for 
the highest emitting industries who have maintained their emissions levels62. Organised in this 
way, they, like the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, allow “questions of efficiency to trump 
principles of distributive justice”63.
In so far as they go, such arguments can be taken to imply that current carbon trading schemes 
have simply not been implemented appropriately to re-embed efficiency. As Lohmann and 
others64 have pointed out, these problems have largely led to calls for reform rather than 
61 Bohm & Dabhi, 2009, p15,  see also Scott-Cato, 2009, p110
62 Bohm & Dabhi, 2009, p15,
63 Brown, 2002, p192 on the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms and trading scheme. 
64 Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p38
209
abandonment of carbon trading. These reforms often attempt to preserve equity and ecological 
effectiveness. For example, Brown emphasises the need for an equitable predistribution of 
permits, and reforms to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to prevent “rich nations” 
from purchasing “the cheapest reductions while leaving the poorer nations with more 
expensive reductions”, which is risked when rich nations seek projects that “reduce the 
greatest amount of greenhouse gas emissions at the lowest possible price”6566. But the 
question, for Lohmann, is “whether they [carbon markets] could ever work”67. For as is argued 
by Lohmann and Clifton and Cullen68, there are reasons to think that even such reforms would 
be inadequate. Their concerns, along with other recent work, provide reasons to believe that 
carbon trading would still risk both equity and ecological effectiveness. This, I will argue, 
suggests that the theory behind carbon trading is flawed in representing it as a means to 
promote and conceptualise a re-embedded efficiency criterion6970.
Why might ecological effectiveness be undermined even by reformed carbon trading, despite 
emissions being capped? The one key emerging concern is that where emissions are reduced 
matters both directly and indirectly from the point of view of ecological effectiveness. The 
former is less widely acknowledged. It is ordinarily claimed that where emissions are released 
or reduced does not matter from the perspective of reducing atmospheric concentrations and 
mitigating DACC71. However, there is some evidence that in fact, emissions reductions in 
different parts of the worlds can have different climatic effects. Berntsen et al highlight that 
65 Brown, 2002, p194
66 Similarly, Agarwal, 2002, argues that “what developing countries should not accept is a principle of emission 
trading built solely on the argument that they provide a lucrative opportunity today to reduce emissions 
cheaply”(p388); rather, emissions should be capped and then distributed “equally among all people of the 
world”(p387). And Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p38 list a range of reforms that have been proposed.
67 Lohmann, 2008b, p2
68 Lohmann, 2008b, passim and Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p38-42
69 Lohmann and also criticise it for other reasons , e.g. infringement of local ways of life, destruction of local 
environment/other environmental problems. Lohmann, 2008a, p362-364
70 The boundary between theory and practice seems in any case unclear, and the suggestion that something 
problematic in practice would be possible ‘in theory’ is unhelpful if the latter involves abstraction to such an 
extent that it could never bear any significant relation to how the world operates ‘in practice’. (Indeed, these are 
precisely Daly and Cobb’s criticisms of the kinds of abstractions that operate in neoclassical economic theory 
surrounding the market; the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. See Daly & Cobb, 1990, p35-43). In this case, 
for carbon trading to successfully re-embed efficiency ‘in theory’ must mean that the circumstances in the theory 
are also replicable in practice, or what is being theorised is merely fantasy. As I go on to argue, the theory does 
still ignore some important structural features of the process of mitigation, which implies problems with the 
theory behind, and not just practice of, carbon trading.
71 See e.g. Brown, 2002, p185. Whilst Brown argues that location matters from the perspective of equity, he does 
not contest it on the basis of ecological effectiveness.
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some GHG reduction measures also involve a reduction of some non-GHGs and aerosols, 
which can “indirectly cause significant radiative forcing of climate through chemical 
processes in the atmosphere”72; i.e. associated changes in the balance of other chemicals73 can 
produce some warming effects which partly counteract GHG reduction. This means that, 
because of differences in climate and atmospheric make-up in different parts of the world, 
these chemical processes have different impacts in different locations, resulting in “a regional 
variation in the effectiveness of abatement measures”. 
Berntsen et al conclude that “it cannot be assumed that identical emission reductions will give 
equal climate effects if the reductions take place in different regions and if several gases and 
aerosols are affected”74, and that in fact, according to their study “reductions in China are most 
effective”, based on “equal emissions reductions in all regions”75. This threatens to undermine 
the trading process, although, as they argue, it also complicates the process of the “initial 
distribution of emission reductions” between countries, since “the same amount of CO2 
reductions in one country may cause a different net change in radiative forcing if several non-
CO2 gases are affected when the atmospheric conditions are different”76.
Similarly, as noted in chapter 277, Lenton has emphasised that “large scale discontinuities” or 
“factors that threaten to tip elements of Earth’s climate system into a different state... are not 
directly dependent on global average temperature, but on localized warming that alters 
temperature gradients between regions.”78 These can be “influenced by uneven distribution of 
anthropogenic aerosols in the atmosphere”79.  Localised changes in radiative forcing from 
changes in use of particular warming or cooling agents could also, therefore, influence the 
passing of particular tipping points in that region which, as well as causing localised harms 
could in turn create positive feedbacks as part of global climate change. 
72 Berntsen et al, 2006, p378
73 E.g. a reduction in aerosols, which have a cooling effect when they destroy ozone.
74 Berntsen et al, 2006, p404.
75 Berntsen et al, 2006, p406.
76 Berntsen et al, 2006, p406.
77 Section 1.1, footnote 13.
78 Lenton, 2011a, p7.
79 Both by “cooling” and warming” aerosols,  and by “land-use change” amongst other factors. Lenton, 2011b, 
p456
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These points add credence to more general concerns about our ability to commensurate 
different kinds of GHGs into one measure - CO2 equivalence (CO2e)80. This measure is based 
on what Lohmann has termed “equivalences that are scientifically dubious”81 since different 
GHGs have different lifetimes and radiative forcing effects. Any equivalence relationships are 
subject to uncertainty, and trading in emissions permits may result in reductions in different 
combinations of GHGs in another country, and different radiative forcing effects. As 
suggested in chapter 2, this might also be a reason for separate caps on different kinds of 
emissions, and for specifying particular regional reductions in some GHG emissions in some 
areas, as Lenton has suggested. Here further research is clearly needed, but it means that 
carbon trading, which relies on commensurability and equivalence of GHG reduction 
measures in different areas, can directly undermine ecological effectiveness. 
But additionally, there are more widely discussed concerns that the location of emissions can 
have indirect effects on global mitigation and, therefore, ecological effectiveness. This point 
has been made by Lohmann, who argues that allowing emission reductions to occur 
predominantly in areas where the cheapest reductions can be made can prevent the “structural 
change required”82 to tackle climate change in the long-run. This is, for Lohmann, the problem 
of “path dependency”. Lohmann argues that the reduction of emissions should be considered 
over time, and questions the assumption “that all emissions cuts are the same in terms of 
climate history”. Rather, “How cuts are made now and who makes them will have an 
influence on how much can be cut in the future”. He argues those industries most likely buy 
additional permits in the first place will be “companies most locked into fossil fuel use and 
therefore also the ones where change is most necessary and most urgent”. This creates a path 
dependency because “billions of dollars” can be tied into fossil fuel plants, with lifetimes 
“measured in decades”, so that “once a fossil fuelled plant is up and running, it becomes 
enormously expensive for it to switch to renewable generation”83. This dynamic, as is 
80 I do not here consider the even more controversial idea that carbon “sinks” should be included in carbon 
trading. See Lang, 2009, who argues that “REDD” (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
- the idea that people “should be rewarded for keeping their forests instead of cutting them down”(p214)), should 
not be financed through carbon trading.
81 Lohmann, 2008a, p361
82 Ibid.
83 Lohmann, 2008b, p6
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emphasised in the Friends of the Earth report on carbon trading, is ignored by the economic 
theory behind it which focuses on “the sellers of credits, not the buyers”84. 
Whilst Lohmann focuses here on trading between companies, the same will be true of trading 
between nations - if industrialised countries with fossil-fuel dependent infrastructure attempt 
to meet emission reduction targets by purchasing permits from poorer nations, they will 
similarly delay “the type of innovation, long-term investments and broad restructuring that are 
crucial to speeding the transition away from fossil fuels”. These changes cannot easily be 
made later on at short notice at the point at which larger reductions need to be made. Hence 
for Lohmann,  “carbon markets are not only ineffective but also damaging to solutions that 
are effective, and are steering societies away from the changes that are needed”85. Agarwal has 
argued similarly that “if northern countries rely heavily on flexibility mechanisms, they risk 
being unprepared for much deeper cuts ultimately required to prevent climate change”86.
Goulder and Nadreau have objected that this kind of “transition argument” is not convincing, 
since encouraging the faster development of low-carbon technologies in credit-buying 
countries would mean “more prolonged reliance on fossil fuels by nations that otherwise 
would sell more permits”87. However, the relevance of path-dependency arguments is that it is 
often credit-buying countries and industries that have a higher structural dependence on fossil 
fuels which needs to be broken at an early stage. And, as Lohmann has highlighted, those 
industries (or nations) who are net permit buyers are not necessarily incentivised, as the theory 
implies, to develop low-carbon means of operating. Rather, the kinds of cuts which are 
cheapest to make in order to make initial reductions will tend to involve making existing 
infrastructure more productively efficient rather than, for example, switching to alternative 
energy production. However, this similarly undermines the ability of the country or 
organisation to make even deeper cuts in the future, because it commits it further to a 
fundamentally high-emitting infrastructure rather than starting to make the structural changes 
which will ultimately need to be made to achieve these subsequent reductions. So for 
Lohmann, “Cap and Trade’s goal of reaching modest numerical emissions targets cheaply is 
84 Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p23, citing Driesen.
85 Lohmann, 2008b, p2
86 Agarwal, 2002, p383
87 Goulder and Nadreau, 2002, p130 
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simply not the same as the goal of mitigating global warming, which entails taking immediate 
steps to break the deeply rooted dependence industrialized societies have on fossil fuels”88. 
Crucially, although “A well-implemented cap and trade system might possibly help make a 
fossil fuel dependent system a bit more efficient around the edges... it is not an appropriate 
instrument for incentivising the fresh industrial path that the global warming problem 
requires”89.
This suggests that one of the most substantial reforms proposed for carbon trading - to limit 
the proportion of credits which can be traded each year - may still not be sufficient. If they are 
limited in such a way which still promotes efficiency as ‘cost minimisation’ or ‘pareto 
optimality’ they necessarily delay the higher-cost investments which need to be made90. It is in 
this vein that Kevin Smith has argued that “carbon trading is designed with the express 
purpose of providing an opportunity to delay making costly, structural changes towards low-
carbon technologies. This isn’t a malfunction of the market or an unexpected by-product: this 
is what the market was designed to do”9192. 
This dynamic in carbon trading similarly risks undermining equity –here too, location matters. 
For carbon trading seems to fall foul of the “low-hanging fruit”93 problem that critics have 
highlighted in the CDM. Under the CDM, richer countries can meet their emissions targets 
through funding projects in poorer countries outside the area of the cap. Even if such projects 
do reduce emissions overall94 the credit for the reduction is awarded to the richer country 
which funded the project. But when the host country comes to make domestic emission 
reductions, critics argue that it will find that the “cheapest mitigation options have been used 
by richer countries”, which could “increase developing countries’ cost of meeting [future] 
targets”.95 So much for the CDM; but a similar problem could occur even through carbon 
88 Lohmann, 2008b, p7
89 Ibid.
90 I return in section 3.3 to the idea that some very minor allowances for trading might arguably need to be built in 
as a safety net. 
91 Smith, 2007, p1
92 Furthermore, Clifton and Cullen highlight the risks of carbon financial derivatives creating an unstable 
speculative “subprime” bubble like the subprime mortgage crisis. (Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p32-35). 
93 Najam et al, 2003, p225.
94 And there are significant concerns about the problem of “addionality” , see e.g. Smith, 2007, p3, Lohmann, 
2009, p510, Clifton and Cullen 2009, p28 
95 Agarwal, 2002, p139 makes a similar point.
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trading under a stricter cap-and-trade system. For if, as noted earlier, poorer countries are 
initially net permit sellers to richer countries since reductions in the former are cheapest, at the 
point that it becomes cost effective for richer countries to start meeting their emissions 
obligations domestically, poorer countries will be left with funding the hardest cuts back 
home. 
But secondly, the location of emissions reductions matters for equity also because of the 
problem of compensation. Receiving money in exchange for ones equitably predistributed 
permit for emissions does not necessarily provide equivalent benefit to the activities that have 
been foregone. Shue argues that permit trading and other least cost measures can only be 
compatible with equity if, in terms of location of emissions, we are “dealing with matters of 
comparable significance”96. As was recalled towards the end of 1.3, the function of emissions 
must be borne in mind, and some are more fundamental to well-being than others – “survival” 
versus “luxury”97 - largely because of other background inequalities between nations. Shue 
therefore suggests that permit trading will be compatible with and provide adequate 
compensation for the loss of emissions space only "if all incremental costs for reducing 
emissions... are to be allocated according to ability to pay" - if "beef-eaters" pay for "better 
feed grain for the subsistence herds of the poor"98.
And it is not clear that this is the case. Although under an equitable predistribution of 
emissions permits any reduction in poorer country emissions to meet industrial country quotas 
would be financially reimbursed, there is no reason that these costs would compensate for the 
role of that emitting activity. In part this is because it is unclear that the sale would involve the 
significant transfers that Meyer had suggested99(cited earlier), or at least significant enough. In 
fact, Baer et al have raised concerns that power imbalances in the reality of markets are likely 
to mean that poorer countries do not receive a “handsome profit” for selling permits100. And 
Clifton and Cullen have argued that “carbon trading will never provide the reliable and 
predictable flows of finance to developing countries that are necessary to truly support well-
96 Shue, 1993, p56
97 Shue, 1993, p54-56
98 Shue, 1993, p56
99 Meyer, 2000, p20.
100 Baer et al, 2008, p81
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planned sustainable development... because the flows are by their very nature unpredictable, 
depending as they do on the price of carbon at any given time.”101. Mitigation might not, 
therefore, result in the “implementation of low-carbon energy services” which would 
compensate for the loss of ability to increase emission-creating activity102.  Such costs would 
not have to just cover particular emissions reductions projects, but wider infrastructural 
change to e.g. industries that are designed for and developing according to fossil fuel activity. 
But this is also particularly problematic if we relate the equity criterion to the principle of 
“Capacity” advocated in chapter 3. I argued there that the prioritarian focus on ‘basic needs’ 
that Shue favours is inadequate in ignoring the importance of relative inequality. 
Accommodating “all incremental costs for reducing emissions” in poorer countries would 
therefore need to ensure that this did not make permanent or lock-in the disparity between 
“beef eaters” of industrialised nations and “subsistence farmers” of poorer countries. Such 
inequities would, as Baer et al point out103, disincentivise and be unfair to poorer countries if 
wealthy countries are seen to be sustaining high-emitting lifestyles which are permanently 
inaccessible to them. Brown similarly argues that trading “may lead to an unjust use of the 
global commons” because “If the United States winds up with much larger rights to use the 
atmosphere as a sink than other nations, and if carbon fuels remain cheaper than other fuels, 
trading may lock in place U.S. rights to use much cheaper fuels per capita than many other 
people world-wide”104. In these arguments, the concern is not just that relative global 
inequalities are not being addressed, but, on the contrary, that they might be being ensured105.
I emphasise this point since these concerns about equity might be considered to be peripheral 
to the issue of equity in climate change mitigation, and instead relate to wider, pre-existing 
inequalities. It is in this vein that Daly has attempted to respond to the general criticism of 
tradeable permits that the rich have an advantage:
101 Clifton and Cullen, 2009, p36.
102 Baer et al, 2008, p81
103 Ibid.
104 Brown, 2002, p197
105 I.e. there is a difference between failing to attain an ideal and structurally ensuring that it could never be 
reached.
216
“The rich always has an advantage, but does this scheme increase or decrease the 
preexisting advantage of the rich? It could do either, it all depends on the initial 
distribution of ownership of the new assets and not on the fact that they are 
tradeable”106. 
The concerns that I have raised so far about the sense in which trading of permits could 
undermine equity might in this light be argued to be going beyond equity in climate 
mitigation, and rather move towards an attempt to achieve socialism through climate policy. 
However, as I argued in chapter 3, the point here is not primarily to attempt to solve all 
problems of global inequality. Rather, it is to tackle global inequalities that relate to fossil-fuel 
use, and ensure future equitable access to the global atmospheric commons, and, therefore, 
energy. Here, to recall, “equity” is understood primarily in terms of “capacity”, i.e. access that 
would account for differences in capacity to allow for an equal level of well-being between 
countries in so far as use of the atmospheric commons is necessary for its attainment. 
However, the possibility of a distinction between these and wider inequalities is precisely what 
is in question in the analysis I have been presenting. 
The inequalities I refer to are central to the issue of equity in climate change mitigation, 
because of the threat of lock-in. For, in the context of no overall limit to growth (and no cap 
on emissions), there is the potential, in theory, for those at the bottom to attain the same level / 
standard of living as those at the top, at some point. But once emitting activity, currently the 
basis for economic wealth, has been capped, this potential becomes even more remote. Carbon 
trading, therefore, could risk locking-in these global inequalities and associated power 
imbalances, and semi-permanently impoverishing some societies even if emissions permits are 
equitably predistributed. If this argument points towards a socialist outcome, then it merely 
highlights the kind of reasons that motivate many socialists and justify radical egalitarianism 
in the first place. It is, as I have argued elsewhere107 the reason why anyone concerned with 
tackling poverty and improving the well-being of the worst off must ultimately adopt an 
egalitarian position.
106 Daly, 1997, p53 
107 Read and Makoff, 2008
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How far this problem of “lock-in” will in fact occur is, of course, ultimately an empirical 
question. It is entirely possible that poorer countries could still continue to develop in low-
carbon, genuinely sustainable ways despite such initial inequalities. Perhaps, then, this would 
simply need to be monitored during a carbon trading programme. But it is not clear that such a 
large-scale, long-term global programme is the kind of thing that could be monitored and 
rectified retrospectively. And whilst it is possible that events would not unfold in this way, a 
cap-and-trade system risks them, by structurally ingraining an equity loop-hole. The cap-and-
trade system was being examined here in so far as it is able to re-embed efficiency – for the 
criterion of efficiency to be guided by, and operate within the limits of equity and ecological 
effectiveness. But in allowing for the possibility of locking-in widescale global inequity, this 
model seems inadequate.
Again, as considered in the case of ecological effectiveness, one solution might be thought to 
be to limit the quantity of emissions permits that are tradeable. However, as suggested before, 
for such a limitation to be sufficient to prevent richer countries avoiding their comparable 
mitigation burden and making deep structural change away from fossil-fuel dependent energy 
systems, it would also thereby need to prevent ‘cost minimisation’ tactics. Such a minimal 
trading system, whilst plausible, would then function largely to allow some year-to-year 
flexibility and adjustments in keeping exactly to the yearly budgeted reductions, rather than to 
promote ‘efficiency’, in terms of cost-minimisation.
One further possible exception here might be if the equitable pre-distribution of emissions 
results in negative emissions allowances, as it does under the “Greenhouse Development 
Rights”(GDRs) framework. That is, if some countries need to make emissions reductions of 
over 100%, which is impossible to be met domestically. Even reductions approaching 100% 
would be unachievable if required on too short a timescale108. But trading in this scenario is 
not then a question of efficiency but a pragmatic solution to meeting the demands of equity. It 
therefore fulfill a different function, and could limit the buying of permits only to those past 
108  Indeed, for these reasons I would question the equity of the GDRs formula as a mechanism for emissions 
distribution and  its particular interpretation of historical responsibility; anything that seems to genuinely require 
a country to reduce its emissions in a way that threatens to impoverish it (even with the kind of radical transition 
suggested in chapter 2 section 2.4) undermines equality of well-being. Rather, as I suggest in Makoff, 2011, 
‘Historical Responsibility’ should be understood in the context of 'Capacity”.
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extremely high levels of domestic reduction (e.g. 80-90%) in countries in such climate ‘debt’. 
Alternatively, the demands could be met not exclusively through the predistribution of 
emissions rights but through formal agreements pairing countries in climate ‘debt’ with other 
countries where an appropriate level of emissions reductions would be funded in combination 
with stringent domestic reductions109. This scenario does not, therefore, impact on the question 
of whether a cap-and-trade scheme would allow for efficiency to be ‘re-embedded’ in the way 
described by Daly, Meyer and others.
What I have been suggesting through 2.2 is that the supposed paradigm case for theoretically 
re-embedding efficiency within ecologically desirable and equitable limits does not succeed. 
For, such attempts retain the conventional understanding of efficiency in narrow economic 
terms of cost minimisation and/or pareto efficiency, and simply attempt to narrow the scope in 
which it can operate. However, retention of this cost dynamic from the reductivist neo-
classical economic paradigm continues to be in tension with and risks undermining the other 
criteria, since the incentives of any such system on a day-to-day basis direct activity according 
to this goal which functions as the immediate aim110. In arguing this, which I pursue in 3.1, I 
go further than both Meyer and Daly who both criticise the dominance of the idea of 
efficiency but who do not significantly revise the concept itself from the dominant forms of 
pareto optimality or cost-minimisation/utility maximisation. For example, Daly defines 
allocation as efficient if it “corresponds to effective demand, that is, the relative preferences of 
the citizens as weighted by their relative incomes, both taken as given”111, i.e. an “optimal 
allocation is one that is efficient in giving people what they want and are able to pay for”, 
driven by “relative prices, which measure marginal, opportunity costs”112. Daly does attempt a 
separate ecological formulation of the concept of general efficiency and efficiency ratios, 
which I consider in 3.2. However, these are, oddly, in addition to his retention of allocative 
efficiency within the context of ‘scale’ and ‘distribution’ via the paradigm case of carbon 
109 This would be my preferred approach, for reasons highlighted in the previous footnote.
110 This argument bears some similarity to Marx's analysis of the general formula for money as capital; that 
whereas the driver of transactions in the circulation of commodities (C-M-C) is the usefulness of the commodity, 
under the circulation of money as capital ('M-C-M’), the transaction is a “wonderful means for making still more 
money out of money”(p256) and the “driving and motivating force, its determining purpose is... exchange 
value”(p250)  (Marx, 1990). However, there is not space to explore this further here.
111 Daly, 1997, p159.
112 Daly, 1997, p222
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trading, rather than revising the concept in relation to scale/distribution113. These distinct 
efficiency ratios are, as I examine, a promising revision, although they are less radical an 
alternative than they might first appear.  
3.Redefining efficiency
3.1. What kind of concept is efficiency?
It might be concluded from this discussion that the criterion of efficiency is simply 
incompatible with equity and ecological effectiveness in this context, and should be 
abandoned, or a trade-off sought114. However, as I suggested at the start of this chapter, the 
general notion of efficiency in terms of, for example, minimising waste, seems a common-
sense aspect of attempts to reduce emissions. Rather, it seems fruitful to contest the narrow 
economic understanding of efficiency and consider whether a different conception could be 
more compatible with the other criteria. This is to agree with Schumacher who maintains on 
efficiency more generally: 
“No one in his senses favours inefficiency. The concept of efficiency, however, has 
become quite uncannily narrow and exclusive: it relates only to the material side of 
things and only to profit. If I said: ‘This process is efficient because it makes the 
worker a happy man’, I should be accused of talking sentimental nonsense, unless I 
could demonstrate that the worker’s happiness actually led to increased output, better 
quality output, and above all to more profitable output. What the work does to the 
worker is not recognised as a decisive criterion of efficiency”115
113 Indeed, it is unclear how they are meant to relate to one another. If he is being internally consistent the thought 
may be that his efficiency ratios simply amount to the scale, distribution, allocation relationship exemplified 
through carbon trading - minimising cost within the bounds of fairness and appropriate scale.
114 Another possible alternative to abandoning efficiency might seem to be simply returning to efficiency as a 
replacement for the other criteria, as is advocated in environmental economics  (and by some ecological 
economists, e.g. Costanza: see chapter 1, footnote 132 ). I.e. that rather than being constrained, efficiency should 
be instead expanded to include all environmental/ecological costs and capture the value of everything. However, 
see my arguments against this in chapter 1, section 3.2, relating to its inability to adequately capture social and 
ecological concerns. 
115 Schumacher, 1993b, p165
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Several important implications follow from Schumacher's insight, for the kind of concept that 
efficiency is. I draw these out through this section, since they will aid the consideration of 
substantive alternative conceptions in 3.2.
Most clearly it contests  the prevalent idea that, as I criticised in chapter 1, efficiency is a 
value-neutral concept, as well as its wider application through CBA as an objective and 
uncontestable  mechanism for evaluating outcomes. As I have suggested, and as Schumacher 
hints, this “uncannily narrow” economic conception is in fact highly value-laden and selective 
in its assumptions about the goal of efficiency. Brown highlights how CBA itself relies on 
(act) utilitarian theories in searching for the maximum overall utility from decisions and, he 
argues, often “a narrow type of utilitarianism, often referred to as ‘preference utilitarianism’” 
116 in identifying preferences expressed through financial cost as the mechanism for 
determining utility. And it also relies on “hidden nonutilitarian assumptions”117 in deciding 
what the relevant consequences are, the timescale for assessing them, and how to 
commensurate different kinds of costs and benefits, as has been criticised throughout this 
thesis.  
If efficiency is indeed normative and value-laden, its formulation is open to contest, and 
reinterpretation. Given that its value-ladenness is being increasingly recognised, it might seem 
odd that such a lack of explicit alternative conceptions of economic efficiency have been 
presented.  For there are very few attempts amongst heterodox, in particular green and 
ecological economists to redefine the term. This has been noted by Jollands who has carried 
out the only explicit overview of the concept of efficiency and review of its use amongst 
ecological economists118. Jollands considers the ”potentially rich concept” of the “efficiency 
criterion” by looking at how far the “wide range of interpretations”119 from different 
disciplines are drawn on by ecological economists writing in the journal Ecological  
Economics. These available interpretations include the relationship between system outputs 
and inputs in thermodynamics, the distinct economic variants of technical, production and 
116 Brown, 2002, p168
117 Brown, 2002, p55
118 Jollands, 2006
119 Jollands, 2006, p360
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allocative efficiency, and the efficiency of biological systems in, for example converting 
energy into work120 . Despite this, and ecological economics’ recognition of the importance of 
reintegrating efficiency with other considerations, Jollands finds that “there is a divergence 
between ecological economic theory and revealed practice when it comes to efficiency”121. His 
analysis revealed that most articles retained a conventional economic interpretation of 
efficiency, and where other (e.g. energy efficiency) concepts were appealed to these were 
ordinarily not reintegrated into ecological economics. In particular, he found a “lack of 
development of a uniquely ecological economic approach to efficiency”122.
Part of the problem may be a failure to recognise how it might be reformulated, and the value-
assumptions may seem to be a necessary component of economic efficiency. To question this 
in the way that Schumacher has, one needs to consider the structure of the concept of 
efficiency. And in this respect it is a different kind of concept to the two other criteria. Le 
Grand,123 has argued that efficiency can be understood as a “secondary objective”, and 
suggests an interpretation of efficiency such that it could not be traded off with equity. He 
offers the following definition: that “An allocation of resources is efficient if it is impossible 
to move toward the attainment of one social objective without moving away from the 
attainment of another objective”124. Whilst one might be concerned with such a formulation in 
so far as it implies a view of efficiency as a neutral mechanism to arbitrate between competing 
objectives, the broad implication he draws is nonetheless helpful. That is, that: 
“efficiency can be defined only in relation to the ability of forms of social and 
economic organization to attain their primary objectives and that therefore efficiency 
cannot itself be one of those primary objectives... Efficiency is not an objective in the 
sense that equity is an objective; rather, it is a secondary objective that only acquires 
meaning with reference to primary objectives such as equity.”125
120 Jollands, 2006, p361-362
121 Jollands, 2006, p363
122 Jollands, 2006, p364
123 This is not to concur with any conclusions Le Grand makes elsewhere with regard to  policy implications e.g. 
for reform in public services (see Wintour, 2005)
124 Le Grand, 1990, p559
125 Le Grand, 1990, p560
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Stein has offered a similar, somewhat blunter critique of the “cult of efficiency”126. Stein 
argues that efficiency is a means rather than an ends, such that we should always specify “at 
what”127 and “for whom”128 a good or process can be efficient. Once this is recognised, the 
general “trade-off between efficiency and effectiveness... in our public conversation, is 
blatantly nonsensical”, since  “Effectiveness is built into any concept of efficiency”129. Any 
“judgements about effectiveness” in meeting particular social goals “must logically precede 
any cost-effectiveness”. Stein argues similarly regarding the “artificial trade-off between 
efficiency and equity” where both are presented as ends. For, “Properly stated, equity is the 
end and efficiency is the means.”130. It therefore “misuses language”, she says,  when we talk 
about mere efficiency alone, defined as “an end in itself” and that “divorced from its larger 
purpose, it becomes nothing less than a cult”131. 
But this can be taken further. Schumacher, in the passage above, argues that the efficiency of a 
process will be understood differently if its goal is to maximise productive output from if its 
goal is also/instead to ensure the happiness or well-being of the workers. This means that what 
will count as waste will also differ significantly, and relates to what the relevant inputs and 
outputs/goals are held to be. For example, a wholly profit-motivated company may view its 
workforce’s hourly 10 minute breaks as waste and be driven to reduce them if they result in a 
larger input (time/money) relative to the output received (good/service produced). However, 
(setting aside arguments that having breaks might also increase workers’ productivity), if 
another ‘output’ – or, rather, a goal for the company -  is to have a happy and healthy 
workforce, as well as producing a good/service, then the 10 minute break will not be treated as 
‘waste’, but an important contribution to the well-being of the workers, and highly efficient.
If waste and efficiency are seen in this way as a function of a system’s output: input ratio, then 
what counts as waste or efficiency will depend on what the relevant outputs and inputs are 
judged to be.  Stein's broad redefinition of efficiency is useful here. Efficiency is “understood 
126 Stein, 2002, The Cult of Efficiency
127 Stein, 2002, p 11
128 Stein, 2002, p72
129 Stein, 2002, p69-70
130 Stein, 2002, p72.
131 Stein, 2002, p3-4.
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correctly”, she suggests, “as the best possible use of scarce resources to achieve a valued  
end”132133. This may sound fairly unremarkable. But recognising this implies, I suggest, more 
than simply a need to limit the operational space of conventional economic forms of 
“efficiency” as in the Daly-Meyer paradigm case of permit trading. And it implies more than 
achieving equity and ecological effectiveness at a minimum financial cost.  Because, as 
Schumacher's example highlights, financial costs may not capture what counts as waste for 
one's objectives, Stein's redefinition implies a need to rethink the content and formulation of 
efficiency in each particular context – of what both the scarce resources and valued end(s) are. 
How efficiency is measured will also, therefore, change. The conventional narrow economic 
understanding of efficiency which rests on the theory of CBA understands efficiency through 
particular measures of success: predominantly, monetary costs and benefits which are meant 
to aggregate all other kinds of costs and benefits134. And, as I have been suggesting in this 
chapter, pursuing these standards of success can then be at odds with and  displace/supplant 
those standards of success of the other criteria - equity and ecological effectiveness. So, if 
efficiency is to be understood as a secondary objective, as a criterion for meeting the other 
criteria, it needs to be redefined and measured in the terms of the primary objectives, rather 
than being merely limited by them.135
It is odd that Meyer does not quite draw this conclusion, if we consider the following passage 
where he explains his criticism of “ideas of efficiency” in climate policy:
132 Stein, 2002, p6, my emphasis.
133 This is something Daly also embraces, and indeed it is one of his key insights, as I explore in section 3.2: that 
in aiming to maximise growth, economics is 'economising' on the wrong thing. In focusing on “capital and labor 
productivity”, we are “using resources lavishly, in other words, by sacrificing resource productivity” when 
“resources are the limiting factor in the long run, and therefore they are the very factor whose productivity 
economic logic says should be maximized.” (Daly, 1997, p7). This is important because it emphasises that 
economies with high GDP and high resource throughput are (and in contrast to conventional economic wisdom) 
actually inefficient with respect to resource use. This is expressed in his “ecological economic efficiency” ratios, 
which I briefly examine in section 3.2. The problem, as I go on to explain, is that Daly does not follow through 
the theoretical implications for allocative efficiency.
134 Even through allocative efficiency in market exchange, each party must financially benefit from the 
transaction.
135 I am unclear as to whether Stein has come to a similar conclusion. She does suggest at one point that 
efficiency “takes on different meanings in different spheres of human activity. The yardstick is relative and 
rooted in context.” (Stein, 2002, p12). However, although throughout the book she emphasises the distinctive 
judgements and  measures of the “valued end” aspect of efficiency, she says less about the cost dimension to 
efficiency – how the “best possible use of scarce resources” might be conceived in different ways depending on 
the context, and seems to understand it in terms of financial costs.
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“We fought the economists on two fronts - their ideas about efficiency and their use of
global cost-benefit analysis... With efficiency we set out to expose it for what it was, a 
device for screening real people out of the equation in order to ensure that North South
 inequity was ignored. The economists expressed efficiency in terms of an ‘objective’... 
ratio, the number of dollars-worth of national income generated for every tonne of 
fossil fuel burned... [but] this is self-referential. It is the economic system establishing 
value in its own terms. Efficiency can only be measured in terms of one’s own 
objectives and... [the economists] assumed that generating higher money incomes 
rather than meeting human needs was the objective of the system. So economics was 
not 'objective', it was the objective. As such it was both means and ends. It 
masqueraded as knowledge of both where we were and where we were going.”136
Meyer's primary concern with the conventional criterion of efficiency is that it needs to be 
recognised as a means to externally determined goals and objectives rather than an end in 
itself. But he fails to recognise that, even as a means, efficiency might therefore need to be 
reformulated to enable it to express other values. Whilst he comes very close to saying this, in 
stating that “Efficiency can only be measured in terms of one's own objectives”, the term 
'measured' here seems to allude not to the metric of efficiency, but to the relativity of cost-
effectiveness to other goals. For example, analogously, I might consider a more expensive 
laptop better 'value for money' than a cheaper one, because although it costs more in absolute 
financial terms, it performs better. My measure of costs is the same (i.e. financial), but the 
'effectiveness' of those costs is relative. In the case of climate policy, what Meyer does not 
seem to explicitly consider is that recognising efficiency as a means to “meeting human 
needs” and reducing emissions means that its expression as cost-minimisation also needs to be 
challenged.
In the context of criteria for a climate mitigation agreement, therefore, efficiency must be seen 
as a different kind of criterion to those of equity and ecological effectiveness, but one 
connected to them - in particular, a requirement about the way in which these criteria must be 
fulfilled that must be expressed in their terms. I next consider whether other approaches to 
136 Meyer, 2000, p43-44
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economic efficiency could help to reconceive it as an appropriate secondary objective, along 
the lines of Stein's broad definition. There are, to return to Jollands’ concerns cited earlier, 
very few alternatives. But amongst them is an attempted ecological economic redefinition of 
efficiency by Daly himself. This might seem difficult to reconcile with his retention of a 
conventional economic understanding of allocative efficiency which, even if limited in 
operation by scale and distribution, is still understood in terms of a narrow preference-
utilitarianism. Indeed, he praises the market as doing “that one thing very well”137. But Daly’s 
“ecological economic” conception of efficiency is not an alternative to allocative efficiency - 
rather it is meant to represent a broader notion, in which allocative efficiency is a contributing 
factor to overall ecological efficiency. It is, in general “the efficiency with which capital, both 
natural and man-made, is used to provide life-support and life-enhancing services”138 - the 
total efficiency of an economy.  However, as I shall explain, his particular reconceptualisation 
of general efficiency is not without problems, since it seems to supervene over  the theoretical 
concepts of distribution and scale as well as allocation. In this sense it offers a replacement 
rather than supplement or secondary objective to the other criteria.   I first consider Daly’s 
reconception of general “ecological economic” efficiency and then move on to suggest how it 
might be better and more usefully cast as a secondary objective.  
3.2 Ecological and Green Economic Efficiency
Daly promisingly argues that “orthodox growth economics has... paid too little attention to the 
complex notion of efficiency, and that a proper analysis of this concept might lend support to 
the steady state view”139. Jollands has highlighted how Daly criticises conventional measures 
of an economy’s efficiency for considering only “the efficiency of the fund factors, labor and 
capital”, by using “GNP divided by number of laborers or by the value of the stock of 
producer’s goods”140. Daly suggests that the efficiency of the economy is therefore determined 
by “the flow of throughput” and “depletion”, and that “In other words, this notion of 
efficiency measures the efficiency with which we destroy what is valuable!”141. The general 
137 Daly & Cobb, 1990, p59.
138 Daly, 1997, p83
139 Daly, 1974, p158
140 Daly, cited in Jollands, 2006, p365
141 Daly, cited in Jollands, 2006, p365
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idea of efficiency, for Daly, is to measure “the ratio of useful service to costs incurred in 
rendering that service”142. Ones particular concept of efficiency will depend on ones definition 
of “useful service” and of “costs incurred”, and he argues that conventional economics does 
not have a sufficiently developed understanding of either, or how they relate. 
In particular, he argues that the “costs incurred” need to distinguish between “natural capital” 
(“NK”) and “man-made capital” (“MMK”), and consider “the amount of service we sacrifice 
per unit of natural capital lost as a result of its conversion into man-made capital”143. This 
results, for Daly in a general efficiency ratio:
“MMK services gained
NK services sacrificed”
This breaks down into “four components” of:
1. Service Efficiency (MMK services gained
MMK stock) X
2. Maintenance Efficiency (MMK stock
throughput) X
3. Growth Efficiency * (Throughput
NK Stock) X
(*or, as Jollands has pointed out, originally described as  “ecosystem maintenance 
efficiency”144)
4. Ecosystem Service Efficiency (NK Stock
NK services sacrificed).  145
I will not examine all of these in any detail here, but it is worth offering a brief summary. The 
first two ratios have been Daly’s main preoccupation. Service efficiency describes the 
142 Daly, 1974, p158
143 Daly, 1997, p84
144 Jollands, 2006, p366
145 Summarised from Daly, 1997, p84
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efficiency with which services (or “want satisfaction”146) are produced from a particular stock 
of goods and maintenance efficiency recognises throughput as a cost for the production of this 
stocks which can be minimised in order to maximise maintenance efficiency. Daly argued that 
maintenance efficiency has been overlooked by economics which has tended to see this 
relationship in reverse - as “production efficiency”, attempting to maximise “throughput 
(resource flow)... per unit of stock of capital or per worker”147.  But this ignores the finite 
physical limits on throughput which are subject to the limits of “the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics”148, and in the longer term depletes available physical stock. This was 
developed further in later versions of Daly’s approach to “ecological economic efficiency”, 
where he explains how the size of the throughput can in turn be determined by the third and 
fourth efficiency ratios - the dependency of this throughput on the growth rate of “natural 
capital” and how far other “ecosystem services” are sacrificed by making use of it. Whilst the 
basic insights are helpful, these last two may be problematic in attempting to commensurate 
all distinct ecosystem “services” and stock in the way alluded to in chapter 1149, although I 
shall not consider this any further here.
The main difficulty is how Daly’s reconception of ecological economic efficiency relates to 
his comments elsewhere about the relationship between scale, distribution and (allocative) 
efficiency. And here there appear to be several problems. Firstly, his new concept of 
efficiency depends in part on the conventional economic concept of allocative efficiency, 
which I raised concerns with in 2.2. Allocative efficiency contributes to Daly’s ratio of service 
efficiency - the relationship of want satisfaction/service outputs resulting from a given 
physical stock - in the conventional way through “the economic efficiency of resource 
allocation among the different product uses in conformity with individual preferences and 
ability to pay”. Although there are other factors which additionally contribute to service 
efficiency (one of which is mentioned below), Daly’s new concept of efficiency does not, 
therefore, replace conventional allocative efficiency, but retains it, alongside the potential risks 
to scale and distribution which I have been highlighting.
146 Daly, 1974, p158
147 Daly, 1974, p159
148 Daly, 1974, p159
149 Chapter 1, section 3.2
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Secondly, distribution and scale seem also to be accommodated into these four efficiency 
ratios. “Distributive efficiency”, as Daly here refers to it, also contributes to service efficiency 
since he argues that services from “man-made capital stock” are maximised when distribution 
is more equal (though he stands back from “total egalitarianism”) because “total social utility 
is increased when resources are redistributed from the low marginal utility uses of the rich to 
the high marginal utility uses of the poor”. Whilst it may in a sense seem welcome that Daly 
clearly considers distribution to be important for determining how efficiently goods/ man-
made stock are being used, and his rejection of the “Pareto condition that utility cannot be 
compared across individuals”150,  it reduces the importance of such distribution to the 
maximising of utility. This leaves it worryingly open to being traded-off against other 
determinants of utility rather than as the distinct ends which he argues for elsewhere. It may be 
argued that Daly intends for distribution also to be considered as a distinct ends outside the 
efficiency ratios which intend to capture aspects of distribution in so far as they impact on 
efficiency. But in this case it is unclear once again how far they are compatible - how far 
Daly’s reconceptualised concept of efficiency is meant to relate to the goals of distribution, 
and how they are to be prioritised.
Even more worryingly, it also appears as if scale is totally subsumed under these efficiency 
ratios. Daly argues that “As NK is converted into MMK... we want at each step to maximise 
the service from the increment of MMK and to minimize the loss of ecosystem services from 
the decrement of NK. But at some point... this process of conversion of NK into MMK will 
itself reach an economic limit, an optimal scale of the economic subsystem beyond which 
further expansion would increase costs faster than benefits”151. But crucially, this optimal scale 
can be defined within this new set of efficiency measures because it takes into account the 
impacts of the economic subsystem on the containing ecosystem, such that “This optimal scale 
is defined by the usual economic criterion of equating marginal costs and benefits”152. Daly 
argues that optimal scale is currently being ignored in how our economies operate because of 
failure to recognise “Ratio 4, ecological service efficiency”153 which assumes rising marginal 
costs. Instead, he argues, we sacrifice ecosystem services in a non-marginal way, because 
150 Daly, 1997, p84
151 Daly, 1997, p86
152 Daly, 1997, p86
153 Daly, ibid. 
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“there has been no rational ordering... to ensure that the least important ecosystem services are 
always sacrificed first”154. By paying “attention to that dimension of efficiency”, Daly argues 
that this “would make the optimal scale of the human niche more definable”155 - definable, that 
is, in terms of efficiency and cost-benefit analysis.
If this is right, then Dalys “ecological economic efficiency” cannot therefore, be understood as 
a secondary objective, or even a distinct concept or criterion to distribution and scale - rather, 
it appears to accommodate and re-interpret them. But in this case Daly seems to have come 
full circle from his initial complaints of the failure to recognise the distinctions between them, 
and this concept returns to the kinds of problems identified in chapter 1 with environmental 
economics.156 I.e. it attempts to commensurate different kinds of costs and benefits, obscuring 
the differences in kind and the explicit value judgements required, in, for example, 
determining the ‘appropriate’ level of “natural capital services” which should be “sacrificed” 
and how this should be weighed against services “gained” from “man-made capital”.
This is not to suggest that there is nothing helpful or important about Daly’s development of 
the concept of ecological economic efficiency, which draws important attention both to the 
physical limitations to efficiency improvements in an economic system and to the complex 
range of factors which influence efficiency as it is ordinarily understood, and may help 
communicate problems of scale to conventional economists.  Rather, I suggest that if Daly’s 
general approach to ecological economic efficiency can be reconceptualised as a secondary 
objective to the other climate policy criteria (relating to the distinct concepts of distribution 
and scale) then it could be a more useful concept not just in the theory of climate policy but 
eco-political (or green) economics157. 
Why this should be so is clearer from a very similar approach highlighted by Schumacher, 
which Daly was no doubt influenced by. Schumacher attempts to develop a Buddhist 
economic perspective, under which he argues that the aim of economics in evaluating standard 
of living should be “to obtain the maximum of well-being with the minimum of consumption”, 
154 Daly, ibid.
155 Daly, ibid.
156 And, as noted in chapter 1, section 3.2, with Constanza’s approach. (See e.g. Costanza et al, 1997)
157 I introduced the idea of an “eco-political economy” in chapter 1, section 0.3.
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since “Buddhist economics is the systematic study of how to attain given ends with the 
minimum means"158. Whilst this is not explicitly framed in terms of efficiency it bears 
considerable similarity to Daly’s overall efficiency concept as the ratio between “MMK 
services gained” and “NK services sacrificed”. However, there are clear limitations to this 
concept when seen as the unique aim of economics, rather than as a supplement to other 
considerations/ as a secondary objective. Because it does not itself specify how low the 
“minimum” consumption might be, merely the relationship between consumption and well-
being. This “minimum” could end up being dangerously high even if the overall “ratio” 
between this and the resulting well-being attained was thereby maximised (in the short-term at 
least). In other words, it is not clear whether one’s priority is to attain the maximum level of 
well-being and consume the minimum amount which would be necessary to achieve this, or 
consume the minimum amount possible and obtain the maximum level of well-being 
attainable from this level. Schumacher - and Daly’s - general concept of efficiency is still 
fundamentally relational - put simplistically, a ratio between outputs and inputs - and requires 
other value judgements to be made in order to guide economic activity. 
Furthermore, how should the “maximum” of well-being be measured? And similarly, how 
should Daly’s “MMK services” be understood?159 Daly implies that it could be understood 
along the conventional lines of “want satisfaction”, but as he also points out, where 
“”services”... serve only relative wants, whose only function is to make one feel superior to his 
neighbor”160 this can undermine long-term want satisfaction, since “for example, when one’s 
neighbors all have status automobiles, the status value is cancelled out, and the stock of bug 
cars becomes a highly inefficient means of satisfying the absolute want for passenger miles of 
transportation”161. This could be tackled in part by specifying absolute or long-term wants, but 
as I have argued in chapter one and chapter three,162 well-being should be conceived of as 
158 Schumacher, 1993a, p177
159 Jollands also makes this point, Jollands, 2006, p368. I return briefly to Jollands' critique of Daly's approach to 
efficiency shortly
160 Daly, 1974, p160
161 Hirsch makes a similar point in arguing that “'positional competition'... at best yields no net benefit and usually 
involves  additional resource costs, so that positional competition itself is liable to be a negative-sum game” 
(Hirsch, 1976, p52)
162 Chapter 1, section 2.2; Chapter 3, section 4.4.
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more than just utility or preference-satisfaction. In this case determining increases or decreases 
in the ratio will require appealing to further evaluative concepts.
This is where such a concept could fully integrate with the criteria of ecological effectiveness 
and equity, where the latter is understood in terms of equality of (objective) well-being.  For 
the “well-being” which we want to maximise, or “services” from man-made capital which we 
want to improve can be understood simply in terms of our equity criterion, and an “increase” 
in these services judged according to how far it both improves and equalises aspects of this 
objectively-defined well-being across people, communities and nations. And how minimal the 
consumption should be will be determined by the “ecological effectiveness” criterion, in terms 
of what is ethically appropriate or ecologically prudent. In other words, the efficiency criterion 
simply defines the relationship between the first two criteria. I sketch how this could work in 
3.3.
And this efficiency  relationship or “ratio” need not be thought of in terms of one homogenous 
scale relating the well-being ‘outputs’ of the resource use to the quantity of resource/natural 
capital use ‘inputs’. It is multi-dimensional because of the distinct aspects of well-being, 
(although we may use various proxies), and can and should be understood qualitatively as well 
as quantitatively. When we talk about improving efficiency as “maximising the efficiency 
ratio”, the language can mislead. Rather, the general Schumacher/Daly “Efficiency” concept 
as a secondary objective need only imply that we should aim to reach, improve and make 
more equal our levels of objective well-being as far as we can (this is the “maximising” part) 
from the resources being used. And, if decent equal levels of objective well-being can be 
achieved from the level of resource use but it is possible to improve or “widen” the efficiency 
ratio, then we can further reduce resource use163. Such a revised concept, I refer to as “green 
economic efficiency”.
It is worth briefly highlighting some of the points of departure between this approach and 
Jollands’ proposed framework for efficiency as a response to Daly. Some of what I suggest 
here is to agree with Jollands, who also argues that “using efficiency concepts alone cannot 
163 I would not want to assume a drive for unlimited continuous improvements, as discussed briefly in chapter 3, 
section 4.5, an understanding of objective well-being must also include an idea of 'enough'/satiety.
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help distinguish between sustainable and unsustainable resource allocations” and that it is 
therefore “important to embed efficiency within broader considerations”164. Indeed, Jollands 
proceeds along not entirely dissimilar lines to my conceptual approach in chapter 1, 
understanding efficiency as embedded in a social and biophysical contexts, and driven by the 
particular “analytical purpose” of the system under consideration165.
However, aside from some conceptual differences, our aims for redefining efficiency also 
differ. I seek to define an efficiency concept or criterion at a macro-economic level, to judge 
the efficiency with which resources are used by the whole system, and applied to an 
international agreement on DACC with regards to a particular resource, emissions space. 
Whereas Jollands aims to define efficiency more broadly, in terms of an “efficiency sphere” 
which covers all distinct and particular situations in which efficiency might be appealed to. 
This is in response to a perceived difficulty in Daly’s work for failing to adequately promote 
“pluralism” and to accommodate all possible efficiency concepts from different disciplines166. 
However, I do not think this supposed lack of pluralism is a problem for Daly. This is firstly 
because his concept of general ecological economic efficiency aims to describe (ecological 
economic) efficiency in the operation of the economic system as a whole, rather than 
formulate a concept that holds for all particular scenarios, such as “the efficiency of a thermal 
electricity generation plant”, as Jollands wishes to accommodate. But secondly, Jollands 
seems to conflate pluralism with relativism, since his criticism of Daly’s lack of pluralism is 
also that Daly offers a “prescriptive ecological economic definition of efficiency”, implying 
that a prescriptive account is problematic. But Daly's prescriptivism is wholly appropriate; 
some efficiency concepts are simply irrelevant or morally repugnant and there is no reason 
why a general ecological economic efficiency concept should accommodate them all167.
164 Jollands, 2006, p369
165 Ibid.
166 Jollands, 2006, p367
167 Jollands believes it to be a criterion for ecological economists. But “taking a 'transdisciplinary' and 'pluralistic' 
approach”(Jollands, 2006, p362) merely involves drawing on a range of ideas from different disciplines, and does 
not equate to either relativism or total pluralism.
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3.3 Applying green economic efficiency as a criterion for climate policy. 
The concept of green economic efficiency can, then, be used to redefine the third criterion for 
an international climate change agreement as well as its broader conception suggested by Daly 
and Schumacher in assessing the efficiency of a total economy/ economic activity. As 
suggested in 3.2, this should be seen as defining the relationship between the criteria of 
ecological effectiveness and equity. The equity criterion as I have interpreted it requires 
emission permits to be distributed between nations so as to allow an equality in capabilities/ 
objective well-being, in so far as this relies on emissions space, to be achieved between each 
nation. But, as discussed in chapter 3,168 if some nations fulfil particular aspects of well-being - 
particular capabilities - through higher-emitting activities, they will require more 
“consumption” of emissions space than other nations and be less efficient in the sense of the 
Daly-Schumacher concept understood as a secondary objective. The redefined efficiency 
criterion could therefore require that nations move towards widening the ratio between “well-
being” and “consumption” or use of emissions space through infrastructural changes so that 
they require fewer emissions to achieve the same level of well-being. This would mean either 
that the total global consumption of emissions space/emissions level could be further 
decreased, or, if necessary, re-allocated amongst all nations to increase (equal levels of) 
standards of living/well-being169.
Does this imply that ‘inefficient’ countries170 get punished and any poorer countries  who do 
not attain equitable levels of capabilities/well-being with a more minimal use of emissions 
space (e.g. because of lack of infrastructure) will end up being impoverished, moving more 
towards an international emissions distribution determined by efficiency that was ruled out at 
the start of chapter 3? I suggest not: nations should still have emissions permits distributed 
such that it is possible to attain an equal level of relevant objective well-being (i.e. according 
to capacity). Rather, the efficiency criterion would require them, firstly, to do this in ways that 
168 Chapter 3, section 4.5
169 Although both the precautionary principle and the difficulties in keeping GMT below 2ºC, let alone the 1-
1.5ºC that I recommend in chapter 2, will almost certainly dictate the former
170 Remembering that countries such as China, whilst seemingly 'efficient' in returns to labour, are inefficient with 
regards to resource throughput; by exporting production (and therefore carbon emissions) there, global resource-
use has become less efficient. 
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currently require the least emissions possible and, secondly. increase the emissions-well-being 
‘efficiency ratio’ over time.  The criterion effectively requires countries under an international 
agreement to embark on the kind of transition outlined in chapter 2 section 2.4, and for 
international climate policy to show how our societies can move towards an equitable level of 
objective well-being whilst achieving ecologically effective emissions reductions. An 
agreement fulfilling the demands of efficiency would have to include particular mechanisms to 
achieve such a transition. For example, establishing green investment funds for national 
programmes in achieving structural change, such as public transport and cycling networks, 
renewable energy and energy grid shifts, building retrofitting to reduce energy use and local 
food production stimulus packages, or changes to international trade and global finance 
regulations to support such localisation. 
The application of the redefined efficiency criterion which I have sketched here and in 3.2. is 
not, it should be noted, totally antithetical to cost-minimisation/ cost-effectiveness which 
played a significant role in conventional approaches to efficiency. Some cost reductions may 
well be a by-product of improvements in green economic efficiency. But because our 
economic system counts ‘bads’ as well as ‘goods’171 as cost-benefits, the reverse is not the 
case - not all cost reductions also indicate improvements in green economic efficiency. Whilst 
there is some overlap, therefore, they are not synonymous and the criterion of green economic 
efficiency that I have sketched is designed to supersede “cost-minimising” efficiency, and the 
perverse incentives that can accompany it through the dynamics of carbon trading172.
There may be, however, some concerns about ruling out all kinds of carbon trading altogether. 
For, it may be argued, whilst a full-scale carbon trading scheme fails to promote conventional 
economic efficiency within the limits of equity and ecological effectiveness, retaining some 
limited element of trading might be important for other aspects of green economic efficiency, 
such as flexibility in adapting to problems. Here, it might be argued, the aim would not be to 
171 GNP measures “illth” - negative capital as well as “wealth” (Daly, 1997, p40), i.e. “Environmental and social 
catastrophes add to GDP” (Scott-Cato, 2009, p115).
172 Jollands is broadly right to say (Jollands, 2006, p370) that different efficiency concepts are linked because of 
the “inescapable connectedness of economic-ecological systems”. But my point is that some efficiency concepts 
better represent the kind of efficiency that is important. So conventional 'cost-effectiveness' will play a role in, 
and affect green economic efficiency, but only as part of a more meaningful (second-order) definition of 
efficiency, since some cost reductions may aid green economic efficiency, others may not.
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minimise cost as such but to allow for the difficulties in anticipating and planning for 
particular reductions in any country’s domestic emissions and, in the terms of the equity 
criterion I have advocated, the impact this might have on well-being and standard of living. As 
I suggested towards the end of section 2.2, I see no reason not to allow some very restricted 
level of carbon trading between countries, so long as it operates in this way, rather than 
offering choice or ‘flexibility’ in the broader sense described by Philibert173 over when and 
where emissions reductions occur in the first place. Further research would be required to 
determine the level of trading to which this would need to be limited in order to prevent it 
being intentionally used to evade emissions reductions.174 
If efficiency is to be applied as a normative criterion to an international agreement on climate 
mitigation, conventional understanding of the concept has to be challenged to ensure that it 
complements, rather than threatens our collective success in averting further DACC. This has 
not been taken up to date in climate policy literature, and I have offered what I hope will be a 
helpful contribution towards a better, more appropriate understanding of efficiency that is fit 
for the task ahead.
173 Philibert, 2006, p29
174 An alternative safety net might be instead to allocate emissions permits so that their combined sum is slightly 
less than the total global budget allocated for the year. However, given that, as argued in chapter 2 section 4, 
because of difficulty in minimising the likelihood of exceeding GMT rises of 1-1.5°C, let alone 2°C, the total 
global budget will already need to be set at the lowest level possible to achieve without risk of comparable harms 
to present generations.
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Conclusion.
I began this thesis by advocating that philosophy should play a central role intellectually in 
tackling DACC by helping to formulate the three key criteria for global climate policy; 
ecological effectiveness, equity and efficiency. I saw this task as both contriving each criterion 
and the order in which they are to be applied. Both aspects, I argued, have been 
underexamined in climate policy literature, and the range of implicit, but questionable 
interpretations risks them being a blunt instrument to guide policy proposals. Through 
conceptual and ethical analysis philosophy can help develop justifiable formulations of the 
criteria, but also help shift the debate by pushing policy advocates to make explicit their 
assumptions and justify their interpretations. I have offered my own contribution in the thesis. 
I framed analysis of the criteria from a green economic perspective in chapter 1. Green 
Economics, I argued, treats DACC as a global commons problem, but unlike conventional 
neo-classical economics does not diagnose it game-theoretically, as arising inevitably from the 
decisions of rational self-interested actors, since there is nothing inevitable about this as a 
model of human behaviour. Rather, the problem results from societies conforming to the 
assumptions of the conventional economic model, which it itself reinforces, through failing to 
recognise the embeddedness of economic activity within social and ecosystemic constraints, 
and structures which lock in individualistic patterns of economic behaviour. Chapter 1 
concluded that the order of the three criteria should reflect this embeddedness through the 
structural relationship between them, rather than a prioritisation as such. This means that 
ecological effectiveness, ordered first, must properly determine the constraints for human use 
of the global atmospheric commons, within which equity, the second criterion can be applied 
to determine distributive shares. Only then can the third criterion, efficiency, be applied, to 
guide economic activity within these limits and to support these ends.
Chapter 2 then considered ecological effectiveness as defining the appropriate ecological 
limits of climate-affecting human activity. In the absence of a clear absolute physical 
boundary, this involved judging both the harmful effects that should be prevented and how to 
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morally account for uncertainty over the emissions levels at which these would occur. 
Regarding the former, I concluded that the criterion required the prevention of any damage to 
the ecological enabling conditions for the functioning and flourishing of future generations, 
irrespective of geographical location. These future generations we should not, I argued, regard 
as simply a temporally disparate group with whom we must share resources fairly over time, 
but as communities emerging from our own, and for whom we must create the conditions for 
survival. I argued that such damage had already occurred from current climatic changes, and 
that preventing GMT rises of 1-1.5ºC seemed more defensible than the widely supported 2ºC, 
which is associated with more far-reaching damage.
Regarding uncertainty over, in particular, the emission levels that might cause these 
temperatures, I argued that the kinds of uncertainty and harms at stake called for use of the 
precautionary principle, as opposed to calculations of the best ‘expected utility’. I used the 
Sandin/Manson general framework for the principle to apply it to DACC. I concluded that, 
given the severity of harms threatened by DACC under the damage condition, the mitigative 
action (“e-remedy”) taken should be proportional to them, in that “it is the strongest action 
available which does not pose threats of a comparable or more serious kind to human and 
wider ecological well-being”1. I considered that the kind or degree of uncertainty over the 
occurrence of such harm is largely irrelevant, so long as the likelihood is non-negligible and 
the knowledge condition has been met, i.e. there are particular and reasonable grounds to 
believe that the harm may occur from the activity in question, and because of the nature of that 
activity. Emissions, therefore, need to be reduced to the level that is most conducive to livable 
ecological conditions. I concluded that we should aim to reduce emissions concentrations at 
least to 350ppm CO2e (net forcing),  but seek to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide levels 
towards pre-industrial level of 280ppm CO2 as soon as possible over the next few centuries 
without risking comparable harms from the action taken. This will involve a rapid global 
socio-economic transition to zero carbon as soon as possible this century, and if possible by 
20502, where possibility is limited by the need to avoid comparable harms to the conditions for 
1 Chapter 2, section 3.4 (iii).
2 Using Ackerman et al's trajectories for achieving 350ppm CO2 by 2200, Ackerman et al, 2009, p44
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well-being of future generations, but widened by the consideration of different socio-economic 
models.
Chapter 3 considered distributional equity in the shared use of this heavily contracting global 
emissions space, and the implications for each country’s emissions limits. I concluded that, 
understood within a resource-sharing rather than burden-sharing framework, Capacity is the 
appropriate principle of equity for a mitigation agreement. I based this on consideration of 
objective welfare as the morally relevant equalisandum, to which resource-use (use of 
emissions space) is only a means. Because general well-being is, within the globalised world, 
currently economically dependent on emitting activity, and countries have varying capacities 
to move away from this dependence, an equal per capita emissions entitlement may prevent 
some countries from attaining equal standards of living to others. Capacity then requires 
distributing the remaining emissions space such that it allows/is sufficient for each country to 
attain a comparably equal level of objective welfare from their entitlements. It would, in this 
sense, help guide an equitable transition to a zero-carbon world. Implementing this directly 
and literally would, I suggested, be very complicated, and the criterion should not be seen as 
requiring total equality of objective well-being (since it is in any case unclear what this would 
look like). Rather, policy proposals should be assessed and developed with this understanding 
of equity in mind, i.e. in consideration of the impacts of a particular emissions allocation 
distribution on equality of objective well-being.
Chapter 4 argued that in order for the efficiency criterion to complement and be embedded 
within the first two criteria as outlined in chapter 1, the criterion needs to be rethought from its 
standard interpretation.  I considered how the conventional economic understanding of 
efficiency in the DACC context as ‘cost-minimisation’ or, relatedly, pareto optimality, places 
the criterion of efficiency fundamentally in tension with equity and ecological effectiveness, 
even when its operation is limited by, for example, trading equitably pre-distributed emissions 
permits under a cap. I suggested revising the criterion by focusing on efficiency as a means 
rather than an end; as a secondary objective that guides how primary objectives - here, the first 
two criteria- should be fulfilled.  This involves, I argued, defining it in terms of and according 
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to the metrics of the first two criteria, rather than exclusively through financial cost. In 
particular, I concluded that efficiency should define the relationship between equity and 
ecological effectiveness; as maximising/improving attainment of equal levels of objective 
well-being from the resources - emissions space - used. Thus a DACC policy is efficient when 
it either enables more equitable levels of objective well-being (or better levels of equitable 
well-being) to be attained from given emissions levels, or it enables even lower emissions 
levels to be attained whilst ensuring equitable levels of objective well-being are not 
compromised: not simply when financial costs are lower. The criterion therefore requires that 
an agreement should seek to make human use of the global atmospheric commons more 
“efficient” in these terms.
Overall, and in brief, I have therefore argued that the three criteria for an international 
agreement on DACC require that it:
● Aims to prevent GMT rises of above 1-1.5°C, to reduce atmospheric concentrations to 
at most 350 CO2e, and therefore ensures a global zero carbon transition this century
● Distributes this emissions budget between countries (and supplement with other 
resources sharing, knowledge, support) such that each is in a position to attain/develop 
equal standards of living from it compared to other countries.
● Makes use of the emissions budget efficient in terms of using the least amount 
necessary to attain these equal standards of living.
How far existing policy proposals would meet these criteria and how they could be modified, 
is a further, important, project3. Whilst Meyer's “Contraction and Convergence” proposal4, for 
example, distributes emissions allowances under a cap which could be set as low as required, 
it only advocates (a convergence to) EPCAs, and does not, therefore, consider whether this is 
sufficient for equity given different countries' capacities. However, whilst the “Greenhouse 
3 Some others have made evaluative assessments, although in relation to different sets of criteria and/or 
interpretations. See e.g. Aldy et al, 2003, Baer and Athanasiou, 2007b, Kraus, 2009. There is not space for a full 
examination here, but I intend to write such a report next year for the Green House think-tank.
4 Meyer, 2000
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Development Rights” framework proposed by Baer et al5 attempts to do exactly that, it is 
enormously more complex and allocates allowances according to both countries' historical 
responsibility and capacity combined, whereas I have suggested that the former is only 
egalitarian in so far as it correlates to the latter6. And both propose emissions trading, to 
different degrees7, which I have extensively argued against, with no direct consideration of 
what I have termed 'green economic efficiency'; ensuring countries use the least emissions 
necessary for equal objective welfare/standards of living. There may be potential 
modifications of both frameworks.  The “Cap and Share” proposal, for example, which is a 
variant of Contraction and Convergence8, suggests a  “Transition Fund”9 for capital projects in 
countries who prove that their citizens are “more seriously disadvantaged by emissions 
restrictions”. Kyoto210, similarly, envisages a global climate fund with “an emphasis on 
addressing the needs of the poor” in both adaptation and supporting mitigation. However, 
funds are raised through upstream auctioning to companies, and since companies in different 
parts of the world will have different capacities to bid for permits; this could affect regional 
accessibility of services that are currently dependent on emitting activity e.g. provision of 
energy, in an inequitable way.  
Such proposals need to be examined and evaluated with regards to a conceptually and 
ethically thorough understanding of ecological effectiveness, equity and (green economic) 
efficiency. With NGOs and campaigners increasingly highlighting the failings in current 
climate negotiations, academics must contribute to the task of evaluating and developing 
justifiable policy proposals, to help guide and shift political debate. This must also include the 
IPCC, which needs to start reviewing and drawing on the kind of philosophical concerns that I 
5 Baer et al, 2008
6 Chapter 3, Conclusion; Makoff, 2011
7 Baer et al do express hesitancy about them, and question whether “in principle, alternatives based on taxes, 
public funds, and other financing mechanisms” would be preferable.
8 It assumes immediate (rather than converging to) EPCAs; these are not allocated to countries. Rather, 
“pollution authorisation permits” are distributed to every adult in the world, who sell them, via banks or post-
offices to fossil fuel producing companies to cover their output, and limit emissions at source (“upstream”). 
Feasta, 2008.
9 Feasta, 2008, p15
10 See http://www.kyoto2.org/  designed by Oliver Tickell.
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have considered and built on here. Tackling DACC of course requires action urgently and at 
all levels. But, as I have shown here, philosophical argument is an important part of this 
action, in highlighting both its urgency and helping to shape the solutions that we will, I hope, 
reach. 
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Appendix 1 – Anthropocentric versus Ecocentric approaches to harm.
The theoretical division between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric (ecocentric or 
biocentric)1 approaches to value may seem to lead to significantly diverse outcomes in 
terms of the “level of protection from global warming that the world should agree on”2. 
That is, whether only harms to humans are considered to be morally relevant, or whether 
additionally harms to non-human entities – individuals of other species, whole species, 
ecosystems or biological processes – also constitute relevant harms in themselves3. On the 
face of it, it may appear that harms to non-human nature are likely to occur at lower 
temperature rises than to humans. If so, then non-anthropocentric approaches to harm will 
define an unacceptable GMT rise as lower than anthropocentric approaches, and the 
mitigation implications will be more radical. 
However, I do not think this is in fact the case, because anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric positions can amount to very similar positions once their distinguishing 
features are examined more thoroughly. Firstly, they need not disagree on a meta-ethical 
level, as O’Neill has pointed out4. Claims that non-anthropocentric perspectives value non-
human nature intrinsically need not be taken to imply a meta-ethical commitment that the 
source of value comes from nature, as some, such as Pepper5 have assumed, requiring the 
human perspective to be relinquished. Rather, claims about the intrinsic value of nature can 
just be taken to be claims about the object of values, as ethical claims that we value certain 
objects as ends in themselves. Non-anthropocentrism, therefore, does not have to reject 
what Dobson has called “weak” anthropocentrism6, where the process of valuing nature is 
recognised trivially to come from a human perspective.7 Weak anthropocentrism is, for 
Dobson, trivially true; “an unavoidable feature of the human condition”8. Rather, it 
primarily rejects what Dobson terms “strong anthropocentrism” – where nature is 
1 Brown defines “biocentric” approaches as valuing all living beings, and “ecocentric” approaches as valuing 
ecosystems.  Brown, 2002, p231
2 Brown, 2002, p62
3 I use the term “non-human nature” to refer to parts of nature which are non-human in the biological sense, 
rather than to refer to parts of nature untouched by or uninfluenced by humans. I also use this term, rather 
than “nature” or the “environment” precisely because we are a part of ‘nature’ –it does not lie around us, but 
encompasses us.
4 O’Neill 1993, p11
5 Pepper 1993, p222.
6 Dobson 2000, p51
7 See on this Read’s argument in Chapter 1 of Read, 2007.
8 Ibid.
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instrumentally valued only in terms of its usefulness to humans 9. (Though see below for 
reasons to believe that even strong anthropocentrism, if sensitive to the ecological 
dependence of humans, will in practice not diverge significantly from non-
anthropocentrism.)
Secondly, non-anthropocentric approaches to the value of non-human nature (understood 
henceforth in the “strong” sense) need not be understood in terms of being exclusively on 
the “intrinsic” side of the “intrinsic”-“instrumental” debate which has problematically been 
thrashed out in environmental philosophy. Arguments for the “intrinsic” value of non-
human nature can seem a reasonable response to strong anthropocentric ethical positions 
which conceive of non-human nature as only valuable in so far as it is useful to humans, 
which alone are valuable in themselves, or intrinsically valuable. But since the concept of 
intrinsic value tends to be grounded in the idea of humans as sentient beings with an 
interest in their own futures, extending this to the non-human domain is somewhat 
problematic for anything other than sentient beings (the latter extension which Singer has 
famously argued for10). 
However, non-anthropocentric approaches to value can be understood in terms of rejecting 
the intrinsic-instrumental distinction. Instead, recognising the value of non-human nature 
can be understood as a respect and admiration for the distinct modes of being of different 
species, processes, communities, not dissimilar to some interpretations of aesthetic 
appreciation11. This might include the “instrumental” roles of a non-human entity - its 
function within the ecosystem as a whole such that our interdependence and connectedness 
with it is recognised and revered - but does not exhaust its value such that it is ultimately 
reducible to the value of the human(s) which stand in particular relations to it (i.e. of 
respect, admiration, etc). This is analogous (though not identical) to how the value of, say, 
one’s mother (or father, sibling, or friend) is constituted by the instrumental role she plays 
as one’s mother – the way in which she cares for and helps you can contribute to rather 
than detract from your sense of value and appreciation for her once it is recognised.12
9 However, accepting such weak or metaethical anthropocentrism should not be taken to imply projectivism 
about values either. Rather, it merely acknowledges that humans are fundamentally, inextricably involved in 
the valuing process.
10 Singer, 1982
11 E.g. James describes Murdoch's “state of absorption” whilst observing a kestrel that she relates, such that 
“the aesthetic appreciation of the kestrel is, she says, accompanied by a selflessness or humility on her part… 
which would seem to have ethical implications” (James, 2004, p100)
12 This does not mean all entities are necessarily equally valuable, and different attributes might be thought to 
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Anthropocentrists can and do also acknowledge this kind of respect-driven relationship 
between human and non-human nature. They will want nonetheless to insist that valuing 
non-human entities in this way is still a form of instrumental value, with intrinsic value 
lying in the human observers. Pepper, for example, argues that the instrumental value of 
nature should be understood more broadly than its common narrow economic 
interpretation, instead using the Marxian concept of “use value”13. He then argues that this, 
“Human ‘use’ will greatly involve moral, spiritual and aesthetic values”14. But this then 
seems to result in only a very subtle distinction in substance between anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric positions15.
Thirdly, on an operational level, the distinction does not seem to me to be necessary to 
decide for assessing moral harm in DACC at the level of international policy, if 
anthropocentrism is understood within the ecological or green economic conceptual picture 
discussed in chapter 1. By this I mean that ecocentric views which directly value non-
human nature would recommend the same temperature limits in a climate change 
agreement as an ecologically sensitive anthropocentrism, concerned with the ecological 
enabling conditions of well-being.
Even if non-human nature is only considered valuable “instrumentally”, to humans, our 
dependence on it for our survival and existence; for food, water, energy, atmosphere, 
minerals amongst others, means that threats to non-human nature also constitute threats to 
us. In assessing the potential harms presented by DACC from GMT rises, it is not merely 
the temperature rise in itself which threatens human lives, nor even the impact of this 
temperature rise on, for example, agriculture through crop productivity. Climate change 
(both from temperature rise and increases in emissions concentrations which can cause e.g. 
ocean acidification16) threatens the “resilience of ecosystems”17 whose effective 
functioning we depend on in complex and uncertain ways which “ecosystem services” 
hold different moral weight – sentience might be particularly relevant in some situations. It just means that all 
parts of non-human nature are morally considerable.
13 Pepper, 1993, p116
14 Pepper, 1993, p117
15 Of course, this does not mean the debate is entirely pointless. Whilst both anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric positions can be stretched to largely accommodate the concerns of the other, one may simply 
be a better fit for the way in which we already do value non-human nature. And each might be argued to be 
strategically important for motivating stronger environmental consideration (see Dobson, 2000, p59).
16 Harvey, 2007a, p2-3
17 IPCC 2007c, Summary for Policymakers, section.C
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assessments attempt to capture. Hence the IPCC's fourth report considers 4 categories of 
“ecosystem services”18: Some are more obvious, such as “Provisioning services” which 
includes food, medicine and cosmetics, some slightly less so, such as “Cultural Services,  
which satisfy human spiritual and aesthetic appreciation of ecosystems and their 
components.”. However, it is also the functioning and processes of ecosystems that we rely 
on; hence also identified are “Regulating Services... such as (a) carbon sequestration, (b) 
climate and water regulation, (c) protection from natural hazards such as floods, 
avalanches or rock-fall, (d) water and air purification, and (e) disease and pest regulation.”. 
And, at an even broader level, they identify “Supporting services” which “provide a basis” 
for the other three categories, and include “primary and secondary production, and 
biodiversity, a resource that is increasingly recognised to sustain many of the goods and 
services that humans enjoy from ecosystems”. Whilst the service-based model for these 
relationships may be criticised19, what it recognises is the complex interdependencies at 
play, which means that all threats of damage to ecosystems, should accordingly be 
understood as (at least) indirect threats to humans. And this in turn  implies that even 
strong anthropocentrism  collapses in practice into ecocentrism, at least so far as the 
purposes of this thesis are concerned.
It might be objected that not all damages are necessarily damaging to humans. But this is 
misleading. It is important to emphasise a difference between damage to ecosystems as 
ecosystems, and damage to entities in ecosystems. That is, particular species might be 
harmed, but this does not necessarily affect the functioning of the ecosystem as a whole, or 
their ability to sustain human life. There is no in principle way to distinguish between 
when this will be the case. In part this is a question for ecological science. But also, 
because of the deeply complex relationships between different species and biological 
processes within ecosystems, continuous alterations to elements of it can have significant 
repercussions over time. This is the kind of argument made in defence of biological 
conservation, which is helpful here. Lovejoy argues (highlighted by Sarkar) that although 
“the loss of a single species out of the millions that exist seems of so little consequence”, 
this is part of a “classic problem in philosophy” whereby although “increments seem so 
negligible… in aggregate they are highly significant”20. This, he suggests, can lead to a 
18 IPCC 2007c, section 4.1.1.
19 E.g. Scott-Cato, 2009, p7-8. Moreover, there seems something odd about talking for instance about the 
‘cultural services’ yielded by nature.
20 Lovejoy, cited in Sarkar, 2005 p15-16. The ‘classic problem’ in question is presumably the sorites.
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problem of overshoot (which is described famously by Meadows et al in Limits to  
Growth21, and which I examine in chapter 1, section 3.1), such that effects from 
“increments… in singletons, tens or even thousands of species out of millions… may be 
imperceptible, and may seem even more so when many of the effects are delayed or are 
impossible to measure… By the time the accumulated effects of many such incremental 
decisions are perceived, an overshoot problem is at hand”22.23 The conclusion is, as Sarkar 
also submits, that “it is wise policy to assume, as a precautionary principle, that every 
species matters”. Once again, this threatens the ability of even strong anthropocentrism to 
diverge in practice from ecocentrism.
Likewise, significant harms to ecosystems in general from DACC should also be prevented 
if we are not to risk overshoot and threaten the conditions they provide for the sustained 
flourishing and survival of human beings. Of course, this argument also makes use of the 
idea of precaution, which I consider in section B of chapter 2. But it is not possible to talk 
exclusively about the harms themselves without considering aspects of uncertainty/risk. 
They enter at every level, even in terms of how direct harms to humans can impact, 
because of the potential for humans to adapt to an uncertain degree. There is therefore an 
‘irreducibly precautionary element’ in the concept of ecological enabling conditions (See 
part B of Chapter 2, for my discussion of the requirements of precaution, and the technical 
appendix on uncertainty, Appendix 2, below.).
Indeed, it seems plausible that at, some lower levels of DACC, groups might be able to 
adapt to damage to ecosystems, if that damage has entailed a shift in the functioning of that 
ecosystem. For example, by growing different crops in so far as their agriculture is 
impacted. Using the terminology I have set out, they would need to adapt to a different set 
of ecological enabling conditions, to be ‘enabled’ in a different way. The question is, 
however, whether this could be the case, or whether, in the process of such an enormous 
21 Meadows et al, 2005.
22 Sarkar, 2005, p14-15.
23 This is distinct from the “rivet” argument for biodiversity conservation which Sarkar argues against. That 
is, that the loss of each species to planet earth is like the loss of a rivet on a plane, whereby one individual 
loss “will not make the plane unsafe” but we risk a “slippery slope” whereby “sooner or later, the next rivet 
will be like the proverbial last straw that breaks the camel’s back”. This argument lacks force, he argues, 
since the loss of many species “will not lead to the collapse of an ecological community” – all it implies is 
that “if there are so-called keystone species… then these species deserve special attention… It only provides 
an argument for the preservation of keystone species”. Although even here, as Sarkar acknowledges, given 
that we do not know which species (or combinations of species) might function as “keystone species”, each 
should be regarded precautiously.
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shift, mass starvation and suffering would occur. In societies whose entire culture and way 
of life centres around and is adapted to the production of key food sources – rice, or grain – 
the impact of having to make such wide ranging changes could potentially be massive, in 
comparison to capitalist societies where the range of foodstuffs is fairly broad because of 
dependence on imports24. 
It may be replied that such a potentially devastating shift in lifestyle is precisely what is 
being required of capitalist societies in taking mitigative action – to rapidly shift energy 
sources and reduce consumption, which would require altering industry, transport patterns, 
designs of towns and so on, and which may cause some suffering in the process. However, 
this is precisely because our society is not culturally rooted within our ecosystems and 
ecosystemic limits. Our economic path is in any case taking us to these limits and thus to 
the need for a sudden shift, which would be all the more devastating if left to its own 
devices. The need for large-scale and rapid shifts in lifestyle and socio-economic 
organisation as mitigative action now is rather to pre-empt and prevent the need for wider 
and far more devastating changes later and elsewhere, which would stand far less chance 
of a successful transition. The fundamental problem here is still: how do we know what 
can be adapted to and what cannot? This would require exploration elsewhere, for the 
thesis is restricted to considering questions of mitigation, rather than of adaptation. But, 
just as I suggest in Chapter 2 section 3, uncertainty in the face of such severe harms calls 
for precaution, not a gamble on outcome.
And it should be remembered that we are concerned with a global phenomenon, rather 
than one particular phenomenon in one locality. This damage, from each degree of GM T 
rise, will have multiple effects on ecosystems as a whole, so we cannot pick and choose the 
effects that can be adapted to and those which cannot25. This is similarly problematic for 
the concern that there may be some ecosystems harmed at lower levels of DACC that do 
not affect humans. We might be able to imagine harm resulting from a particular, lower 
24 The point here is not that capitalist societies would be better able to adapt – since we are so heavily 
dependent on imports, we would be severely affected by changes elsewhere. The point is rather that it may be 
hard, within our society, to comprehend the scale and difficulty of change needed throughout the entire 
economic and social structure from alteration in crop choice because most of us now are so distanced from 
this process.
25 Although, as I emphasised at the end of 3.3, in addition to local changes resulting from global mean 
temperature rises, there are some greenhouse gases whose uneven distribution can cause local climatic 
changes that can be harmful (see Lenton (2011). We may, therefore, need to take additional and particular 
precautions against particular greenhouse gases causing localised harms. 
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temperature rise to an isolated, self-contained ecosystem. Of course, these are often 
depended on by small and indigenous communities. But even if it appears not to affect 
human societies, there are still other ecosystems  that would also be harmed by that same 
GMT rise, as can be observed from the “burning embers” diagram26 and that in the IPCC 
fourth report27 that  depict the multiple harmful effects at each GMT rise. Some of those 
harms are surely going to be dangerous to humans. Once again, we find how difficult it is 
in practice to extricate harms to humans from harms to ecosystems, and thus how difficult 
it is to drive any wedge (in practice) between anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches.
In the end, this Appendix suggests that it seems difficult to see how anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric positions could end up having different policy outcomes regarding 
DACC. Harmful impacts to ecosystems should be included when morally relevant harms 
and limits to GMT rise from DACC are being defined, even under an ‘anthroprocentric’ 
approach. And anthropocentric approaches to moral harm will not necessarily imply lower 
GMT thresholds for acceptable harm from DACC than ecocentric ones2829.
26 Smith et al, 2009.
27 IPCC, 2007c, Summary for Policymakers, section C.15
28 I use the caveat “necessarily” because anthropocentric approaches which do not consider the distribution of 
harms amongst humans may end up advocating that harms do not become unacceptable until higher 
temperatures, because they judge that significant harms to some regions or groups of people are outweighed 
by benefits to others. However, I have argued that this is ethically unjustified in chapter 2, section 1.3.
29 But in any case, most ecocentric perspectives which "directly" value nature and frame moral obligations to 
avoid harms to it are not absolutist about such values or harms. That is, they do not have the status of 
inalienable rights which cannot be infringed under any circumstance, or even of equal value. In fact, as is 
often pointed out, most ecocentric philosophers adhere to a "hierarchy" of value, based on equal 
considerability but not equal outcome . It is therefore not clear that more stringent limits to GMT rise would 
be recommended even if harms to non-humans were thought to occur at lower temperature rises than harms 
to humans. Because the harms caused to some humans from some levels of mitigation might be thought as 
having moral priority over the harm caused to other natural entities from less stringent mitigation levels.
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Appendix 2 – Distinguishing uncertainties in Climate Science.
In this technical appendix I outline the different ways of drawing distinctions over 
uncertainties surrounding DACC from literature on climate change. Although some authors 
have drawn particular distinctions, there is, surprisingly, no comprehensive overview of the 
kinds of distinctions that can be made or the different levels at which they operate (which 
are represented for reference in the diagram in fig.7.)
1. Uncertainties surrounding DACC.
When knowledge about DACC is said to contain uncertainties, it is firstly important to be 
clear about where the uncertainties are held to lie before such claims are used to influence 
mitigative action, as others1 have noted. The term ‘uncertainties’ might refer to a lack of 
knowledge in any of three domains. The first I term “theoretical uncertainty” over the 
greenhouse gas theory for DACC, the second I call “social indeterminacy” over the 
predictability of future phenomena which depend on human choices and the third I refer to 
as “scientific uncertainty” within climate science over the relationships in the causal chain 
of effects from GHG emission levels to the resulting impacts from DACC. 
The first domain of knowledge has probably received the most media attention and most 
significantly for climate sceptics, refers to scientific disagreement over the greenhouse gas 
theory – the very basis of science on DACC2. It should be remembered, however, that what 
is disputed by most climate sceptics is not the basic mechanisms involved in the 
greenhouse effect by which atmospheric GHGs trap light from the sun as heat which are 
grounded in foundational premises of physics. The dispute and hence theoretical 
‘uncertainty’ is whether anthropogenic GHG emissions can alter or have altered the 
constitution of the atmosphere sufficiently to provoke significant temperature changes. 
Malnes notes that although the response to the latter theoretical uncertainty in defence of 
the greenhouse gas theory is commonly to point to the near consensus in the scientific 
community on the theory itself, this is somewhat unsatisfactory a response if it is a 
question of numbers. “Does the fact that the greenhouse theory has the bulk of qualified 
opinion on its side attest to its trustworthiness?”, he asks. Not, Malnes argues, if, like the 
1 E.g. Brown,  2002, p101-103; Meadows et al, 2005, p116 
2 E.g. as noted by Malnes, 2008.
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jury theorem, this assumes that “the credibility of an opinion depends straightforwardly on 
the number of people who vouch for it”, and “grounds a presumption to the effect that 
scientific disputes can be resolved by counting heads”3. This is both because “we should 
not assume too readily that each scientist is more likely to be right than wrong”4, a premise 
which is assumed by the jury theorem, and because it “invites rejoinders”5 which list 
scientists who do not adhere to the greenhouse theory which lend credibility to those 
critical of mitigative action. 
However, this argument misconstrues the relevance of numbers. This is not simply a 
question of head-counting opinions. Rather, it is an indicator of consensus within a 
scientific paradigm; a coherent body of knowledge that guides scientific inquiry, in the 
Kuhnian sense6. Whilst paradigms can shift, this is only in the presence of significant 
anomalies which cannot be accommodated, and in the presence of an emergent alternative 
that better explains them. This is not currently the case in climate science. Greenhouse gas 
theory, therefore, is the best and most rational approximation that has been proposed at this 
current time, and there is no adequate reason to assume that it is false. Of course, for 
Malnes in any case, acknowledging this theoretical uncertainty “does not bear on the 
question whether the danger of anthropogenic climate change exists… The crucial issue… 
is whether model-based simulations of the climate give enough reason to reckon with a real 
danger that ought to be averted”, and concludes that “they do, although they may well be 
wrong”7. For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, this kind of uncertainty surrounding the 
correctness of the basic theory is disregarded. Such uncertainty by definition underlies all 
scientific theory and should not prevent our use of it to inform our actions, or no science-
based action would ever be justifiable.
A second domain of knowledge which can be alluded to surrounds the inability to predict 
both future emissions levels and future adaptation to climatic changes owing to their 
dependence on human individual and collective choices. However, although often classed 
by some authors as an area of uncertainty in DACC8, it is misleading to cast this alongside 
the scientific uncertainties considered in the third group below or the sources of error 
3 Malnes, 2008, p666
4 Malnes, 2008, p667
5 Malnes, 2008, p669
6 Kuhn, 1996.
7 Malnes, 2008, p669
8 E.g. Brown, 2002, p227; Schneider & Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p56.
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distinguished in 1.29. For, referring to this kind of unpredictability as an “uncertainty” 
implies the existence of fixed future states as yet unknown which will verify or falsify 
contemporary descriptions of future scenarios. Or, alternatively, of unknown fixed causal 
relations between current and future socio-economic states. Whereas, in depending on 
human choices and decisions, both our future emissions levels and adaptability have the 
potential to unfold in a variety of different ways which, as highlighted by Dupuy and 
Grinbaum10, are in turn influenced by contemporary depictions of the future themselves. 
It is unhelpful, therefore, to describe this as an ‘uncertainty’ of models of DACC. I offer 
“social indeterminacy” as a preferable term11. Unfortunately, however, some models used 
in climate science and climate policy do treat these indeterminacies as uncertain 
parameters in an attempt to predict eventual future climatic states, as opposed to focusing 
on the relationship between particular (given) levels of emissions and the climatic states 
that would be likely to arise from such levels, if they were to occur. This is the case, for 
example, with the IPCC 'scenarios'12.
The third domain is perhaps the most significant for the current question of the appropriate 
emissions level, since it covers scientific uncertainties within greenhouse gas theory and 
climate science over the functioning of ecological processes which regulate and are 
affected by the greenhouse effect. I examine these in the next section.
2. Uncertainties in Climate Science 
There are scientific uncertainties at various points in the causal chain (See chapter 2 , fig. 
5) from emissions to harms from DACC which can be identified, represented in fig.7. The 
first is the relationship between quantities of GHG emissions and the resulting atmospheric 
concentration, and has been termed “carbon sensitivity”13. That is, it is uncertain how a 
particular level of emissions over a particular time period will result into an atmospheric 
concentration of that substance. This depends in part on the properties of the GHG in 
9 As alluded to by Tomassini et al, 2010, third page (no page numbers available), albeit described as “A 
further uncertainty of entirely different nature”.
10 Dupuy & Grinbaum, 2005, section 3.
11 Dupuy and Grinbaum use the term “ontological indeterminacy”, but I prefer to use “social indeterminacy” 
since it more specifically reflects the subject matter.
12 IPCC, 2007a, Summary for Policymakers, section 3.
13 Matthews et al, 2009, p829
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question and on absorption rates by sinks such as oceans and forests, whose take-up of, e.g 
CO2 will be in turn affected by temperature amongst other factors. 
Next, is the renowned uncertainty over “climate sensitivity”14. This is “ a measure of the 
climate system response to sustained radiative forcing… the global surface warming 
following a doubling of GHG concentrations from pre-industrial levels of 280 parts per 
million by volume (ppmv).” 15. It in other words defines the relationship between 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and resulting equilibrium global temperature 
changes, and is subject to significant uncertainty16. 
A further area of uncertainty in the causal chain is regarding the ecological effects of 
temperature rises on both global and local levels. How, that is, temperature rises (and also 
rises in atmospheric GHG concentrations, which, as footnoted in chapter 2 section 1.1, can 
directly impact on ecosystems) translate into climatic phenomena and how this impacts on 
and alters ecological processes. In particular there is uncertainty over the point at which 
various tipping points might be crossed; where “components of the Earth system” are 
pushed “past critical states  into qualitatively different modes of operation, implying large-
scale impacts on human and ecological systems”17. Some, such as thresholds for “Boreal 
forest dieback”18 have a “large uncertainty” and “constitute candidates for surprising 
society”19.
However, these relationships and uncertainties are even more complicated because of 
“carbon cycle feedbacks”20. The impacts of a given atmospheric concentration on 
temperature, climate and ecosystems can in turn cause more carbon to be released 
(e.g .“ice sheet disintegration, vegetation migration, and GHG release from soils, tundra or 
ocean sediments”21). Accordingly, Hansen et al attempted to account for how some of these 
longer-term feedbacks might impact on climate sensitivity by examining paleoclimate data, 
and found that equilibrium sensitivity was in fact 6°C22. Or, they can impact carbon sinks 
14 Caldeira et al, 2003, p2053.
15 Anderson et al, 2008, p3715.
16 Meinshausen, 2006, p266
17 Lenton et al, 2008, p1786
18 Lenton et al, 2008, p1791
19 Lenton et al, 2008, p1792
20 Anderson et al, 2008, p3715 
21 Hansen et al, 2008, p217
22 Hansen et al, 2008.
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and their “ability to store CO2”; this could increase because of “carbon fertilisation”, but 
“Rising temperatures increase the rate of decomposition of carbon and hence decrease the 
storage capacity of the land”23. These feedbacks and their size24 are themselves subject to 
uncertainty.  
As noted in chapter 2, section 4, because of this complexity it has more recently been 
suggested that a measure directly representing the relationship between cumulative 
emissions and GMT is preferable to both carbon sensitivity and equilibrium climate 
sensitivity25, since it incorporates both and carbon-cycle feedbacks and is, perhaps 
surprisingly, “better constrained”26 in terms of uncertainties. This metric has been 
separately proposed as “Cumulative Warming Commitment (CWC) as the peak warming 
response to a given total injection of CO2 into the atmosphere”27, and the “carbon-climate 
response (CCR)” as “the climate response to anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions”28.
3. Methodological sources of climate science uncertainties.
What I have called “areas of uncertainty” in climate science should be further 
distinguished from what are best referred to as different methodological sources of 
scientific uncertainty.  Although stated in various forms and often listed alongside the areas 
of uncertainty distinguished in sections 1 and 229, these are distinct in that they constitute 
possible reasons that these uncertainties exist. Three main classifications of possible 
sources of scientific uncertainty and error can be inferred from the literature.  These are 
useful in considering how best to account for and respond to the uncertainties, since they 
shed light on what is possible to require of scientific knowledge about DACC, and the 
ways in which factual statements it offers might be uncertain. 
The first source of error that has been highlighted by Patt and Dessai is “measurement 
error”30 which also seems to correspond to what Dupuy and Grinbaum call “uncertainty in 
23 Anderson et al, 2008, p3715
24 Ibid.
25 Matthews et al, 2009, p829
26 Allen et al, 2009, p1163
27 Allen et al, 2009, p1165.
28 Matthews et al, 2009, p829
29 See e.g. Brown, 2002, p116-117
30 Patt and Dessai, 2005, p426. Also mentioned by Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002,  p55
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initial data” 31. This refers straightforwardly to errors in measuring or recording data on 
current or historic initial conditions, for example on temperature readings or atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs or oceanic concentrations of carbon dioxide. The impacts of such 
errors on the ultimate predictions of models about the systems they represent can be 
significant, as Patt and Desai have argued: 
“given that the climate system, and the biological and human systems with which it 
interacts, are complex and in some cases complex adaptive systems, future 
outcomes are highly sensitive to small changes in current conditions, meaning that 
with any errors in measuring important data (and there are always errors in 
measuring important data), it is impossible precisely to predict future system 
states”32
Dupuy and Grinbaum have similarly pointed out that whilst a system might be such that “a 
small error on the initial data entails a small error on the final result”, if “the trajectories 
[“paths that its development in time can take”, according to the laws governing the system] 
that start at two points that are initially very close diverge and lead the system in two 
totally different directions… then a small error on the initial data entails a very large 
uncertainty regarding the final result… the well-known type of behaviour called 
deterministic chaos”33.  
A second source of error is also highlighted by Patt and Dessai, which I will term “model 
error”. This kind of error arises from “incomplete understanding of how all the relevant 
systems behave” such that “there is always a certain degree of uncertainty as to whether 
the models used capture the essential structures of the system”34. This also includes the 
kind of error in parameterisation and adequately representing “feedbacks between 
processes” which is noted by Tomassini et al35. As Emanuel has noted36, dealing with this 
by “Changing the values of the parameters or the way the various processes are 
parameterized… can change not only the climate simulated by the model, but the 
sensitivity of the model’s climate to, say, greenhouse gas increases”, so can lead to 
31 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p461.
32 Patt and Dessai, 2005, p426
33 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p461
34 Patt and Dessai, 2005, p426
35 Tomassini et al, 2010, second page (no page numbers available)
36 Cited in Malnes, 2008, p667
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significantly different ranges of predictions in the areas of scientific uncertainty 
highlighted in section 2. 
A third source of error which is superficially similar to but distinct from both previous 
sources of error, can be found in Dupuy and Grinbaum, arising from the “intrinsic 
character of the complex system”37. This is unlike the circumstances of “deterministic 
chaos”. Instead, the system is subject to “rapid change” in the trajectories of the system 
and “abrupt modification of its parameters”. Here too then, it is not (merely) that the 
current parameters of the system’s processes are not known, but that they themselves can 
suddenly change. Dupuy and Grinbaum note that such “discontinuities in mathematics are 
called catastrophes”38, although others have referred to them as “monsters”39 or  “climate 
surprises”40, which are “rapid nonlinear responses of the climatic system to anthropogenic 
forcing”41.  
Such a source of error and uncertainty can be further distinguished from the kind 
instantiated by the first two sources. Dupuy and Grinbaum describe this as an “objective” 
as opposed to “epistemic” uncertainty, since the uncertainties arise not from a “temporary 
insufficiency of our knowledge” but from “objective, structural properties of 
ecosystems”42. Patt and Desai similarly distinguish between this “natural stochastic” 
uncertainty43 which “relates to the chaotic nature of the climate system” and “epistemic 
uncertainty” which “originates from incomplete knowledge of processes that influence 
events”44.  
4. Conceptual categories of uncertainty
The way in which the scope for such errors is represented scientifically normally involves 
expressing uncertainties in outcomes as probabilities.  Patt and Desai describe how 
estimates of the probability distributions are attained in the case of “measurement error” by 
running “predictive models multiple times, varying the data within the range of likely 
37 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p461
38 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p461
39 Lohmann, 2009, p513 
40 Brown, 2002, p94. Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p58 refer to these as “imaginable surprises”.
41 Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p58.
42 Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p462.  
43 Patt and Dessai, 2005, p427
44 Patt and Dessai, 2005, p426
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measurement error”45, and to account for “model error”, “scientists often have degrees of 
confidence in different models” and “expert elicitation techniques can often represent the 
confidence estimates from numerous scientists as probability distributions”. However, as 
Patt and Desai point out, these probability distributions are “highly subjective, based on the 
informed guesswork of the scientists”. That is, the probabilities used to quantify the 
uncertainties are themselves uncertain. Furthermore, whilst Patt and Desai imply that 
“natural stochastic uncertainty” can, like “measurement error” be “quantified (with limits) 
using multiple runs of the model with slighly different initial conditions”, it is unclear how 
useful or certain any resulting probability distributions can be, given that the likelihood of 
a model following any particular path and the description of the path itself may be 
unknowable because of the presence of “catastrophes” or “monsters”. 
Uncertainties over outcomes may not, therefore, be confidently or even meaningfully 
expressible in terms of probabilities. It is for this reason that it is useful to distinguish 
between conceptual categories of uncertainty that take account of quantifiable and 
unquantifiable likelihoods of uncertain events. Such a by now well known distinction is 
that highlighted by Frank Knight, between “risk” and “uncertainty”. Here a “risk” defines 
an uncertain event or outcome whose likelihood can be quantified by assigning a 
probability, whereas the latter defines an outcome where it is not possible to do so46. The 
distinction has been further built on by Stirling47 and by O'Riordan et al48. They describe a 
two-by-two matrix of four concepts of “incertitude”, which is defined by quantifiability of 
likelihood and definability of the outcome itself and its magnitude (see figure 7.). This 
emphasises the two aspects of uncertainty highlighted in the introduction to chapter 2 – the 
likelihood of an outcome and the features of an outcome itself. Thus the four concepts of 
“incertitude” for Stirling are:
• “risk”, where the probability of an outcome is known and outcome well-defined 
as a magnitude.
• “uncertainty”, “where there is acknowledged to exist no uniquely valid 
theoretical or empirical basis for the assigning of probabilities”49 to outcomes, 
although the outcome itself is well defined.
45 Patt and Desai, 2005, p426
46 Noted by Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005, p460, amongst others.
47 Stirling, 2001, p78-79
48 O'Riordan et al, 2001, p24-25
49 Stirling, 2001, p78.
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• “ambiguity”, where there is some basis for probabilities, but the outcome is 
poorly defined. 
• “ignorance”, where neither the probability of an outcome nor its features are 
well defined; there is no basis for defining “a complete set of outcomes”, which 
is “an acknowledgement of the possibility of surprises”50. (This applies 
particularly to the third source of errors described in 1.2).
The areas of uncertainty in climate change described in section 1 do not fit neatly into any 
one category, and for this reason these four concepts of “incertitude” might be argued to be 
of limited conceptual use seen as strict categories. Because of the variety of  processes in 
the areas of uncertainty being considered, some likelihoods and outcomes are defined more 
clearly than others, and to different degrees. However, if treated rather as a two-
dimensional scale, they are useful in emphasising how far neither probabilities nor 
outcomes can be sufficiently captured by the “risk” category. As I shall highlight shortly, 
quantitative probabilities can not always (confidently, or in principle) be assigned, and 
outcomes often only loosely defined, either because the magnitude is presentable only as a 
range or because they are simply unknown.
Uncertainties over the ecological and climatic impacts from a particular GMT rise (the 
third area of scientific uncertainty in section 2) seem to fall most clearly between 
categories of uncertainty and ignorance. The IPCC report51 assesses “key vulnerabilities” 
which would be impacted by different degrees of temperature rises and the associated 
climatic changes.  But it describes these in terms of the broad impact across a temperature 
range, with a degree of confidence assigned. Neither the impacts nor probabilities are well 
defined. For instance, when considering effects on plant growth such as crop yields, for a 
1-3 degree GMT rise, the potential impact is described as “Productivity decreases for some 
cereals in low latitudes... Productivity increases for some cereals in mid/high latitudes”.52 
For a GMT rise of more than 3 degrees, “Cereal productivity decreases in some mid/high 
latitude regions”. These broad descriptions are assigned low/medium confidence, and the 
likelihood is not quantified at all.
The impacts are only stateable in terms of general trends because the scale and complexity 
50 Stirling, 2001, p78 
51 IPCC, 2007c, section 19.3.1
52 IPCC, 2007c, table 19.1.
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of the systems being modelled mean the models are vulnerable to all three sources of error. 
Models have to look at, in the above example, the impacts of additional CO2  on plant 
growth, and then at how this might interact with the temperature rises, changes in patterns 
of precipitation, increased frequency of extreme events, and pest activity53  often with 
evidence from very specific studies.  Indeed, the IPCC report asserts that the overall effect 
on crop yields of such a complex set of interactions is therefore “highly uncertain due to 
many factors, including large discrepancies in GCM predictions of regional precipitation 
change, poor representation of impacts of extreme events and the assumed strength of CO2 
fertilisation”.54    In particular, it is acknowledged that the summaries of trends tend to 
describe only the potential impacts of “mean climate change”, which ignores “the 
possibility for negative surprises” (i.e. those which result from errors of the third kind in 
representing carbon cycle feedbacks)55. These have implied, “in some cases, significant 
negative impacts in key producing regions of developed countries, even before the middle 
of this century.”
Definitions of impacts are therefore very broad and generalised and are not characterised 
through probabilities. Much of this third area of uncertainty in climate science, therefore, 
seems most appropriately categorised as between “uncertainty” and “ignorance”, 
depending on how far impacts can be described. 56 However, uncertainties over climate 
sensitivity, carbon sensitivity and carbon cycle feedbacks are predominantly but 
problematically described using the language of formal risk, which can be misleading. 
For example, uncertainties in “equilibrium climate sensitivity” are expressed through 
temperature ranges with probabilities assigned. It is defined as “likely” (i.e. at least a 66 % 
likelihood57) that the true sensitivity lies in the range 2- 4.5 degrees and “very likely” (i.e. 
at least 90 % likelihood58) that climate sensitivity “is larger than 1.5°C”, and the IPCC state 
that “For fundamental physical reasons, as well as data limitations, values substantially 
53 IPCC, 2007c, section 5.4.1
54 IPCC, 2007c, section 5.4.2.2.
55 IPCC, 2007c, section 5.4.2.1
56 Although some impacts have probability ranges assigned to describe general trends, and might therefore be 
characterised as weak ambiguity rather than ignorance. E.g. IPCC, 2007b, section 10.ES.2, on “temperature 
extremes”: “It is very likely that heat waves will be more intense, more frequent and longer lasting in a future 
warmer climate. Cold episodes are projected to decrease significantly in a future warmer climate. Almost 
everywhere, daily minimum temperatures are projected to increase faster than daily maximum temperatures, 
leading to a decrease in diurnal temperature range. Decreases in frost days are projected to occur almost 
everywhere in the middle and high latitudes, with a comparable increase in growing season length.”
57 IPCC, 2007b, section 1.6
58 Ibid.
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higher than 4.5°C still cannot be excluded”59. Therefore, despite the language used to 
describe the sensitivity, the degree of specificity is insufficient to derive a precisely 
quantified risk. Since these likelihoods are expressible only as probability ranges applied to 
very broad ranges of GMT rise, a fixed likelihood of a particular climate sensitivity cannot 
be calculated formally. In addition, these assigned broad probabilities are themselves 
uncertain. Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti write, for example, that “A projected range is a 
quantifiable range of uncertainty situated within a pop-ulation of possible futures that 
cannot be fully identified (nominated as “know-able” and “unknowable” uncertainties by 
Morgan et al.).The limits of this total range of uncertainty are unknown but may be 
estimated subjectively.”60.  In fact, therefore, this area of uncertainty in climate science 
seems better characterised by the “uncertainty”, rather than “risk” category.
Similarly, the IPCC attempt to express uncertainties in climate sensitivity and carbon 
sensitivity (and what I referred to in section 1 as social indeterminacy, which I have argued 
is odd considered as an “uncertainty”) through ranges of possible warming from a given 
emissions level and trajectory61. For example, in the fourth IPCC report , for scenario B1, 
where (carbon equivalent) emissions reach 600ppm by 2100, the “likely” range of GMT 
increase is projected to be between 1.1 to 2.9 degrees by the end of the 21st century62. 
Whereas for higher emissions scenario A1F1, where (carbon equivalent) emissions 
concentrations reach 1,500ppm by 2100, the “likely” range of GMT increase is projected to 
be  between 2.4 to 6.4 degrees63. These uncertainties and temperature ranges are therefore 
greater for higher emissions levels, because although it is known that in general “an 
increasingly large fraction of anthropogenic CO2  would stay airborne in the atmosphere 
under a warmer climate”64, there are significant uncertainties about the precise magnitude 
of carbon cycle feedbacks at higher emissions scenarios and higher temperatures65 66. 
59 Indeed, Meinshausen, 2006, includes a range of climate sensitivities up to 10°C (p266) and, as noted 
earlier, Hansen et al, 2008 have argued that paleoclimate evidence suggests that climate sensitivity may be 
6°C
60 Schneider & Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p66
61 IPCC, 2007b, section 10.ES.1
62 IPCC, 2007b, Summary for Policymakers,  Projections of Future Climate Change
63 Ibid.
64 IPCC, 2007b, section 10.ES 
65 “The greater uncertainty at higher values results in part from uncertainties in the carbon cycle feedbacks”, 
(Ibid, Mean Temperature), and “Atmospheric CO2  concentrations simulated by these coupled climate-carbon 
cycle models range between 730 and 1,020 ppm by 2100”, (Ibid, Carbon Cycle).
66 Although carbon cycle feedback uncertainties have often not been incorporated at all into models of the 
relationship between emissions levels and atmospheric concentrations. See IPCC, 2007b, Summary for 
Policy makers, p14: “Models used to date do not include uncertainties in climate-carbon cycle feedback nor 
do they include the full effects of changes in ice sheet flow, because a basis in published literature is lacking.”
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Aspects of this knowledge could also be categorised as “ignorance” since there are some 
feedbacks and mechanisms that are not yet known, in terms of either likelihood or 
outcome; which Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti have termed “imaginable surprises”67. 
It is crucial to recognise that due both to the broadness of outcomes and likelihoods, these 
uncertainties in climate science are therefore not wholly characterisable in terms of formal 
risks68. Crucial, because this significantly influences how we can take account of them in 
our decision-making about mitigation targets, as I consider in chapter 2, section 369, and 
points to a substantial limitation of the conventional economic approach to dealing with 
uncertainty. 
67 Schneider & Kuntz-Duriseti, 2002, p58: “Extreme events that are not truly unexpected are better described 
as imaginable abrupt events. And for some surprises, although the outcome is unknown, it is possible to 
identify imaginable conditions for surprise to occur. For example, as the rate of change of CO2 concentrations 
is one imaginable condition for surprise, the system would be less rapidly forced if decision makers chose to 
slow down the rate at which human activities modify the atmosphere. This would lower the likelihood of 
surprises. To deal with such questions, the policy community needs to understand both the potential for 
surprises and the difficulty of using current tools such as integrated assessment models (IAMs) to credibly 
evaluate the probabilities of currently imaginable “surprises,” let alone those not currently envisioned.”.
68 As Lohmann has also argued (Lohmann, 2009, p514), which I discuss in chapter 2, section 3.2.
69 That is not, therefore, to say that they are not useful in considering appropriate responses, as I suggest in 
chapter 2, section 4.
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Abbreviations.
CBA Cost-benefit analysis
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CO2(e)(ppm) Carbon Dioxide (equivalent) (parts per million)
DACC Dangerous Anthropogenic Climate Change
EPCAs Equal Per Capita Allowances
ETS Emissions Trading Scheme
GMT Global Mean Temperature 
GHG(s) Greenhouse Gas(es) 
GDRs Greenhouse Development Rights
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
PP Precautionary Principle
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
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